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“WITH A LITTLE HELP OF MY FRIENDS...
Brussels, Heysel stadium, 15 December 1982. After a truly heroic game, the Belgian Red 
Devils defeat Scotland 3-2 and make an important step towards the qualification for the European 
Championships in 1984. Amongst the crowd, there was a 9-year old boy, fascinated about his 
first presence at a real match... Twenty years have passed since, and the game has never 
completely let go of the boy anymore. Admittedly, things have not gone exactly the way I 
thought they might in my boyhood’s dream, but today, I can only look back upon my time in 
Florence with a smile. The commonplace “if only I had known what it actually takes to write a 
thesis, I would not have embarked on the adventure” therefore does not really hold true for me. I 
would only say that one thesis is enough though! Also, I know perfectly well that I would have 
never been able to write this thesis without the help of a number of people, whom I would like to 
thank sincerely at this occasion.
“If you are in the penalty area and you don’t know what to do with the ball, just put it in 
the net and we’ll discuss the options later.” How appealing this no nonsense approach may sound 
and how effective it may turn out to be on a sports field, whether it is useful to write a thesis is 
more questionable. Fortunately, I could always count on Professor Grainne de Burca, a truly 
wonderful person and a fantastic supervisor, to show me the right way forward. I really could not 
have wished for a better ‘coach’! I am indebted to Professors Christian Joerges and Pierre 
Lanffanchi for having raised and incited my interest and enthusiasm for this particular topic. 
Furthermore, I would like to thank the people of the Sport Unit of DG Education and Culture of 
the European Commission for having given me the opportunity to work on sports issues in 
practice. I am grateful to Professors De Witte, Lenaerts and Weatherill for having agreed to sit in 
the jury of my defence. Thanks also to the entire technical and administrative staff of the 
European University Institute, for creating an agreeable working environment.
Vado via adesso, parto per orizzonti piu nordiche, e lascio il mio paese preferito. Ma il 
mio non e un ‘addio’, e soltanto un ‘arrivedercik Spero proprio di potere portare con me un po’ 
dello tipico spirito italiano, che caratterizza tutte Ie persone con cui ho condiviso tanti bellissimi
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momenti in questi anni. ‘Carpe dìem’ ! Inanzittutto c’è Mimmo, mio grande amico e punto di 
riferimento della prima ora; la signora Eugenia di Via Marconi 108 e Domenico, l’autore della 
piu bella rete nella storia dell’ Istituto; Franca, la mia prima insegnante di italiano, e Guido, il 
cronista piu famoso di gare ciclistiche; Antonio, o’mister, Pippo, o ’manager, e Giuliano della 
‘squadra fantastica’; Mauro, il miglior batterista al mondo, e Federico, metà belga ormai... 
Grazie a tutti, e a risentirci!
Writing a thesis may very well be thè solitary activity par excellence, but I never walked 
alone. These years at the Institute have offered me several -  multicultural - friendships that I hope 
to treasure for a very long time to come. Koen, Sandrine, Frédéric, Sigrid, Dan, Hidia, Monica, 
Eulalia and Annelies, it’s simply great to have you as a friend! Thanks for sharing many 
unforgettable moments with me also to thè guys of thè ‘Eroi Intemazionali’, the moot court teams 
of Copenhagen and Budapest, Oscar, Mike, Sam, Vanessa, Inaki, Catherine, Makis, Gaiina, Paul, 
Olivier, Aline D., Alex, Sarah, Thierry and Laurence, Olivia and all the others I may not have 
mentioned, but whom I have definitely not forgotten!
En ce moment, une pensée particulière va à une personne qui a joué un role déterminant 
dans cette thèse. Aline, ton soutien a simplement été essentiel pour m oi...
Tenslotte nog enkele dankwoordjes in het Nederlands. Lue, Lieven en Geert, ik heb altijd 
reikhalzend uitgekeken naar de bijeenkomsten van de vrienden van de universiteit als ik eventjes 
in België was. Ik kom echt terug nu! Ik maakte telkens ook graag een ommetje langs Brugge, bij 
de familie Blomme. Maar België betekent in de allereerste plaats natuurlijk thuis, in Meerbeke, 
bij mijn broers, mijn zus en mijn ouders. Ik ben er niet vaak geweest de laatste 4-5 jaar, maar 
jullie waren tegelijk nooit ver weg. En dat is altijd een ongelofelijke geruststelling geweest. Ik 
draag dit proefschrift dan ook graag aan jullie op.
Stefaan Van den Bogaert, Firenze, 9 April 2003
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Introduction
“In the beginning, there was nothing... 
then there was Bosman
Such an overture has in common with most, if not all, myths, legends, fairytales and other 
stories of this kind that it is inevitably somewhat inaccurate and does not always entirely - if at all 
- capture the reality of things. Be that as it may, it nonetheless unmistakably carries an element of 
truth. Furthermore, the inherent weakness of such a statement is at the same time counterbalanced 
by its strengths, in that it immediately announces the crucial event and moreover, despite or 
thanks to its conciseness, easily catches the eye and thus endeavours to stimulate the readers’ 
interest in the further course of the story. Arguably, therefore, bearing in mind these reservations, 
this catch-phrase could stand as a prelude for a hopefully intriguing account. Certainly, that is not 
to say that this thesis aspires to acquire epic dimensions. Nor does it purport to deal with the 
impact of European law on sporting issues in an exhaustive way. Its objectives are significantly 
more modest. For a proper understanding of what this study aims to achieve, it is necessary to 
firstly draw a rough sketch of the general framework within which it is situated. This will permit 
the research questions, which shall be subsequently outlined, to be evaluated in the relevant 
context. Certainly the Bosman decision o f the European Court of Justice,1 which to date still 
constitutes the most spectacular legal intervention within the sporting environment, will occupy a 
central place within the structure of this thesis. Therefore, it is appropriate -  also as a kind of 
recognition - to initiate this research project with a reflection on an athlete who has already 
secured himself a place in history books, even if it were not really for his sporting 
performances... “Once upon a time, everything was peace and quiet in the world of sp o rt... until 
Bosman came.”
1 Case C-415/93 Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Association ASLB v Jean-Marc Bosman [1995] ECR 
1-4921.
1. The many different faces of sport
In the European Sports Charter, the Council o f Europe has undertaken a reasonable 
attempt to categorise sport under the definition of “all forms of physical activity which, through 
casual or organised participation, aim at expressing or improving physical fitness and mental 
well-being, forming social relationships or obtaining results in competition at all levels” .2 It must 
indeed be recognised that sport is a social phenomenon which plays various roles in 
contemporary societies. In a working paper exploring the prospects for Community action in the 
field of sport, the European Commission has identified no less than five different functions which 
demonstrate the uniqueness of sport.3
Five examples, randomly taken from different places during five separate sporting events, 
serve to illustrate this point: Cambridge, 13 June 1998. On the last day of the traditional May 
Bumps and under the equally traditional British poring rain, Wolfson College’s First Rowing 
Eight manage to overtake Clare College and crown themselves as champions o f the third rowing 
division to the delight of hundreds of fellow students supporting them from the banks of the river 
Cam.
Paris, 12 July 1998. In a truly remarkable game in the Stade de France, the French 
national football side defeats title holders Brazil in the final of the 1998 FIFA World Cup. The 
relatively unexpected victory of ‘les bleus’ unchains incredible festivities and scenes of joy in the 
whole of France and its overseas territories. The team was composed of players with widely 
varying origins such as Blanc, Zidane, Djorkaeff, Desailly, Karembeu and the likes of Lizarazu, 
but nevertheless managed to win the unequivocal support of the whole of France, which identifies 
itself with its heroes.4
Paris, 22 May 1982. In an act of true sportsmanship during the fifth set of the semi-final 
of the French Open at Roland Garros, 17 year old tennis player Mats Wilander overrules a line 
call in his favour on his first match point, w-hich would have secured him a ticket to his first
2 Article 2 Council of Europe, European Sports Charter, (consult http://www.coe.inO
3 European Commission staff working paper, The development and prospects fo r  Community action in the field o f  
sport, consult http://europe.eu.int/comm/sport
4 X, “Et Dieu créa Zizou” , La Provence, 13 July 1998.
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Grand Slam final. Rather than gratuitously accepting the erroneous decision of the umpire, the 
Swedish talent decided to play fair and awarded the point to his opponent. Eventually, he still 
won the match and two days later even the tournament.
Austin, Texas, 9 October 1996. American cyclist Lance Armstrong, former world 
champion and one of the most charismatic riders of the pack, is diagnosed with cancer. Doctors 
give him only a small chance of survival and virtually none to return to competitive sports at 
professional level. However, the body o f an athlete is a chamber of secrets. The Texan fails to 
surrender, conquers the illness and realises one of the most stunning come-backs ever within 
sporting history when he wins the Tour de France for the first time in 1999.5
Amsterdam, April 2001. The football team of the European University Institute in 
Florence takes part in the European Championship for Universities. In-between the different 
games of the group stage, the student-players have some time off to visit the city and admire the 
works of ancient masters such as Rembrandt and Van Gogh...
It appears clearly from these examples that sport performs in the first place a recreational 
function, both for active participants in any given sporting discipline as well as for the more 
passive bystanders. Sport guarantees people personal and collective entertainment during their 
leisure time. According to relatively recent statistics, more than half of the citizens of the 
European Union regularly engage in sporting activities, be it within or outside the framework of 
one of the approx. 700.000 sports clubs within the Union.6 Furthermore, millions of people 
directly or indirectly follow sporting events as spectators, through their physical presence at the 
stadium or by means of television coverage. Secondly, sport evidently also plays an important 
social role, in that it can be used as an effective instrument to combat racism, intolerance, 
violence, alcohol and drug abuse. It may be helpful in bringing together people, irrespective of 
their social origin, and even assist in integrating people excluded from the labour markets. 
Thirdly, and closely linked to the former, sport also has a clear educational function: it 
emphasises the importance of moral values such as fair play and solidarity and encourages team 
spirit. It is conceived as an excellent way of ensuring balanced personal development for all
5 Consult http://www.1ancearmstrong.com
6 Communication from the Commission (COM (1999) 644 and /2), Report from the European Commission to the 
European Council with a view to safeguarding current sports structures and maintaining the social function of sport 
within the Community framework (‘The Helsinki report on Sport’). Consult http://europe.eu.int/comm/sport/
3
categories o f age. Sport is extraordinary because it is a combination of fair competition and 
competitiveness, and that is why the influence of sport in the education of adolescents is 
particularly important. Fourthly, sport also contributes to public health, as appropriate physical 
activities constitute essential health determinants and may generally serve to prevent or cure 
illnesses and diseases and improve an individual’s well-being. Fifthly, sport is intricately related 
to culture, offering people ample opportunities to explore their roots as well as new areas, and to 
develop respect for, amongst other things, the environment.
In addition to these societal functions, sport is also often used by governments and 
regimes as an instrument to realise various political objectives. In 1971, the USA sent its national 
table-tennis team to China for a historic encounter in a symbolic act to relax international 
diplomatic relations between the two world powers. This event would later be referred to as the 
‘ping-pong diplomacy’. During the period of the Cold War, many countries behind the Iron 
Curtain — especially former Eastern Germany - invested heavily in sporting programmes. 
Sporting success was thought to reflect the success of the communist system. For many years, 
athletes and teams from Southern Africa were prevented from taking part in international sporting 
competitions by several associations. This almost universal boycott was a loud condemnation o f  
the apartheid system in the country. Furthermore, sport is also increasingly acquiring an 
economic dimension in contemporary societies. In the summer o f 1998, Lazio Roma, one o f 
Italy’s leading football teams, bought Christian Vieri, one of the world’s most prolific strikers, 
from Atletico Madrid for 45 million Euro to increase its chances of winning the Italian 
championship. In order to finance the whole operation, Lazio’s chairman and owner Cragnotti 
raised the prize of the famous tomato sauces (!) of Cirio, the company of which he is the owner. 
Nine months later, Lazio drew in Florence after their penultimate game of the championship and 
saw their title contenders of AC Milan definitively overtake them. After the game, the shares o f 
Lazio took a dive o f 11% at the Roman stock exchange, amounting to a loss of 20 billion Euro.7 
These examples illustrate that sport is a rapid growth area in economic terms: nowadays a lot of 
money is invested in sport, and-sporting competitions often generate enormous amounts of 
revenue. As a result, an ever-increasing number of people engage professionally in the sporting
7 La Repubblica, 17 May 1999: During the match in Florence, the referee had wiped away vigorous protests from the 
Lazio players for a supposed foul in the penalty area of Fiorentina. Cragnotti harshly criticised the referee for not 
having thought twice before taking such an important decision.
4
IVHHHMfllll !!mi!'iLiAjnuim!!i
business. As will become clear below, existing sporting rules and structures, which are often still 
based on traditional or even archaic principles, are not always adequately adapted to these 
particular economic developments. In this thesis, the core focus shall be on certain economic 
dimensions of sporting activities.
2, The evolving relationship between sport and the European Union
The original Treaty of Rome establishing the European Economic Community was 
primarily an economically inspired and economically oriented treaty. This appeared clearly from
A
the aims of economic integration set out in its preamble and in Article 2 EEC. At the time of 
drafting this Treaty, at the end of the fifties, the economic dimension of sport was still virtually 
negligible; professional sport was still very much in its infancy. Sport was almost exclusively 
exercised on a purely amateur basis. Unsurprisingly therefore, no explicit reference to sport was 
included in the EEC Treaty. Several decades later, sport still does not expressly appear within the 
Community Treaty, although nowadays that omission is not so readily explicable. Since the 
adoption of the EEC Treaty in 1957, there have been significant developments, both within the 
domain of sport as with regard to Community law. First of all, economics and professionalism 
have made a remarkable and irresistible entry within the field of sport.8 9 Even though sport 
remains foremost a leisure activity for the great majority of people, an ever-increasing number of 
sportsmen and their entourage currently make a living of some kind from the performances of the 
athletes within the sporting arena. Hence sporting events often also generate enormous amounts 
of revenue for organisers, sponsors, advertisers, television broadcasters, etc.
This important evolution induced the European Court of Justice to recognise for the first 
time in 1974 in the case of Walrave and Koch that in so far as it constitutes an economic activity, 
sport falls under the scope of application of Community law.10 Two years later, the Court of 
Justice unequivocally confirmed this principle in Dona v Mantero.11 Contrary to common 
expectations, these judgements - which shall be analysed in depth at a later stage - did not lead to
8 Craig & de Burca. EU Law. Text, Cases and Materials (OUP, 2003), at 10-12.
9 See, inter alia, European Commission staff working paper, The development and prospects for Community action 
in the field o f  spore, European Commission, Consultation document of DG X, The European model o f sport. 
(consult: http://europe.eu.int/comm/sportl
10 Case 36/74 Walrave and Koch v Union Cycliste Internationale [1974] ECR 1405, par. 4.
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a stream of challenges against the compatibility with Community law of certain sports rules a n d  
practices before national courts and tribunals. The ranks were closed in sporting circles. T h e  
sporting federations involved in the different disputes tried to minimise the impact of th e  
decisions as much as possible. Walrave and Koch were strongly dissuaded from pressing for a  
judgement before the national court after the Court of Justice had rendered its preliminary ru ling, 
as the International Cycling Union threatened to remove the discipline in which they were active 
from the programme of the next World Championships.* 12 13 Moreover, the Italian football 
federation even tried to ignore the consequences of the Dona decision, although ultimately it w as  
forced to comply with its terms when a similar request for a preliminary ruling was referred to th e  
Court of Justice. From a practical point o f view, both decisions appeared thus to have caused 
nothing but a storm in a glass of water. Afterwards, it was business as usual. Most sporting 
associations continued elaborating their own regulations, settling their affairs autonomously an d  
operating on the assumption that they were practically immune from legal intervention from  
outside.14 Finally, it would effectively take almost 20 years before another dispute concerning 
sports regulations would reach the stadium of the Court in Luxembourg.
The tone was set, however. Once the Court’s rulings had made it absolutely clear th a t 
sporting activities were at least partly subject to Community law, the European institutions, 
especially the European Parliament and the European Commission, gradually started to  
demonstrate a greater interest in the subject.15 In the first place, they voiced serious concerns
"  Case 13/76 Dona v Mantero [19761 ECR 1333, par. 12.
12 Van Staveren, 18th Colloquy on European Law, Sport and the Law (Proceedings published by the Council o f  
Europe, Strasbourg, 1989) 67.
13 Request for a preliminary ruling, presented by an ordonnance of the ‘Procura della Repubblica italiana de Salerno’, 
Case 46/79 Criminal proceedings v Gennaro Brunetti, 28 April 1979, OJ C 107/14.
14 Joerges, Furrer and Gerstenberg, “Challenges of European Integration to Private Law”, Collected Courses o f the  
Academy o f European Law, Volume VII, Book / (Kluwer, 1999) 281.
13 Consult, inter alia, European Parliament, Resolution on Sport and the Community, 13 April 1984, (1984) OJ C  
127/142; European Parliament, Resolution on violence and the Heysel tragedy, 13 June 1985, (1985) OJ C 175/211; 
European Parliament, Resolution on the necessary measures to combat vandalism and violence in sport, 11 July 
1985, (1985) OJ C 229/99; Resolution on women in sport, 30 June 1987, (1987) OJ C 305/62; European Parliament, 
Resolution on Sport in the European Community and a People’s Europe, 17 February 1989, (1989) OJ C 69/234; 
European Parliament, Report Janssen van Raay on the freedom of movement of professional footballers in the 
Community, PE DOC A2-415/88, 1 March 1989; European Parliament, Resolution on the freedom of movement o f  
professional footballers in the Community, 11 April 1989, (1989) OJ C 120/33; European Parliament, Resolution on 
the freedom of movement of professional footballers, 21 November 1991, (1989) OJ C 326/208. European 
Parliament, Larive Report on the European Union and Sport, 27 April 1994. PE DOC A3-0326/94. European 
Parliament, Resolution on the European Community and Sport. 6 May 1994, (1994) OJ C 205/486; European
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about the lawfulness under Community law of sporting rules such as the nationality restrictions 
and the transfer systems which were applicable in different sporting disciplines. However, their 
interventions in relation to sport did not remain strictly limited to issues which could be situated 
in an economic context. This had everything to do with the second relevant development since 
the entry into force of the EEC Treaty. With the adoption o f the Single European Act and the 
Treaties of Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice, the original European Economic Community has 
been transformed in the European Community and subsequently the European Union, and has 
been attributed powers which far exceed the economic sphere.16 Almost inevitably therefore, in 
view of the multifunctional role played by sport in contemporary societies, Community interest in 
the field of sport has moved onto a broader social, educational and cultural plane. These 
Community ‘actions’ relating to sport remained essentially limited to the level of 
communications, resolutions, reports or declarations of intent. This was mainly due to the fact 
that the sporting associations vigorously safeguarded their self-proclaimed regulatory autonomy 
and were extremely reluctant to accept any interference in what they considered to be their 
prerogatives. Furthermore, as the Treaty contained no clear legal basis for action in the domain of 
sport, the Community institutions had to be careful not to transgress the limits of their 
competencies.
In this context, the decision of the Court of Justice in the Bosman case, in which it 
invalidated the traditional nationality clauses and some aspects of the transfer system in 
professional football for infringement of the Community rules on freedom of movement for 
workers, evidently fell like a bolt from the blue. The ruling exerted an immediate and drastic 
impact on the relationship between the world of sport and ‘Europe’. For one, the sporting 
associations were suddenly and definitively stripped of their aura of untouchability. Even if they 
remain the primary regulatory authority within the sporting disciplines for which they are 
responsible and undoubtedly still have a large margin of discretion to organise their affairs, they 
can no longer simply ignore the reality of Community law. The Bosman decision raised the -  
■often painful - awareness in sporting circles that sporting rules are in principle subject to a test of 
compliance with Community law. Contemporaneously, the decision also caused a change in the
Commission, Adonnino Report (1985), at 28 et seq; Communication on Sport of 1991 (consult:
http://europe.eu.int/comm/sport
16 Craig & de Burca, o.c., at 13-52.
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mindset o f the Community institutions about sport. It led to both an intensification and a 
deepening o f Community intervention in sports matters.17 Sport even started figuring regularly o n  
the agenda o f the European Council during the various intergovernmental conferences.18 On tw o  
recent occasions, this resulted in an official declaration on sport being attached to the Treaties o f  
Amsterdam and Nice. The first Declaration on Sport, annexed to the Treaty of Amsterdam, 
emphasises the social significance of sport and calls on the bodies of the European Union to give 
special consideration to the particular characteristics of amateur sport.19 20The second -  and m ore 
elaborate -  Declaration relates to the specific characteristics of sport and its social, educational 
and cultural functions in Europe, of which account should be taken in implementing com m on 
policies. With these documents, sport has thus managed to acquire in some way a formal, albeit 
modest place within the Community framework.
3. Delimitation of the scope of this thesis
As the European Commission specified in its working paper relating to sport, there are 
three major areas of Community activity which have a direct influence on sporting affairs: firstly, 
the free movement rules; secondly, the competition rules; and thirdly, the different provisions 
concerning Community policies such as health, education, culture, etc. The Commission also
17 Since the Bosnian ruling, several disputes involving sports matters have reached the stadium of the Court o f  
Justice: see Joined Cases C-51/96 and C-191/97 Christelle Deliège v Ligue Francophone de Judo et Disciplines 
ASBL and Others [2000] ECR 1-2549; Case C-176/96 Jyri Lehtonen and Castors Canada Dry Namur-B raine v 
Fédération Royale Belge des Sociétés de Basketball [2000] ECR 1-2681; Case C-264/98 Tibor Balog v Royal 
Charleroi Sporting Club ASBL, removed from the register; Case C-438/00 Deutscher Handballbund v M aros 
Kolpak, still pending. European Parliament, Resolution on the broadcasting of sporting events, 22 May 1996. (1996) 
OJ C 166/109; Report Pack on the role of the EU in the domain of sport of 22 May 1997, PE Doc. A4-0197/97; 
Resolution on the role of the EU in sport, 13 June 1997, (1997) OJ C 200/252; Resolution on the urgent measures to 
take to fight doping in sport, 17 December 1998, (1999) OJ C 98/291; Report Mennea on the Commission’s Helsinki 
report on sport of 18 July 2000, PE Doc A5-0208/2000.
18 Consult, inter alia, the conclusions of the Presidency of the European Council of Cardiff, 15-16 June 1998, 
European Bulletin 6/98, IV, pt. 31: ‘Bringing the Union closer to the citizen’; the conclusions of the Presidency o f  
the European Council of Vienna, 11-12 December 1998, European Bulletin 12/98, XII, pts 95 et seq: ‘Sport’; the 
conclusions of the Presidency of the European Council of Santa Maria da Feira, 19-20 June 2000, European Bulletin 
6/00, IV, pt. 50: ‘Europe and the citizens*.
19 European Council, Declaration on Sport, attached to. Treaty of Amsterdam (consult
http://europe.eu.int/comm/sport/
20 European Council, Declaration on the specific characteristics of sport and its social function in Europe, of which 
account should be taken in implementing Community place, attached to the Treaty of Nice, consult 
http://earope.eu.int/comm/sport- The Declaration stipulates, inter alia, that “the Community must, in its action under 
the various Treaty provisions, take account of the social, educational and cultural functions inherent in sport and 
making it special, in order that the code of ethics and the solidarity essential to the preservation of its social role may 
be respected and nurtured.’’
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readily identified the ineffectiveness of anti-doping measures, the lack of protection for young 
people taking part in top-level competitions, and the risk o f excessive commercialisation or 
economic interpenetration of sport as the principal challenges to contemporary sport. These first 
two problems, which are tackled under the different Community policies, will not be dealt with in 
this thesis. Only in the second chapter of the second part, which is dedicated to the new 
international transfer system in professional football, shall the issue of the protection o f minors be 
briefly dealt with. This thesis is largely focused on one specific aspect of the third -  economic - 
challenge to sport, namely the regulation of the mobility of sportsmen in the European Union 
in the post•Bosman era. This central theme shall be examined primarily on the basis of two 
practical case studies, which constitute the doctrinal core of the thesis. The question asked in each 
of the two studies, respectively, is whether rules on transfers of athletes between sport clubs and 
rules limiting or excluding the participation of athletes with a foreign nationality from certain 
sporting competitions, both sets of rules normally being elaborated by sporting associations, can 
withstand the test of compatibility with the Treaty free movement provisions. The study is almost 
exclusively devoted to the free movement rights of the sportsmen themselves, and therefore the 
specific problems related to the mobility of their coaches or instructors, notably with regard to the 
recognition of their diplomas and qualifications, or of sport clubs, will be not be scrutinised in 
further detail. As a logical negative consequence of this choice, the principles on the free 
movement of goods will only be taken into consideration insofar as this may prove necessary or 
useful to interpret or explain particular developments within the domains of the freedom of 
movement of persons and the freedom to provide services. By the same token, the possible 
impact of the Community competition rules, which is the second fundamental pillar of the 
Internal Market programme, on sporting rules and practices shall not be systematically examined. 
Reference to the competition rules shall only be made in so far as this may be necessary to fill 
certain loopholes in the protection of some categories of sportsmen under Community law, 
caused by a restrictive application of the Treaty free movement provisions.
This thesis aims to provide an answer to some practically relevant issues and 
simultaneously attempts to contribute to some more abstract questions. The main research 
questions are:
9
• firstly, whether -  and if so, to what extent - valuable arguments exist for keeping certain 
sporting rules and practices entirely outside the scope of the Community Treaty, o r  
alternatively, for sheltering them from the straightforward application of the Treaty rules. In  
this respect, close attention shall be paid to the particular dynamics of the uneasy relationship 
between the sporting federations and the Community institutions.
♦ Secondly, whether the private nature of regulatory or contractual entities such as sporting 
associations and clubs constitutes a stumbling block for the application of the relevant free 
movement rules.
As already indicated, an important part o f this study shall be dedicated to an in-depth analysis 
of the viability under Community law of traditional sports regulations such as transfer rules and 
nationality clauses. A subsidiary question which will be addressed is whether certain specific 
categories of athletes, such as amateurs and sportsmen with the nationality of a third country can 
derive some rights of mobility from certain legal instruments within the European Union. The 
peculiar situation of national representative sides and o f naturalised athletes or athletes with a  
dual nationality shall also be dealt with in further detail.
On the basis of the findings on these questions, the thesis shall ultimately consider whether 
the current position of sport within the formal Community legal framework is appropriate o r 
needs to be revisited.
4. The precise s truc tu re  of the thesis
This thesis is composed of an introduction, two main parts and a conclusion. The first part 
is dedicated to a largely abstract study of the general framework of the relevant fundamental 
freedoms, in casu the freedom of movement for persons and the freedom to provide services. It is 
divided into three chapters. The first two chapters concern the question whether, and to what 
extent, Community ‘law in general and Articles 39 and 49 EC in particular can überhaupt be 
applied to sporting rules and practices which might run counter to the principle of freedom of 
movement. Firstly, critical attention shall be paid to the most important arguments of the sporting 
associations against the applicability of Community law to sport. Secondly, the chapter will
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enquire whether the necessary preconditions for the application of the free movement rules -  the 
requirement of an economic activity, a cross-border element and possession of EU nationality -  
are fulfilled in the case of sportsmen claiming that they are hindered in the exercise of their free 
movement rights by the application of certain rules or regulations, normally elaborated by the 
associations of the discipline in which they are active. Practical questions concerning the legal 
situation of amateur athletes and sportsmen with the nationality of a non-EU Member State will 
also be considered in this context.
Once the existence of the indispensable criteria for the application of the Community free 
movement provisions has been established, the next issue addressed in the third chapter is 
whether sporting measures actually do infringe the relevant Treaty Articles. In first instance, the 
principle of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality, which has traditionally been the 
guiding principle in the Court’s case law concerning free movement, will be considered. An 
analysis of the significant evolution in the Court’s approach from a discrimination-based 
examination to a more general analysis centred around the more elusive notion of restriction will 
follow. The final section will consider different aspects of the issue of justification, to which the 
Court turns once it has concluded that the contested rule is liable to prevent or render less 
attractive the right to freedom of movement.
In the second part of this thesis, which also consists of three chapters, the abstract 
principles elaborated in the first part are applied to two sets of concrete sporting rules and 
practices, which have been subject to legal scrutiny by the European institutions. The theme of 
the first two chapters is the so-called transfer system, which makes the ‘transfer’ of an individual 
sportsman from one sports team to another conditional upon the fulfilment of a certain number of 
formal, materia! and temporal criteria. The first chapter consists almost entirely of an in-depth 
examination of the famous Bosman ruling of the European Court of Justice. The analysis focuses 
first on whether the Court applied the law correctly and secondly, whether sufficient account was 
taken of the particular features of sport. The second chapter begins with a brief description of the 
practical consequences caused by the judgement in Bosman for the wrorld of sport, and the way in 
which athletes, clubs and federations tried to adjust to this new reality. The remainder of the 
chapter examines the new international transfer system in football. Legally speaking, the Bosman
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ruling remained limited to the specific circumstances of the case and thus left several issues 
unresolved. As the responsible associations showed no inclination to carry through a radical 
reform of the traditional system, the European Commission began an official infringement 
procedure in order to bring to an end the remaining unlawful practices. The recently implemented 
new FIFA regulations represent the result of intense negotiations between the Commission and 
the football authorities. The new rules are analysed in detail to assess whether the revised system 
withstands the test of conformity with Community law and at the same time whether the specific 
characteristics of sport were duly taken into consideration. Where appropriate, alternative 
solutions are proposed.
The third chapter concentrates on issues relating to nationality. In practice, the regulations 
of several national and international sports associations contain rules on nationality which, in 
different ways, limit an athlete’s opportunities to compete in the sporting events o f his choice. 
Firstly, an overview of the different sorts of nationality clauses which are frequently found in the 
regulations of various sporting associations is provided. Within this context, the situation of 
naturalised sportsmen and of athletes with a dual nationality is scrutinised further. On the basis of 
some concrete examples, the crucial concept of national teams is also examined in more detail. 
Secondly, the reaction of the Court of Justice towards these nationality requirements in its case 
law is analysed in depth. In particular, the Court’s ruling in the Bosnian case again constitutes the 
core of the examination.
Finally, on the basis of the various conclusions drawn from the different chapters of the 
thesis, the conclusion aims to evaluate whether the existing Treaty framework is appropriate and 
sufficiently flexible to guarantee satisfactory treatment of sporting matters under Community 
law, or whether a number of changes are required.
Part 1
Theoretical Framework
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Applicability of Community law to sport 
‘For the Good of the Game’?
1
Introduction
Formally, the EC Treaty contains no single explicit reference to sport. According to the 
principle of attributed competencies, the Community can act only within the limits of the powers 
conferred upon it by the Treaty and of the objectives assigned to it therein.21 The remaining 
competencies are reserved to the Member States. Logically, the Member States and the sporting 
associations thus have the primary responsibility in the conduct of sporting affairs.22 The 
Community does not have any direct powers in this area.23 Unsurprisingly therefore, the 
application of Community law in general, and of the free movement provisions in particular, to 
sporting rules and practices has at times been vigorously contested in proceedings before the 
European Court of Justice. Several arguments have been invoked to keep sport outside the scope 
of application of the Treaty, or alternatively, to minimise at least the impact of Community law to 
sport. In this largely introductory chapter, the most important of these submissions will be 
subjected to somewhat closer scrutiny.
§1: The noneconomic and/or special character o f sport
In all cases relating to sports matters which have been brought before it up until today, the 
Court of Justice has conspicuously ruled that having regard to the objectives of the Community, 
sport falls within the ambit of Community law insofar as it constitutes an economic activity
21 Article 5 EC.' 22
Vieweg, ‘The Legal Autonomy of Sport Organisations and the Restrictions of European Law”, in Caiger & 
Gardiner (eds.), Professional Sports in the EU: Regulation and Re-regulation (The International Sports Law Centre, 
TMC Asser Press, 2000), 83.
“ European Council, Declaration on the specific characteristics of sport and its social function in Europe, of which 
account should be taken in implementing common policies, adopted at the IGC in Nice. (Consult: 
http://europe.eu.int/comm/sport
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within the meaning of Article 2 EC.24 Almost inevitably therefore, the first arguments 
traditionally forwarded by the sporting federations or the Member States to attempt to avoid or to  
restrict the application of the Treaty rules to a particular sporting dispute consist of pointing at th e  
non-economic character of the sporting activity in question, or at least of emphasising its sports- 
specific characteristics so as to downplay the importance o f its economic features. By way o f  
example, during the proceedings in Bosman, the German government intervened stressing that in  
most circumstances, a sporting discipline such as football is not an economic activity. T he  
Belgian football federation defended a similar point of view, arguing that only the m ajor 
European clubs are to be regarded as undertakings, whereas the majority o f clubs carry on an  
economic activity only to a negligible extent.26 UEFA approached the matter in a subtle way; it 
indicated that it would be an extremely arduous task distinguishing between the economic an  
purely sporting aspects of football and that a Court’s decision concerning the situation o f  
professional players might “call in question the organisation of football as a whole”, clearly 
implying that it would be better for the Court not to apply Community rules to the circumstances 
of the case. It continued carefully suggesting that for that particular reason, even if the C ourt 
were to apply Article 39 EC to professional players, “a degree of flexibility would be essential 
because o f the particular nature of sport.”27 A similar mode of reasoning can be found in the case 
of Deliege, in which the defendants essentially affirmed that in Belgium judo constitutes a leisure 
activity, and thus has a recreational rather than an economic character.28 It results clearly from  
these examples that, in order to avoid the intervention of Community law into their affairs, the  
sporting federations and the Member States try to minimise as much as possible the economic 
character of sports and simultaneously to stress the special features of sport. They are n o t 
completely blind to the reality and do acknowledge that many sports nowadays undeniably have 
economic aspects, with high wages for sportsmen and their personnel and huge revenue fo r 
athletes and clubs derived from various sources such as sponsoring, ticketing or television 
broadcasting o f sporting events, but these economic aspects are considered indispensable for th e  
well- functioning of the entire system -  for example, the purpose of the transfer rules under
24 <-rThis princile was enunaciated for the first time in Case 36/74 Walrave and Koch v Union Cycliste Internationale 
[1974] ECR 1405, par. 4. It was consistently reiterated in subsequent case law relating to sport.
25 Bosman, par. 72.
26 Bosman, par. 70.
27 Bosman, par. 71.
28 See e.g. Cosmas AG in Deliege, par. 23.
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scrutiny in Bosman is inter alia to subsidise the smaller clubs.29 They advocate that the role of 
economics in sports, apart from being marginal, is thus merely functional and in any event 
subordinate to the social role sport plays in modem society.30
Even though the Court consistently held on firmly to the principle it had enounced for the 
first time in Walrave, these submissions nonetheless did not completely fall on deaf ears. The 
Court has effectively taken into account the specificity of sport and has granted the sporting 
authorities that with regard to the difficulties encountered when trying to distinguish the 
economic aspects from the other, purely sporting aspects, the Community free movement 
provisions do not preclude “rules or practices on non-economic grounds which relate to the 
particular nature and context of certain matches.” It added the important proviso though that this 
restriction on the scope of Community law must remain limited to its objective and could thus not 
be relied upon to exclude an entire sporting activity from the ambit of the Treaty.31 In legal 
doctrine, there exists some controversy as to the specific legal basis o f this ‘restriction on the 
scope of Community law’: it is not entirely clear whether these rules must be considered as an 
exception to the sphere of the Treaty, or rather as a justification under the mandatory 
requirements doctrine. This specific matter will be tackled in the chapter on nationality.32 
Moreover, the Court has acknowledged that restrictions on the right to freedom of movement 
caused by the application of particular sporting rules and practices may at times be justified by 
overriding requirements in the general interest relating to the specificity of sport. In the second 
part of this research, this issue will be dealt with in further detail. Furthermore, to the contention 
in Bosman that such a ruling would have serious repercussions for the organisation of football, 
the Court clearly stated that “although the consequences of any judicial decision must be weighed 
carefully, this cannot go so far as to diminish the objective character of the law and compromise 
its application. At the very most, such repercussions might be taken into account when 
determining whether exceptionally to limit the temporal effect of a judgement.”33
29 See Lenz AG in Bosman, par. 128. For an elaborate analysis, see in particular chapters 4 and 5.
30 See also Dubey, La libre circulation des sportifs en Europe (Bruylant, 2000), at 189-190; Schroeder, Sport und 
Europäische Integration -  Die Diskriminierung von Sportlern in der Europäische Gemeinschaft (thesis München, 
1989), at 35.
31 See, e.g., Dona, paras. 14-15; Bosman, par. 76.
32 See infra, chapter 6, §2, II, 1.
33 Bosman, par. 77. In this context, the Court referred to Case C-163/90 Administration des Douanes v Legros and 
Others [1992] EC R 1-4625, par. 30.
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Consequently, both arguments undoubtedly have some effect. Firstly, by means of an a  
contrario reasoning applied to the Court’s principled statements in Walrave and subsequent 
cases, it appears that non-economic sporting activities may fall outside the scope of application o f  
Community law. In this respect, it must of course be stressed that the principled position of th e  
Court an sich, based on a strict dichotomy between economic activities falling under the scope o f  
Community law and non-economic activities being excluded from it, is to be situated in the early  
conception of the European construct as a predominantly economically inspired legal order.34 35
Since then, sport has somehow gained a modest place within the Community framework, in te r  
alia by means o f two official declarations attached to the respective Treaties of Amsterdam an d  
Nice. This means that nowadays it does not suffice any longer to simply emphasise the non­
economic character of a certain sporting activity to avoid the application of Community law . 
Some elaboration on the legal situation o f amateur sportsmen in the following chapter will clarify 
this issue. Secondly, the Court has also been willing to accept that sport is special and that in  
view of these specific features, the straightforward application of the Community free movement 
provisions may be tempered by making use of the doctrine of objective justification.
§2; The similarity between sport and culture
During the proceedings in Bosnian, the German government further submitted that sport 
in general has points of similarity with culture and pointed out that, under Article 151(1) EC, th e  
Community only has limited powers and must respect the national and regional diversity of th e  
cultures o f the Member States. The link between culture and sport was not new: already in th e  
seventies, the Commission had advocated in a communication that a modem conception o f  
culture also comprised sport.36 The analogy between these sector-specific policies was m ade 
because of the fact that they arguably pursue parallel objectives: limiting Community action 
within the respective domains, ensuring that the specific features of these fields are taken in to
34 See Dubey, at 190-191. As he correctly pointed out, once the objectives of the Treaty exceeded the economic 
domain, this argument was no longer really sustainable.
35 Bosnian, par. 72.
36 Commission Communication of 22 November 1977 concerning Community action in the cultural sector, O J 
Supplement 6/77, 26, points 55-57.
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consideration in Community action and guaranteeing extensive consultation of the representative 
actors within the field before undertaking action.
However intrinsically valuable this comparison may be, for example in the broader 
context o f evaluating whether a specific title concerning sport should be inserted in the 
Community Treaty,37 arguably its practical usefulness in this particular context is doubtful. 
Cultural activities which are carried out, performed or delivered in return for remuneration are 
just the same deemed to be economic activities for the purposes of the application o f Community 
law and thus do not escape the scope of the Treaty.38 The Court has previously established this on 
several occasions in its case law, for example with regard to the activities of tourist guides39 or 
museums. Consequently, the mere analogy between sport and culture cannot constitute reason for 
rejecting the application of Community law to sport. Clearly, the Court of Justice shared the same 
opinion.40 Nonetheless, it did not enter into the substance of this argument based on an alleged 
similarity between sport and culture, and contented itself by rejecting it on the ground that “the 
question submitted by the national court does not relate to the conditions under which 
Community powers of limited extent, such as those based on Article 151(1) EC, may be 
exercised but on the scope of the freedom of movement o f workers guaranteed by Article 39, 
which is a fundamental freedom in the Community system.”41
§3: The freedom of association
A third argument regularly invoked to protect sport from falling within the ambit of the 
Treaty concerns the freedom of association and the autonomy enjoyed by sporting federations 
under national law.42 In his opinion in Bosnian, Advocate General Lenz pointed out that it is
37 See infra, the conclusion to this thesis.
38 Séché, “Quand les juges tirent au but: L’arrêt Bosman du 15 -12-1995”, CDE (1996) at 360.
39 Case C-154/89 Commission v France [1991] ECR 1-659, Case C-180/89 Commission v Italy [1991] ECR 1-709; 
Case C-198/89 Commission v Greece [1991] ECR 1-727.
40 As has been demonstrated above, the Court views sport as being covered under the heading of Community law 
insoar as it is an economic activity. At a later stage, it will be advocated that also sporting activities of amateur 
athletes may be part of the scope o f application of Community law, making use of the concepts of ‘social 
advantages’ in secondary legislation and/or ‘corollary rights’ of free movement.
41 Bosman, par. 78. The Court also referred to, inter alia. Case C-19/72 Kraus v Land Baden-Württemberg 11993] 
ECR 1-1663, par. 16.
42 Bosman, par. 72.
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“certainly undeniable that the sports associations have the right and the duty to draw up rules fo r  
the practice and organisation of the sport, and that that activity falls within the association’s 
autonomy which is protected as a fundamental right.”43 The Court explicitly recognised that th e  
principle o f freedom of association, enshrined in Article 11 ECHR and resulting from th e  
constitutional traditions common to the Member States, “is one of the fundamental rights which, 
as the Court has consistently held and as is reaffirmed in the preamble to the Single European A ct 
and in Article F(2) of the Treaty on the European Union, are protected in the Community legal 
order.”44 Subsequently, however, the Court stopped short from conferring complete and 
unconditional protection on the freedom of association, thereby effectively quashing the  
argument. It somewhat vaguely ruled that the contested rules elaborated by sporting federations 
could not be considered as necessary to ensure enjoyment of the freedom of association by those 
associations, nor could they be regarded as an inevitable result thereof.45 In his opinion in the  
case of Deliege, Advocate General Cosmas stated more explicitly that even though the principle 
of freedom of association is protected under Community law, this does not go so far as to exclude 
a certain activity from the scope of the Treaty, insofar as this issue did not directly affect the 
exercise o f this freedom.46
Evidently, these statements do not render this particular submission completely devoid o f  
purpose. The sporting associations may rely on the right to freedom of association, but if this 
right clashes with the individual sportsman’s right to freedom of movement, these rights must 
clearly be brought into harmony.47 To resolve such a conflict, a delicate exercise of ‘balancing o f  
rights’ will have to be effectuated.48 More attention will be paid to this issue at later stages of this 
research. In any event, it is clear that even if the principle of freedom of association were not 
useful to exclude sporting activities completely from the scope of the Treaty, it may nonetheless 
serve at the justification stage, once a restriction to the freedom of movement has been
43 Lenz AG in Bosman, par. 216.
44 Bosman, par. 79.
45 Bosman, par. 80.
46 Cosmas AG in Deliege, par. 27.
47 Schroeder, o.c., at 191.
Schroeder, o.c., at 199; also Lenz AG in Bosman, at 216. Preedy, Private Regulations and the Fundamental 
Freedoms o f  the EC Treaty (EUI LL.M. thesis, 1999).
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established, when verifying whether there exist imperative reasons in the general interest to 
uphold the contested measures.49
§4: The principle o f subsidiarity
Finally, and closely linked to the previous argument, also the principle of subsidiarity has 
been advanced to safeguard sport from Community law scrutiny.50 The German government in 
Bosman advocated that “by virtue of the principle of subsidiarity, taken as a general principle, 
intervention by public, and particularly Community, authorities in this area must be confined to 
what is strictly necessary.”51 The second limb of Article 5 EC indeed provides that “in areas 
which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall take action, in 
accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the objectives of the 
proposed action cannot sufficiently be achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by 
reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, better be achieved by the Community.”
Clearly, the principle o f subsidiarity, which concerns the division of competencies 
between the Community and the Member States, is of crucial importance within the Treaty 
framework. In all circumstances, this principle must be carefully respected. Complaints about 
violations of the principle must be cautiously examined. In this particular context, the issue o f 
subsidiarity was however of no avail to the sporting federations. In Bosman, the Court of Justice 
limited itself to stipulating that the principle of subsidiarity, as interpreted by the German 
government, “cannot lead to a situation in which the freedom of private associations to adopt 
sporting rules restricts the exercise of rights conferred on individuals by the Treaty.”52 Advocate 
General Lenz was more straightforward in his opinion. He firmly stated that the wording of the 
principle of subsidiarity clearly indicates that it does not apply in the field of the Community’s 
exclusive competence, such as the fundamental freedoms. Furthermore, he continued that it could 
not be deduced from the principle either that Community law could not be applied to the field of
49 See also Dubey, o.c., at 193-194.
50 Bosman, par. 71.
51 Bosman, par. 72.
52 Bosman, par. 81.
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professional sport.53 Evidently, the Advocate General shared the view of the Commission, w hich 
had identified a series of exclusive powers which are joined around the concept of the internal 
market and do include the fundamental freedoms*54 The idea that the fundamental freedoms are  
within the Community’s exclusive competence and therefore escape the application of th e  
principle o f subsidiarity also finds widespread support in legal doctrine.55 In this respect, it m ust 
nevertheless be observed that the Member States do have a certain margin of discretionary 
competence in relation with freedom of movement. They are legitimately entitled to invoke 
grounds o f public policy, public security or public health, exceptions of public service an d  
overriding reasons in the general interest to uphold measures which have prima facie  been held to  
be restrictive o f freedom of movement. These justifications will be examined at a later stage. 
Furthermore, it must be indicated that the Court of Justice has recently, in a number of cases, 
applied the principle of subsidiarity to issues relating to the internal market,56 albeit with a  
‘relatively light touch’.57 It seems therefore appropriate to to take this principle carefully in  
consideration when dealing with sports matters.
Conclusion
It emerges clearly from the foregoing that the different arguments submitted by the  
sporting associations and some Member States were not such as to convince the Court of Justice 
to keep Community law entirely at bay in the field of sport. But after all, this was an unrealistic 
prospect anyway. Be that as it may however, what matters far more is that the Court has 
effectively accepted that the practice of sport presents some characteristics which are somehow 
special and which therefore deserve protection under Community law. The following chapters 
will elaborate on how the Court conceives this special treatment and how far the Community
53 Lenz AG in Bosman, par. 130.
54 See 1st Report o f the Commission on Subsidiarity, COM (94) 533.
55 See, inter alia, Lenaerts & van Ypersele, 16; Séché, Cahiers de Droit Européen (1996) 360; Toth, “A Legal 
Analysis of Subsidiarity”, in O’Keeffe & Twomey (eds.),Legal Issues o f the Maastricht Treaty (London, 1994) 39- 
40.
56 Case C-377/98 Netherlands v Council (Biotechnology Directive) [2001] ECR 1-7149, paras. 30-34; Case C-491/01 
The Queen and Secretary o f State for Health ex parte BAT Ltd, And Imperial Tobacco ltd. [2002] ECR I-, paras. 
177-183.
57 Craig & de Burca, o.c., at 136-137.
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institutions are actually prepared to go in their recognition of this specificity o f sport. 
Furthermore, it has also been demonstrated that the Community actors must approach carefully in 
this respect, in order not to encroach upon the powers of the Member States and the sporting 
federations in this domain. This is the inevitable result of the lack of a clear position of sport 
within the Treaty framework. It remains thus to be seen whether this current situation is 
practically still tenable.
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Applicability of free movement rules 
‘Citius, Altius, Fortius’
2
Introduction
In order to trigger the application of the Treaty provisions on free movement of persons 
and freedom to provide services, three basic requirements must in principle be satisfied: the 
person who wishes to exercise his or her rights to freedom of movement must be engaged in 
some kind of economic activity, he or she must be a national of a Member State of the European 
Union, and finally, there must be a cross-border element detectable in the particular situation. 
These three prerequisites shall be dealt with respectively in sections two, three and four of this 
chapter. The analysis shall rigorously be centred around the person of the sportsman who wants 
to make use of his freedom of movement. However, before addressing these criteria separately, 
the first section shall be dedicated to the preliminary question of whether the Community free 
movement provisions can actually be relied upon in disputes between private entities.
§1: The Issue of Horizontal Direct Effect
One of the principal objections forwarded against the application of the Community 
provisions on free movement of persons and services to rules and practices enacted and imposed
c p
by sporting associations and/or clubs concerns the issue of the so-called horizontal direct effect. 
According to conventional doctrine, Articles 39 and 49 EC are only applicable to acts of public 58
58 For a more elaborate discussion of the issue of horizontal direct effect of the free movement provisions, see, inter 
alia, Baquero Cruz, The Economic Constitutional Law o f the European Community: between Competition and Free 
Movement (EUI Ph.d thesis, 1999); Jaensch, Die unmittelbare Drittwirkung der Grundfreiheiten, Untersuchung der 
Verpflichtung von Privatpersonen durch Art. 30, 48, 52, 59, 73b EGV (Nomos, 1997); Schaefer, Die unmittelbare 
Wirkung des Verbots der nichttarifären Handelshemnisse (Art. 30 EWGV) in den Reehtsbeziehungenzwischen 
Privaten (Lang, 1987); Van den Bogaert, “Horizontally: The Court Attacks?”, in Barnard & Scott (eds.). The Law o f 
the Single European Market: Unpacking the Premises (Hart, 2002) 123.
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authorities and are therefore not horizontally directly effective in disputes between private 
parties. Thereupon, it has been advocated that possible restrictions resulting from sporting 
regulations nevertheless do not fall under free movement scrutiny as the sporting federations 
and/or clubs which have drafted these rules are private entities. From the outset, it must be 
acknowledged that, in spite of several judgements on the matter, it is still not completely clear 
precisely to what extent Articles 39 and 49 EC are applicable to acts of private parties.
I. RELEVANT CASE LAW OF THE COURT
1. Wairave: collective measures
The issue of the potential horizontal direct effect o f the Community provisions on the free 
movement of persons came to the fore for the first time precisely in Wairave.59 The Court had to  
decide whether Articles 12, 39 and 49 EC had to be interpreted in such a way that the provision 
in the rules of the UCI relating to medium-distance world cycling championships behind 
motorcycles, according to which the pacemaker had to be of the same nationality as the stayer, 
was incompatible with them. Wairave and Koch, who used to participate in these races as 
pacemakers for stayers of other nationalities,60 regarded this provision of the rules of the UCI as 
discriminatory. It was undisputed in the proceedings that the UCI, being an association o f  
national bodies concerned with cycling as a sport, is a private association. The defendants 
advocated that the prohibitions of any discrimination on grounds of nationality, laid down in 
Articles 12, 39 and 49 EC, “refer only to restrictions which have their origins in acts o f an  
authority and not to  those resulting from legal acts of persons or associations who do not com e 
under public law.”61 The Court, however, refuted this allegation and held that the prohibition o f  
discrimination “does not only apply to the action of public authorities but extends likewise to  
rules of any other nature aimed at regulating in a collective manner gainful employment and the 
provision o f services.”62
59 Case 36/74 Wairave and Koch v Union Cycliste Internationale [1974] ECR 1405.
60 Warner AG in Case 36/74 Wairave and Koch v Union Cycliste Internationale [1974] ECR 1423.
61 Wairave, par. 15.
62 Walravey par. 17.
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The Court based this decision upon three grounds: firstly, it stipulated that the “abolition as 
between Member States of obstacles to freedom of movement for persons and to freedom to 
provide services, which are fundamental objectives of the Community contained in Article 3(c) 
of the Treaty, would be compromised if the abolition of barriers of national origin could be 
neutralised by obstacles resulting from the exercise of their legal autonomy by associations or 
organisations which do not come under public law.” This can be described as the effet utile 
argument. Secondly, it proceeded stating that since “working conditions in the various Member 
States are governed sometimes by means of provisions laid down by law or regulation and 
sometimes by agreements and other acts concluded or adopted by private persons, to limit the 
prohibitions in question to acts of a public authority would risk creating inequality in their 
application.”63 4 This could be referred to as the uniform application argument. Thirdly, it 
emphasised the general nature of the terms of the relevant Treaty provisions, not distinguishing 
between the source of the restrictions to be abolished and extending to rules and agreements 
which do not emanate from public authorities.65 This is the general wording argument.
Consequently, to the extent that measures regulate the subject matter concerned in a collective 
manner, public and private regulation are unequivocally put on a par by the Court of Justice.66 
Interpreted in this way, the Walrave decision undoubtedly constituted a significant development 
in the jurisprudence of the Court. Evidently, its importance should be estimated at its true value: 
the private party involved in the proceedings, the International Cycling Union is an association 
with a quasi-government status, as it acts as the ultimate regulatory body within its field of 
competence and performs State-like functions.67 Arguably, at this stage of the Court’s case law 
on the matter, only this kind of private party thus seemed to be subject to free movement scrutiny. 
Besides, it also needs to be emphasised that the case concerned a measure which clearly 
discriminated between Community nationals on grounds of nationality. Practically, for the 
purposes of this research, this ruling does unmistakably mean that regulations elaborated by 
sporting federations are caught by the free movement provisions insofar as they contain 
discriminatory provisions,
63 Walrave. par. 18.
64 Walrave, par. 19.
65 Walrave, par. 20-21.
66 This decision has been confirmed in Case 13/76 Donà v Marnero [1976] ECR 1333, par. 17.
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2. B osm an  : beyond discrimination
The Court of Justice developed the issue further in subsequent case law. In Haug-Adrion6S, 
the Court hinted for the first time that it might be prepared to extend the applicability o f the  
Community provisions on freedom of movement of workers and services to private parties 
beyond the point at which it had arrived in Walrave: it omitted every reference to collective 
measures, and held instead that the Treaty provisions in question “are intended to eliminate a ll  
measures (emphasis added) which, in the fields of free movement of workers and freedom to  
provide services, treat a national of another Member State more severely or place him in a  
situation less advantageous, from a legal or factual point of view, than that of one of the M em ber 
State’s own nationals in the same circumstances.”67 89 This general statement had the potential o f  
opening up the whole array of private measures to investigation. However, somewhat 
surprisingly maybe, at the time the whole issue was not really taken up any further in the legal 
doctrine, presumably because the standardised contract terms at stake in the particular case could  
be considered as comparable to collective agreements,70 or possibly because the Court reached 
the conclusion that the measure concerned was not discriminatory and thus not contrary to the  
Treaty provisions invoked.71 72In Bosman,12 the Court of Justice, in true ‘procession of Echtem ach’ 
style, first appeared to retreat one step from its previous findings before finally moving som e 
steps forward again. At stake was the compatibility with Articles 39, 81 and 82 EC of a num ber 
of rules emanating from the representative football federations FIFA and UEFA, two private 
associations governed by Swiss law. First of all, the Court reiterated the approach it had already 
adopted in Walrave. Then, the Court made a giant leap forward: whereas in its previous case 
law it had only submitted discriminatory rules of private associations to the test of compliance 
with the free movement provisions, it now brought genuinely non-discriminatory private 
measures under direct free movement scrutiny. Indeed, the Court ruled that even though th e
67 The same could be said about the Italian Football Federation in Donà.
68 Case 251/83 Haug-Adrion v Frankfurter Versicherungs-AG [1984] EC R 1-4277.
69 Haug-Adrion, par. 14.
70 Roth, “Dnttwirkung der Grundfreiheiten”, in Due/Lutter/Schwarze (eds.), Festschrift für Ulrich Everting, Vol. 2, 
(Nomos, 1995) 1239.
71 Haug-Adrion, par. 18.
72 Case C-415/93 Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Association ASLB v Jean-Marc Bosman [19951 E C R  
1-4921.
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transfer rules in question did not discriminate on grounds of nationality, they still directly 
affected players’ access to the employment market and were thus capable of impeding the 
freedom of movement of workers. And the Court did not leave it at that. When the UEFA 
objected that the Court’s interpretation made Article 39 EC “more restrictive in relation to 
individuals than in relation to Member States, which are alone in being able to rely on limitations 
justified on grounds of public policy, public security or public health”73 45, the Court rejected this 
argument for being based on a false premise, and ruled in an unequivocal way that “there is 
nothing to preclude individuals from relying on justifications on grounds of public policy, public 
security or public health. Neither the scope nor the content of those grounds of justification is in 
any way affected by the public or private nature of the rules in question.”76 *78This statement was 
wider than it strictly had to be, for at the time, only measures regulating employment or the 
provision of services in a collective manner were caught by the free movement provisions. n 
After Bosman, it could thus be taken for granted that also non-discriminatory private collective 
measures come under free movement scrutiny. However, it still remained to be seen whether the 
same held true also for purely individual measures.
3. Angonese: horizontal direct effect of Article 39 EC
Ultimately, it would take the Court five more years to provide explicit confirmation about the 
full horizontal direct effect of Article 39 EC. It formulated its views against the background of 
the case of Angonese.ls Angonese, an Italian national whose mother tongue is German and who is 
resident in the province of Bolzano, applied to take part in a competition for a post with a private
73 Bosnian, paras. 82-84.
74 Bosman, par. 103.
75 Bosman, par. 85.
76 Bosman, par. 86; see also Case 350/96 Clean Car Autosenice v Landeshauptmann von Wien [199S] ECR 1-2521, 
Ç>ar. 24.
7 In two other sports cases, the Court neatly proceeded along the path it had previously chosen in Bosman. albeit 
with a different outcome: see Case C-176/96 Jyri Lehtonen and Castors Canada Dry Namur-Braine v Fédération 
Royale Belge des Sociétés de Basketball [2000] ECR 1-2681, par. 49 on workers; Joined Cases C-51/96 and.C- 
191/97 Christelle Déliége v Ligue Francophone de Judo et Disciplines ASBL and Others [2000] ECR 1-2549, par. 64 
on services. For further information, see e.g. Van den Bogaert. “The Court of Justice on the Tatami: Ippon, Wazari or 
Koka“, 25 ELRev. (2000) 554.
78 Case C-281/9S Roman Angonese v Cassa di Risparmio di Bolzano [2000] ECR 1-4139. See Lane & Shuibhne. 
“Annotaton on Case C-281/98 Roman Angonese v Cassa di Risparmio di Bolzano*\ 37 CMLRev. (2000) 1237; 
Streinz & Leíble, “Die unmittelbare Drittwirkung der Grundfreiheiten -  Überlegungen aus Anlass von EuGh, EuZW 
2000,468 Angonese", 15 EuZW (2000) 459.
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banking undertaking in Bolzano. One of the conditions for entry to the competition was 
possession of a certificate of bilingualism, which used to be required in Bolzano for access to the 
former managerial career in the public service. The specific certificate is issued by the local 
public authorities after an examination which is held only in that province. Angonese is perfectly 
bilingual, but he was not in possession of that specific certificate. On that basis he was denied 
admission to the competition. Although acknowledging the right of the bank to select its future 
staff from persons who are perfectly bilingual, he considered the requirement to have and to 
produce the certificate unlawful and contrary to the principle of freedom of movement for 
workers, and thereupon commenced legal proceedings. When seized of the dispute, the Court o f  
Justice initially trod on well-known territory, reaffirming the principles enounced in Walrave. It 
also embraced exactly the same line of reasoning, based on the arguments of the general wording 
of Article 39, the requirement of effectiveness and the necessity of uniform application of the 
principle o f non-discrimination.79 Subsequently, however, the Court introduced a new element 
into the debate, originating from its decision in the second Defrenne case80. In that case, the Court 
had ruled that “the fact that certain provisions of the Treaty are formally addressed to the 
Member States does not prevent rights from being conferred at the same time on any individual 
who has an interest in compliance with the obligations thus laid down.”81 And accordingly it had 
held, in relation to a provision of the Treaty which was mandatory in nature, that “the prohibition 
of discrimination applied equally to all agreements intended to regulate paid labour collectively, 
as well as to contracts between individuals.”82 On the basis of these statements, the Court 
construed a bridge with Article 39 EC in the present case, emphasising that “such considerations 
must, a fortiori, be applicable to Article 39 of the Treaty, which lays down a fundamental 
freedom and which constitutes a specific application of the general prohibition of discrimination 
contained in Article 12 of the EC Treaty. In that respect, like Article 143 of the EC Treaty, it is 
designed to ensure that there is no discrimination on the labour market.”83 At this point, 
everything was put in readiness for le moment suprême, which was not long in coming:
79 Angonese, paras. 30-33.
80 Case 43/75 Gabrielle Defrenne v Sabena [1976] ECR 455.
81 Defrenne, par. 31.
82 Defrenne, par. 39; Angonese, par. 34.
83 Angonese, par. 35.
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“Consequently, the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality laid down in Article 
39 of the Treaty must be regarded as applying to private persons as well.”84
II. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
Since Angonese, it is undisputed that Article 39 EC is horizontally directly effective. Some 
questions are however still unanswered and must therefore be addressed in future case law. 
Firstly, in the case at hand, the contested measure was indirectly discriminatory. It is still unclear 
whether Article 39 EC can also be applied in a dispute between purely private parties concerning 
a genuinely non-discriminatory measure.85 Furthermore, it is not entirely certain either whether 
these findings will be entirely transposed to the domains of the freedom of establishment and the 
freedom to provide services.86 Within this context, the Court recently ruled in Wouters that 
compliance with Articles 43 and 49 EC is also required in the case of rules which are not public 
in nature but which are designed to regulate collectively, self-employment and the provision of 
services.87 It did not appear to matter to the Court whether the contested regulation w'as 
discriminatory or not.88 It can therefore relatively safely be assumed that non-discriminatory rules 
from collective private actors are also covered under Articles 43 and 49 EC. Consequently, on the 
basis of these findings, it is advocated that the regulations from all sporting associations which 
are self-regulatory and possess powers akin to public law must comply with the provisions on 
free movement of persons and services, regardless of whether they are discriminatory or not and 
whether the athletes submitted to these regulations are workers or self-employed. Moreover,
84 Angonese, par. 36.
85 Baquero observed that the Court’s judgement is limited to discriminatory rules (Baquero, o.c., at 234). Korber 
limited himself to stating that the Bosman decision of prohibiting also genuinely non-discriminatory rules was not 
reiterated (Korber, ‘Innerstaatliche Anwendung und Drittwerking der Grundfreiheiten?”, 6 EuropaRecht (2000) at 
949-950)
86 Baquero, o.c., at 250, is of the opinion that the Angonese decision will not be transposed to other freedoms. He 
advocates that the Court prefers to ensure an enhanced protection for workers as a matter of constitutional law. 
According to Korber, the decision in Angonese will be implemented also with regard to services, but maybe not with 
regard to establishment (see Korber, o.c., at 950). On the broader issue of convergence between the fundamental 
freedoms, see, e.g., Behrens, “Die Konvergenz der wirtschaflichen Freiheiten im europäischen Gemeinschaftsrecht”, 
EuropaRecht (1992) 145; Daniele, “Non-Discriminatory Restrictions to the Free Movement of Persons”, 22 ELRev. 
(1997) 191; Friedbacher, “Motive Unmasked: The European Court of Justice, the Free Movement of Goods and the 
Search for Legitimacy”, 2 E U  (1996) 226; Mortelmans, “Excepties bij non-tarifaire intracommunautaire 
belemmeringen: assimilatie in het nieuwe EG-VerdragT’, 5 SEW (1997) 182; Mortelmans, ‘Towards convergence in 
the application of the rules on free movement and on competition?", 38 CMLRev. (2001) 613.
87 Case C-309/99 Wouters v Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten [2002] ECR 1-1653, par. 120.
88 Wouters, par. 122.
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discriminatory measures imposed on employed sportsmen by private entities such as clubs, fo r 
example in contracts, arguably also come under the scope o f application o f Article 39 EC . 
Whether Community law will eventually reach even further within the realm of private relations 
must still be awaited...
§2: The Requirement of an ‘Economic Activity9
Sport falls within the ambit o f the Community’s law to the extent that it constitutes an  
economic activity.89 The specific wording o f this principled statement of the Court of Justice is 
straightforward and does not leave much room for interpretation. Consequently, at first scrutiny, 
it seems to be that the only question which needs to be tackled for the purposes of this research is 
the following: can a certain form of sport be considered as being of an economic nature; and if so , 
to what extent? However appealing this may look for reasons of clarity or simplicity, this way o f  
putting the question is just not accurate enough. It must be emphasised from the outset that w hat 
matters really is not so much that a particular sports discipline in general is regarded as an  
economic activity, but rather that the concrete activities of sportsmen involved in one or the o ther 
sport are of an economic nature. This subtle change of perspective may seem immaterial, but it 
does have its importance. Indeed, as Advocate General Cosmas indicated in his opinion in  
Deliege,90 it is perfectly feasible that notwithstanding the fact that a sport is deemed to be of an  
amateur character in general, some sportsmen nevertheless perform it in an economic way. 
Therefore, instead, the predominant question which has to be addressed becomes then whether a  
given sportsman’s activities when practising his sport are to be considered of an economic nature. 
If the answer to this question is affirmative, the athlete concerned will be able to rely directly o n  
the free movement provisions of the EC Treaty of his own right - provided he satisfies the other 
requirements for their application, o f course. Conversely, if the answer to the question formulated 
is negative, the sportsman will be considered as an amateur and he will have to invoke o ther 
Community provisions or instruments in order to be able to  move within the European Union, 
thereby necessarily having to comply with their inherent restrictions.
89 Walrave, par. 4.
90 Cosmas AG in Deliege, par. 26,
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Once the Court has decided that a certain sporting activity is economic in nature, the next 
issue to be dealt with - for the purpose of the application of the Community law provisions on 
free movement of persons - is whether the athlete in question is to be qualified as a ‘worker’ 
within the meaning of Article 39 EC, or alternatively, rather as a sportsman competing in an 
independent, self-employed capacity according to the terms of Articles 43 and 49 EC. In view of 
the common foundations of the free movement provisions and the apparent tendency towards 
convergence, which will be discussed further below, this second evaluation may turn out to be of 
less crucial importance than the former one. Admittedly, in many, if not most circumstances, the 
concrete application of the respective free movement provisions will lead to the same outcome, 
regardless of whether the sportsman in question is considered as an employee (‘workers’) or as a 
self-employed (‘establishment’ or ‘services’) . Moreover, as will be demonstrated later, it won’t 
always be easy or even possible to assess with absolute certainty how a particular sportsman is to 
be qualified exactly under the chapter o f the fundamental freedoms. However, one shouldn’t 
forget that the principles of the freedom of movement of workers and these of the freedom to 
provide services do not always run completely in parallel, and therefore, it arguably remains 
important to always try at least to distinguish correctly between these different categories of 
rights holders.
One more additional remark before tackling the identified issues concretely: it speaks for 
itself that this two-tier approach remains to some extent artificial and theoretical, in the sense that 
in practice, these two questions are often almost inextricably linked and scrutinised 
contemporaneously. In order to keep the different concepts separated, the two issues will be dealt 
with successively in this research, respectively in the second and the third section of the chapter. 
The first section will be dedicated to a concise explanation of the content of the central notions 
‘economic activity’, ‘worker’, ‘establishment’ and ‘services’. In the last section, the legal 
position of amateur sportsmen under Community law shall be scrutinised more in detail.
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I. GENERAL CONCEPTS & PRINCIPLES
In this first section, it will be examined which specific conditions someone needs to fulfil 
from an economic point of view in order to activate the Community provisions on the 
fundamental freedoms. In order to concentrate fully on the different aspects of the requirement o f 
an economic activity, the other two constituent criteria which must equally be satisfied before 
someone can benefit from the rights conferred in these Treaty Articles, namely the fact that the 
person in question must in principle be a national of a Member State of the European Union and 
the presence of an inter-state element, will provisionally be left out of consideration here.
1. The concept of ‘worker’ within the meaning of Article 39 EC
It follows logically from the terms of Article 39(1) EC that in order to be able to trigger 
the application o f this provision, one must have the status of a ‘worker’. It has been left up to the 
Court of Justice to establish the impact of this term.91 Initially, the Court confined itself to laying 
down the general contours of its approach, stopping short of providing an actual definition of the 
concept. It has consistently held that the term ‘worker’ must be given a Community scope, so as 
to avoid that Article 39 would be deprived of all effect and the Treaty objectives would be 
frustrated if its meaning were unilaterally fixed and modified by national law.92 Furthermore, the 
Court stipulated that it is appropriate, to determine the meaning of the terms ‘worker’ and 
‘activity as an employed person’, “to have recourse to the generally recognised principles o f 
interpretation”,93 and that these concepts may not be interpreted restrictively.94 After having
91 For a more elaborate discussion on the evolution of this concept, see e.g. Castro Oliveira, “Workers and Other 
Persons: Step-By-Step from Movement to Citizenship”, 39 CMLRev. (2002) 77; Craig & de Bürca, EU Law. Text, 
Cases and Materials (OUP, 2003), at 701-762; Handoll, Free Movement o f Persons in the European Union 
(Chancery, 1995); O'Leary, “The Free Movement of persons and Services” , in Craig & de Bürca (eds.). The 
Evolution o f  EU Law (OUP, 1999) 377.
92 Case 75/63 Hoekstra (née Unger) v Bestuur der Bedrijfsvereniging voor Detailhandel en Ambachten [1964] ECR 
177. Mancini described this situation as a ‘hermeneutic monopoly* conferred by the Court upon itself to counteract 
possible unilateral restrictions of the application of the rules on freedom of movement by the different Member 
States. See Mancini, “The Free Movement of Workers in the Case-Law of the European Court of Justice” , in Curtin 
& O’Keeffe (eds.), Constitutional Adjudication in European Community and National Law (Butterworths, 1992), 67. 
9> Case 53/81 Levin v Staatssecretaris van Justitie [1982] ECR 1035, par. 9.
94 Levin, par. 13.
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sufficiently outlined the premises, the Court specified that the essential feature of an employment 
relationship is that “for a certain period of time a person performs services for and under the 
direction of another person in return for which he receives remuneration.”95 Three constituent 
criteria can be detected in this judge-made definition: before someone can be regarded as a 
worker, there must be (1) an economic activity of some kind; (2) remuneration; and (3) 
subordination. Each of these elements has been subject to further scrutiny in the Court’s case law. 
With regard to the first criterion, the prerequisite of an economic activity of some kind, the Court 
introduced a kind of quantitative element, explaining that Article 39 EC is said to cover only “the 
pursuit of effective and genuine activities, to the exclusion of activities on such a small scale as to 
be regarded as purely marginal and ancillary”.96 The second criterion, involving the element of 
remuneration, constitutes the financial counterpart of the activities carried out and ensures or 
confirms in a certain way their truly economic character. It gives a kind of qualitative touch to the 
definition of a worker. In this context, the Court included part-time workers earning an income 
lower than what is considered to be the minimum required for subsistence within the Community 
scope of ‘worker’, recognising that part-time work constitutes for a large number of persons an 
effective means of improving their living conditions.97 As such, it didn’t even oppose to the fact 
that part-time workers appeal to assistance from the public funds to supplement their income.98 
The Court pushed the issue of remuneration to its outer limits, accepting that in so far as work 
carried out by members of a religious community, which aims to ensure a measure of self- 
sufficiency for the Community, constitutes an essential part of participation in that Community, 
“the services which the latter provides to its members may be regarded as an indirect quid pro
95 Case 66/85 Lawrie Blum v Land Baden-Württemberg [1986] ECR 2135, par. 17.
96 Levin, par. 17. in further cases, the Court has offered more guidance in this respect: See Case C-357/89 Raulin v 
Minister van Onderwijs en Wetenschappen [1992] ECR M027, par. 14: the “national court may [...] take account of 
the irregular nature and limited duration of the services actually performed under a contract for occasional 
employment. The national court may also take account, if appropriate, of the fact that the person must remain 
available to work if called upon to do so by the employer.” Also, Case C-3/90 Bernini v Minister van Onderwijs en 
Wetenschappen [1992] ECR 1-1071, par. 16: the Court concluded that an Italian national who was employed for ten 
weeks as a paid trainee as part of her occupational training was not precluded, in principle, from being considered as 
a worker either by the fact that her productivity was low or that she worked only a small number of hours a week and 
received limited wages. Nonetheless, the national court was entitled “to examine whether in all the circumstances the 
person concerned has completed a sufficient number of hours to familiarise himself with the work.”
7 Levin, par. 15.
98 Case 139/85 Kempfv Staatssecretaris van Justitie [1986] ECR 1741, par. 14. Slynn AG in Kempf, at 1744, opined 
that “if a person deliberately and for no good reason took a part-time job when he could do a full-time job, that might 
under national law affect his rights to public funds. It does not prevent him from being a worker.”
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quo for their work.“99 The third constitutive criterion of the definition laid down in Lawrie-Blum  
can be described as the element o f subordination. In its case law the Court has identified several 
relevant factors which can be taken into consideration when evaluating concretely whether or n o t 
a given person is to be regarded as being in a position of subordination towards a person th a t 
ordered him to carry out a certain economic activity. In Lawrie-Blum, the Court concluded th a t 
during the entire period of preparatory service, the trainee teacher in question was indeed under 
the direction and supervision o f the school to which he was assigned, holding “it is the school 
that determines the services to be performed by him and his working hours and it is the school’s 
instructions that he must carry out and its rules that he must observe.”100 10In the case o f  
Agegate101, the Court furnished some additional distinguishing elements, “such as, for example, 
the sharing o f the commercial risks o f the business, the freedom for a person to choose his o w n  
working hours and to engage his own assistants. In any event, the fact that a person is paid a  
‘share’ and that his remuneration may be calculated on a collective basis is not of such a nature a s  
to deprive that person of his status of worker.”102 103
Additionally, the Court gradually adduced some further specifications to this general 
framework in order to complete the whole picture concerning the concept of ‘worker’. First o f a ll, 
the Court clarified that the underlying motives for undertaking work are immaterial and c a n  
therefore, in principle, not prevent a person from being qualified as a worker within the m eaning 
of Article 39 EC. Secondly, not only persons carrying out an economic activity on the basis o f  
a contract governed by private law, but also persons performing work in the public sphere, w hose 
terms of work are regulated by public law, can properly be considered as workers within th e  
meaning o f Article 39 EC.104 Thirdly, the Court also extended the protection of Article 39 EC to  
persons who are actively looking for a job, but who cannot, formally speaking, be considered as  
workers just yet.105 In this respect, it must be observed, however, that the Court hasn’t conferred
99 Case 196/87 Steymann v Staatssecretaris van Justitie [1988] ECR 6159, par. 12.
100 Lawrie-Blum, par. 18.
101 Case 3/87 The Queen v Ministry o f Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte Agegate Ltd. [1989] ECR 4459.
102 Ex parte Agegate, par. 36.
103 In Levin, for example, it was suggested that Mrs. Levin may have sought work only in order to obtain a residence 
permit to remain in the country. See, however, Case 344/87 Bettray v Staatssecretaris van Justitie [1989] ECR 1621, 
paras. 17-19.
04 Case 152/73 Sotgiu v Deutsche Bundespost [1974] ECR 153, paras. 5-6.
105 Case C-292/89 R v Immigration Appeal Tribunal, ex parte Amonissen [1991] ECR 1-745, paras. 12-13. See also 
Levin, par. 16; and Case 48/75 Royer [1976] ECR 497: the right “to look for or pursue an occupation”.
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the same status to job seekers as to actual workers,106 and that the right to enter and to stay in 
another Member State to look for employment is limited in time.107
2. The concepts of ‘establishment’ and ‘serv ices’ within the meaning of Articles 43 & 49 EC
The fundamental freedom of movement of persons, enumerated in Article 3(c) EC, is not 
limited to workers who perform labour for and under the direction of someone else; it also 
extends to persons who carry out work in a self-employed capacity, on an independent basis. 
Their free movement rights are regulated in respectively, Articles 43 EC et seq.t on the freedom 
of establishment, and Articles 49 EC et seq., on the freedom to provide services.108 Again, it has 
been mainly the responsibility of the European Court of Justice to establish the precise scope of 
application of these freedoms. Basically, the Court imposed the same two principal requirements 
as with regard to Article 39 EC: there needs to be some kind of economic activity in return for 
which remuneration is due to trigger the application of these two sets of provisions. Furthermore, 
the Court has also interpreted the text of the Treaty Articles or even adduced some further 
elements to distinguish more clearly between self-employed falling under the heading of 
establishment and self-employed covered by the rules on services.
106 See Case 316/85 Centre public d ’aide sociale de Courcelles v Lebon [1987] ECR 2811, in which the Court ruled 
that several of the social and tax advantages granted to workers under Community law could not be claimed by those 
who were moving in search of work.
107 In Antonissen, par. 16, the Court pointed out that “the effectiveness of Article 39 is secured in so far as 
Community legislation or, in its absence, the legislation of a Member State gives persons concerned a reasonable 
time in which to apprise themselves, in the territory of the Member State concerned, of offers of employment 
corresponding to their occupational qualifications and to take, where appropriate, the necessary steps in order to be 
engaged.” Subsequently, in par. 21, the Court further specified that “in the absence of a Community provision 
prescribing the period during which Community nationals seeking employment in a Member State may stay there, a 
period of six months, such as that laid dowii in the national legislation at issue in the main proceedings, does not 
appear in principle to be insufficient to enable the persons concerned to apprise themselves, in the host Member 
State, of offers of employment corresponding to their occupational qualifications and to take, where appropriate, the 
necessary steps in order to be engaged and, .therefore, does not jeopardise the effectiveness of the principle of free 
movement. However, if after the expiry of that period the person concerned provides evidence that he is continuing 
to seek employment and that he has genuine chances of being engaged, he cannot be required to leave the territory of 
the host Member State.”
108 For a more elaborate discussion on these concepts, see e.g. Craig & de Burca, EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials 
(OUP, 2003) at 765-824; Hatzopoulos, “Recent Developments in the Case Law of the ECJ in the Field of Services”, 
37 CMLRev. (2000) 43; O'Leary, “The Free Movement of persons and Services”, in Craig & de Burca (eds.), The 
Evolution o f EU Law (OUP, 1999) 377, Snell. Goods and Serv ices in EC Law (OUP, 2002).
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2.1 Freedom  o f  establishment
The Court went through relatively little trouble in defining the concept of ‘establishm ent’ . 
In Factortame, the Court observed in general terms that the concept of establishment within th e  
meaning of Article 43 et seq. of the Treaty involves the actual pursuit o f an economic ac tiv ity  
through a fixed establishment in another Member State for an indefinite period.109 Evidently, th e  
notion o f ‘establishment’ thus involves both a geographical and a temporal requirement.110 T o  
complete the picture, regard should also be had to the following observations. Firstly, the C o u rt 
stipulated that freedom of establishment is not confined to the right to create a s in g le  
establishment within the Community. In its opinion, a person may be established, within th e  
meaning of the Treaty, in more than one Member State -  in particular, in the case of com panies, 
through the setting-up of agencies, branches or subsidiaries, and, in the case of members of th e  
professions, by establishing a second professional base, subject to observance of the professional 
rules of conduct.111 Secondly, the Court also unequivocally held that “a Member State cannot b e  
denied the right to take measures to prevent the exercise by a person providing services w h o se  
activity is entirely or principally directed towards its territory of the freedom guaranteed b y  
Article 49 for the purpose of avoiding the professional rules of conduct which would b e  
applicable to him if he were established within that State. Such a situation may be subject to  
judicial control under the provisions of the chapter relating to the right of establishment and n o t  
of that on the provision of services.” 112 *In the light of the foregoing, the Court legitim ately 
concluded that “the concept of establishment within the meaning of the Treaty is therefore a v e ry  
broad one, allowing a Community national to participate, on a stable and contingent basis, in th e
109 Case C-221/89 The Queen v The Secretary o f  State for Transport, ex parte Factortame LTD and Others [1991] 
ECR 1-3905, par. 20. See also Case C-55/94 Gebhard v Consiglio dell’Ordine degli Awocati e Procuratori d i  
Milano [1995] ECR I-4I65, par. 23: the Court described the right of establishment, subject to the exceptions a n d  
conditions laid down, as allowing “all types of self-employed activity to be taken up and pursued on the territory o f  
any other Member State, undertakings to be formed and operated, and agencies, branches or subsidiaries to be se t
nS”Chalmers & Szyszczak, European Union Law -  Volume II - Towards a European Polity? (Ashgate Publishing, 
1998), 363-366.
111 See Case 107/83 Ordre desAvocats au Barreau de Paris v Klopp [1984] ECR 2971. par. 19.
112 Case 205/84 Commission v Germany [1986] ECR 3755, par. 22; Case 33/74 Van Binsbergen v Bedrijfsvereniging 
Metaalnijverheid [1974] ECR 1299. The concrete application of this principle in Case C-212/97 Centros Ltd. v 
Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen [1999] ECR 1-1459 caused considerable commotion in legal doctrine: the Court ru led
that the deliberate choice of a Member State national to set up a company in a Member State with lenient legislative 
requirements concerning incorporation and to set up branches in other Member States with stricter requirements
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economic life of a Member State other than his State of origin and to profit therefrom, so 
contributing to economic and social interpenetration within the Community in the sphere of 
activities as self-employed persons.” 113
2.2 Freedom to provide services
Article 50 EC stipulates that “services shall in particular include: activities of an industrial 
character; activities of a commercial character; activities of craftsmen; activities of the 
professions.” The domain of ‘services’ constitutes the residual category of the free movement 
provisions, which can only come into play whenever a particular situation cannot be caught under 
the other fundamental freedoms.114 In clear contrast with the Treaty provisions on the freedom of 
establishment, requiring a permanent basis in the host Member State, the provisions of the 
chapter on services, in particular the third paragraph of Article 50 EC, envisage that where the 
provider of services moves to another Member State, he is to pursue his activity there on a 
temporary basis. The Court clarified that “the temporary nature of the activities in question has to 
be determined in the light, not only of the duration of the provision of the service, but also of its 
regularity, periodicity or continuity.” 115 Article 50 EC expressly mentions only the right of the 
person providing a service to temporarily pursue his activity in the Member State where the 
person for whom the service is provided is established.116 However, in its case law, the Court has 
given an extensive interpretation to this fundamental freedom, seemingly extending its scope of 
application to interstate services in general.117 Firstly, it has ruled that the freedom to provide 
services also includes the freedom, for the recipients of services, to go to another Member State
cannot simply in itself constitute an abuse of the right of establishment. Such a decision is inherent in the exercise, in 
a single market, of the freedom of establishment, (paras. 24-27).
1.3 See to this effect also Case 2/74 Reyners v Belgium [1974] ECR 631, par. 21.
1.4 Article 50 EC. The Court unequivocally confirmed this in Case C-159/90 Society fo r  the Protection o f the Unborn 
Child (SPUC) v Grogan [1991] ECR 1-4685, par. 17; see also Gebhard, par. 25.
115 Gebhard, par. 27. In addition, it held that the fact “that the provision of services is temporary does not mean that 
the provider of services within the meaning of the Treaty may not equip himself with some form of infrastructure in 
the host Member State (including an office, chambers or consulting rooms) in so far as such infrastructure is 
necessary for the purposes of performing the services in question.”
116 See, for example, cases such as Case 16/78 State v Choquet [1978] ECR 2293, or Case 279/80 Criminal 
Proceedings against Webb [1981] ECR 3305.
117 Eeckhout, The European Internal Market and International Trade: A Legal Analysis (Clarendon Press, 1994). at 
9-10.
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in order to receive a service there, without being obstructed by restrictions.118 It considered this 
scenario as the necessary corollary of the freedom to provide services, fulfilling the objective o f 
liberalising all gainful activity not covered by the free movement of goods, persons and capital.119 
Secondly, also a third situation in which both the provider and the recipient of the service move 
from one Member State to another is considered to be caught under the heading of services,120 as 
well as thirdly, a final fourth situation in which nor the provider nor the recipient move, and only 
the service itself ‘travels’.121
The broad approach generally adopted by the Court with regard to the fundamental freedoms 
is also reflected in the concept of remuneration. In Steymann, it had already accepted that also an 
indirect quid pro quo could nevertheless be considered as a economic counterpart for the services 
rendered.122 Furthermore, in Bond van Adverteerders, the Court acknowledged that “Article 50 
does not require the service to be paid for by those for whom it is performed”, so long as there is 
remuneration from some party.123 The issue becomes complicated however when the 
remuneration is provided for by the state. In Humbel124, the Court held that the essential 
characteristic of remuneration -  “that it constitutes consideration for the service in question, and 
is normally agreed upon between the provider and the recipient of the service”125 - is absent in the 
case of courses provided under the national education system126, as the State, in establishing and 
maintaining such a system, fulfils its duties towards its own population in the social, cultural and
118 Cases 286/82 and 26/83 Luisi and Carbone v Ministero del Tesoro [1984] ECR 377, par. 16.
119 Luisi and Carbone, par. 10.
120 See for example the so-called ‘tourist guide’ cases: Case C-154/89 Commission v France [1991] ECR 1-659; Case 
C-180/89 Commission v Italy [1991] ECR 1-709; Case C-198/89 Commission v Greece [1991] ECR 1-727.
121 For example financial operations, telecommunication, etc: see Case C-353/89 Commission v Netherlands [19991] 
ECR 1-4069; Case C-3 84/93 Alpine Investments v Minister van Financiën [1995] ECR 1-1141.
122 Steymann, par. 12.
123 Case 352/85 Bond van Adverteerders v the Netherlands [1988] ECR 2085, par. 16. This issue was further 
elaborated upon in Deliège, at paras. 56-57. In the previous Case 62/79 Compagnie Générale pour la Diffusion de la 
Télévision, Coditel, and Others v Ciné Vog Films and Others [1980] ECR 881, at 890, the applicants argued that the 
provision of services does not necessarily imply the existence of a legal relationship between the provider and the 
recipient of a service; Such a requirement was considered being scarcely compatible with economic reality in 
industries such as the newspaper, radio and television industries in which revenue is often largely generated by 
advertising.
124 Case 263/86 Belgian State v Humbel [1988] ECR 5365.
125 Humbel, paras. 16-17.
126 In Humbel, par. 20, it concluded that “courses taught in a technical institute which form part of the secondary 
education provided under the national education system cannot be regarded as services for the purposes of Article 49 
of the EEC Treaty, properly construed.”
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educational fields and funds it, as a general rule, from the public purse.127 However, it ensues 
from a series of recent cases concerning cross-border health care that this distinction between 
publicly and privately remunerated services appears difficult to handle.128 In Geraets-Smits and 
Peerbooms, the Court unequivocally stated that it is settled case-law that medical activities fall 
within the scope of Article 50 EC, and that the fact that “hospital medical treatment is financed 
directly by the sickness insurance funds on the basis of agreements and pre-set scales of fees is 
not in any event such as to remove such treatment from the sphere of services.” 129 As Craig & de 
Burca indicate, Articles 49-50 EC apply in principle to any service which is provided for 
remuneration, and it remains to be seen to what extent systems of mixed public and private 
financing of welfare and social services will fall within the scope of the Treaty rules.130
Furthermore, it must be observed that, in principle, a certain economic activity must be 
legal, although it is not required that all Member States regard it as such in order for it to be 
qualified as a service in the terms of Article 49 EC.131 The Court came to this conclusion in cases 
such as Grogan132 on the prohibition of abortion in Ireland or Schindler133 on the sale of lottery 
tickets in the United Kingdom. On both occasions, the Court stipulated that it was not its task “to 
substitute its assessment for that of the legislature in those Member States where the activities are 
practised legally.”134 However, it also ruled that the fact that these activities are to be regarded as 
services does not preclude Member States in which the activity in question is considered illegal
127 Humbel, par. 18. In par. 19, the Court added that the “nature of the activity is not affected by the fact that pupils 
or their parents must sometimes pay teaching or enrolment fees in order to make a certain contribution to the 
operating expenses of the system.” In the similar case of Wirth, the Court stipulated that those considerations “are 
equally applicable to courses given in an institute of higher education which is financed, essentially, out of public 
funds. Subsequently, however, it observed that “whilst most establishments of higher education are financed in this 
way, some are nevertheless financed essentially out of private funds, in particular by students or their parents, and 
which seek to make an economic profit.” Therefore, it ruled that when “courses are given in such establishments, 
they become services within the meaning of Article 50 of the Treaty. Their aim is to offer a service for 
remuneration.” (Case C -109/92 Wirth v Landeshauptstadt Hannover [1993] E C R 1-6447, paras. 16-17)
128 See Case C -158/96 Kohll v Union des Caisses de Maladie [1998] ECR 1-1931; Case C-368/98 Vanbraekel v 
ANMC [2001] ECR 1-5363.
129 Case C-157/99 Geraets-Smits v Stichting Ziekenfonds, Peerbooms v Stichting CZ Groep Zorgverzekeringen 
[2001] ECR 1-5473, paras. 47-59.
130 Craig &. de Bürca, o.c., at 806-810.
131 See, inter alia. Case C-268/99 Jany v Staatssecretaries voor Justitie [2001] ECR 1-8615: the Court ruled that “the 
activity of prostitution pursued in a self-employed capacity cab be regarded as a service provided for remuneration.” 
To arguments based on the immoral nature of the services the Court responded declaring that “far from being 
prohibited in all Member States, prostitution is tolerated, even regulated by most of those States.” (par. 57)
132 Case C-159/90 SPUC v Grogan [1991] ECR 1-4685.
133 Case C-275/92 Customs and Excise v Schindler [1994] ECR 1-1039.
134 Grogan, par. 20; Schindler, par. 32.
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from regulating or restricting the provision of these services on its territory by providers 
established in another Member State,135 as long as they respect the principle of proportionality 
and do not discriminate arbitrarily on grounds of nationality or place of establishment.136
II. DO SPORTSMEN CARRY OUT AN ECONOMIC ACTIVITY?
This second section shall be dedicated to the question whether sportsmen can b e  
considered to be carrying out an economic activity within the meaning of the Community T rea ty  
when competing in a particular form of sport. In a first instance, a brief ex cursus will b e  
effectuated, to figure out how English national courts have dealt with the same issue u n d e r 
national law, before subsequently coming to the truth of the matter and explore how this question 
has been and/or should have been answered under Community law. Admittedly, at first sight i t  
may appear somewhat odd in the context of this chapter to have a look at how national co u rts  
have addressed the problem at stake from the angle o f national legislation, but arguably, th is  
approach is legitimate and can be justified. Hence, both Walker v Crystal Palace as Dona v  
Mantero and Bosnian, two of the first three sports case before the European Court of Justice, 
turned around football. The question whether football players are to be considered as carrying o u t  
an economic activity arose in every one of these three cases. Unsurprisingly, counsel for th e  
parties involved in the different proceedings advanced more or less the same arguments in favour 
of or against this contention. From the point of view of the principles involved, therefore, it is  
interesting to see which conclusion was reached at by the English Court of Appeal, even though i t  
must be readily acknowledged that its practical usefulness is limited, given the different legal 
context in which the cases are situated. In addition, there is also the emotive reason that this is a n  
English football case, decided by English judges, and England will always be regarded as th e  
country in which football as it is played nowadays found its origins.137
135 See e.g. Case Société Générale Alsacienne de Banque SA v Koestler\\91%] ECR 1971.
136 See Van Gerven AG in Grogan\ similarly also Craig & de Bürca, op.cit., at 770-772.
137 In 1996, when UEFA’s European Championship was held in England, British newspapers headlined “Football’s 
coining home”.
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Walker v Crystal Palace, concerning a sportsman’s request for compensation due to 
incapacity for work, is to be situated already in the beginning of the twentieth century. In this 
particular case, the English Court of Appeal had to rule upon the issue whether a professional 
football player was to be considered as a ‘workman’ under the Workmen’s Compensation Act.138 39 
The clubs counsel advocated that a football player could not be qualified as a ‘workman’ within 
the terms of the Act for two main reasons: firstly, the club arguably only exerts limited control 
over the player, as the way in which he performs on the pitch during the games depends on his 
own initiatives, skills and instincts. And secondly, “the game of football which the applicant was 
hired to exhibit is a sport or pastime, not work.” These arguments were readily quashed by the 
Court. Cozens-Hardy Master o f the Rolls, who delivered the first opinion, concluded in the 
following way: “I feel myself quite unable to entertain any doubt that this man has entered into a 
contract of service with the club. I think it was a contract by way of manual labour, but whether it 
was so or not, I think it is a contract which plainly comes within those words ‘or otherwise’.”140 
Equally, Fletcher Moulton Lord Justice couldn’t find any reasonable room for doubt that a 
professional football player came within the scope of the Act: “Here is a company that carries on 
the game of football as a trade, getting up and taking part in football matches. In order to share in 
the proceeds of those matches they must, of course, have a team, which they can send to 
represent them in the games. This they obtain by entering into contracts of service with definite 
persons who are called professional football players, and who, in the language of the Master of 
the Rolls, give up their time for the purpose. Now I ask myself why is such a contract, which is in 
its form a contract of service, not to be regarded by us as such? I can see no reason.”141 Finally, 
Farwell Lord Justice rejected the arguments of the club in the following terms: ‘T hey  first of all 
say there is no contract of service with an employer because the football player is at liberty to
138 Walker v The Crystal Palace Football Club Limited [1910] 1 K.B. 87.
139 Section 13 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act 1906 provides: “The definition of a workman does not include 
any person employed otherwise than by way of manual labour whose remuneration exceeds .two hundred and fifty 
pounds a year, or a person whose employment is of a casual nature and who is employed otherwise than for the 
purposes of the employer’s trade or business, or a member of a police force, or an out-worker, or a member of the 
employer’s family dwelling in his house, but, save as aforesaid, means any person who has entered into, or works 
under, a contract of service or apprenticeship with an employer, whether by way of manual labour, clerical work, or 
otherwise, and whether the contract is expressed or implied, is oral or in writing.”
140 Walken at 92.
141 Walker, at 92-93.
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exercise his own initiative in playing the game. That appears to me to be no answer. There is 
many employment in which the workman exercises initiative, but he may or may not be bound to  
obey the directions o f his employer when given to him. If he has no duty to obey them, it m ay 
very well be that there is no service, but here not only is the agreement by the player that he w ill 
serve, but he also agrees to obey the training and general instructions of the club. I cannot doubt 
that he is bound to obey any directions which the captain, as the delegate o f the club, may give 
him during the course of the game -  that is to say, any direction that is within the terms of his 
employment as a football player.”142 Moreover, he stated that “it is impossible for the Court to  
consider the practical utility of the service or work performed. It may be sport to the amateur, but 
to a man who is paid for it and makes his living thereby it is his work. I cannot assent to the 
proposition that sport and work are mutually exclusive terms, or hold that the man who is 
employed and paid to assist in something that is known as sport is, therefore, necessarily 
excluded from the definition of workman within the meaning of the Act.”143
Consequently, the judges unanimously decided that the footballer in question came under 
the terms o f the Act. In the opinion of the Court of Appeal, it seemed therefore self-evident that 
the sporting activity of an athlete can be considered as an economic activity. Furthermore, the 
judges also seemed to agree that a football player performed his game under the direction and the 
supervision of his employer. Several decades later, the European Court of Justice would reach the 
same conclusions within the context of the Community Treaty, as will be demonstrated next.
2. Economic versus non-economic activities in the Community Treaty
As it results clearly from the analysis of the Court’s case law effectuated above, any given 
sporting activity must comply with two essential preconditions for it to be considered as an 
economic activity within the meaning of Article 2 EC: firstly, it must be a genuine and effective, 
and not a merely marginal or ancillary activity, and secondly, it must be of a truly economic 
character, implying that it is carried out in return for remuneration. The other main elements 
outlined in the previous section, namely the test of subordination and the temporary character o f
Walker, at 93.
143 Walker., at 93-94.
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the activities, will colour the debate in the next section as to whether these perceived economic 
activities are performed by workers or rather by self-employed covered under the provisions of 
establishment or services.
First of all, it must be assessed whether sport can be considered as a genuine and effective 
activity. In the light of the generous reading of the Court of Justice of this concept, interpreting, 
for example, teaching as a trainee for approximately 11 hours per week during two years144 or 
giving 12 hours of music lessons per week during a period of eight months145 as genuine and 
effective work, it seems that it can hardly be disputed that sport, certainly when performed at a 
certain level, constitutes a genuine and effective activity. The great majority of people active in 
one or the other sports discipline, regardless of whether they play in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro, 
on the streets of Berlin, in Yankee Stadium or on the holy grass of Wimbledon, view sport as fun, 
a leisure activity, a pastime. Some however, invest time, effort and money in sport with the 
objective of somehow making a living out of it. Most sports do require special technical skills 
and particular physical and mental capacities to obtain performances of a certain level. It almost 
inevitably and invariably takes years and years of practice, training and effective competition to 
master completely the whole gamut of basic techniques of a certain sports discipline and to gain 
the necessary insight and experience in the game to be able to play successfully. Furthermore, it 
speaks for itself that once athletes have reached a certain level of competitiveness, they have to 
keep on working, often even harder, to continue improving, to keep up with the rest. As one often 
says “it’s hard to get there, it’s even harder to stay there”. A recent survey carried out in Finland 
demonstrated, for example, that athletes competing at the highest national level in the five most 
popular sports dedicated between 24 and 32 hours per week to their sports, without even taking 
into account time for the indispensable periods of rest after training or mental preparation for the 
games.146 It seems thus obvious that sport can be a genuine and effective, very time-consuming 
activity, both physically as psychologically.
144 See Lawrie-Blum.
145 See Kempf.
146 See Huttunen, A comparative analysis o f the legal position o f professional sportsmen under Finnish, English and 
European Community Law. The borderlines o f employment (Ph.D. thesis EUI, 1999) at 169-177: for the 1992/93 
season football players devoted on average 24 per week to warming up, training, matches and travelling to the
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Secondly, and principally, the exercise of sport must also be o f an economic nature, that is 
to say it must be pursued for remuneration for it to come under the scope o f application of the 
Community Treaty. It is all very well that sport is practised by the athlete as a genuine and 
effective activity in terms of time and effort, but if there is no financial counterpart whatsoever 
for the performances of the player, then his sporting activity does not have a real economic 
character. In the early days, this particular requirement seemed to function as a real stumbling 
block to the inclusion of sport under Community law, as amateurism was considered to be o f  
paramount importance in sport. Under the motto of the Olympic movement “participating is m ore 
important than winning”, professionalism was taboo. Until recently, the greatest sporting event in 
the world, the Olympic Games, were only open to amateur athletes.147 The same exclusionary 
phenomenon could also be detected in other sports.148 However, it is clear that in practice, it w as 
often merely lip service which was paid to amateurism. Already in ancient Greece, Olympic 
medal winner received financial rewards securing them a comfortable life in society. And nobody 
can be expected to believe that athletes like sprinter Carl Lewis or pole-vaulter Sergey Bubka 
who earned eternal sporting glory in the Olympic arena were real amateurs. It didn’t therefore 
come as a surprise that the sporting associations finally yielded to the pressure exerted by the 
industrial sector and officially opened the doors to their competitions for professional sportsmen. 
In a way, in doing so, the associations were simply keeping up with time and adjusting to the 
changed reality. It was the arrival of -  in a second phase especially private - television that 
heralded the entry of big business and forced the definitive break-through of professionalism 
within the world of sport.149 Sponsors had found an ideal forum to advertise their products and 
invested loads of money in sport.150 Athletes suddenly got the opportunity to turn their hobby or
matches; basketball players 25 hours per week; Finnish baseball players 28 hours, volleyball players 31 hours and ice 
hockey players 32 hours.
147 In this way, Germany’s ice skating queen Katarina Witt was prevented from aiming for another gold medal after 
taking part in Disney’s professional World on Ice tour. Conversely, several talented Cuban boxers, headed by Felix 
Savon, renounced the almost certain championship belts and the big money to be earned in professional fights in the 
United States and remained loyal to Castro, in order to gain some precious sporting success for the communist 
regime as amateurs at the Olympic Games.
148 In tennis, for example, Australian tennis legend Rod Laver was excluded from participating in the Grand Slam 
events between 1962 and 1969 for also participating in the professional tennis circuit.
149 European Commission Working Paper on sport, consult http://euroDe.eu.int/comm/sDort
150 To illustrate with an example, in 2001, the French Open at Roland Garros in Paris, one of the four Grand Slams 
events in tennis, was financed by the following sponsors: BNP Paribas (presenting sponsor), IBM (official partners), 
Adecco (suppliers), JCDecaux (suppliers), Adidas, Lacoste, Balles Roland Garros, Champagne Lanson, AVIS, Café 
de Colombia, Comfort Bultex, Nestlé, Groupe ONET, Perrier, Descamps, PMU, Canon, Ericsson, elis, Stella Artois, 
Peugeot, Fujifilm, Haagen-Dazs, Tecnifibre, Philips, Rado Switzerland, France Télévision, RTL, Intersport, Orange,
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their passion into their profession and make their living out of it. They received a salary from the 
club they play for, or obtained participation fees or prize money from tournament organisers,151 152
or concluded sponsorship contracts. A recent analysis has highlighted that a football player in the 
Belgian first division, one of the smaller European leagues, nowadays earns on average 3.750 
Euro per month, and in addition gets to use an apartment and a car from his club. Furthermore, 
these figures are very small compared to the astronomic amounts of money that players in the 
Italian, Spanish, English, French or German leagues often make. Consequently, viewed at against 
the background of the wide approach adopted by the Court to the concept of remuneration, 
recognising not only the economic value of work carried out for less than the minimum 
guaranteed income, but being also permissive towards payments of income by persons other than 
the beneficiaries of the work or even towards economic counterparts which constitute only an 
indirect quid pro quo for the services delivered and can therefore not be considered as 
remuneration in the traditional sense of the term, it is clear that certain sport performances are of 
an economic nature within the meaning of Article 2 EC.
Effectively, the Court of Justice had little trouble in holding in Dona that the activities of 
professional or semi-professional football players are “in the nature of gainful employment or 
remunerated service” within the meaning of the Community provisions.153 This conclusion 
appears logical and straightforward, almost trivial nowadays. Far more intriguing is the question 
where the borderlines of this approach within the field of sport can be detected. It may very well 
be obvious that a high-level football player performs an economic activity within the meaning of 
Article 2 EC, but it is an entirely different matter whether the same can be said about a footballer 
playing for a club in a lower division. Equally worthy of further investigation is the situation of 
athletes active in other disciplines, less mediatised than football and often generating much 
smaller amounts of money. The main issue becomes then: when does sport in general cease or 
start being an economic activity for the purposes of the Treaty? Is it possible to distil some
Sanex, Top Tennis, Groupe Algeco, GlobeCast. In 2000, the event was broadcast in 166 countries, (source of 
information: http://www.rolandgarros.com )
151 In 2001, at Roland Garros, the total amount of prize money to be divided by the participating players amounted to 
73,317150 FF.
152 Demets & Killemaes, ‘"Luis Figo naar Westerlo?”, Trends, 10 August 2000. All included, this is more or less 4-5 
times as much as the minimum level of subsistence in Belgium.
153 Dona, par. 12.
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general guidelines or principles from the scarce pronouncements from the Court of Justice on the  
matter?
In theory, a kind of presumption could be established in favour of high-level football 
players, implying that they are to be regarded as performing an economic activity until p roof o f  
the contrary and therefore entailing a shift in the burden of proof in proceedings before the courts. 
Furthermore, one could envisage transposing this approach to the situation of athletes competing 
in other high profile sports. However, it is submitted that it is appropriate to adopt a cautious 
approach in this respect and avoid jumping to conclusions too hastily. First of all, one should 
evaluate properly the practical relevance of such a decision. Establishing a presumption 
necessarily implies that sometime somewhere a dividing line will have to be drawn. And this m ay  
prove to be more difficult than maybe expected at first sight, for in Italy or Spain, generally 
considered to have the strongest European leagues, a footballer playing in the third division m ay 
still be considered as carrying out an economic activity, whereas in Luxembourg, even a second 
division player may not satisfy the conditions to be regarded as such any longer. In this no t 
improbable scenario, any workable presumption will inevitably be reduced to a sort of lowest 
common denominator, devoid o f much practical substance. Secondly, one should also be aw are 
of the impact of regional differences and preferences within the European Union on the potential 
correctness o f such a presumption. Football is a special case. When it is sometimes referred to as 
‘King Football’, there is a reason for it. Football enjoys universal popularity. And moreover, in 
most countries it is the top sport, in which so much money circulates that everywhere within the  
European Union the game played at high level can be considered without too much difficulty o r 
hesitation as an economic activity.154 This makes it a difficult case for comparison however. A ny 
other sport which is considered to be a high profile sport in one Member State, does no t 
necessarily enjoy the same fame or status in another Member State. Some examples serve to  
illustrate this point: rugby may be immensely popular within the United Kingdom, Ireland, 
France and to a certain extent also in Italy,155 and many players can undoubtedly be considered as 
professional athletes carrying out an economic activity for the purposes of the application o f the
154 In 2000, the world’s three richest football clubs, Manchester United, Real Madrid and Bayern München had an 
annual turnover of respectively 184,8 million Euro, 163,8 million Euro and 144,7 million Euro. The top-10 is further 
completed by AC Milan, Juventus, Lazio Roma, Chelsea, FC Barcelona, Intemazionale and AS Roma. (Source: 
Deloitte and Touche Sport at http://www.sportbusiness.com. )
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Community provisions, but elsewhere in the European Union, rugby is only a sport of secondary 
importance, exercised almost exclusively on an amateur basis. The same holds true for ice 
hockey in Scandinavia, or cyclo-cross in the low countries. One should therefore be careful not to 
generalise too readily.
In principle therefore, in view of the fact that it is difficult to elaborate any workable 
presumption, it seems reasonable to presuppose that the particular situation of each sportsman 
will have to be evaluated on a case by case basis, on the basis of the objective circumstances of 
each particular situation.15 56 In this respect, it is important to bear in mind that the starting point of 
the analysis is always the same: the essential difference between amateur sport, which remains 
outside the Treaty scope, and professional sport or sport as an economic activity within the 
meaning of the Community Treaty lies in the fact that, contrary to amateur sportsmen, who play 
the sporting game predominantly as a pure hobby, professional athletes practice sport in order to 
earn their living, or at least part of it, by doing so. This is not to say that amateurs receive no 
financial compensation whatsoever for taking part in one or the other sporting activity. On the 
contrary, often they receive a kind of remuneration which in fact more or less takes the form of a 
reimbursement for the expenses incurred. In addition, they may also be rewarded by financial 
bonuses in case of sportive success. Substantially, in the light of the case law of the Court of 
Justice on the matter, that does not change as such their status of amateurs for the purposes of the 
application of Community law. However, what really seems to distinguish professional 
sportsmen from amateurs and permits them to be considered as workers or self-employed 
competing on an independent basis within the meaning of the Treaty provisions on free 
movement is the fact that in return for exercising their specific skills and capacities within a 
given sports discipline, they earn a regular income, exceeding the expenses made. The precise 
amount of this income does not really appear to be a matter of primary importance, in the light of 
the broad interpretation given by the Court to the concept of remuneration. In any event, in case 
of doubt or discussion, the issue will have to be decided by the national courts. For athletes which 
are to be regarded as workers, on the one hand, this remuneration will probably take the form of a 
traditional salary, to be paid in accordance with the terms of the contract of employment by the
155 England, Scotland, Wales, Ireland, France and Italy compete yearly in the famous “Six Nations Tournament”.
156 See also Huttunen, o.c., at 259-264.
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club or organisation with which they are affiliated. The specific details of the individual con tract 
seem to be of no particular importance: whether a sportsman receives a fixed salary regardless o f  
sporting results, or rather a basic salary to be supplemented by bonuses or premiums in the ev en t 
of sporting success makes no real difference. Professional athletes practising sport on an  
independent, self-employed basis, on the other hand, are more likely to be qualified as service 
providers within the meaning of the free movement provisions. In general, they derive th e ir  
remuneration from various sources. First of all, there is the prize money they gain in sporting 
competitions, the amount of which is normally dependent on the stage of the competition th e y  
reach before getting eliminated or on the place they obtain in the final rankings.157 In this respect, 
it could be argued that since there sometimes is an inherent chance of not winning any p rize  
money, this eventuality might imperil the qualification of a sportsman as a service provider. 
However, it is submitted that this supposition can be countered on the basis of the following 
argument: in principle, athletes taking part in this kind of competitions have the intrinsic qualities 
and the intention to perform on a certain level which guarantees them to win prize money more o r  
less on a regular basis. As long as this is the case, there is no reason to question the economic 
character of their sporting activities. Ultimately, this always remains a factual evaluation o f  
course. Secondly, they often also receive money for simply taking part in a particular contest o r  
competition, as the prestige, attractiveness for the audience and success o f a sporting event is 
often measured on the basis of the presence of sport stars. Organisers are therefore mostly m ore 
than prepared to pay to engage players like Stephen Hendry or Jimmy White to participate in 
their snooker tournaments. Furthermore, many sportsmen also obtain an income consisting o f  
sponsorship revenue or grants or subsidies awarded by their representative federations. Arguably, 
these financial means can also be taken into consideration when assessing the economic nature o f  
the sporting activities of the athlete in question.
Test-case: the situation o f judoka Christelle Délié ge
An excellent illustration of the casuistic approach of the Community institutions w ith 
regard to this matter is the opinion of Advocate General Cosmas in the case of Deliége. He
157 The winner of the Australian Open 2002 in Melbourne, another of the four Grand Slam events in tennis, receives 
1,000 000 Australian dollars. The losers of the first-round matches still get 14,980 Australian dollars, (source:
htip://www. australianopen.org )
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entered into an in-depth examination of the issue whether the activities of the judoka in question 
could be regarded as being of an economic nature.
Firstly, the Advocate General analysed whether the support offered by the judo 
federations to Deliege constituted in fact the financial counterpart of the services she claimed to 
provide, regardless of the specific denomination of these sums of money or the absence of a 
contractual relationship between the athlete and the federation.158 159He submitted that a sportsman 
is to be viewed as a service provider within the meaning of Article 49 EC if he carries out his 
sporting activities in a professional way. This is to be assessed in the first place on the basis of 
objective criteria imposed by the responsible institutions, often in a general and abstract way, 
which must be fulfilled by the athlete in question for financial help to be granted: as there are, for 
example, daily training sessions, other obligations requiring the athlete to dedicate him/herself 
exclusively to sport, significant investments of time and efforts, concrete high-level 
performances, titles, etc. In addition, it is also required that this activity has a certain continuity or 
duration, and that the actual amount of support can somehow be considered as a form of salary 
and thus exceeds the level of help for purely sporting reasons. Furthermore, in the opinion of the 
Advocate General, attention should equally be paid to more subjective criteria, such as for 
example the underlying motivation of the federation when subsidising certain athletes. Allegedly, 
the sole objective of this mechanism of attributing grants to athletes would be to make it possible 
for them to improve their sportive performances. The federations maintain that, in view of this
159purely social and cultural aim, Article 50 EC should be declared non-applicable in this respect. 
The Advocate General raises some doubts about the validity of this statement. He argues that aids 
granted on a regular basis by the federations to their champions often exceed the level of 
ameliorating or perfecting the performances. He opines that a high-level athlete renders an 
important service to his representative sports organisations, since his sports successes make him a 
hero or an idol for the youngsters one wants to convert to the sport in question,160 and an 
attraction pole for sponsors. Sporting success is also a convincing argument to claim a bigger
158 Cosmas AG in Deliege, paras. 36-47.
159 This proposition is based on an analogous interpretation of the Court’s decisions in a number of cases concerning 
public education; see Case 263/86 Belgium v Humbel [1988] ECR 5365 and Case C-109/92 Wirth v 
Landeshauptstadt Hannover [1993] ECR 1-6447.
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share o f the total amount of subsidies for sport from the State budget. Certain spo rts  
performances have a clear financial value nowadays. Therefore, in the light of these objective a n d  
subjective elements, the Advocate General concluded that under certain circumstances, sporting 
activities can be considered as services normally provided in return for which the sportsm an 
regularly receives financial and/or material support from his federation
Secondly, Advocate General Cosmas embarked on a more general study o f th e  
relationship between sport and economic life.160 61 Firstly, he affirmed the fundamental rule that th e  
closer the link is between sport and economic activity, the more sporting activities are subject to  
the Treaty provisions on freedom of movement. Within this framework, he firstly examined th e  
potential importance for the application o f Community free movement law of the existence o f  
individual sponsoring contracts concluded between sportsmen and private financiers.162 In h is  
opinion, it would be mistaken to completely disconnect the advertising services the ath lete  
renders to his sponsors from his sporting performances. Most of the time, both activities a re  
closely linked and are simply two expressions of the same activity. Admittedly, it must be  
observed that sports results are not the only relevant element which is taken into consideration 
when undertakings decide to sponsor sportsmen. Other factors also have a role to play, such as 
the physical appearances, certain qualities or capacities or particular characteristics of the athlete. 
It can therefore not be excluded that for commercial purposes, sponsors prefer another athlete 
rather than the champion of a certain sports discipline to promote or identify with a certain  
product.163 However, it is undeniably true that this kind of publicity through sponsoring does 
require athletes of a high level, known by the audience at large precisely because o f their 
participation in important sporting events.164 Advertising assignments go hand in hand w ith  
sporting success. Consequently, the Advocate General concluded that the existence o f personal 
sponsors are an important indicator of the fact that a given sports activity might represent an
160 Since the two Belgian teenagers Kim Clijsters and Justine Henin stormed into the top-10 of women’s tennis in the 
summer of 2000, after respectively reaching the finals at Roland Garros and Wimbledon, the number of young tennis 
players in Belgium has increased.spectacularly.
*61 Cosmas AG in Deliège, paras. 48-60.
162 Cosmas AG in Deliège, paras. 51-53.
163 A good example can be found in the women’s tennis circuit: Russia’s Anna ‘Lolita’ Koumikova is the undisputed 
queen of commercials, even though she isn’t ranked in the top ten and hasn’t even won one single WTA (Women’s 
Tennis Association) singles tournament in her career yet. But she has the looks...
164 Danone have chosen Bob Peeters to figure in their new commercials for yoghurts in Belgium. He is definitely not 
the best or most famous Belgian football player, but still, he is often selected for the ‘Red Devils’, the national side.
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economic character. He didn’t go so far as stipulating that sponsoring constitutes always or 
necessarily a sufficient condition for a certain sports activity to be considered as economic 
however, explaining that the financial expectations of the athletes and the commercial interests of 
the sponsors do not, as such, touch upon the substance o f the sport in question. He opined that if 
all other relevant factors which make up a sporting event (such as, in particular, the sporting rules 
or the rules concerning the organisation of the competitions) remain outside the economic sphere, 
sponsors cannot intervene in these non-economic aspects of sport and change the face of the sport 
according to their wishes. As an abstract rule, this is no doubt correct. However, during the last 
years, one can unmistakably observe an increasing tendency to modify the specific rules in 
different sports in order to make them more attractive for television broadcasting.165 The grip of 
sponsors on sport is still continuously tightening ... Subsequently, the Advocate General tackled 
the question whether a sporting event in itself, in view of its specific features, can be considered 
to be of an economic nature, an issue which he regards as being of capital importance for the 
precise determination of the economic nature of a sporting activity.166 After all, only sports 
contests allow for the evaluation of athletes: individual performances lose much, if not all, of 
their significance and value if they are not accompanied by success in real events, where athletes 
compete with and measure themselves against their rivals. If a sporting competition is more than 
simply a quest to be the best and represents also a proper economic dimension, it may constitute 
as such an economic activity within the meaning of Article 2 EC. According to Cosmas, this 
economic dimension may consist of different elements: firstly, the sporting competition may be 
an event accessible to the public in return for payment ( ‘gate-money’); secondly, it may become a 
television product generating revenue for the holders of the rights of transmission, and thirdly, it 
can provide an ideal location or moment for promotion services or advertisement campaigns. In 
this respect, the Advocate General also rightly observed that common experience has revealed 
that the natural course of things leads to a progressive reinforcement of the economic character of 
sporting events. As the importance of a certain sporting competition grows for the world of sport, 
also the economic interests at stake increase. Paradigm examples are the Tour of France for
165 In basketball, the time for a team to make an attempt at the basket has been reduced from 30 to 24 seconds, 
increasing the number of replays and thus also of potential commercial messages. In volleyball, one has abolished 
the old rule according to which one could only score a point on one’s own serve, to increase the risk factor in the 
game, to render it more attractive and to reduce the duration of matches. This move was indicated for television 
annex sponsorship purposes.
166 Cosmas in Deliege, paras. 54-56.
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cycling, the World Cup for football and above all, the Olympic Games for sport in general. All 
these events generate enormous amounts o f money from spectators, television deals and 
sponsorship contracts. Equally, their economic dimension can be derived from the impact of the 
economy on the purely sporting aspects of the competition. For example, as far as the Olympic 
Games are concerned, in order to attract the largest possible audiences and to increase sponsoring 
deals, professional athletes have recently been allowed to participate, and new sporting 
disciplines are regularly being introduced on the Olympic agenda.
On the basis o f his findings, Advocate General Cosmas opined that the participation o f a 
high-level athlete such as Christelle Deliege, who has the benefit of some sponsorship contracts, 
to international tournaments with an economic dimension, can be considered as an economic 
activity and constitutes a service within the meaning of Article 49 of the Treaty.167 The Court, on 
the other hand, only dealt in an extremely concise way with this matter. It noted first that the 
referring judge referred “among other things to grants awarded on the basis of earlier sporting 
results and to sponsorship contracts directly linked to the results achieved by the athlete”, before 
simply specifying that Deliege had produced supporting documents that she had indeed received, 
“by reason of her sporting achievements, grants from the Belgian French-speaking Community 
and from the Belgian Inter-Federal and Olympic Committee and that she has been sponsored by a 
banking institution and a motor-car manufacturer.”168 This seemed to suffice for the Court to 
conclude somewhat further in its judgement that “sporting activities and, in particular a high- 
ranking athlete’s participation in an international competition are capable of involving the 
provision o f a number o f separate, but closely related, services which may fall within the scope o f 
Article 49 o f the Treaty, even if some of those services are not paid for by those for whom they 
are performed.”169 There is nothing inherently wrong or objectionable about the Court’s 
principled decision in this respect, o f course, but it speaks for itself that the profoundly 
documented examination of the Advocate General is much richer and has provided more insight 
and analysis relevant for the purposes of this thesis.170
167 Cosmas AG in Deliege, par. 60.
168 Deliege, par. 51.
169 Deliege, par. 56.
170 Also, as is often the case, the Court may well have been influenced by the AG’s analysis even while basing its 
judgement on a much narrower ground. A similar relationship between a ‘rich’ AG’s opinion and a rather
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III. A RE SPORTSM EN W ORKERS OR SELF-EMPLOYED?
Having established that the practice of sport can under certain circumstances be 
considered as an economic activity within the meaning of Article 2 EC, one would logically 
expect the next step in the general Community approach to be a critical evaluation of the question 
whether this kind of activity falls under the Treaty provisions on the freedom of movement of 
workers or rather under the rules concerning the freedom to provide services.171 However, the 
Court does not seem to attach too much weight to the precise assessment of the applicable Treaty 
provisions with regard to this particular issue, or at least did not do so initially.
On the first occasion when the Court was confronted with this matter, in Walrave, 
Advocate General Warner had already expressed his view that “Articles 39 and 49 are, in every 
material respect, parallel and that, Article 49 being residuary, if the plaintiffs contracts are not of 
a kind to which Article 39 relates, they must be of a kind to which Article 49 relates. That being 
so, the question whether they are contracts of service or contracts for services loses, to my mind, 
much of its importance. At all events, the Arrondissementsrechtbank, quite properly, does not ask 
this Court to decide it.” 172 In essence, the Court followed the opinion of its Advocate General on 
this point. It stipulated clearly that when the practice o f sport has the character of gainful 
employment or remunerated service, “it comes more particularly within the scope, according to 
the case, of Articles 48 to 51 or 59 to 66 of the Treaty.”173 It proceeded holding that in this 
respect, “the exact nature of the legal relationship under which such services are performed is of 
no importance since the rule of non-discrimination covers in identical terms all work or 
services.”174 Further on in its decision, the Court specified that the “activities referred to in 
Article 49 are not to be distinguished by their nature from those in Article 39, but only by the fact
deliberately ‘narrow’ judgement of the European Court of Justice on the same issue of remuneration and economic 
activity (in broadcasting) can be seen in the much earlier Bond van Adverteerders case.
171 The rules on freedom of establishment, though theoretically potentially relevant of course, will be left out of 
consideration for the remainder of this chapter, as in all sports cases which have been decided up until now, the issue 
has been whether the athletes in question were to be qualified as workers or alternatively, as service providers.
172 Warner AG in Walrave, at 1425.
173 Walrave, par. 5.
174 Walrave, par. 7.
55
that they are performed outside the ties of a contract of employment.”175 According to the Court, 
“this single distinction cannot justify a more restrictive interpretation of the scope of the freedom 
to be ensured.” 176 The Court thus didn’t deem it necessary to judge which provisions finally 
prevailed in the light of the factual circumstances of the case. W hen referring the matter back to  
the national court to be decided, it contented itself with the statement that “the provisions o f  
Articles 12, 39 and 49 of the Treaty may be taken into account by the national court in judging 
the validity or the effects of a provision inserted in the rules of a sporting organisation.” 177
Two years later, in the case of Donà, the matter came up for consideration again. 
Advocate General Trabucchi made a rather interesting contribution to the debate. In his opinion, 
he drew some comparisons with the previous case, stating that in Walrave, “in the relationship 
between athlete and club, the prevalence of the element of gainful employment over the sporting 
element was very clear since it involved a type of cycle race in which some o f the participants 
[...] played a secondary and subordinate role. In the case of a football team, the element o f 
athletic subordination, if I may call it that, is not present; the fact remains, however, that the 
players have a professional or semi-professional status which, in fact, puts them in the position o f 
employees as against the club which runs the team.”178 Be that as it may, the Court once more 
refrained from  offering any useful guidance to the discussion, and simply ruled that the activities 
of professional or semi-professional football players are in the nature of gainful employment o r 
remunerated service.179 Furthermore, it also added that where “such players are nationals of a  
Member State they benefit in all the other Member States from the provisions o f Community law 
concerning freedom of movement of persons and of provision of services.”180 Consequently, the 
Court left it open whether the provisions of Article 39 on workers or rather the provisions o f  
Article 49 on services apply to the activities of professional footballers.
In the light of these previous two judgements, it seemed almost self-evident that the Court 
of Justice would be inclined to proceed along the path chosen and would not distinguish between
175 Walrave, par. 23.
176 Walrave, par. 24.
177 Walrave, par. 25.
178 Trabucchi AG in Donày at 1343.
179 Donà, par. 12.
180 Donà, par. 13.
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the fundamental freedoms of persons and services if there was no real necessity to do so. From 
this point of view, it did thus somehow come as a surprise that when the Belgian Court of Appeal 
decided to stay the proceedings in the Bosman case and refer the matter to the European Court of 
Justice, its request for a preliminary ruling concerning the transfer rules and nationality clauses in 
professional football involved only their compatibility with Article 39 EC, to the exclusion of 
Article 49 EC.181 In any event, the Court did not appear to be troubled by this omission, for it 
simply concluded that “Article 39 therefore applies to rules laid down by sporting associations 
such as URBSFA, FIFA or UEFA, which determine the terms on which professional sportsmen 
can engage in gainful employment.”182 Advocate General Lenz dedicated some interesting 
paragraphs in his opinion to the matter. Firstly, he observed that “it appears indeed correct that 
the professional footballers active in a football club are to be regarded as workers within the 
meaning of that provision”, but immediately added that “the result would be no different if the 
examination had to be done with reference to Article 49 et seq.” 183 Subsequently, he suggested 
that “in examining the compatibility of national provisions with the provisions of Community law 
on the fundamental freedoms, it is not so important which specific fundamental freedom a 
particular factual situation is to be measured against. What should be decisive is rather whether 
the provisions in question hinder trans-frontier economic activity and - if  that is the case- whether 
those restrictions are justified.” He acknowledged that “that does not exclude the possibility that 
distinctions are to be made with respect to justification according to whether the hindrance is of a 
discriminatory or non-discriminatory nature. The circumstance of a permanent or only a 
temporary activity in another Member State being concerned may also justify distinctions in that 
respect, as is already accepted in the case law.”184 He insisted that "‘that is by no means a purely 
academic point. The Court’s case law shows that there is often considerable difficulty in 
distinguishing between factual situations which come under one and those which come under 
another of the fundamental freedoms. The present case is a good example. As a rule it is no doubt 
correct [...] to classify football players as workers within the meaning of Article 39. Under the 
third paragraph of Article 50, the essential criterion for distinguishing between Article 39 and 
Article 49 is that the latter only covers activities which are ‘temporarily’ pursued in another
181 The national court also asked the Court to express its opinion on the lawfulness of the transfer rules and the 
nationality clauses with regard to the Community competition rules, of course.
182 Bosman, par. 87.
183 Lenz AG in Bosman, at 1-4976, par. 134.
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Member State. What does that mean, for example, with respect to a contract by which a club 
engages a player for a few matches? It is debatable whether in such a case it would not be better 
to speak o f a provision of services. The transfer rules currently in force admittedly ensure for the 
most part by means of specified time-limits that contracts with players have a term o f at least a 
whole season, or at any rate half a season. However, that is not necessary, as the example of other 
sports shows. The Court has therefore quite rightly left it open in a number of cases whether 
Article 39 or 49, for example, was applicable in the present case. It did that in the Walrave and 
Dona cases, which are of special interest in the present case. The Court thereby clearly indicated 
that those two provisions employ comparable criteria and that their application led to the same
1 ftcresult in the specific case. That confirms my opinion set out above.”
Clearly, all this perfectly illustrates the almost overwhelming consensus at the time 
between the Court of Justice and its Advocates-General on the qualification of the sporting 
activities o f  an athlete for the purposes of the application of the Community law provisions on the 
right of freedom of movement: the precise nature of the legal relationship under which the sport 
in question is exercised simply does not seem to matter really. Once a certain activity is 
considered being of an economic nature, that suffices to trigger the application o f the free 
movement provisions, be it the rules on the free movement of workers or rather the ones on the 
freedom to provide services. This particular approach of the Court, however practically useful it 
may be, cannot be unequivocally supported, for it oversimplifies things and, more importantly, 
disregards the intrinsic differences which can be distinguished between these two sets of 
provisions. Even if it must be acknowledged that it is sometimes indeed extremely hard to state 
with absolute certainty under which fundamental freedom a given factual situation is to be 
caught, and moreover, that the final outcome of the decision of the Court is often the same, 
irrespective o f whether the Court’s analysis has been based on Article 39 or Article 49 EC, the 
fact remains that these Articles to a certain extent cover separate realities, as Advocate General 
Jacobs readily admitted. In the words of the Court itself, “the situation of a Community national 
who moves to another Member State of the Community in order there to pursue an economic 
activity is governed by the chapter of the Treaty on the free movement of workers, or the chapter *183
184 Lenz AG in Bosman, at 1-5006, par. 200.
183 Lenz AG in Bosman, at 1-5006-5007, par. 201.
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1 RAon the right of establishment or the chapter on services, these being mutually exclusive.” To 
emphasise these differences once again, firstly, the provision of services, contrary to the 
performance of mere working activities, is performed outside the ties of a contract of 
employment, so that the element of subordination, inherent in a working relationship, is less 
clear-cut or even completely absent in this respect. And secondly, the Treaty provisions on 
services envisage that these activities are pursued only on a temporary basis. It is therefore 
submitted that, inasmuch as possible, regard should be had to these characteristic features to 
determine which fundamental freedom is better suited to deal with the factual situation at hand. 
And if this were to turn out practically impossible on the basis of the information available, it 
should not be forgotten that services constitute a residual category, subordinate to the other 
fundamental freedoms, in that the first paragraph of Article 50 EC specifies that the provisions 
relating to services apply only if those relating to the other freedoms do not apply.186 87
Besides, it is submitted that also from a legal point o f view, it may be relevant to 
distinguish carefully between workers and service providers. Arguably, the category of workers 
have been attributed more substantive rights and entitlements in Community secondary 
legislation than the category of service providers. To give but an example, Article 7(2) of 
Regulation 1612/68 which guarantees Community workers the same social and tax advantages in 
their host Member State as that State’s nationals, is not applicable to service providers.188 
Moreover, it is not unthinkable that, in the light of the intrinsic differences between these two 
fundamental freedoms, certain justifications invoked to safeguard any given restrictive national 
measure may be accepted by the Court o f Justice as overriding requirements in the general 
interest under one fundamental freedom whereas they may be rejected as unsatisfactory or 
unnecessary under the other freedom. Furthermore, it is entirely conceivable that the Court will 
refrain from transposing its findings in Angonese to the field of services so that Article 49 EC, 
contrary to Article 39 EC, will not be considered as fully horizontally effective. In the light of the
186 See Case C-55/94 Gebhard v Consiglio delVOrdine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano [1995] ECR 1-4165, 
par. 20.
187 See e.g. Gebhard, par. 22 et seq.; or Case 155/73 Giuseppe Sacchi [1973] ECR 409, paras. 6-7, in which the 
Court decided that the transmission of television signals, including those in the nature of advertisements, comes 
within the rules of the Treaty relating on services, but conversely, subjected trade in material, sound recordings, 
films, apparatus and other products used for the diffusion of television signals to the rules relating to the freedom of 
movement for goods.
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foregoing, the specific qualification of sportsmen as workers or service providers may therefore 
turn out to be of crucial importance for their legal situation under Community law. Conversely, if 
in the future the trend towards convergence were to be radically carried through, a hypothesis 
which cannot be completely discarded, so that one would not be able detect practical differences 
between the freedom o f movement of workers and the freedom to provide services any more, 
under these circumstances it would no longer make sense to try to distinguish between these two 
sets of provisions. For the time being, however, it arguably still makes sense to differentiate 
clearly between Articles 39 and 49 EC.18 89
That it is indeed perfectly feasible in many circumstances to distinguish between workers 
and service providers is further evidenced by the fact that the Court, contrary to its findings in the 
early sports cases Walrave and Dona, in which it held both Articles 39 and 49 EC to be 
indistinctly applicable, based its judgements in the more recent cases of Bosman, Deliege and 
Lehtonen on the basis o f one single Treaty provision relating to one fundamental freedom only, 
this respectively being Article 39, 49 and again 39 EC. Whether this change does effectively 
reflect an evolved approach on behalf of the Court or, rather, is to be explained on the simple 
ground that the national courts or tribunals, when they decided to stay the national proceedings 
and sent the matter to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling, referred only to one 
fundamental freedom with regard to the case to be decided, so that the Court was more or less 
forced to limit its pronouncement to that particular Treaty Article, is not completely crystal clear. 
It may very well be that the last three preliminary references originate all from Belgian courts, 
whereas the former two have their source in respectively a Dutch and an Italian court, but this 
fact can probably more easily be attributed to a fortunate concurrence of circumstances rather 
than constitute a scientific explanation for the occurrence o f the change in question. A far more 
plausible elucidation lies in the observation that the societal and legal landscape has considerably 
evolved in the years which passed between the Court’s decision in Dona in the mid seventies and 
the initial skirmish in Bosman in the beginning of the nineties. As a  matter o f fact, in the 
seventies, the Court’s case law on the fundamental freedoms in general, and on the concepts of 
‘workers’ and ‘services’ in particular, was relatively speaking, still in its infancy. And within the
188 See also Preedy, Private Regulations and the Fundamental Freedoms o f the EC Treaty (EUILLM. thesis, 1999) at 
18.
189 See also Huttunen, o.c., at 264-269.
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world of sport, professionalism was still very busy settling down. One simply seemed to be too 
busy coming to grips with this new reality and with all its inevitable repercussions to be really 
genuinely concerned about the -  from this perspective at least - minor question whether 
sportsmen, if they already had to be considered as carrying out an economic activity within the 
meaning of the Community Treaty at all, were to be regarded as workers or service providers in 
the context of the free movement provisions. However, since then, a lot of water has been 
running to the sea. By the time Bosman cleared his throat to utter his legendary complaint against 
the traditional transfer system in football, the Court of Justice had fleshed out the scope of 
application of the provisions relating to free movement. Moreover, in several Member States 
important progress had been made with regard to the assessment o f the legal status of sportsmen. 
On the basis of these almost contemporaneous developments, the task of distinguishing between 
sports activities carried out under the terms of a contract of employment as a worker within the 
meaning of Article 39 EC and sports performances delivered as a service provider falling under 
the scope of Article 49 EC became much more feasible.
In the remainder of this paragraph, I will scrutinise somewhat more in detail the specific 
activities of certain athletes, in order to assess whether they are to be qualified as workers or 
rather as services providers for the purposes of Community law. From these particular findings, I 
will then try to derive some more general observations about other sportsmen active in different 
sports disciplines.
The most hotly debated case undoubtedly is that of professional or semi-professional 
football players. Whereas the Court of Justice in Dona still declined to pronounce itself on the 
question whether footballers were to be regarded as workers or alternatively as service providers, 
almost twenty years later in Bosman it did not show any hesitation whatsoever in stipulating that 
football players are workers within the meaning of Article 39 EC. Essentially, the Court simply 
affirmed this, without providing any further guidance. It limited itself to holding that all that is 
required for the application of the Community provisions on freedom of movement for-workers 
“is the existence of, or the intention to create, an employment relationship”190 and furthermore 
that Article 39 applies to “rules laid down by sporting associations such as URBSFA, FIFA or
190 Bosm an, par. 74.
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UEFA, which determine the terms on which professional sportsmen can engage in gainful 
employment.”191 In this respect, it is interesting to observe that the defendants in the proceedings 
objected to virtually everything they were charged with, but they did not adduce any specific 
information or evidence to rebut the qualification by the Belgian court of football players as 
workers. Inevitably, this silence on behalf of the football authorities contributes to the impression 
that this particular qualification is to be taken for granted, as a matter of fact.
Time has therefore come now to try to falsify the hypothesis and put the Court’s statement 
to the test: do football players effectively comply with the necessary preconditions to be 
considered as a worker in the meaning of Article 39? Firstly, it goes without saying that 
professional or semi-professional football is a genuine and effective economic activity and that 
these players are -  or at least are supposed to be - familiar with all the different aspects of the 
game, both technically and tactically. Secondly, it is also beyond doubt that professional football 
players are -  often even richly -  financially rewarded for representing their club of affiliation. 
Admittedly, all this still seems like forcing an open door. Thirdly, however, finally arriving at the 
decisive criterion to discern workers from service providers, it still remains to be seen whether 
footballers pass the test of subordination as laid down in Lawrie-Blum and supplemented in 
Agegate. Strictly speaking, footballers clearly do not choose the services they perform: the club 
pays them principally to play football, not to act in a movie for example. Admittedly, there may 
be some free choice with regard to concomitant activities such as interviews and other 
representative tasks, but in general, this freedom is only limited and furthermore concerns only 
activities o f secondary importance. Basically, everything turns around the ball. Moreover, 
football players normally do not have the freedom to choose their working hours either. 
Evidently, they have to be present at the regular fixtures of their club, regardless of whether these 
matches are played during the day or in the evening, at weekdays or during the weekend, in the 
own stadium or ‘away’, in the home country or abroad. Before important games, teams 
sometimes go in ‘retirement’, in order to prepare the players in optimal conditions for the game; 
therefore, they have to accompany the team in these retirements. Players also have to be regularly 
at the training centre of the club to participate in the group training sessions as scheduled by the 
coaching staff. Besides, many clubs simply impose the requirement that their players also be
191 Bosman, par. 87.
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present at the club during certain hours, in order to promote the team spirit and to keep an eye on 
discipline (with regard to food, alcohol, lifestyle in general, etc.). Only in the event of individual 
training sessions, for example during the phase of rehabilitation after injury, players may have 
some freedom to choose their working hours, but even then, they are normally supposed to follow 
precisely the instructions of the special programme elaborated by the coaches in co-operation 
with the medical staff o f the club. Furthermore, the players have the obligation to obey the orders 
and carry out the tasks assigned to them on the pitch by the coaches, both during training sessions 
and matches. Also more in general, footballers must observe the rules established by the club 
they play for. These may concern a variety of issues, ranging from internal regulations or dress 
codes over obligations not to ventilate critical remarks on the colleagues, coach and management 
of the club to rules imposing bedtime hours or limiting alcohol consumption within a certain 
period o f time before a match.
All criteria laid down by the Court of Justice in Lawrie-Blum in order to determine the 
existence of a relationship of subordination are clearly fulfilled in the case of football players and 
the club they represent. In sum, nothing seems to contradict the supposition that footballers are to 
be considered as workers within the meaning of Article 39 EC. Additionally, this conclusion is 
further reinforced by the fact that the situation of footballers also seems to satisfactorily comply 
with the supplementary factors furnished by the Court in Agegate to complete the test of 
subordination. Firstly, usually football players do not share the commercial risks of the business. 
They normally do not own shares of the club if it is quoted on the stock exchange. Creditors of 
the club can not recover their losses from the players if the club fails to live up to its financial 
obligations.192 Secondly, players do not have the freedom to engage their own assistants. It is 
self-evident that football players are in no position to engage personal assistants who would carry 
out their sporting activities for them. The practice of sport requires the individual effort and 
performance of the athlete in question. Germany’s Oliver Kahn is paid by Bayern Munich to be 
their goalkeeper; he cannot rely on someone else, his brother for example, to do so, he has to 
stand between the posts himself. In principle,- there does not seem to be any reason to prevent
192 http://www.kwsport.kataweb.it of 14 November 2001: The situation of Italian team Fiorentina, which went 
bankrupt due to accumulated debts serves to illustrate this point. In no way whatsoever were the players involved in 
the investigation procedure of the Florence justice department. To the contrary, they even acted as creditors, claiming 
arrears of income.
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players from calling for the services of personal doctors or physiotherapists or other assistants, 
apart from the personnel they can already consult at the club, as long as they get the club’s 
consent to do so. But in any event, what matters really is the sports performance in se, and this 
unmistakably has to be delivered by the athlete himself. Thirdly, also the final criterion 
recognised by the Court to determine someone’s status for the purposes of the application of free 
movement law, namely the particular way in which remuneration for services rendered is 
calculated, does not stand in the way of a qualification of footballers as workers within the 
meaning of Article 39 EC. Hence, in the case of Agegate, the Court already minimised somewhat 
the importance to be attached to this criterion, expressing the opinion that “the sole fact that a 
person is paid a ‘share’ and that his remuneration may be calculated on a collective basis is not o f 
such a nature as to deprive that person of his status of worker.”193 And besides, in general it 
seems that football players do not receive pay calculated on a collective basis. In principle, the 
specific salary structure, the way it is calculated and its final height may vary considerably from  
player to player and is negotiated in the terms o f the individual contract between the player and 
the club. It must be acknowledged that bonuses received in the event of successful performances 
could be constmed as pay calculated on a collective basis, but even if this were true, it only 
constitutes part o f the salary o f the players, the rest of which remains, under normal 
circumstances, on an individual basis.
Consequently, at this point, it can safely be affirmed that the Court of Justice reached the 
correct conclusion in Bosman and that professional or semi-professional football players indeed 
fit squarely within the scope of application o f the Treaty provisions on free movement of workers 
as laid down in Article 39 EC et seq. Even the observation of AG Jacobs that it is debatable 
whether it would not be better to speak of provision of services with respect to a contract by 
which a club engages a player only for a few matches, how pertinent it may be or seem, does not 
detract from this conclusion. Hence, even if the engagement by the club of these football players 
is only very temporary, that does not change anything about the fact that during that limited 
period of time, they are supposed to carry out their sporting activities under the direction and the 
supervision o f the club that has hired them.194 Under these circumstances, they clearly fulfil the
193 Agegate, par. 36.
194 See in this context Case C-3/90 Bemini v Minister van Onderwijs en Wetenschappen [1992] EC R 1-1070.
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necessary conditions to be considered as workers within the meaning of Article 39 and there is no 
reason to qualify them as service providers simply because of the limited duration o f their 
contract. This also serves to illustrate the hierarchically superior position of the category of 
workers with regard to the category of services within the framework of the EC Treaty: as soon 
as the requirements for the application of Article 39 are satisfied, Article 49 as the residual 
provision no longer has to be taken into consideration.
Arguably, the same conclusion can also be reached with regard to athletes active in many 
other sports such as volleyball, basketball, handball, rugby, ice-hockey, etc. What has been said 
previously about football players also holds true, mutatis mutandis, for sportsmen performing 
these kinds of sports. When signing a contract of affiliation with a certain team, these players 
agree to render services to the club for a certain period o f time, in return for which they receive 
remuneration. It belongs to the essence of team sports that the team delivers a collective 
performance, composed of the combined individual efforts of all of its players. It goes without 
saying that a team can only function properly and that the team’s performances can only be 
improved or optimised when the constituent members know exactly what is expected of each of 
them individually and do indeed carry out the coaching staffs instructions on the pitch. It can 
therefore hardly be disputed that these sportsmen carry out their sporting activities under the 
direction and the supervision of the club’s management. Consequently, it is advocated that the 
conclusion reached by the Court of Justice in Bosman to the extent that the activities of 
professional or semi-professional football players are covered under Article 39 EC, can be 
transposed without too much difficulty to athletes active in other team sports, who are thus 
equally to be considered as workers within the meaning o f Article 39 EC. In this respect, it must 
be emphasised that the Court of Justice seems to share the same opinion. In the case of Lehtonen, 
involving a Finnish professional basketball player, the Court readily came to the conclusion that 
he had to be considered as a worker. After briefly outlining its established case law on the 
concept of ‘workers’ within the meaning of the Community Treaty,195 it simply held that “it 
appears from the findings of fact made by the national court-and from the documents produced to 
the Court that Lehtonen had entered into a contract of employment with a club in another 
Member State with a view to exercising gainful employment in that State. As he has rightly
195 Lehtonen, paras. 39-45.
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submitted, he thereby accepted an offer of employment actually made, within the meaning of 
Article 39(3)(a) of the Treaty.”196 Previously, in his opinion in the case, Advocate General Alber 
even more readily reached the same conclusion.197
In the light of the foregoing, the qualification of athletes competing in team sports for the 
purposes of the application of the Community provisions on freedom o f movement seems to be 
sufficiently crystallised now, at least for the time being. That, however, is not the end of the story 
yet. Many sports disciplines are exercised predominantly or exclusively on an individual basis. 
Suffice to think o f tennis, skiing, most of the track and field athletics disciplines, swimming, etc, 
to name but some of the more obvious. In general, competitions in these sports take the form of 
direct encounters between two sportsmen, whereby the winner advances to the next stage of the 
event,198 or of confrontations between several athletes contemporaneously.199 Contrary to what is 
the case in team sports, in which the score or result obtained by the team is the result of the 
combined efforts of the team members, in individual sports the result is entirely dependent upon 
the single performance of the sportsmen in comparison to that of the other athletes competing in 
the same event. The question arises now whether these sportsmen performing an individual sport 
have to be qualified differently from the angle of the Community free movement rules than 
athletes active in team sports or whether they can equally be considered as workers within the 
meaning of Article 39 EC? Once more, one proceeds from the assumption that the basic 
constituent preconditions for the application of the fundamental freedoms are fulfilled, that is to 
say that the specific sporting activities of these athletes are of an economic nature and that they
196 Lehtonen, par. 46.
197 Alber AG in Case C-176/96 Jyri Lehtonen and Castors Canada Dry Namur-Braine v Federation Royale Beige 
des Sociétés de Basketball [2000] ECR 1-2681, paras. 41-43: Firstly, he opined in more general terms that what was 
the case for professional football players, also had to be true for professional basketball players, as they find 
themselves in the same situation. Subsequently, he proceeded holding that as “it is not necessary, for the purposes of 
the application of the Community provisions on freedom of movement for workers, for the employer to be an 
undertaking; all that is required is the existence of, or the intention to create, an employment relationship”, Article 39 
EC is applicable to the circumstances of this case. Finally, he did acknowledge that -  as the Italian government had 
observed in its intervention -  the request for a preliminary ruling contained almost no concrete factual information 
which might be helpful in deciding whether Lehtonen was to be qualified as a worker. However, he didn’t consider 
this to be problematic, as he argued that it emerged incontestably both from the reference from the national tribunal 
as from the subsequent developments in the procedure between the parties that Lehtonen must be regarded as a 
worker.
198 Tennis is a good example of this sort of competition. In order to win one of the four Grand Slam events, a tennis 
player needs to win seven consecutive matches.
199 For example, in general, eight sprinters participate in the final of the 100 meter athletics at international 
tournaments.
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are remunerated. The decisive criterion distinguishing between sportsmen competing on an 
employment basis and athletes performing their sporting discipline as self-employed, as outlined 
above, is the element of subordination. In general, this seems to be absent in this particular kind 
of factual situation. Sportsmen competing in individual sports normally do not sign contracts of 
employment with one or the other employer. In principle, they deliver their performances on their 
own account, not under the direction and the supervision of an employer. They can therefore not 
be considered as workers within the meaning of the Community Treaty. They do of course 
conclude contracts with sponsors or organisers of tournaments which entail that certain 
obligations are temporarily imposed upon them, for example during the progress of a certain 
competition,200 201but it seems that the activities they carry out in compliance with these contracts 
can be more appropriately classified in the category of provision of services as regulated in 
Article 49 EC. The Court of Justice highlighted this very well in its judgement in the case of 
Deliegey involving a Belgian judoka who performed this martial art at high level. Firstly, the 
Court confirmed that “sporting activities and, in particular, a high-ranking athlete’s participation 
in an international competition are capable of involving the provision of a number of separate, 
but closely related, services which may fall within the scope of Article 49 of the Treaty even if
I
some of those services are not paid for by those for whom they are performed.”* Subsequently, 
it offered somewhat more guidance on the issue, holding that “for example, an organiser o f such 
a competition may offer athletes an opportunity of engaging in their sporting activity in 
competition with others and at the same time, the athletes, by participating in the competition, 
enable the organiser to put on a sports event which the public may attend, which television 
broadcasters may retransmit and which may be of interest to advertisers and sponsors. Moreover, 
the athletes provide their sponsors with publicity the basis for which is the sporting activity 
itself.”202
Summarising, it seems relatively safe to conclude that sportsmen carrying out a sporting 
activity - which has an economic character and for which they receive remuneration in return -  
on a collective basis, that is to say that they are member of a team, generally do so according to
200 A good example of such an obligation is the availability for interviews with the press immediately after a game or 
match.
201 Deliege, par. 56.
202 Deliege, par. 57.
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the terms and conditions of the contract of employment they sign with their club of affiliation, 
and are therefore to be regarded as ‘workers’ within the meaning o f Article 39 EC. Conversely, 
athletes competing in an individual sports discipline generally do not perform under the direction 
and the supervision of an employer, but rather act as self-employed sportsmen rendering certain 
services to tournament organisers, sponsors or advertisers, and are consequently more 
appropriately to  be considered as ‘service providers’ within the meaning of Article 49 EC.
However practically workable this generalisation may be in most circumstances, 
nevertheless it has to be taken into consideration that its usefulness is not absolute. This has a lot, 
if not everything, to do with the fact that it will not always be possible to discern with perfect 
precision whether a certain sports discipline is to be considered as a team sport or rather as an 
individual sport." Admittedly, this may seem surprising at first sight, especially for outsiders, 
but it cannot be denied that certain sports show features which are characteristic of both team 
sports and individual sports. Cycling seems to be the paradigm example of this. Initially, one 
might be inclined to say that cycling is an individual sport par excellence, as only one cyclist can 
cross the finish line as the winner of the race per definition, but after closer scrutiny, it becomes 
clear that this appearance is deceptively simple and that the situation in reality is less 
straightforward. O f course, it is undeniably the case that each edition o f traditional races such as 
Liege-Bastogne-Liege or the Giro d’ltalia can only be won by one rider at the time, as much as it 
is true that the International Cycling Union makes an official individual ranking of all 
professional cyclists based on the results they obtained in the races that form part of the official 
UCI calendar. However, by the same token, it is equally true that in order to obtain a licence to 
start in cycling races, cyclist have to be member of a team. Apart from an individual ranking, 
there also exists a UCI world ranking for teams. And it is unequivocally clear that in many 
circumstances, and in races consisting of a number of different stages during several successive 
days203 04 almost inevitably, the victory of one particular cyclist is facilitated or at least made 
possible thanks to the physical and mental or tactical help and support from his team members
203 See also Parisis and Fernández Salas, “Le sportif individuel au regard de l’arrêt ‘Bosman’: les ordonnances 
‘Deliège’”, 1 RMUE (1996) 139.
204 Varying from two days up to three entire weeks, as there are for example the Internationaal Wegcriterium (two 
days), the Three Days of Le Panne, the Four Days of Dunkerque, Paris-Nice (one week), the Tour of Switzerland , 
and the Vuelta d’España (three weeks).
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during the race.205 206Furthermore, it is an unwritten ethical rule that during a race, one does not 
chase after another cyclist if he belongs to the same team, or at least that one does not bring 
opponents along if one nevertheless decides to do so. It could therefore easily be envisaged that a 
victory in a cycling race should be considered as the fruit of the combined efforts of the different 
team members. Consequently, contrary to first impressions, cycling turns out to be not such a 
clear-cut case of an individual sport at all, as some plausible arguments can be adduced in favour 
of regarding it rather as a team sport in fact. The relative uncertainty surrounding the 
qualification of cycling as an individual sport or as a team sport is further increased by the 
specific structure or course of some cycling events. The Tour de France for example, the most 
important race of the year, consists of 21 or 22 stages, most of which are normal races, but some 
of which are individual time trials and/or time trials per team. This is further evidence of the fact 
that it is not really possible to straightforward categorise cycling as an individual sport or as a 
team sport. In these circumstances in which the division between team sports and individual 
sports is less than clear, it is submitted that the proposed generalisation, which ultimately is no 
more than a simple rule of thumb, must be left aside and one should proceed with a case-by-case 
analysis based on concrete facts and objective features to ascertain whether an athlete competing 
in a certain sport is to be regarded as a worker or rather as a self-employed for the purposes of the 
application of the Community free movement provisions. If we take up the example of cycling 
again, after closer examination of the working conditions, I am inclined to say that, contrary to 
first impressions, professional cyclists are to be considered as ‘workers’ within the meaning of 
Article 39 EC. In order to be able to participate in cycling races, sportsmen must belong to a 
team. When both parties -  rider and team - reach an agreement of collaboration and conclude a 
contract, this implies that the athlete will compete for the team in certain races and will receive 
remuneration from the team. It appears to be that cyclists indeed carry out their sporting activity
205 This help may take the form of purchasing rivals that escaped from the main group, supplying provisioning during 
the race, leading the pack to control its speed and indicate the rhythm, giving assistance in the event of technical 
breakdown, etc.
206 In this respect, it might be interesting to have a closer -  or more critical -  look at what happened in the last miles 
of the World Championship in 2001. in Lisbon, a race to which traditionally national teams participate. Italy’s 
Gilberto Simoni had escaped from the peloton and seemed to profit from a moment of hesitation in the pack behind 
him to reach for the title and the rainbow jersey, were it not for the fact that another Italian, Paolo Lanfranchi, 
suddenly, and to the complete astonishment of the entire sporting world, started pursuing him and brought the whole 
group back to his teammate-for-the-day. A few minutes later, Spanish Freire won the final sprint in front of Italian 
Bettini. An unfortunate misunderstanding between occasional team mates, one might say. But the story definitely 
gets more spicy if one takes into consideration that Lanfranchi, Freire and Bettini all belong to the Mapei team, 
whereas Simoni defends the colours of the rivals of Lampre...
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under the direction and the supervision of the team management. It must be acknowledged that 
they may have some freedom in the choice o f their training programme, or even of the races in 
which they will participate, often taking the necessary decisions in co-operation with the sporting 
directors, but in general they must follow strictly and rigidly the guidelines or the 
recommendations of the team management. Even the great Miguel Indurain, ‘El Rey’, winner of 
the Tour de France for 5 consecutive years, was forced to participate in the Vuelta d ’Espana in 
his last year of racing, to satisfy the demands of Banesto, a Spanish commercial bank and main 
sponsor of the team of which he was a member. Moreover, the sportsmen are clearly obliged to 
follow the orders and carry out the tasks they receive before, during and after the race by their 
coaches. Belgium’s Johan Museeuw’s victory in Parix-Roubaix, the legendary race over the 
cobblestones o f the ‘Hell of the North’, in 1996 serves perfectly to illustrate this point. That year, 
the three leaders in the race all belonged to the Italian team Mapei. Rather than really competing 
for the victory amongst themselves, they contented themselves with staying simply ahead of the 
chasing group, and ended the race without even sprinting. Mapei boss Squinzi had telephonically 
instructed team coach Lefevere to follow this scenario, with Museeuw as the designated winner. 
And so the photo of three Mapei racers celebrating victory together on the legendary velodrome 
of Roubaix, with Museeuw slightly preceding his team mates Bortolami and Tafi, crossed the 
world ... Furthermore, cyclists must also comply with the code of conduct and, more generally, 
with all the internal rules established by the team they represent. In this respect, for example, one 
can situate the unilateral decision of the management of French team Cofidis to preventively 
suspend their star rider Belgian Frank Vandenbroucke from further cycling activities in the spring 
of 2001 after his name had appeared in an ongoing investigation concerning certain doping 
practices, even though he had not been found guilty and the UCI had not imposed a temporary 
ban yet. Apparently, in view of all this, the element of subordination is present in the 
relationship between cyclists and the team they race for. Arguably, therefore, they can be 
qualified as ‘workers’ under Community law.
Another similar illustration, but this time the other way around, of the fact that the 
generalisation proposed is only tenable to a limited extent is to be found in the tennis circuit. The 
men’s ATP singles tournaments and the women’s WTA singles counterparts are undeniably 
competitions between individual athletes. By the same token, it seems logical and self-evident to 207
207 Later on, Vandenbroucke was completely acquitted from all accusations and the team suspension was lifted.
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consider doubles events as an example of team sports. However this may be, it becomes apparent 
that a tennis match between two doubles teams is conceptually not entirely similar to a football or 
basketball game between two teams. In the former situation teams are normally the simple result 
of a decision or the will of two individuals to play together without too much structure and 
without too many strings attached. Generally, there are no contractual agreements made. The 
continued existence of the teams depends almost entirely upon the players which compose the 
team. It is really the players that enter into the spotlight. Hence, in this respect it is unsurprising 
that the world ranking for doubles is made up on a purely individual basis, rather than per team. 
Conversely, in the latter case teams are proper institutions of their own, to a large degree 
independent of its players. The emphasis is thus much more on the team itself, rather than on its 
constituent members. One day Raul, Figo and Zidane will change club or retire from professional 
football, but Real Madrid will continue to exist. Consequently, it may seem necessary in this 
respect to introduce a fine distinction between team sports sensu strictu, concerning competitions 
between different clubs of which the players are contractually registered members, and team 
sports sensu lato, involving sporting events between more or less loose associations of several 
individuals. The generalisation that athletes active in team sports are considered to be 
‘workers’ and are thus covered under the personal scope of application of Article 39 EC, would 
only hold true for team sports sensu strictu. I suggest that for the others every situation will again 
have to be decided on a case-by-case basis. In the situation of double tennis, I would say that the 
team consists of two independent service-providers according to the terms of Article 49 EC.
Finally, one also has to take into account that in certain situations, sports with an 
intrinsically individual character acquire certain collective features. Athletes competing in 
martial arts such as judo, for example, often do not participate only in individual tournaments, but 
compete also in national and/or international club championships. During these events, these 
sportsmen still compete individually, but the result obtained is added to the result of all the other 
team members and contributes in this way to the final score of the club. In this respect, it must be 
wondered whether under these specific circumstances the qualification of the sporting activity of 
the sportsmen in question for the purposes of the application of the Community free movement 2089
208 See in this respect also Parisis and Fernández Salas, o.c., at 139.
209 Parisis and Fernández Salas, o.c., 138-140.
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provisions is to be altered. It is submitted that, once more, this particular situation will have to be 
analysed and evaluated on the basis o f the concrete circumstances of each individual case, for it 
seems appropriate that it cannot be excluded a priori that athletes who generally fall under the 
heading of ‘service providers’ of Article 49 EC must be qualified as ‘workers’ within the scope 
of Article 39 EC for certain specific activities. This is probably all the more so when these club 
competitions have a certain regularity or frequency and are of a certain importance. Is Belgium’s 
Jean-Michel Saive, one of the world’s leading table tennis players, to be seen as an employee or 
rather as a self-employed service provider when he defends the colours of his club Villette 
Charleroi, with which he has already won the European Champions League? Decisive in this 
respect will be again the special features of the relationship between the player and the club for 
which he competes: does the club have a certain say over the athlete, or rather, is their 
relationship merely one of simple affiliation, allowing the player to render the club some services 
occasionally?
IV. THE LEGAL SITUATION O F AMATEUR SPORTSM EN
It results clearly from the analysis in the previous sections that sportsmen whose sporting 
activities can be classified as an economic activity fall under the personal scope of application of 
the Community free movement provisions and may therefore benefit from the rights laid down in 
these Treaty Articles. Conversely, athletes who deliver their sporting performances on a merely 
amateur basis, without an economic dimension, cannot enjoy from this protection granted by the 
relevant free movement chapters. All this fits squarely within the general pronouncement of the 
Court of Justice, reiterated on several occasions, that sport is part o f  Community law only in so 
far as it constitutes an economic activity within the meaning of Article 2 EC.210 By means of an a 
contrario reasoning, purely amateur sport thus appears to remain outside the ambit of 
Community law.
These concise statements could have very well constituted the end point of the 
examination; instead, however, they are nothing but the starting point of further analysis which 
will add nuances to this rather rigid dichotomy between professional and amateur sportsmen in
210 Walrave, par. 4; Dona, par. 12; Bosman, par. 73; Deliege, par. 41; Lehtonen, par. 32.
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various respects, both from a legal and even from a purely sporting point of view. Firstly, it must 
be observed that from a sporting perspective, professional and amateur sportsmen do not always 
belong to two completely separate worlds. Traditionally, the federations of many sports 
disciplines maintained a strict dividing line in their regulations between professional and amateur 
athletes, organising separate and mutually exclusive events and competitions for these two 
categories of athletes. However that may be or may have been, this often cautiously safeguarded 
distinction seems to have become blurred to a certain extent. As it appeared clearly from the 
factual circumstances in the case of Deliege, it is not always straightforward to establish whether 
the sporting performances of a given athlete have an economic character or not. Furthermore, 
nowadays professional and amateur sportsmen compete sometimes with each other in the same 
sporting event. In this context, it is particularly revealing that in the last few years, the Olympic 
Games, which have always been the absolute bastion of amateur sports, have been officially 
opened to professional sportsmen. In this way, professional sportsmen could also enter the 
Olympic arena and compete for glory in disciplines which were traditionally exclusively reserved 
to amateurs.21 12 Furthermore, the International Olympic Committee also conferred Olympic status 
on some sports disciplines which have an undoubtedly professional character -  in the sense that a 
number of athletes active in these sports perform their activities in an economic way. The point 
which is being made here is simply that in contemporary sport, even though distinctions between 
professional and amateur athletes continue to exist in many, if not all sporting disciplines, and are 
nowadays often even more outspoken than ever as a result of the recent massive influx of money 
in professional sport, these differences cannot be generalised under all circumstances.
Secondly, also from a legal point of view, some additional comments need to be made in 
this respect. The statement of the Court of Justice that sport belongs to the ambit of Community 
law only to the extent that it constitutes an economic activity within the meaning of the Treaty 
was made in the judgement in Walrave in 1974 and must be situated in this specific context of 
time, when the European Union was still the European Economic Community, with a strong 
emphasis on economic matters. Since then, through the Single European Act and the Treaties of
211 For more detail, see analysis of Cosmas AG in Deliege, supra, in §2.11.2.
212 This was the case of cycling for example during the Games of 1996 in Atlanta, where Switzerland’s professional 
Pascal Richard took the gold medal.
73
Maastricht and Amsterdam, the EEC has become the EU, with largely expanded powers and 
competencies which clearly exceed the economic sphere.213 14 The Court’s principled statement 
from Walrave has therefore arguably become somewhat inaccurate: certainly, sport forms part of 
Community law when it can be characterised as an economic activity; but that is not the whole 
story. As the Court has explicitly recognised in its case law, sporting activities are also of 
considerable social importance in the Community.215 216Besides, the Declaration on Sport, annexed 
to the Treaty o f Amsterdam, emphasises the social significance of sport and calls on the bodies of 
the European Union to give special consideration to the particular characteristics of amateur
" ) \£ ksport. Currently, 20 out of 24 Directorates-General of the Commission are dealing in some way 
or the other with sports issues, linking sport with matters such as culture, environment, education, 
social affairs, etc. Evidently, nowadays sport is no longer subject to Community law only insofar 
as it has an economic character.217 As a result, it is advocated that this modified situation 
exercises an influence upon the legal situation of amateur sportsmen under Community law.
The legal position of amateur sportsman vis-à-vis Community law shall be clarified 
somewhat more in detail on the basis o f the rights they can invoke to oppose the application of 
the transfer rules and the nationality clauses which were at stake in Bosman. As a logical 
consequence o f a strict application of the free movement principles, the direct practical 
implications o f the Bosman decision in which the Court of Justice outlawed some aspects of the 
traditional transfer system and the nationality clauses in football for unjustified violation of 
Article 39 EC remained limited to the sphere o f professional sportsmen. Strictly legally speaking, 
this judgement did not affect the situation of amateur sportsmen. Hence, from the point of view 
of the Treaty free movement provisions, there seemed to be nothing to preclude the maintenance 
at amateur level of rules instituting nationality restrictions and of rules imposing the payment of
213 Also during the 1996 Atlanta Olympics, tennis was for the first time scheduled on the programme: local hero and 
highly paid professional Andre Agassi turned out to be the strongest of the field.
214 For a more detailed overview of this development, see Craig & de Burca, o .c, at 3-52.
215 Bosman, par. 106, Deliege, par. 41.
216 See also Deliege, par. 42.
217 For an broad overview o f the Community’s involvement in sport, see, inter alia, the Commission’s ‘Helsinki
report on Sport’, or the Commission’s Consultation Document “The European Model of Sport”, or the European 
Council’s Declaration on the specific characteristics of sport and its social function in Europe, of which account 
should be taken in implementing Community place, attached to the Treaty of Nice: consult
http: //europe. eu. in t/comm/sport
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fees in the event of transfers of out-of-contract players. This principled position however must be 
revisited in several respects.
1. Broad interpretation of concept of ‘economic activity’
First of all, and importantly, the evolution from an economically inspired Community 
towards a broader oriented Union has prompted the Court of Justice to give a generous reading to 
Community concepts such as ‘economic activity’, ‘worker’ or ‘service provider’. In the light of 
its expansive case law on the matter, it can forcefully be submitted that many sportsmen 
nowadays exceed the basic threshold to trigger the application of the Community provisions on 
freedom of movement. Arguably, a lot of athletes effectively carry out their sporting activities in 
such a way that these can be considered as ‘genuine and effective work* and also obtain a certain 
financial return from the performances they deliver.
2. Secondary Community legislation
Secondly, the fact that pure amateur sportsmen still cannot successfully be qualified as 
‘workers’ for the purposes of Community law and are therefore not entitled to rely directly on 
Article 39 EC nonetheless does not automatically entail that they cannot claim any rights related 
to freedom of movement. Article 7(2) of Regulation 1612/68, intended to flesh out the principles 
laid down in Article 39(2) EC, guarantees Community workers “the same social and tax 
advantages” in the territory of another Member State as the national workers. The Court of 
Justice has given an extensive interpretation to this notion, so as to include all those advantages 
“which, whether or not linked to a contract o f employment, are generally granted to national 
workers primarily because of their objective status as workers or by virtue of the mere fact of 
their residence on the national territory and the extension of which to workers who are nationals 
of other Member States therefore seems suitable to facilitate their mobility within the 
Community.”218 As a result, it can presumably not be excluded a priori that a Community 
national who has exercised his free movement rights to carry out an economic activity in another 
Member State and wishes to practice a certain sporting discipline on an amateur basis in the host
2,8 Case 207/78 Ministere Public v Even and ONPTS [1979] ECR 2019, par. 22.
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Member State can successfully rely upon Article 7(2) to be enabled to deliver his sporting 
performances on the same par as nationals of that State.219 Moreover, Article 7(2) has even been 
held to cover advantages which are only of indirect benefit to the worker himself.220 This way, 
even family members who, by virtue of Article 10 of Regulation 1612/68, have installed 
themselves with the Community worker in question, might be entitled to avail themselves o f  
these advantages.221 It is submitted that this possibility for Community workers and/or certain 
members o f their family to participate in sporting events and competitions in their' host Member 
State in their spare time for non-economic purposes under the same conditions and circumstances 
as the nationals of that State may facilitate the integration o f the worker and his family into the 
new Member State and contribute in this way to the realisation of the objective of freedom o f  
movement for workers,222 and might thus be considered as a social advantage within the meaning 
of Article 7(2).
Concretely, were the Court to accept this proposition, amateur sportsmen who have 
moved abroad for professional purposes themselves and/or who are a member of family o f  a 
Community worker within the meaning of Article 10 of Regulation 1612/68 would be entitled to  
object on this legal basis against the application to them of the nationality clauses limiting the 
participation of foreign players in sporting events and of the transfer rules, to the extent that these 
rules infringe the principle of equal treatment with the nationals of the host Member State. This is 
definitely the case with the nationality clauses, which clearly discriminate on grounds o f  
nationality. However, the same cannot readily be said about the transfer rules. Importantly, the 
principle o f  equal treatment marks the outer limits of this particular approach: for example, 
foreign amateurs cannot challenge the practice of transfer payments within a certain M ember 
State insofar as the nationals of that State are also subject to these rules.
Regulation 1612/68 is applicable within the context of the free movement of workers. It is 
not entirely clear whether persons who are self-employed and/or certain of their family members
2,9 For a concurrent opinion, see Thill, “L’arrêt ‘Bosman’ et ses implications pour la libre circulation des sportifs à 
l’intérieur de l ’Union européenne dans des contextes factuels différents de ceux de l’affaire ‘Bosman’” , 1 RMUE  
(1996) at 104-105; Dubey, La libre circulation des sportifs en Europe (Bruylant, 2000), at 157-163.
220 Case 94/84 Office Nationale de l ’Emploi v Deak [1985J ECR 1873.
221 Case 316/85 Centre public d ’aide sociale de Courcelles v Lebon [1987] ECR 2811, par. 12.
222 See, inter alia, Case C -137/84 Mut s ch [1985] ECR 2681, par. 16; Case C-59/85 Reed [1986] ECR 1283, par. 28.
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can rely upon the concept of ‘social advantages’ to ensure equal treatment with other Community 
nationals when they engage in sporting activities on an amateur basis in a host Member State. 
However, this relative uncertainty is soon to be remedied. There is to be a new general directive 
on free movement for citizens of the European Union and their family members,223 which will 
replace much of the existing secondary legislation. Under the terms of this directive, the concept 
of social advantages will arguably also be of benefit to self-employed citizens.
3. ‘Corollary rights’ to freedom of movement
Furthermore, if, conversely, the Court were not to be inclined to categorise the possibility 
for amateur sportsmen to take part in sporting competitions in a given Member State under the 
same conditions as the nationals of that country as a social advantage within the meaning of 
Regulation 1612/68, legal solace may nevertheless be brought about by another judicially created 
technique. In its case law, the Court of Justice explicitly established on several occasions that 
certain rights may constitute the “necessary corollary” o f the rights to freedom of movement and 
are therefore included within these freedoms.224 In the case of Cowan, for example, involving a 
British tourist assaulted in France who was subsequently denied State compensation for victims 
of violent crimes, which was available to nationals and residents of France, the Court stipulated 
that “when Community law guarantees a natural person the freedom to go to another Member 
State, the protection of that person from harm in the Member State in question on the same basis 
as that of nationals and persons residing there, is a corollary o f  that freedom of movement.”225 267
Consequently, it held the principle of non-discrimination to be applicable to this situation.“ 
Interestingly, in a more recent case, the Court recognised that access to leisure activities in the 
host Member State constitutes the corollary of the free movement of workers. On the basis of 
this decision, it appears plausible and perhaps even likely to assert that the participation to 
sporting competitions on an amateur basis of Community workers or self-employed in their host
223 Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on the Right of Citizens of the Union and their Family 
Members to Move and Reside Freely within the Territory of the Member States, COM (2001) 257 final.
224 See, inter alia, Cases 286/82 and 26/83 Luisi and Carbone v Ministero del Tesoro [1984) ECR 377, paras. 10-16; 
Case C-294/97 Eurowings Luftverkehrs AG  v Finanzamt Dortmund-Unna [1999] ECR 1-7447; Case C-17/00 De 
Coster v Collège des Bourgmestres et échevins de Watermael-Boitsfort [2001] ECR 1-9445.
225 Case 186/87 Cowan v Le Trésor Public [1989] ECR 195, par. 17.
226 Cowan, par. 17.
227 Case C-334/94 Commission v France [1996] ECR 1-1307, paras. 21-23.
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Member State under the same circumstances as the home nationals may constitute the corollary 
of the freedom of movement guaranteed in the relevant provisions o f the Community Treaty.228
4. Concept o f citizenship
Finally, and importantly, there is another set of provisions on which amateur sportsmen 
presumably can base certain claims related to freedom of movement under Community law. 
Article 17 EC provides that “every person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a 
citizen of the Union.” According to the terms of Article 18 EC, possession of the status of citizen 
of the Union automatically engenders the principal right to move and reside freely within the 
territory o f the Member States. As a result o f the introduction of the concept of citizenship of the 
European Union, the right to freedom of movement is no longer strictly limited to workers and 
their family, but is extended in principle to the non-economically active nationals of the EU. Be 
that as it may, Article 18.1 EC also contains the important proviso that this citizens’ right is 
“subject to such limits and conditions as are laid down in the Treaty and by the measures adopted 
to give it effect.” In the first place, there are of course the express Treaty exceptions on grounds 
of public policy, public security and public health and the public service or official authority 
exception. In addition, the Council adopted three directives granting rights of residence to 
categories o f persons other than workers, subject to the conditions that they have sufficient 
financial resources so as not to become a burden on the social assistance schemes of the Member 
States and are also covered by sickness insurance.229 Consequently, the rights contained in Article 
18.1 EC are only conferred upon EU citizens with adequate financial means.
Substantially, there is considerable uncertainty and controversy in legal doctrine 
concerning the precise meaning or practical effect of Articles 17 and 18 EC.230 It is not 
unequivocally clear to what extent EU citizens can actually derive rights from these provisions.
228 For a concurring opinion, see Dubey, o. c., at 164-165; Thill, o.c., at 105.
229 Council Directive 90/366 (later replaced by Directive 93/96) concerning students exercising the right to 
vocational training, (1993) OJ L 317/59; Council Directive 90/365 relating to employed and self-employed people 
who have ceased to work, but without necessarily having moved to another Member State, (1990) OJ L 180/28; 
Council Directive 90/364 governing all persons who do not already enjoy a right of residence under Community law, 
(1990) O JL 180/26.
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In a number of more recent judgements, the Court of Justice has shed some more light on this 
issue. It solemnly declared that “Union citizenship is destined to be the fundamental status of 
nationals of the Member States, enabling those who find themselves in the same situation to 
enjoy the same treatment in law irrespective of their nationality, subject to such exceptions as are 
expressly provided for.’ In the case of Martinez Sala, the Court stated that a citizen of the 
European Union who is lawfully resident in the territory of a host Member State, can rely on the 
principle of non-discrimination in Article 12 EC “in all situations which fall within the scope 
ratione materiae of Community law”.230 132 Subsequently, in its ruling in Grzelczyk, the Court 
stipulated that those situations “include those involving the exercise of the fundamental freedoms 
guaranteed by the Treaty and those involving the exercise of the right to move and reside freely 
in another Member State, as conferred by Article 18.1 EC.”233 It appears thus clearly from this 
statement that in the Court’s opinion, the concept of citizenship has an autonomous content, as 
the scope ratione materiae of Community law is partly defined by the right to move and reside 
freely in another Member State in Article 18.1 EC.234 Moreover, this conclusion that the Court 
conceives Article 18 EC as a free-standing provision results with even more force from its 
decision in Baumbast,235 The Court did not eschew using the language of direct effect in this 
context. It expressly held that “as regards, in particular, the right to reside within the territory of 
the other Member States under Article 18(1) EC, that right is conferred directly on every citizen 
of the Union by a clear and precise provision of the EC Treaty. Purely as a national of a Member 
State, and consequently as a citizen of the Union, Mr. Baumbast therefore has the right to rely on 
Article 18(1) EC.”236 The Court proceeded admitting that this right is subject to conditions and 
limitations, but it insisted that “any limitations and conditions imposed on that right do not
230 See, for example, O’Keeffe, “Union Citizenship”, in O'Keeffe & Twomey (eds.), Legal Issues o f the Maastricht 
Treaty (Wiley, 1994) 87; O’Leary, “Putting Flesh on the Bones of European Union Citizenship”, 24 ELRev. (1999) 
68; Shaw, “The Many Pasts and Futures of Citizenship in the European Union”, 60 MLR (1997) 554.
231 Case C-184/99 Rudy Grzelczyk v Centre Public 4'Aide Sociale d ’Ottignies-Louvain-la-Neuve [2001J ECR 1-6193, 
par. 31.
32 Case C-85/96 Maria Martinez Sala v Freistaat Bayern [1998] ECR 1-2691, par. 62-63: this scope includes “the 
situation where that Member State delays or refuses to gram to that claimant a benefit that is provided to all persons 
lawfully resident in the territory of that State on the ground that the claimant is not in possession of a document 
which nationals of that same State are not required to have and the issue of which may be delayed or refused by the 
authorities of that State.”
233 Grzelczyk, par. 33. See also Case C-274/96 Bickel and Franz [1998] ECR 1-7637, paras. 15-16.
234 See also Craig & de Burca, o.c., at 758-759.
235 Case C-413/99 Baumbast, R v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] ECR 1-7136.
236 Baumbast, par. 84.
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prevent the provisions o f Article 18(1) EC from conferring on individuals rights which are 
enforceable by them and which the national courts must protect.”237
Now, as will be demonstrated later with more detail, it emerges clearly from the Court’s 
decisions in the cases o f Walrave, Donà and Bosman that the transfer rules and the rules on 
foreign players, which constitute the core of the analysis, belong to the material scope of 
application o f the Community Treaty. Taking into account the preceding considerations of the 
Court on the status o f citizenship of the Union, it can relatively safely be assumed that EU 
amateur sportsmen who lawfully reside in a host Member State and who satisfy the formal 
conditions of sufficient financial resources and coverage under sickness insurance derive a right 
from Article 18 EC to successfully challenge transfer rules and nationality clauses to the extent 
that these measures put them at a disadvantage vis-à-vis that Member State’s own nationals. The 
Court did unequivocally state that Article 18(1) EC attaches to the status of citizenship of the 
Union “the rights and duties laid down by the Treaty, including the right [...) not to suffer 
discrimination on grounds of nationality within the scope ratione materiae of the Treaty.”238
V. CONCLUSION
The Court of Justice has consistently, the usual exception that confirms the rule 
notwithstanding, given a generous reading to the concept o f an ‘economic activity’ in its case 
law. In practice, this broad interpretation has allowed many athletes to pass the hurdle of ‘a 
genuine and effective, and not a merely marginal or ancillary activity’ which is carried out in 
return for remuneration, so as to qualify as a worker or as a service provider for the purposes of 
the application of Articles 39 and 49 EC. Moreover, it has been argued that it is still important to 
differentiate between these two sets o f fundamental freedoms, as they do not always under all 
circumstances yield exactly the same legal effects. Merely as a rule of thumb, it has been 
proposed that athletes active in team sports can normally be considered as workers, whereas 
sportsmen competing in individual disciplines are generally to be regarded as self-employed 
service providers, but in view of the complexity o f some factual situations, it is nonetheless
237 BaumbasU par. 85-86. To that effect, the Court referred also to Case 41/74 Van Duyn [1974] ECR 1337, par. 7.
238 Martinez Sala, par. 62.
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recommended to always have regard to the particular circumstances of each specific case before 
proceeding to a final qualification anyway. Furthermore, it has been demonstrated that amateur 
athletes, who do not pass the threshold of performing sport in an economic way, nevertheless do 
not completely fall outside the scope of application of the Community treaty and may actually 
rely upon a number o f Community concepts and legal instruments to claim a certain degree of 
free movement protection under Community law. In this particular context, inter alia, some 
provisions of Regulation 1612/68, the concept of ‘corollary free movement rights’, and, 
especially, the concept o f citizenship of the European Union have been identified as potentially 
relevant.
§3: The Condition o f Nationality
I. EU NATIONALS V THIRD-COUNTRY NATIONALS: GENERAL OBSERVATIONS
In principle, the right to freedom of movement of persons is only open to nationals of the 
Member States of the European Union. As a rule, third-country nationals have been excluded 
from this right under Community law.239 Articles 43 and 49 EC explicitly refer to ‘nationals of a 
Member State*. Only from the wording ‘workers of the Member States’ in Article 39 EC it was 
not immediately apparent whether this notion was intended to cover only nationals o f the 
Member States, or whether it also included third-country nationals resident and employed within 
the Community.240 The secondary legislation subsequently passed to implement Article 39 EC, 
especially Regulation 1612/68, explicitly restricted its personal scope of application to workers 
who are nationals of the Member States.241 In the case of Meade,242 the Court of Justice has 
confirmed this interpretation. This general body of EC freedoms is therefore in principle not 
applicable to non-EU nationals. This dichotomy between Us and Them has been further
239.Lenaert$ & Van Nuffel, Europees Recht. In Hoofdlijnen (Maklu, 1999) at 198-199.
240 Burrows, Free Movement in European Community Law (Clarendon Press, 1987), at 124. Plender insisted that the 
contrast with the terms of Article 69 of the ECSC Treaty, which mentioned ‘workers who are nationals of the 
Member States’, urged the reflection that “the draftsmen of the EEC Treaty intended to establish a common policy 
for all workers in the Community, irrespective of their nationality": Plender, "Competence, European Community 
Law and Nationals of Non-Memfcer States”, 39 ¡CLQ (1990) 599.
241 Craig & de Burca, EU Law. Text, Cases & Materials (OUP, 2003) at 705.
242 Case 238/83 Caisse d’allocations familiales v Echtelieden Meade [1984] ECR 2631, par. 7.
81
exemplified by the introduction of a status of citizenship o f the Union, which is conditional on 
the possession of Member State nationality.243 Third-country nationals can only fully benefit 
from the rights and advantages conferred upon the citizens of the Union if they acquire the 
nationality o f one of the Member States.244 That is not to say that non-EU nationals enjoy no 
rights of movement and residence within the Community.245 The treatment accorded to third- 
country nationals has both an external and an internal dimension.246 Only the latter one is of 
interest for the purposes of this research. The limited rights non-EU nationals enjoy within the 
Community are based on a number of diverse legal provisions and arrangements: they may derive 
rights from their capacity as family members of certain EU workers, or from their status as 
employees of EU service providers,247 or also from their being subjects of one of the third 
countries with which the Community and its Member States have concluded an international 
agreement.
In this section, it will be examined whether, and if so, to what extent and under which 
precise conditions, certain categories of third-country nationals can rely on these legal 
instruments to avoid the application o f certain sports rules and practices to their concrete personal 
situation, in particular the nationality clauses and the transfer rules which were invalidated by the 
Court of Justice in the Bosman ruling.248 From a legal point of view, this judgement entailed 
direct consequences only for EU nationals. Strictly technically speaking, third-country nationals 
were not concerned by this decision. Many sporting federations effectively decided to comply 
with the terms and conditions imposed by the Court only to the minimum extent necessary. This
2«  p ’Oliveira, “Expanding External and Shrinking Internal Borders: Europe’s Defence Mechanisms in the Areas of 
Free Movement, Immigration and Asylum”, in O'Keeffe & Twomey (eds.) legal Issues o f the Maastricht Treaty 
(Chancery, 1994), 261.
244 Staples, The Legal Status o f  Third Country Nationals Resident in the European Union (Kluwer 1999) at S3.
245 See for example, Carlier, “Le droit d’entrée et de séjour des ressortissants des Etats membres”, AD (1994) 143; 
Peers, Towards Equality: Actual and Potential Rights of Third Country Nationals in the European Union", 33 
CMLRev. (1996) 7; Cremona, Citizens of Third Countries: Movement and the Employment of Migrant Workers 
Within the European Union” , LIEI 2 (1995) 87; Hedemann-Robinson, “An Overview of Recent Legal Developments 
at Community Level in relation to Third Country Nationals Resident within the European Union, with Particular 
Reference to the Case Law of the Court of Justice”, 38 CMLRev. (2001) 525.
246 The terminology is borrowed from Craig & de Burca, o.c., at 753-755: Thfe external dimension is concerned with 
‘getting into the EU’, and deals with issues such as border controls, visa requirements, etc. The internal dimension 
deals with the rights granted to third-country nationals resident within the EU.
247 See Case C-113/89 Rush Portuguese v Office National d ’immigration [1990] ECR 1-1417; Case C-43/93 
Vanderelst v Office des Migrations Internationales [1994] ECR 1-3803; Case C-165/98 Mazzoleni, Guillaume and 
others [20011 ECR 1-2189.
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means that non-EU nationals are nowadays sometimes still confronted with rules limiting their 
participation to official matches on grounds of their nationality. In Italy, for example, until the 
rules of the FIGC were changed in April 2001, football clubs playing in the Serie A could engage 
a maximum of five players with a non-EU nationality, out of which only three could participate 
during one and the same championship’s match.248 49 With regard to the transfer system, the 
situation of third-country nationals has only recently been regularised in football. In Circular n° 
611 of 27 March 1997, FIFA notified the national associations that players who were not subjects 
of an EU or EEA country would henceforth be classified as European citizens and that no 
compensation would be due any longer for the transfer of these players between two countries on 
EU or EEA territory as from 1 April 1997.250 251FIFA had taken this course of action shortly after 
Rumanian footballer Hagi and the Croatian player Vlaovic had deposited an official complaint 
against this transfer regulation with the European Commission. The Executive Committee of 
FIFA proceeded to ratify this decision on 31 May 1997. However, at the express request of 
several national associations and on the recommendation of the Player’s Status Committee, it 
decided to postpone enforcement of the new rule until 1 April 1999.252 Clubs and players affected 
by this rule were thus granted a transitional period of two years to implement it into practice. In 
the meantime, Article 14 of the FIFA Regulations governing the Status and Transfer of Players of 
1994 were to remain in force. Accordingly, in the event o f an international transfer of a third- 
country national between two clubs in different countries o f the EU/EEA, the acquiring club still 
had to pay a transfer sum to the selling club to ensure itself of the services of the player in 
question. Consequently, as from 1 April 1999, third-country national football players are treated 
in the same way as Community nationals with regard to transfers within the Community. Even 
though the following analysis will therefore have a largely theoretical relevance only for football,
248 Case C-415/93 Union Royale Beige des Societes de Football Association ASLB v Jean-Marc Bosnian [ 1995] ECR 
1-4921.
249 In April 2001, during the course of the Serie A season, the FIGC suddenly abolished the second indent of this 
rule, while holding on to the first indent, so that clubs were allowed to field all five third-country nationals during 
one and the same game. This change had an immediate impact three days later, for it put AS Roma in a position to 
bring Japanese midfielder Nakata on the pitch as a substitute alongside Argentina’s Batistuta and Brazil’s Asuncao 
and Lima in the title deciding game against Juventus in Turin. Nakata scored the goal which helped the Romans to 
clinch the championship a couple of weeks later.
250 Consult http://www.fifa.com
251 See Blanpain, De Belgische Voetbalbond, Het Vlaams Decreet Martens en het Arbitragehof: Vrijheid en 
gebondenheid in de sport. DeCAO van 12 juni 1998. De Balog case, (Peelers, 1998), at 206.
252 See Circular n° 616 of 4 June 1997, http:// www.fifa.com
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it nonetheless remains useful to scrutinise the specific status of non-EU nationals in relation to 
transfer payments, to assess whether there are legal grounds which can relied upon by third- 
country national sportsmen active in other sports disciplines in which transfer payments might 
still be a current practice to evade the application of these rules.
Before actually addressing the issue practically, some preliminary observations must 
nevertheless still be made. Firstly, it must be taken into consideration that many countries which 
are currently still third countries, will very soon acquire the status of Member States. The positive 
outcome of the second Irish referendum on the ratification o f the Treaty of Nice in October 2002 
has effectively given the green light to the finalisation of the ongoing enlargement process which 
will ultimately result in the accession of twelve new member countries to the European Union, 
arguably some time in 2004. Invariably, the nationals o f these countries will acquire the 
privileged status of EU citizens with all the rights and repercussions this entails. Secondly, even 
though it is undeniably true that there is still no coherent body of EU law regulating the position 
of third-country nationals, it must be pointed out that it seems that slowly but surely some 
progress is being made in this context. Recently, a Community Regulation has been 
implemented, which deals with certain issues relating to residence of third-country nationals.253 54 
Moreover, several other important pieces of legislation are currently being prepared, concerning 
the status o f third-country nationals who are long-term residents in a Member State,255 256or relating 
to the posting of workers who are third-country nationals for the provision of cross-border 
services, the provision of cross-border services by third-country nationals established in the 
Community, or the conditions of entry and residence for third-country nationals who seek 
employment, or self-employment, within the EU. When effectively implemented, these acts of 
secondary Community legislation will considerably improve the situation of third-country 
nationals within the European Union.
253 The Tampere European Council of 15-16 October 1999 called for a set of uniform rights for third-country 
nationals, which are to be as near as possible to those enjoyed by EU citizens.
254 Regulation 1091/2001 (2001) OJ L 150/4, dealing with freedom of movement for those with a national long-stay
visa.
255 COM (2001) 127.
256 COM (2000) 271; COM (1999) 3.
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II. ENTITLEMENTS FO R  THIRD-COUNTRY NATIONALS
The analysis shall be conducted in the following way: firstly, it will be examined which 
rights can be invoiced by which non-EU nationals on the basis of secondary Community 
legislation, and specifically Regulation 1612/68. Secondly, it will be verified what may be the 
impact of the relevant provisions of the international agreements concluded by the Community 
and its Member States with certain third countries on the position of the nationals o f these 
countries within the Community. Thirdly, and admittedly somewhat out of context, it will be 
scrutinised whether third-country nationals may rely on the Community competition rules to 
challenge the persisting existence of transfer rules and nationality clauses concerning them.
1. Article 11 of Regulation 1612/68
It may very well be that the Community Treaty provisions on the free movement of 
persons confer rights exclusively on nationals of the Member States of the European Union, this 
does not preclude that third-country nationals may nevertheless derive some rights from certain 
instruments of secondary Community legislation. In particular Regulation 1612/68,257 the 
purpose of which is to further implement the principles laid down in Article 39 EC, contains a 
number of provisions from which also a particular category of third-country nationals can benefit. 
Most importantly, Article 11 of Regulation 1612/68 provides that “where a national of a Member 
State is pursuing an activity as an employed or self-employed person in the territory of another 
Member State, his spouse and those of the children who are under the age of 21 years or 
dependent on him shall have the right to take up any activity as an employed person throughout 
the territory of that same State, even if they are not nationals of any Member State.” The 
inclusion of a similar provision in Regulation 1612/68 is not surprising. After all, the right to 
freedom of movement also unequivocally entails that obstacles to the mobility of workers, 
relating specifically to the worker's right to be joined by his family and the conditions for the 
integration of that family into the host country, shall be eliminated.258 In the case of G«/,259 the
257 Council Regulation EEC N° 1612/68 on freedom of movement for workers within the Community, OJ Special 
Edition 1968 (II) at 475.
258 See Preamble Regulation 1612/68.
259 Case 131/85 Gul [19861ECR 1583.
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Court of Justice undertook to interpret the terms of this provision, and affirmed that a spouse of a 
Member State national should benefit, on the basis of Article 11, from the same working 
conditions as the nationals of the host Member State.
When focusing somewhat more in detail on this provision, its inherent strengths and 
weaknesses become readily apparent.260 In the first place, a considerable advantage of Article 11 
of Regulation 1612/68 -  especially in comparison with the disparate situation created by the 
international agreements concluded with third countries - is that it can be relied upon by any 
third-country national, regardless of his nationality, who is a spouse or a dependent child of a 
Community national. Furthermore, as it forms a constituent part of a Council Regulation, Article 
11 has the additional bonus of being directly applicable throughout the whole territory of the 
Community,261 so that the direct effect of the provision is not contested. The third-country 
nationals who fall under the scope o f this provision may thus directly rely on it before the 
national courts of their host Member State. Be that as it may, it should not be lost out of sight that 
there clearly are also some significant downsides to this provision. Firstly, the preconditions 
which must be fulfilled in order to trigger the application of Article 11 are rather restrictive. 
Hence, it is indispensable that the third-country national in question is married to or is the 
dependent child of a Member State national, but this alone is not sufficient, for the Member State 
national must also have effectively made use o f his right o f free movement before the third- 
country national can invoke the provisions of Article 11. The right to take up any activity as an 
employed person is only a derived right, dependent on the exercise of the free movement rights of 
the Community worker, and is thus of no avail to a third-country national if the EU  national does 
not leave his Member State of origin. A second negative side of the medal is that the scope of 
application o f Article 11 is strictly restricted to territory o f the Member State in which the 
European Union national is employed, and does not extend to the territory of other Member 
States. Basically, this means that a third-country national who is working in a certain Member 
State X, where his spouse or parent, who possesses the nationality of Member State Y, is 
employed, is only entitled to take-up an economic activity in Member State Z on the basis of 
Article 11 of Regulation 1612/68 on the condition that his spouse or parent has moved to work in
260 See also Nyssen & Denoel, “La situation des ressortissants de pays tiers a la suite de 1'arret ‘Bosman”’, 1 RMUE 
(1996) at 127-128.
261 Craig & de Burca, o.c., at 189-193.
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Member State Z as well. Obviously, this is a serious disadvantage in a sector such as sport, which 
is often characterised by great mobility of athletes. However, it is abundantly clear that the strict 
application of this provision can be rather easily circumvented in practice. Hypothetically 
speaking, if a Spanish football club were interested in the services of any given third-country 
national, it would simply suffice to engage his Italian spouse or parent or to find them an 
employment elsewhere in Spain in order to enable the football player with the non-EU nationality 
to benefit from the same working conditions as the Spanish footballers.
It is important to evaluate the precise impact of this right for third-country nationals on its 
intrinsic value. Concretely, the issues which are at the centre of the attention in this research are 
the obstacles to mobility created by the existence of the nationality clauses and the transfer rules. 
On the one hand, with regard to the rules limiting the formal engagement or alternatively, the 
actual use of foreign players during official matches, the situation created by Article II  of 
Regulation 1612/68, as interpreted by the Court of Justice, seems to be clear: third-country 
nationals should benefit from exactly the same working conditions as the nationals of the 
Member State in question and thus cannot be hindered in the exercise of their sporting activities 
by the existence of nationality clauses. That the nationality clauses effectively fall under the 
concept of ‘working conditions’ seems to yield from the Bosman ruling, in which the Court 
expressly held, in reference to these rules on foreign players, that Article 39 EC “applies to rules 
laid down by sporting associations which determine the conditions under which professional 
sports players may engage in gainful employment.”262 On the other hand, the situation with 
regard to the transfer rules appears to be less straightforward, or at least partially. Firstly, in all 
likelihood Article 11 has no impact on the domestic transfer systems. When a third-country 
national moves from one club to another within one Member State, he is therefore subject to the 
same rules on internal transfers as the national athletes of that Member State. Secondly, however, 
it is no so evident whether a third-country national can rely on Article 11 when he is transferred 
internationally, between clubs in different Member States. Article 11 confers on him the right to 
take up employment in the Member State* in which his spouse or parent is employed. According* 
to the Court of Justice, this implies that he should benefit from the same working conditions as 
national workers. The Court hasn’t gone as far as granting third-country nationals access to the
262 Bosman, par. 116.
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labour market of a Member State on the same par as that Member State’s nationals. Presumably, 
therefore, Article 11 could not be invoked to escape the payment of transfer fees under these 
circumstances.263 All elements taken into consideration, the derived right of Article 11 of 
Regulation 1612/68 granted to certain third-country nationals family members of an EU worker 
who has exercised his free movement right is therefore only o f partial use for the sporting 
purposes o f the non-EU nationals concerned.
2. International Agreements with third countries
In general, agreements concluded between on the one hand, the European Community - 
and sometimes also its Member States -  and on the other hand, third countries constitute the most 
important legal instrument which confers rights on third-country nationals who are legally 
resident in a Member State of the European Union. Article 310 EC is the legal basis of these 
agreements. The relationship that is established between the Contracting Parties is governed by 
public international law. Moreover, the fact that these international agreements are acts of public 
international law does not preclude that they entail legal effects within the Community legal 
order. They are also a source of Community law.264 The Court of Justice has consistently ruled 
that these agreements are an integral part of Community law.265 Consequently, individuals can 
invoke the provisions o f these agreements provided that these provisions satisfy the conditions 
for direct effect as established by the Court of Justice.266 The most important of these 
international agreements are the Agreement establishing the European Economic Area, the 
Association Agreement concluded with Turkey, the Co-operation Agreements concluded with the 
Maghreb countries, the Europe Agreements concluded with the Central and Eastern European 
countries and the Baltic States, the Partnership Agreements concluded with former Soviet
263 For a contrary opinion in this respect, see Nyssen & Denoël, o.c., at 127-129.
2M Staples, The Legal Status o f Third Country Nationals Resident in the European Union (Kluwer, 1999) at 95-96.
265 See inter alia, Case 181/73 Haegeman [1974] ECR 449, par. 5; Case 12/86 Demirel [19871 ECR 3719, par. 7; 
Case 30/88 Greece v Commission [1989] ECR 3711, par. 12.
266 See inter alia, Craig, “Once Upon a Time in the West: Direct Effect and the Fédéralisation of EEC Law” , 12 OJLS 
(1992) 453; De Witte, “Direct Effect, Supremacy and the Nature of the Legal Order”, in Craig & de Bûrca (eds.), 
The Evolution o f EU Law (OUP, 1999) 177; Eleftheriadis, “The Direct Effect of Community Law: Conceptual 
Issues”, 16 YBEL (1996) 205; Lenz, Tynes & Young, “Horizontal What? Back to Basics”, 25 ELRev. (2000) 509; 
Pescatore, “The Doctrine of ‘Direct Effect’: An Infant Disease in Community Law”, 8 ELRev. (1983) 155; Prêchai, 
“Does Direct Effect Still Matter?”, 37 CMLRev. (2000) 1047; Winter, “Direct Applicability and Direct Effects”, 9 
CMLRev. (1972) 425.
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Republics and the Lomé Agreements. These different categories of international agreements are 
characterised by a great diversity of substantive rights in their contents. This variety of rights 
significantly complicates the effort of conducting a somewhat coherent analysis of the legal status 
of third country nationals residing in the European Union/67 In the following analysis, regard 
will only be had to the relevant provisions of the more important agreements, and moreover, only 
with these provisions which deal with the situation of third-country national workers.267 68
7.7. European Economic Area Agreement269 : freedom of movement
In the first place, Article 28 of the European Economic Area Agreement literally 
reproduces the wording of Article 39 EC. The terms of this provision seem to be sufficiently 
clear, precise and unconditional for it to be granted direct effect.270 In this respect, it should 
nevertheless be remarked that the Court has stipulated that notions or principles, used in 
provisions contained in international agreements or decisions adopted by an Association Council, 
which are textually similar or even identical to the corresponding provisions of Community law, 
are in principle not necessarily interpreted in exactly the same way.271 This ultimately depends on 
the objectives pursued with the Agreement in question. Specifically, in the context of the EEA 
Agreement, the EFTA Court and the European Surveillance Authority are obliged to take into 
consideration the relevant judgements of the Court of Justice relating to the interpretation of 
provisions of Community law which are substantially identical to those contained in the EEA 
Agreement.272 Hence, it has immediately been taken for granted in legal doctrine that players 
from Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein were able to rely on Article 28 of the EEA Agreement to 
successfully combat the obstacles to freedom of movement erected by the rules on foreign
267 For a more elaborate analysis, see Staples, o.c., 239-270; Jorens, De rechispositie van niet-EU-onderdanen in het 
Europese Socialezekerheidsrecht (die Keure, 1997).
268 In most of these international agreements, the provision of services has received much less attention. The 
provisions relating to services are often only framework provisions which are much less far-reaching than those 
relating to workers. Generally, they also lack direct effect. For these reasons, the attention in this context is focused
.on the provisions on workers.
269 Agreement creating a European Economic Area, signed at Porto, May 2 1992. (1994) OJ L 1/3.
270 Maresceau, “Nationals of third countries in agreements concluded by the European Community", in Actes du 
Colloque organisé l’Institut d’études juridiques européennes de l’Université de Liège "1993, le marché unique et 
l ’Europe des personnes”, 2 AD  (1994), at 249-263.
27’ See Case 270/80 Polydor [1982] ECR 329, par. 8; Case 104/81 Kupferberg [ 19S2] ECR 3641, par. 29-31.
272 Pollet, “The Bosman Case and the Abolition of Nationality Clauses and the Position of Third Country Nationals", 
European Business Law Review (June 1996), at 143.
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players and the transfer rules.273 Besides, on one of the first official meetings of its Executive 
Committee in the wake of the Bosman decision in February 1996, UEFA had already explicitly 
confirmed that the ruling of the Court of Justice was also relevant to EEA football players and on 
EE A territory.274 275
Clearly, the nationals of EEA countries find themselves in a privileged position. They are 
the only third country nationals who benefit undisputedly from the right to freedom of movement 
within the territory of the Member States of the European Union and the European Economic 
Area. The rights granted to nationals of other third countries with which the Community and/or 
its Member States concluded an international agreement are all invariably substantially more 
limited.
1.2. Association Agreement with Turkey : Access to the labour market in host State
Subsequently, also the situation of Turkish nationals merits further attention. Article 12 of 
the Association Agreement of 1963 declares that the freedom of movement for workers shall be 
gradually established and indicates that the Contracting Parties shall be guided by the relevant 
Community Treaty provisions of Articles 39, 40 and 41 EC in this regard.276 27Despite the clear 
intention to secure progressively the freedom of movement for workers, currently this objective 
has not been fully realised in practice yet. Article 37 of the Additional Protocol concluded in 
1970 merely provides that workers of Turkish nationality employed in the Community shall not 
be discriminated against on grounds of nationality as regards working conditions and 
remuneration. Furthermore, Decision 1/80 of the EC/Turkey Association Council278 deals with
273 Norberg, Hökborg, Johansson, Eliasson and Dedicken, The European Economic Area. EEA Law. A Commentary 
on the EEA Agreement (CE Fritzes AB, 1993) at 192.
274 Blanpain, Het statuut van de sportbeoefenaar naar internationaal. Europees, Belgisch en Gemeenschapsrecht 
(Larcier, 2002), at 13.
275 Agreement establishing an Association between the European Economic Community and Turkey, signed at 
Ankara, September 12 1963, (1973) OJC 113/2.
276 According to Article 36 of the Additional Protocol concluded in 1970, the freedom of movement for workers 
should have been gradually established in the period between 12 and 22 years after the entry into force of the 
Association Agreement.
277 Additional Protocol to the Agreement establishing an Association between the European Economic Community 
and Turkey, signed at Brussels, November 23 1970, (1973) OJ C 113/18.
278 Decision n® 1/80 of the Association Council of September 19 1980, on The Development of the Association, not 
published in the Official Journal.
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the situation of Turkish workers who are already integrated into the labour market of their host 
Member State. Importantly, as the Court has unequivocally held on several occasions, it therefore 
does not encroach upon the competence of the Member States to regulate both the entry to their 
territory by Turkish nationals and the conditions under which they can take up their first 
employment.279 Article 6(1) of this Decision 1/80 entitles a Turkish worker (1) after one year of 
being legal employed in the Member State of residence, to renewal of his work permit for 
employment by the same employer; (2) after three years of legal employment and subject to 
priority for Community workers, to respond to any offer of employment for the same occupation 
with an employer of his choice, made under normal conditions and registered with the 
employment services o f that Member State; and (3) after four years of legal employment in his 
Member State of residence, to enjoy free access to any paid employment. A similar right has been 
granted to family members under Article 7 of Decision 1/80.
This concisely described legal framework allows for the following conclusions to be 
made: firstly, the abolition of nationality clauses should presumably also apply to the benefit of 
professional athletes of Turkish nationality legally employed in their host Member State, on the 
basis of Article 37 of the Additional Protocol. This provision appears to fulfil the conditions to be 
declared directly effective. Secondly, with regard to the transfer rules, the situation is arguably 
somewhat more intricate. The transfer rules have been brandished by the Court of Justice as 
directly affecting access to the relevant employment markets.280 Undeniably, Article 6(1) of 
Decision 1/80 grants Turkish nationals the right to accede to any paid employment on the 
condition that they satisfy a precise set of legally established criteria.281 On several occasions, the 
Court has affirmed that this provision is directly effective.282 This right to accede to the labour 
market conferred upon Turkish workers presumably constitutes the most substantial right granted 
to third-country nationals in general in international agreements. Be that as it may, in order to be 
entitled to invoke this Article 6(1) to safeguard the right contained in it, Turkish workers must be
279 Case C-355/93 Eroglu [1994] ECR 1-5113, par. 10; Case C-171/95 Tetik [1997] ECR 1-329, par. 21; Case C- 
351/95 Kadiman [1997] ECR 1-2133, par. 31
280 Bosnian, par. 103.
281 For more details, consult Staples, o.c., at 244-255.
282 Case C-192/89 Sevince [1990] ECR 1-3461, par. 26; Case C-237/91 Kus [1992] ECR 1-6807; Case C-9S/96 
Ertamir [1997] ECR 1-5179, par. 24.
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“duly registered as belonging to the labour force of a Member State”283 and furthermore “legally 
employed”284 285in their Member State of residence for a period of four years. Only if these 
conditions have been rigorously complied with, workers of Turkish nationality can claim access 
to any paid employment of their choice, a right which is further confined to the territory of their 
host Member State. Consequently, four years o f legal employment in the host Member State does 
not give them the right to accept any offer o f employment in another Member State. In theory 
therefore, there is no legal basis in the Association Agreement or the subsequent Decisions of the 
Association Council to evade the application o f  the transfer rules in the event of an international 
transfer between clubs in different Member States of a Turkish athlete, even if he has been legally 
employed for four years in the host Member State. Conversely, it seems that Article 6(1) of 
Decision 1/80 does oppose against the imposition of a transfer fee when sportsmen of Turkish 
nationality who have played for four years in the host Member State, move between domestic 
clubs. Arguably, in practice, the application of this provision leads to the somewhat 
paradoxical situation that in these particular circumstances, Turkish athletes are in a more 
advantageous position in relation to the home-grown players, as the Bosman ruling of the Court 
of Justice condemned the transfer rules only in their international context and didn’t extend to the 
purely internal situation of domestic transfers.286 Strictly from the point of view of European law, 
a professional German football team could thus freely engage an out-of-contract Turkish 
footballer from another German team, provided the Turkish national has been legally playing in 
Germany for four years, whereas it would have to pay a transfer sum to ensure itself of the 
services of an equally out-of-contract German player from the same team.
283 See Case C-434/93 Bozkurt [1995] ECR 1-1475, para. 22-23; Ertamir, paras. 39 and 43; Case C-36/96 Gunaydin 
[1997] ECR 1-5143, paras. 29 and 31: according to the Court, two elements are relevant in determining whether a 
Turkish national must be categorised as “duly registered as a member of the labour force of the host Member State”: 
firstly, it must be possible to identify the employment relationship within the territory .of a Member State; and 
secondly, the person in question must be engaged in a genuine and effective economic activity, carried out for and 
under the direction of another person in return for which he receives remuneration.
284 Sevince, par. 32; Kus, par. 18; Case C-285/95 Kol [1997] ECR 1-3069, paras. 27-28: it derives from the Court’s 
case law that “legal employment” presupposes a stable and secure situation as a member of the labour force in the 
Member State of residence.
285 For a concurrent opinion, see Pollet, o.c., at 144.
286 See also Nyssen & Denoel, o.c., at 122.
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Running the risk of generalising maybe too broadly, the remainder of the international 
agreements concluded by the European Community and/or its Member States can grossly be 
classified in a third category, which only provide for equal treatment of third country nationals 
legally employed in a Member State - on a basis of reciprocity -  as regards working conditions, 
remuneration - and sometimes also dismissal - in relation to its own nationals. This is the case for 
the Co-operation Agreements concluded with the Maghreb countries, the Europe Agreements 
concluded with the Central and Eastern European countries and the Baltic States and the 
Partnership Agreements concluded with former Soviet Republics. Nationals of these third 
countries can invoke these rights provided that, firstly, they are legally employed in their host 
Member State, and secondly, the relevant provisions on the international agreements are 
considered to be directly effective. This can be further exemplified on the basis of the recent 
disputes involving a Polish basketball player and a Slovak handball player. In both cases, the 
players claimed that the sporting federations responsible for the discipline in which they are 
active had issued rules on foreign players which unjustifiably discriminated against them.
1.3.1. The Malaja case
Miss Lilia Malaja is a professional basketball player of Polish nationality. She used to 
play for Rennes in the French first division. In the summer of 1998, she was recruited by Racing 
Club Strasbourg for the 1998-99 sports season. The relevant provisions of the Regulation for the 
women’s league of the French Basketball Federation stipulated that maximum ten players could 
participate to an official match of the championship, out of whom maximum two players could 
possess the nationality o f a non-EU/EEA country.287 Prior to the engagement of Malaja, RC 
Strasbourg already employed a Croatian and a Bulgarian player. However, its Bulgarian player 
was about to acquire the nationality of an EU country through her scheduled marriage with a 
Greek national. When the marriage was unexpectedly called off, RC Strasbourg effectively faced 
the problematic situation that during official matches, always at least one of its three non-EU 
players had to remain sidelined. The club requested the official authorisation from the federation
287 More specifically. Article 8 of the rules of the French Basketball Federation.
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to grant Malaja the same status as EU/EEA nationals for the purpose of the application of Article 
8 of the relevant regulation. For this purpose, it referred to the judgement of the Court of Justice 
in the case o f Bosman and to the Europe Agreement establishing an Association between the 
European Communities and its Member States and the Republic of Poland.288 The federation 
rejected the request in August 1998, and subsequently maintained its position in October 1998, in 
spite of a procedure of reconciliation289 which had resulted in a favourable outcome for Malaja 
and RC Strasbourg. Hereupon, the player and the club instituted legal proceedings before the 
administrative tribunal of Strasbourg for annulment of the decision of the federation, but their 
complaint was rejected. The tribunal reached the conclusion that Malaja could not be regarded as 
being legally employed in France because the national basketball federation had refused to 
officially recognise her contract with RC Strasbourg. The athlete didn’t leave it at that and lodged 
an appeal against this decision.
In its judgement of 3 February 2000, the Administrative Court of Appeal of Nancy 
decided to annul the ruling of the administrative tribunal of Strasbourg.290 Firstly, it had regard to 
the relevant provisions of the Europe Agreement concluded with Poland.291 Article 37(1) of the 
Europe Agreement provides that “subject to the conditions and modalities applicable in each 
Member State, the treatment accorded to workers of Polish nationality legally employed in the 
territory of a Member State shall be free from any discrimination based on nationality, as regards 
working conditions, remuneration or dismissal, as compared to its own nationals”. According to 
the Court o f Appeal, this provision fulfilled the conditions for it to be directly effective.292 
Moreover, it considered that the possibility for an professional athlete to play for a certain team 
forms part o f the working conditions with regard to which Polish workers who are legally
288 Europe Agreement establishing an Association between the European Communities and their Member States, of 
the one part, and the Republic of Poland, of the other part, (1993) OJ L 348/2.
289 Under these circumstances, such a procedure was mandatory according to the terms of Article 19 of the Loi n° 92- 
652 du 13 juillet 1992 modifiant la loi n° 84-610 du 16 juillet 1984 relative à l ’organisation et à la promotion des 
activités physiques et sportives et portant diverses dispositions relatives à ces activités, JO 16 juillet 1992, at 9515 et 
seq.
290 Cour administrative d’appel de Nancy, Ire chambre, arrêt du 3 février 2000, Lilia Malaja c/ Fédération française 
de basketball (affaire VC n° 99 NC OO 282): consult http://iurisweb.citeweb.net
291 Cour administrative d’appel de Nancy, Ire chambre, arrêt du 3 février 2000, Lilia Malaja cf Fédération française 
de basketball (affaire VC n° 99 NC OO 282), 36(2) RTDeur. (avril-juin 2000), at 387.
292 In a later case, the European Court of Justice unequivocally confirmed the direct effect of Article 37(1) of the 
Europe Agreement concluded with Poland: see Case C -162/00 Land Nordrhein-Westfalen v Pokrzeptowicz-Meyer 
[2002] E C R 1-1071, paras. 17-30.
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employed in France cannot face any form of discrimination. Subsequently, it turned to the 
contested issue of whether Malaja must be considered as being legally employed in France.293 
Article 337 of the general regulations of the French Basketball Federation stipulates that contracts 
of employment must be compulsory homologated by the Federation to be regularly recognised 
and to be able to produce legal effects. However that may be, the Court of Appeal observed that 
such a requirement cannot have as its object or effect to evade the application of the labour law 
rules relating to the conclusion and effects of labour contracts, and results in the situation that the 
beneficiary of the contract, namely the athlete in question, cannot be deemed to be legally 
employed within the meaning of Article 37(1) of the Europe Agreement in the absence of 
homologation. Concretely, it ruled that Malaja was in possession of a contract of employment the 
regularity of which was not disputed under the terms of the labour law legislation. Moreover, the 
Court of Appeal proceeded holding that she had a valid residence permit and therefore must be 
regarded as being legally employed in France at the time of the judgement of the administrative 
tribunal. As a result, it concluded that the French Basketball Federation could not refuse to 
authorise Malaja to participate to official matches of the Women’s championship on the grounds 
of Article 8 of its Regulations without infringing the principle of non-discrimination, as laid 
down in Article 37(1) o f the Europe Agreement with Poland.294 Ultimately, this decision was 
recently entirely upheld on the same grounds by the French Conseil d ’Etat.
1.3.2. The Kolpak case 295
The dispute involving Mr. Maros Kolpak, a Slovak national, represents a lot of 
similarities with the Malaja case. Since March 1997, Kolpak plays handball as goalkeeper for the 
German second division team TSV Östringen. Initially, he signed a contract which was due to 
expire on 30 June 2000. In February 2000, both parties concluded a new contract for the period 
until 30 June 2003. In return for the services he provides to the club, he receives a monthly salary 
of DM  2500 net. He resides in Germany and possesses a valid residence authorisation. Rule 15 of
293 Cour administrative d’appel de Nancy, Ire chambre, arrêt du 3 février 2000, Ulia Malaja c/ Fédération française 
de basketball (affaire VC n° 99 NC OO 282), o.c., at 387-388.
294 For a more elaborate discussion of the peculiarities of the case, consult Auneau, “Les conditions de résolution 
d’un contentieux sportif national à la lumière de la jurisprudence communautaire: l’affaire M alaja\ 36(2) RTD eur. 
(avril-juin 2000), 389-399.
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1the playing regulations (the ‘Spielordnung’, hereinafter referred to as ‘SpO’) of the German 
Handball Federation (the ‘Deutscher Handballbund\ further referred to as ‘DHB’) reads as 
follows:
1. ‘T he letter A is to be inserted after the licence number of the licences of players
a. ) who do not possess the nationality of a State of the European Union,
b. ) who do not possess the nationality of a third country associated with the EU
whose nationals have equal rights as regards freedom of movement under 
Article 39(1) of the EC Treaty,
c. ) ...
2. In teams in the federal and regional leagues, no more than two players whose licences 
are marked with the letter A may play in a championship or cup match.
3. ... 1
4. ...
5. The marking of a licence with the letter A is to be cancelled from 1 July of the year if 
the player’s country of origin becomes associated within the meaning of paragraph 
1(b) by that date. The German Handball Federation (DHB) publishes and continually 
updates the list of the States correspondingly associated.”
In correspondence to its own rules, the DHB has issued Kolpak a player’s licence marked 
with the letter A because of his foreign nationality. Kolpak regards this as unfavourable treatment 
and seeks from the DHB a player’s licence without a suffix indicating his foreign nationality. He 
claims that Slovakia is one o f the third countries whose nationals are entitled, under the rules of 
the SpO and on the basis of the relevant provisions of the Europe Agreement establishing an 
association between the European Communities and its Member States and the Republic of 
Slovakia,295 96 to an unrestricted authorisation to play, as Germans and nationals o f other Member 
States of the EU/EEA are entitled to. In first instance, the Regional Court of Dortmund ordered 
the DHB to issue the player’s licence sought. The federation appealed against this decision with
295 For more details about the facts of the case, consult Stix-Hackl AG in Case C-438/00 Deutscher Handballbund v j
Maros Kolpak, not yet reported, at paras. 6-19. 1
296 Europe Agreement establishing an Association between the European Communities and their Member States, of i
the one part, and the Slovak Republic, of the other pan, (1994) OJ L 359/2. !
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the Higher Regional Court of Hamm, which decided to stay the proceedings and referred the 
matter to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling under the third paragraph of Article 234.
Currently, the action is still pending before the Court of Justice. Advocate-General Stix- 
Hackl presented her opinion on 11 July 2002. The Advocate General conducted her analysis in 
different steps. Firstly, she examined whether Article 38(1) of the Europe Agreement concluded 
with Slovakia is directly effective. This provision provides that “subject to the conditions and 
modalities applicable in each Member State, treatment accorded to workers of Slovak Republic 
nationality, legally employed in the territory of a Member State shall be free from any 
discrimination based on nationality, as regards working conditions, remuneration or dismissal, as 
compared to its own nationals”. In this context, the Advocate General referred to the recent 
judgement of the Court of Justice in the case of Pokrzeptowicz-Meyer,297 899 in which the Court had 
explicitly pronounced that the first indent of Article 37(1) of the Europe Agreement with Poland 
must be held to have direct effect, so that Polish nationals who assert it may invoke it before the 
national courts of the host Member State.300
For the purposes of this research, it seems interesting to have a closer look at the precise 
considerations which led the Court to this outcome. Primarily, it must be stated that it is settled 
case law that a provision in an agreement concluded by the Community with non-member 
countries must be regarded as being directly applicable when, having regard to its wording and to 
the purpose and nature of the agreement itself, the provision contains a clear and precise 
obligation which is not subject, in its implementation or effects, to the adoption of any 
subsequent measure.301 Firstly, considering the wording of Article 37(1), the Court held that this 
rule o f equal treatment lays down a precise obligation to produce a specific result and, by its 
nature, can be relied on by an individual to apply to a national court to set aside the 
discriminatory provisions of a Member State’s legislation, without any further implementing
297 Stix-Hackl AG in Case C-438/00 Deutscher Handballbund v Maros Kolpak, not yet reported.
298 Stix-Hackl AG in Kolpak, paras. 39-44.
299 Case C-162/00 Land Nordrhein-Westfalen v Beata Pokrzeptowicz-Meyer [2002] ECR1-1071.
300 Pokrzeptowicz, par. 30.
301 Pokrzeptowicz, par. 19; see also Case C-262/96 Sunil [1999] ECR 1-2685, par. 60; Case C-63/99 Gloszczuk 
[2001] ECR 1-0000, par. 30.
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measures being required for that purpose.302 According to the Court, the proviso “subject to the 
conditions and modalities applicable in each Member State” may not be interpreted in such a way 
as to allow the Member States to subject the principle of non-discrimination set forth in the first 
indent of Article 37(1) to conditions or discretionary limitations, as it would render that provision 
meaningless and deprive it of any practical effect.303 Secondly, the Court ruled that the 
provisional conclusion that the principle of non-discrimination is capable of directly governing 
the situation of individuals is not invalidated either by an analysis of the purpose and nature of 
the Europe Agreement.304 According to the 15th recital in the preamble of the Europe Agreement 
and its Article 1(2), its puipose is to establish an association designed to promote the expansion 
of trade and harmonious economic relations between the Contracting Parties, in order to foster 
dynamic economic development and prosperity in Poland, with a view to facilitating its accession 
to the Community.305 Moreover, the Court emphasised that the fact that the Europe Agreement is 
intended essentially to promote the economic development of Poland and therefore involves an 
imbalance in the obligations assumed by the Community towards the non-member country 
concerned is not such as to prevent recognition by the Community of the direct effect o f certain 
provisions o f that Agreement.306 Thirdly, the Court considered that the direct effect of Article 
37(1) is not affected by the impact of Article 58(1) of the Europe Agreement.307 The Court 
stresses that all that follows from Article 58(1) is that the authorities of the Member States remain 
competent to apply, inter alia, their own national laws and regulations regarding entry, stay, 
employment and working conditions of Polish nationals, while respecting the limits laid down by 
the Europe Agreement. As a result, it judged that Article 58(1) does not concern the Member 
States’ implementation of the provisions of the Europe Agreement relating to the free movement 
of workers and is not aimed at making implementation or the effects of the rule o f equal 
treatment o f Article 37(1) subject to the adoption of further national measures.308 Finally, the
302 Pokrzeptowicz, par. 22.
303 Pokrzeptowicz, par. 24.
304 Pokrzeptowicz, par. 25.
305 Pokrzeptowicz, par. 26.
306 Pokrzeptowicz, par. 27; also Gloszczuk, par. 36.
307 This Article 58(1) of the Europe Agreement provides: “For the purposes of Title TV of this Agreement, nothing in 
the Agreement shall prevent the Parties from applying their laws and regulations regarding entry and stay, work, 
labour conditions and establishment of natural persons, and supply of services, provided that, in so doing, they do not 
apply them in a manner as to nullify or impair the benefits accruing to any Party under the terms of a specific 
provision of this Agreement."
*08 Pokrzeptowicz, par. 28.
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Court stipulated that implementation of the first indent of Article 37(1) is not subject to the 
adoption of additional measures by the Association Council to define the modalities for its
* 309application.
In the opinion o f Advocate-General Stix-Hackl, a comparison of the Europe Agreements 
concluded with respectively Poland and Slovakia and, more precisely, the relevant Articles 37(1) 
and 58 for the former and Articles 38(1) and 59 for the latter, reveals that they have decisive 
points in common. Firstly, on the basis of their purpose and their nature, one cannot distinguish in 
principle between the two Agreements. Secondly, also the terms of Articles 37(1) and 38(1) are 
essentially identical.309 10 On these grounds, the Advocate-General submitted that the statements of 
the Court relating to the Europe Agreement with Poland can be transposed to the Europe 
Agreement with Slovakia. Concretely, this entails that Article 38(1) of the Europe Agreement 
with Slovakia is directly effective and that Article 59 of this Agreement does not detract anything 
from this conclusion.311
Once this matter had been settled, the remainder of the case was predictable. Evidently, 
the Advocate General didn’t have any problems in holding that Kolpak belongs to the circle of 
beneficiaries of Article 38(1), since he has a valid residence permit and it is undisputed that he is 
linked to handball club TSV Ostringen with a contract of employment.312 Furthermore, she 
argued that the contested Rule 15 of the SpO relates to the working conditions of handball 
players to the extent that it effectively restricts the possibilities of nationals of third countries to 
participate in official matches of the national and regional leagues.313 In her opinion, Rule 15 of 
the playing regulations of the DHB unjustifiably discriminates against Slovak handball players on 
grounds of their nationality.314 As a result, Advocate-General Stix-Hackl submitted that Article 
38(1) of the Europe Agreement concluded with the Slovak Republic precludes that a rule of a
309 Pokrzeptomcz, par. 29.
310 Stix-Hackl AG in Kolpak, par. 42.
311 Stix-Hackl AG in Kolpak, paras. 43-44.
312 Stix-Hackl AG in Kolpak, paras. 55-58.
313 Stix-Hackl AG in Kolpak, par. 60.
314 Stix-Hackl AG in Kolpak, paras. 62-70.
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sporting federation which allows clubs only to field a limited number of third-country nationals 
in official matches is effectively applied to Slovak nationals.315
1.3.3. Observations
Arguably, it is conceivable to derive some more generalised conclusions from the above 
examples on the status in the EU/EEA of workers who are nationals of a third country with which 
the Community and its Member States have concluded an international agreement. In the first 
place, all Agreements under consideration invariably presuppose that a third-country national 
worker is legally employed in the host Member State before he can actually assert the right to 
equal treatment as regards working conditions and remuneration (and sometimes also dismissal) 
in relation to that Member State’s own nationals. In this respect, regard must always be had to the 
relevant labour law legislation of the host Member State. Evidently, this is predominantly a 
factual question which must be evaluated on the basis of the concrete circumstances of each 
particular case. As has been analysed above, there was some dispute on the issue of whether 
Malaja could be considered as being legally employed in France in the absence of registration of 
her contract with RC Strasbourg by the responsible federation, whereas it is not really contested 
that Kolpak is legally employed in Germany. Legal employment in the host Member State may 
be a necessary condition, but it is not a sufficient condition to invoke the right to equal treatment 
conferred to third-country nationals in the international agreement which is of concrete interest to 
them.
Secondly, nationals o f third countries who have passed the first hurdle and are legally 
employed in their host Member State, are only able to rely on the principle of non-discrimination 
as regards working conditions, remuneration and dismissal before the national courts of this host 
State if the relevant provisions of the international agreement concluded between their country of 
nationality and the Community and the Member States are directly effective. In what is about to 
follow, it will be endeavoured to give a short examination of some of these provisions laid down 
in the more important international agreements. This overview is by no means intended to be 
exhaustive. In the case of Pokrzeptowicz-Meyer, the Court of Justice unequivocally regarded
315 Stix-Hackl AG in Kolpak, par, 71.
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Article 37(1) of the Europe Agreement concluded with Poland as being directly effective.314 *16 In 
her opinion in the case of Kolpak, Advocate-General Stix-Hackl reached the same conclusion 
with regard fo Article 38(1) o f the Europe Agreement with Slovakia.31^ ' An examination o f the 
corresponding provisions in the other Europe Agreements concluded between the Community 
and the Member States and the Central and Eastern European countries and the Baltic States 
demonstrates that they are all essentially identically worded in clear, precise and unconditional 
terms. Furthermore, all these Europe Agreements appear to pursue the same or at least similar 
purpose of establishing an association designed to promote the expansion of trade and 
harmonious economic relations between the Contracting Parties, in order to foster dynamic 
economic development and prosperity in these third countries, with a view to facilitating their 
accession to the Community, and they also seem to have the same nature. Consequently, it is 
submitted that Article 37(1) of the Europe Agreement with Hungary,318 Article 38(1) of the 
Agreement with Romania,319 Article 38(1) of the Agreement with the Czech Republic,320 Article 
38(1) o f the Agreement with Bulgaria,321 Article 38(1) o f the Agreement with Slovenia,322 Article 
37(1) of the Agreement with the Latvia,323 Article 37(1) of the Agreement with Lithuania,324 and 
Article 36(1) of the Agreement with Estonia,325 etc, which all provide that subject to the 
conditions and modalities applicable in each Member State, the treatment accorded to workers of 
the nationality of these countries, legally employed in the territory o f a Member State, shall be 
free from any discrimination based on nationality, as regards working conditions, remuneration 
or dismissal, as compared to its own nationals, are all to be considered as being directly effective.
314 Pokrzeptowicz. paras. 19-30.
317 Stix-Hackl AG in Kolpak, paras. 39-44.
318 Europe Agreement establishing an Association between the European Communities and their Member States, of
the one part, and the Republic of Hungary, of the other part, (1993) OJ L 347/2.
319 Europe Agreement establishing an Association between the European Communities and their Member States, of
the one part, and the Romania, of the other part, (1994) OJ L  357/2.
320 Europe Agreement establishing an Association between the European Communities and their Member States, of 
the one part, and the Czech Republic, of the other part, (1994) OJ L 360/2.
321 Europe Agreement establishing an Association between the European Communities and their Member States, of 
the one part, and the Republic of Bulgaria, of the other part, (1993) OJ L 358/3.
322 Europe Agreement establishing an Association between the European Communities and their Member States, of 
the one part, and the Republic of Slovenia, of the other part, (1999) OJ L 51/3.
323 Europe Agreement establishing an Association between the European Communities and their Member States, of 
the one part, and the Republic of Latvia, of the other part, (1998) OJ L  26/3.
324 Europe Agreement establishing an Association between the European Communities and their Member States, of 
the one part, and the Republic of Lithuania, of the other part, (1998) OJ L 51/3.
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By the same token, also Article 23(1) o f the Agreement o f Partnership and Co-operation 
concluded by the Community and its Member States with Russia,325 26 which provides that “subject
rto the laws, conditions and procedures applicable in each Member State; the Community and its 
Member States shall ensure that the treatment accorded to Russian nationals, legally employed in 
the territory o f  a Member State, shall be free from any discrimination based on nationality, as 
regards working conditions, remuneration or dismissal, as compared to its own nationals” could 
possibly be considered as having direct effect.327 Conversely, the equivalent provisions in the 
Agreements o f  Partnership and Co-operation which the Community and its Member States 
concluded with other republics of the former Soviet Union, such as, inter alia, Ukraine,328 
Moldova,329 Kazakhstan,330 the Republic of Kyrgyz,331 Georgia,332 Uzbekistan333, Armenia334 or 
Azerbaijan,335 in all likelihood lack direct effect, as the Contracting Parties only committed 
themselves to  “endeavour to ensure” that the treatment accorded to the nationals of these 
countries shall be free from discrimination. Not only the specific wording of these provisions 
stands in the way of granting them direct effect. It must also be considered that these Agreements 
of Partnership and Co-operation do not pursue the same goals as the Europe Agreements. In their 
preambles, no reference is made to “the process o f European integration” or the “objective of EU 
membership”. Instead, these Agreements principally aim towards a gradual rapprochement 
between ex-Soviet States and a wider area o f co-operation in Europe and neighbouring
325 Europe Agreement establishing an Association between die European Communities and their Member States, of 
the one part, and die Republic of Estonia, of the other part, (1998) OJ L  68/3.
326 Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation establishing a partnership between the European Communities and 
their Member States, of one part, and the Russian federation, o f the other part, (1997) OJ L 327/3.
327 For a concurrent opinion, see Nyssen & Denoel, o.c., at 125.
328 Article 24(1) Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Communities and their Member 
States, and Ukraine, (1998) OJ L  49/3.
329 Article 23(1) Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Communities and their Member 
States, and the Republic o f Moldova, (1998) OJ L 181/3.
330 Article 19(1), Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Communities and their Member 
States and the republic of Kazakhstan (1999) OJ L 196/3.
331 Article 19(1) Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Communities and their Member 
States, of the one part, and the Kyrgyz Republic, of the other part (1999) OJ L 196/48.
332 Article 20(1) Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Communities and their Member 
States, of the one part, and Georgia, of die other part, (1999) OJ L  205/3.
333 Article 19(1) Partnership and Co-operation Agreement between the European Communities and their Member 
States, of the one part, and the Republic of Uzbekistan, of the other part, (1999) OJ L  229/3.
334 Article 19(1) Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Communities and their Member 
States, of the one part, and the Republic of Armenia, of the other part, (1999) OJ L 239/3.
335 Article 20(1) Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Communities and their Member 
States, of the one part, and die Republic of Azerbaijan, of the other part, (1999) OJ L  246/3,
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regions.”336 That these Partnership and Co-operation Agreements have a less far reaching impact 
than the Europe Agreements is further evidenced by the fact that they do not contain specific 
provisions relating to family members of the nationals of these third countries and that, if  they 
already lay down provisions on social security co-ordination, these entitlements are still purely 
provisional, so that separate agreements will have to be negotiated at a later stage to guarantee 
these rights.
Furthermore, the Community has also concluded a series o f Co-operation Agreements 
with some Maghreb countries. The objective of these Agreements is to promote overall co­
operation between the Contracting Parties with a view to contributing to the economic and social 
development of the third country and helping to strengthen relations between the Parties.337 
Although the ambitions of these Agreements are thus obviously less high than these of the 
Community Treaty, this particular observation didn’t prevent the Court of Justice from declaring, 
in the case of Kziber,338 that it follows from the terms of Article 41(1) of the Co-operation 
Agreement with Morocco,339 as well as from the purpose and nature of the Agreement of which 
that provision forms part, that this Article is directly effective, thereby effectively enabling a 
Moroccan national resident in Belgium to secure the right of non-discriminatory treatment on 
grounds of nationality in relation to nationals o f the Member State in which he was employed in 
the field of social security. In view o f this unequivocal statement, it is submitted that Article 40 of 
the same Co-operation Agreement, which stipulates that “the treatment accorded by each 
Member State to workers of Moroccan nationality employed in its territory shall be free from any 
discrimination based on nationality, as regards working conditions or remuneration, in relation to 
its own nationals”, must equally be accorded direct effect so that Moroccan nationals can rely on 
this provision before Member States’ courts. Besides, also Article 39 of the Co-operation
336 Peers, “From cold war to lukewarm embrace: the European Union’s agreements with the CIS states”, 44 ICLQ 
(1995) 829, at 831.
337 See for example Article 1 Co-operation Agreement between the European Economic Community and the 
Kingdom of Morocco, (1978) OJ L 264/2.
338 Case C-18/90 Office nationale de VEmploi v Kziber [1991] ECR1-199, paras. 15-23.
339 Article 41(1) provides that “subject to the provisions of the following paragraphs, workers of Moroccan 
nationality and any members of their families living with them shall enjoy, in the field of social security, treatment 
free from discrimination based on nationality in relation to nationals of the Member State in which they are 
employed."
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Agreement concluded with Tunisia340 and Article 38 o f the Co-operation Agreement concluded 
with Algeria341 should arguably be regarded accordingly, given that these provisions are 
identically Worded and these Agreements pursue the same objectives ana are of the same nature 
as the Agreement with Morocco.
Consequently, sportsmen who are legally employed in a Member State and who are 
nationals o f a third country with which the European Community and/or its Member States have 
concluded an international agreement which contains provisions conferring them the right of 
equal treatment as regards working conditions, remuneration and dismissal within the host 
Member State in relation to that Member State’s own nationals, may thus rely on these provisions 
before their host State’s courts and tribunals, on the condition that these specific provisions are 
directly effective. Concretely, this entails in the first place that they can oppose against the 
application o f rules on foreign players which have the effect of quantitatively limiting their 
possibilities to participate in sporting events o r even to be officially employed by a sports club. 
As has already been stated earlier in this section, in Bosnian, the Court of Justice ruled that 
Article 39 EC was applicable to “rules laid down by sporting associations which determine the 
conditions under which professional sports players may engage in gainful employment.”342 It 
emerges clearly from this statement that these nationality clauses fall within the scope of the 
notion ‘working conditions’. Moreover, these nationality clauses are obviously discriminatory on 
grounds o f nationality and should therefore be abolished in relation to these third-country 
nationals, because they inevitably result in an infringement o f the right of equal treatment granted 
to them in these international agreements. In this respect, it might be interesting to point out that 
the Court also explicitly considered that the fact that these nationality clauses sometimes concern 
not the employment o f players, but only the extent to which their clubs may actually field them in 
official matches is irrelevant, insofar as participation in such matches is the essential purpose of a 
professional player’s activity.343 Relying on the relevant provisions of the Association 
Agreements with respectively Russia and Rumania, Valery Karpin and Carmen Contra obtained
340 Co-operation Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Republic of Tunisia, (1978) OJ L 
265/2.
341 Co-operation Agreement between the European Economic Community and the People’s Democratic Republic of 
Algeria, (1978) O JL  263/2.
342 Bosnian, par. 116.
343 Bosnian, par. 120.
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from the Spanish judge the authorisation to consider the nationality restrictions which the Spanish 
Football Federation still maintained with regard to non-EEA players inapplicable to them,344 so 
that they could play undisturbed for their respective employers in the Spanish Primera 
Division.345 Admittedly, this is an all in all relatively straightforward conclusion. Secondly, 
however, it is an entirely different issue whether these privileged third-country nationals can also 
serve themselves of this right to non-discriminatory treatment laid down in directly effective 
provisions of the Association Agreements to challenge the application of the transfer rules. In this 
respect, it has been argued on the one hand that the transfer rules concern the issue of access to 
employment, rather than that they relate to matters such as working conditions, remuneration and 
dismissal. As a result, since the right to equal treatment conferred to third-country nationals in 
these international agreements does not extend to access to the labour market of Member States, 
the relevant provisions o f these Agreements arguably cannot be relied upon to contest the 
application of the transfer rules. Besides, this conclusion is further reinforced by the observation 
that the transfer rules do not amount to a discrimination on grounds o f nationality, but constitute a 
genuinely non-discriminatory restriction of the freedom of movement.346 On the other hand, it has 
also been advocated that the maintenance o f a system of transfer payments in the event of a 
transfer of a third-country national, in combination with the abolishment of these transfer sums in 
the similar situation of a transfer of an EU/EEA sportsman, results in discriminatory treatment of 
the third-country national athletes as regards remuneration.347 This submission is based on the 
presumption that when clubs don’t have to pay a transfer sum to ensure themselves of the 
services of a Community national, they are in a position to offer them a salary which is 
significantly higher than the financial offer they can make to a third-country national for whom 
they had to pay a transfer sum to engage him. Supposedly, such a situation would amount to a 
breach of the right to treatment free from discrimination on grounds of nationality as regards 
remuneration, which is guaranteed to some third-country national athletes in the Association 
Agreements. Precisely this latter argument has also been raised at the proceedings in the case of
344 According to the rules of the Spanish Football Federation, Spanish clubs may only engage five non-EU nationals.
345 Fylan, “Contra to follow Karpin in bid for EU status”, consult www.fifa.com/reuters of 29 November 2000. In 
this respect, it is interesting to observe that the Italian Football Federation approved the request of AC Milan to grant 
EU status to Ukrainian striker Shevchenko, even though the relevant provisions of the Association Agreement with 
Ukraine are arguably not directly effective. Consult X, “Milan's Shevchenko gets EU status”, www. fi fa. com/reuters 
of 1/12/2000.
346 For a concurrent opinion, see Pollet, o.c., at 144-145.
347 See Nyssen & Denoel, o.c., at 123-124.
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Balog, which will be further discussed below.348 Interestingly however, the national court which 
stayed the proceedings and referred the matter for a preliminary ruling, to the Court o f Justice, 
asked the Court only for an interpretation o f the Community competition rules, and did not 
explicitly refer to the relevant provisions of the European Agreement concluded with Hungary. 
Presumably, it might appear somewhat light-hearted to deduce from this simple omission that the 
national court considered that the contested transfer rules did not constitute an infraction of the 
right to equal treatment accorded to workers o f Hungarian nationality as regards remuneration. 
However, it is undeniably so that one would inevitably be confronted with a practical problem of 
proof in this specific context: even if one were to manage to deliver some evidence of disparate 
treatment as regards remuneration to the detriment of third-country nationals in relation to 
Community athletes, it would still remain to be conclusively demonstrated that this difference is 
precisely due to  the existence o f the system of transfer payments in case of a transfer of a third- 
country national.349 This appears to be an arduous task in the light of the availability of 
alternative plausible explanations: for one, it may simply be that the reason why some third- 
country nationals are less well paid is because they are less good players. Moreover, the issue of 
remuneration is a contractual question, which has to be negotiated and agreed upon by both 
parties: it might thus also be that third-country nationals have lower financial demands than 
Community athletes. Consequently, it is far from clear and probably even doubtful whether 
directly effective provisions of Association Agreements may be useful to invalidate the transfer 
rules in relation to certain privileged third-country nationals. In this respect, it must of course be 
remembered that the right o f treatment free from discrimination is limited to the territory of the 
host Member State: if the responsible sports federation has maintained the system of internal 
transfers also for national athletes, as they strictly legally speaking could do, third-country 
national athletes are not even treated differently.
By way o f summary, again, just as was the case for the rights conferred to third-country 
nationals in Community secondary legislation, this second set of legal instruments granting rights 
to non-EU nationals combines some strengths with a number of inherent weaknesses. The great 
advantage in comparison with the derived rights from Article 12 o f Regulation 1612/68 is of
348 See Report for the hearing in Case C-264/98 Tibor Balog v Royal Charleroi Sporting Club ASBL, par. 29, 
removed from the register.
349 Nyssen & Denoel, o.c., at 126.
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course that third-country nationals are now guaranteed the right to freedom of movement or equal 
treatment in relation to the host Member State’s nationals as regards, access to employment, 
working conditions, remuneration or dismissal -  as the case may be - of their own right. 
Exception made for the free movement right accorded to EEA nationals, this treatment free from 
discrimination on grounds o f nationality remains however limited to the territory of the home 
Member States. In addition, the third-country nationals are only entitled to invoke the rights 
conferred on them in the international agreements provided that they are legally employed in 
their host Member State and that the relevant provisions of the Agreement in question fulfil the 
conditions to be considered directly effective. The Achilles heel o f this particular legal technique 
of conferring rights upon third-country nationals remains obvious: only the nationals of the non- 
EU countries with which the European Community and/or its Member States have concluded an 
Association Agreement can invoke some rights. American and African athletes, to name but the 
most eye-catching examples, are excluded from this preferential treatment. In the end, it 
ultimately requires thus a case-by-case analysis to ascertain exactly which nationals of third 
countries can claim which particular rights.
3. Community Competition rules
At this stage, it is interesting to remark that, apart from some Articles of secondary 
Community legislation and a set of directly effective provisions in Association Agreements 
concluded between the Community and its Member States, there potentially exists a third legal 
technique within the Community law framework for third-country nationals to challenge the 
continued existence of nationality clauses and transfer rules after the Bosman decision, albeit 
outside the formal context o f freedom of movement. What is more, the Community competition 
mles may actually turn out to be the most effective instrument to invalidate the contested rules 
and practices of the sporting associations.350 For one, the Articles 81 and 82 EC are unmistakably 
directly applicable. Moreover, the nationality of the parties which have been adversely affected 
by the anti-competitive behaviour of undertakings seems to be of little or no relevance. What 
matters to trigger the application of the competition rules is that the restrictive behaviour takes
350 See in respect of the applicability of the competition rules, inter alia, Campogrande, “Les règles de concurrence et 
les entreprises sportives professionnelles après l ’arrêt ‘Bosman'”, 1 RMUE (1996) 45; Pappalardo & Parisis, “Le
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place within the Community territory. In theory, therefore, Articles 81 and/or 82 EC appear to 
provide the ideal setting to tackle the issue of nationality clauses and transfer payments in relation 
to third-country nationals, were it not for the fact that the Court of^ Justice up until today 
consistently and rigorously dribbled around the hot potato and refused to pronounce a judgement 
on the applicability o f  the Treaty competition rules to regulations of sporting associations, 
deciding the cases in which the question on the compatibility of certain sporting rules with the 
competition rules was raised invariably on the basis of the free movement provisions.351 In the 
end therefore, from the point of view of the Court in Luxembourg, the relationship between 
Community competition law and sport is still very much unexplored territory.352
Be that as it may, in the case of Balogi the Tribunal of First Instance of Charleroi in 
Belgium requested the Court of Justice to gather up the threads of Bosman and to rule 
unequivocally on the validity of the transfer rules in relation to third-country nationals under the 
competition rules.353 The particular circumstances of the case were the following: Mr. Balog was 
a professional football player of Hungarian nationality. Between 1993 and 1997, he used to  play 
for R.S.C. Charleroi, a Belgian first division team, until the expiry o f his contract on 30 June 
1997. in April 1997, in conformity with the applicable transfer rules, Charleroi offered him a new 
contract of a  one-year duration, which Balog refused to sign, after the management of the club 
had revealed in local newspapers that the player didn’t fit any more within the future plans of 
Charleroi and that there was not really a place for him any more in the team. As a result, he was 
put on the transfer list. Several other clubs showed an interest to engage Balog,354 amongst them 
even Kaiserslautern, a leading team in the German Bundesliga, but none of them was prepared to 
pay the transfer sum, initially set at 125.000 Euro, later decreased to 75.000 Euro by Charleroi in 
accordance with Article IV/85 of the Regulations of the KBVB. His transfer to the Norwegian
droit de la concurrence et le sport professionnel par équipe: quelques appréciations critiques sur la notion de marché 
en cause, en marge de l’affaire ‘Bosman’”, 1 RMUE (1996), 57.
351 See for example Bosman, par. 138: ‘‘Since both types o f rule to which the national court’s question refer are 
contrary to Article 39, it is not necessary to rule on the interpretation of Article 81 and 82 of the Treaty.”
352 For the time being, Advocate-General Lenz’ submission in Bosman that the transfer rules at stake in the 
proceedings constituted a violation of Article 81 EC is arguably still the highest authoritative opinion in this 
particular context
553 Fore more information, consult Blanpain, De Belgische Voetbalbond, Het Vlaams Decreet Martens en het 
Arbitragehof: Vrijheiden gebondenheid in de sport De CAO van 12juni 1998. De Balog case, (Peeters, 1998).
354 In particular Laval and Nancy, two teams playing in the French second division, and Austria Salsbourg and 
Hartberg, two teams evolving in the Austrian second division: see Report of the Hearing in Case C-264/98 Tibor 
Balog v Royal Charleroi Sporting ClubASBL, par. 12, removed from the regista“.
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 ^ team of Skeid only fell through because the KBVB refused to deliver the international transfer 
I certificate reguested by the Norwegian football federation. For half a year, the situation remained
| in an impasse. From December 1997 onwards, Balog started playing m r Ironi Ashdod in the
I Israeli first division. The Israeli team only temporarily engaged Balog on a free loan, which
 ^ entailed that the player remained ‘property1 of Charleroi, and thus had to return to Charleroi at
| the end of the season 1997-98. In order to avoid the same ‘vaudeville* from happening all over 
| again, Balog decided to take the matter to the national courts in April 1998. Being of Hungarian 
| nationality and therefore a third-country national, he could not directly rely on the Bosman
I judgement of the Court of Justice to vindicate his claimed right to freely move to another clubj after the expiry of his contract without the imposition o f a transfer sum. Consequently, he
| challenged the remains of the existing transfer system under the Community competition rules.
[ The Tribunal of First Instance of Charleroi stayed the proceedings and referred the matter to the
 ^ Court of Justice under the Article 234 EC procedure, requesting the Court to rule on the
( following question: “Is it compatible with Article 81 EC and/or Article 53 EEA that a football
!i team established on the territory of a Member State of the European Union claims to obtain a
[ transfer sum for the engagement of one of his former players, a professional football player with
| the nationality of a third country whose contract of affiliation with that club has expired, by a
| new employer established in the same Member State, in another Member State of the European
I Union or the European Economic Area, or in a third country?1*355
[
f
( This time, there really seemed to be no route of escape available to the Court. In its
request for a preliminary ruling, the national court had only referred to the conformity o f  the 
transfer system in professional football with the Community competition rules, so the Court was 
forced to couch its judgement in these terms. And yet, the event again didn*t materialise, as the 
dispute was settled out of court. Precisely on the morning of 29 March 2001, when Advocate- 
General Stix-Hackl was expected to deliver her opinion to the case, the parties reached an 
agreement not to pursue the proceedings any further. Clearly, the timing of the amicable 
resolution of the dispute was peculiar and raised some questions. Insiders believed the content of 
the opinion of the Advocate-General was somehow leaked to the football authorities on the eve of 
its publication. Supposedly, it contained a condemnation o f the transfer rules for breach of the
355 Report of the Hearing in Balog, par. 12, removed from the register.
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competition rules. Presumably, this circumstance would have persuaded FIFA to convince Balog 
to clinch a deal. Rumours go that the player was offered the sum o f two million dollar to drop the 
case. The impression that this whole scenario of events sounds rather plausible is further 
reinforced by the fact that the deal included that the actual content of the opinion of Advocate 
General Stix-Hackl would not be revealed.356 Besides, in this context it should not be lost out of 
sight that barely three weeks before, on 5 March 2001, FIFA had managed to come to a 
consensus with the European Commission on a revised international transfer system, which 
brought the infringement procedure for breach o f the competition rules which the Commission 
had instigated against the football authorities to  a halt.357 This agreement was generally hailed as 
a moral victory for the football authorities. Quite understandably, they didn’t want to throw to 
grabs immediately the newly acquired image that they are perfectly well capable of managing 
their own affairs without legal intervention from  outside. From  this point of view, an outright 
condemnation in Luxembourg, even o f a rule o f  the transfer system that was no longer in force at 
the time of the proceedings, would have a pernicious impact on this perception. And that is not 
even to speak of the potential effects for future litigation which a principled decision on the 
applicability of the competition rules on sporting regulations may entail. Consequently, all pieces 
of the jigsaw fit together. FIFA’s sudden and unexpected readiness to reach a friendly settlement 
in Balog is after all rather comprehensible.
From a practical point of view, the concrete outcome o f the dispute can hardly be 
deplored. As a general rule of law, dispute settlement out o f court is to be preferred over court 
litigation. Besides, whatever the decision of the Court of Justice would have been, as such its 
impact would remain limited to the particular circumstances o f the Balog case, since the system 
of transfer payments in the event of international transfers within the territory of the EU/EAA of 
third-country national football players whose contract of employment with their club has expired 
had been officially abolished as from 1 April 1999.358 Be that as it may, however, from a more 
theoretical point of view, another seemingly excellent opportunity has been lost to finally obtain a 
principled judgement on the applicability o f the Community competition rules to certain
356 Surprisingly, some time later, AG Stix-Hackl published an article on die uncomfortable relationship between 
sport and competition law... Egger & Stix-Hackl, “Sports and Competition Law: a Never-Ending Story?’, ECLR 
(2002)81.
357 See infra, chapter 5.
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regulations and practices o f sporting federations. Once again, one is left to guess how the Court 
would have trenched the case. May it suffice to simply state in this context that arguably, the 
Court woulcf have ruled that the contested transfer rules amount to an "unjustified restriction of 
competition and therefore violate Article 81 EC. It is submitted that the transfer system could be 
categorised as a decision o f associations of undertakings which shares markets or sources of 
supply, which may affect trade between Member States and has as its effect a restriction of 
competition within the common market.* 359 Furthermore, presumably, also the practice of 
nationality clauses could be tackled under this particular heading.
ID. CONCLUSIONS
According to the principles of the EC Treaty, as interpreted by the European Court of 
Justice, the free movement rights belong thus to the exclusive preserve of the nationals o f the 
Member States of the European Union. However, in international agreements concluded by the 
Community and its Member States and in some acts of secondary Community legislation, some 
of these movement rights have been conferred to some categories of third country nationals under 
certain circumstances. For the time being, the whole framework of rights concerning non-EU 
nationals is extremely complex and rather patchy. Community legislation intended to grant more 
substantial rights and to introduce more coherence into the system is currently being prepared. 
This tendency can only be applauded.
The analysis in this section has been predominantly focused on the issue of whether third 
country nationals could rely on certain provisions of Community law or international agreements 
to challenge the application of transfer rules and nationality clauses against them. Firstly, with 
regard to the transfer rules, this was largely a theoretical question for the world of football, as 
FIFA proceeded to abolish the system of transfer payments in the event of international transfers 
within the EU/EEA of out-of contract professional players also for third-country nationals as 
from 1 April 1999. It resulted from the examination that the Community competition rules 
constitute arguably the most reliable instrument to invalidate these contested transfer rules. Only
338 See FIFA Circular n° 616 of 4 June 1997, http://www.fifa.com
359 Article 81.1(c) EC.
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the nationals o f Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein can undoubtedly rely on the provisions o f the 
international agreement concluded with the Community -  the EEA Agreement -  to contest the 
legality of the transfer system in relation to them. To a more limited extent, this also holds true 
for Turkish workers on the basis o f Decision 1/80 of the EC/Turkey Association Council. The 
relevant rights conferred to the other third-country nationals in international agreements are 
mostly limited to treatment free from discrimination within the host Member State with that 
State’s nationals, and furthermore, it is doubtful whether these transfer rules can be convincingly 
construed as amounting to a violation of this principle as regards remuneration. Besides, for 
basically the same reasons, Article 11 of Regulation 1612/68 does not appear to be particularly 
useful in this context either. Secondly, and conversely, these legal instruments seem to be more 
appropriate to mount a challenge against the nationality clauses which restrict the possibilities for 
third-country nationals to be engaged by a club or to participate in official matches or 
competitions. Non-EU nationals who are the spouse or dependent children of a Community 
worker who has exercised his free movement rights may rely on Article 11 of Regulation 1612/68 
before the national courts of the host Member State in this context. Furthermore, the same can be 
done by nationals o f  the third countries with which an Association Agreement has been 
concluded which contains directly effective provisions securing equal treatment within the host 
Member State as regards working conditions. Presumably, the nationality clauses also amount to 
an infringement of the Community competition rules. From the point o f view of Community law 
alone already, it therefore seems recommendable and probably even compulsory to eradicate the 
practice of nationality clauses.360 Be that as it may, not all national sports associations have 
effectively carried through this reform. In various sports disciplines in different countries, there 
are still rules on foreign players in force.
At times, this has given rise to unexpected and utterly unwarranted situations. Under such 
a regime of nationality clauses, it is clear that an EU passport is a useful asset, as it significantly
360 Arguably, on the basis of some provisions of international law or national state law one would reach the same 
conclusion. However, it would exceed beyond the scope o f this research project to consider this issue any further. 
May it suffice in this respect to refer to one particular example: in the case of Econg, a Nigerian football player, the 
Italian ‘pretore di lavoro’ has decided that the rule of the Italian Football Federation according to which team playing 
in the third division cannot make use of third-country national players is incompatible with the national decree 
Turco-Napolitano which stipulates that there shall be no discrimination between Italian workers and foreign workers 
who are residing in Italy, and therefore must be abolished. See www.kwsport.kataweb.it of 3 November 2000, 
“Extracomunitario, giocheri in C l per decisione del tribunale. E il calcio italiano trema”
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increases an athlete’s opportunities to find employment and/or to effectively take part in official 
matches or competitions. The mere possession of the nationality of an EU  country may actually 
make the difference for a sportsmen between a place in the starting line-up of the team in official 
matches or a seat on the bench, or even between a contract of employment with a club or no 
contract whatsoever. From this particular perspective it somehow does not come as a surprise that 
many third-country national sportsmen, in their quest to compete in their sporting discipline 
under the most favourable personal circumstances possible, have endeavoured to establish a link 
with a Member State of the European Union, so as to acquire the nationality of this State and the 
corresponding privileged Community status for sporting purposes. Unsurprisingly, many of these 
non-EU sportsmen effectively turned out to have one or the other relative or ancestor with the 
nationality of an EU Member State -  often a Southern European country -  which enabled them, 
in accordance with the relevant nationality legislation of the Member State in question, to obtain 
the EU passport desperately looked after. However, on some occasions, these documents 
appeared to be of doubtful legal validity.361 An after all rather innocent identity check in Poland 
in September 2000 unleashed a real passport scandal when the Polish customs found out that the 
Portuguese passports of two Brazilian players o f Italian football club Udinese, who travelled with 
their club to Poland for the away game of an UEFA Cup tie, appeared to be false. This scandal 
concerning false passports for athletes would ultimately assume serious proportions all over 
Europe. In Italy, where the whole affair was commonly referred to as ‘passaportopoli’, the Justice 
Department opened an official enquiry against no less than 7 football clubs and 24 players from 
the Serie A.362 And these number could even have been considerably higher if the clubs had not, 
on their own initiative, refused to take into consideration the EU passport of some of the third- 
country nationals they employed.363 Former Lazio Roma midfielder Veron from Argentina and 
Intemazionale striker Recoba from Uruguay were the most famous names implicated in the 
whole affair. Their Italian passports effectively turned out to be false. In the end, only relative 
light punishments were inflicted on the clubs and the players who were finally convicted in Italy: 
they consisted of fines to be paid by the clubs involved and of temporary bans to play for the
361 See Leijendekker, “Landstitel van Lazio Roma staat ter discussie door schandaal valse paspoorten”, De 
Standaard, 8 February 2001.
362 Some of the players and teams involved are Cafu and Aldair from AS Roma, Chamot of AC Milan, Mihaljovic of 
Lazio Roma and Sosa of Udinese.
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footballers, which could then easily be circumvented by moving abroad to another Member State. 
Arguably, French football club St-Etienne paid the highest sporting price for the fraud 
committed: after the passports of two of its players had turned out to Be false, ie s  stéphanois’ 
received a severe point penalty from the ERF which ultimately led to the relegation of the club to 
second division. This whole affair o f false passports clearly shows that interests in contemporary 
professional sports have assumed such dimensions that some athletes and clubs do not eschew 
from using illegal methods to attain their objectives any longer. Evidently, such sporting fraud 
should never be tolerated. However, the fact that this practice has actually occurred could also be 
an additional argument in favour o f abolishing these nationality clauses which are in all 
likelihood untenable under Community
§4: The Requirement o f a Trans-National Underpinning
In order to trigger the application o f the Community free movement provisions, the 
situation of a Member State national who carries out a genuine and effective economic activity 
must also contain a certain cross-border element.36 64 Without migration from the territory of one 
Member State to that of another, no free movement protection can be invoked. According to 
settled case law of the Court of Justice, “the provisions o f  the Treaty on freedom of movement 
for workers cannot ... be applied to situations which are wholly internal to a Member State, in 
other words, where there is no factor connecting them to any o f the situations envisaged by 
Community law.”365 As Advocate General Fennelly stated, this formula has acquired the status of 
terms of art used to express the test of applicability o f Community law.366 In this respect, the 
Court has stressed on repeated occasions that a purely hypothetical prospect of exercising free
363 Fot example, AS Roma didn’t trust the Portuguese papers of its Brazilian Asuncao, AC Milan refused to consider 
the Portuguese papers o f Brazilian goalkeeper Dida and Juventus doubted about the validity of the Greek passport of 
Uruguyan O’Neill.
364 Lenaerts & Van Nuffel, o.c., at 201-203.
365 Case 175/178 R v Saunders [1979] ECR 1129, par. 11; Case 298¡84 Jorio v Azienda Autonoma delle Ferrovie 
dello Stato [1986] ECR 247, par. 14; Case C-332/90 Steen v Deutsche Bundespost [1992] ECR 1-341, par. 9.
366 Fennelly AG in Case C-281/98 Roman Angonese v Cassa di Risparmio di Bolzano [2000] ECR 1-4139, par. 14.
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movement rights does not establish a sufficient connection with Community law' to justify the 
application of Community provisions.367
c ' i *« -,
As a result of this principle, situations may arise in which static nationals of a given 
Member State are effectively treated less favourably within their own Member State than 
nationals of other Member States who have actually moved and may therefore invoke 
Community law, even though they find themselves in similar factual circumstances. This 
particular situation is usually referred to as ‘reverse discrimination’.368 In general, it is viewed as 
a regrettable, but inevitable consequence of the division of the spheres of competence between 
the Community and its Member States.369 In principle, Member State nationals who claim to be 
discriminated against in their own Member State and who seek redress before the national courts 
against this State must rely on the internal legislation and cannot invoke EC law. Be that as it 
may, the Court has somehow fine-tuned this position in its case law'.370 At this point, only the 
most important of these decisions will be highlighted. The Court did for example expressly 
acknowledge that the fundamental freedoms of persons, establishment and services “could not be 
fully realised if the Member States were in a position to refuse to grant the benefit of the 
provisions of Community law to those of their nationals who have taken advantage of the 
facilities existing in the matter of freedom of movement and who have acquired, by virtue of such 
facilities, the trade qualifications referred to by the Directive in a Member State other than that
367 See inter alia, Case 180/83 Moser v Land Baden-Württemberg [1984] ECR 2539, par. 18: the case concerned a 
German national who had always lived and maintained his residence in Germany, but who, in order to establish a 
connection with the Community provisions he invoked, claimed that the German legislation denying him access to 
the teaching profession in that country because of uncertainty as to his loyalty to the Basic law (he was said to be a 
member of the Communist Party) also precluded him from applying for posts in schools in the other Member States. 
Similarly, see also Case C-299/95 Kremzow v Austrian State (1997] ECR 1-2629, par. 16: the Court declined to 
tackle the question whether the deprivation of an Austrian national’s liberty by virtue of a prison sentence imposed 
by the Austrian courts for murder and possession of firearms constituted an unlawful restriction on the prisoner's 
freedom of movement, stipulating that “whilst any deprivation of liberty may impede the person concerned from 
exercising his right of free m ovem ent,... a purely hypothetical prospect of exercising that right does not establish a 
sufficient connection with Community law to justify the application of Community provisions.“
368 For m are general information, consult inter alia, Canizzaro, “Producing ‘Reverse Discrimination* Trough the 
Exercise of EC Competences” , YBEL (1997) 29 ; Pickup, “Reverse Discrimination and freedom of movement for 
workers”, 23 CMLRev. (1986) 135; Maduro, "The scope of European remedies: The case of purely internal situations 
and reverse discrimination”, in Kilpatrick, Novitz and Skidmore (eds.), The Future o f European Remedies (Hart, 
2000)117.
369 Shuibhne, ‘Tree Movement o f Persons and the Wholly Internal Rule: Time to Move on?’, 39 CMLRev (2002) 
731.
370 See Hedemann-Robinson, “An Overview o f Recent Legal Developments at Community Level in relation to Third 
Country Nationals Resident in the European Union, with Particular Reference to the Case Law of the European 
Court of Justice”, 38 CMLRev. (2001) 345.
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whose nationality they possess.”371 Every Community national who has carried out an economic 
activity in another Member State than that o f his nationality is considered by the Court to be  
covered under the personal scope o f application of the free movement o f workers and 
establishment, regardless o f his residence or nationality.372 *Furthermore, in the landmark decision 
o f Surinder Singh?1* the Court has postulated that “a national o f a Member State might be 
deterred from leaving his country o f origin in order to pursue an activity as an employed or self- 
employed person as envisaged by the Treaty in the territory o f another Member State if, on  
returning to the Member State of which he is a national in order to pursue an activity there as an 
employed or self-employed person, the conditions of his entry and residence were not at least 
equivalent to those which he would enjoy under the Treaty or secondary law in the territory o f  
another Member State.”374 It proceeded holding that “he would in particular be deterred from so 
doing if his spouse and children were not also permitted to enter and reside in the territory of his 
Member State of origin under conditions at least equivalent to those granted them by Community 
law in the territory o f another Member State.”
Even in spite o f these refinements, the ‘wholly internal situation’ approach of the Court o f  
Justice has led to some truly unsatisfactory and unwarranted results, both for Community 
nationals and their families.375 A clear illustration of the invidious consequences of the 
acceptance of reverse discrimination at Community level can also be found in the domain o f  
sport. In the proceedings in the Bosman case, UEFA considered that the dispute concerned a 
Belgian player whose transfer fell through because of the conduct o f a Belgian club and a Belgian
371 Case 115/78 Knoors v Secretary o f State fo r  Economic Affairs [1979] ECR 399, par. 20. See also par. 24: 
“Although it is true that the provisions o f the Treaty relating to establishment and the provision of services cannot be 
applied to situations which are purely internal to a M em ber State, the position nevertheless remains dial the reference 
in Article 43 to ‘nationals o f a  Member State* who wish to establish themselves ‘in the tenitory o f another M em ber 
State’ cannot be interpreted in such a way as to exclude from  the benefit o f Community law a given Member State’s 
own nationals when the latter, owing to the fact they have lawfully resided on the territory o f another Member State 
and have there acquired a trade qualification which is recognised by the provisions of Community law, are, with 
regard to their States o f origin, in a  situation which m ay be assimilated to that of any other persons enjoying the 
rights and liberties guaranteed by the Treaty.”
37* See inter alia, Case C-419/92 Scholz v Opera Università di Cagliari [1994] ECR 1-505, par. 9; Case C-443/93 
Vougioukas [1995] ECR 1-4033, par. 38; Case C-107/94 Asscher v Staatssecretaris van Financiën [1996] ECR I- 
3089, paras. 31-34.
Case C-370/90 R v Immigration Appeal Tribunal and Surinder Singh, ex parte Secretary o f State fo r  the Home 
Department [1992] ECR 1-4265.
374 Singh, par. 19.
375 See in particular Cases 35-36/82 Morson and Jhanjan v the Netherlands [1982] ECR 3723; or Joined Cases C- 
Ó4&65/96 Land Nordrhein-Westfalen v Uecker and Jacquet v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen [1997] ECR 1-3171.
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association and therefore had to be regarded as a purely internal Belgian situation which 
consequently fell outside the ambit of Article 39 EC.376 The Court of Justice swiftly dismissed 
this argumeift, pointing out that it was clear from the findings of fact made by the national court 
that Bosman had entered into a contract of employment with a club in another Member State with 
a view to exercising employment in that State.377 It stated that by doing so, the player had 
accepted an offer o f employment actually made, and thus squarely came within the scope of 
Article 39(3)(a) EC.378 Subsequently, the Court pursued its analysis along these lines, which 
ultimately culminated in a condemnation of the international transfer rules which prevent a 
professional football player who is no longer linked to a contract with his former club from freely 
negotiating a new contract with a club in another Member State of the European Union for 
violation of Article 39 EC.379 Accordingly, the express terms of the ruling do not extend to purely 
domestic transfers. As a result, on the basis of the Community free movement provisions there 
seemed to be no immediate need for the national football associations to abolish their domestic 
transfer regimes. Some federations have actually made use of this opportunity offered by the 
Court to assert the continued existence of domestic transfer rules. The application of these 
national transfer systems can under certain circumstances effectively work to the detriment of 
national players and thus amount to reverse discrimination: if out-of-contract football players 
who are nationals of a given Member State want to change clubs in their Member State, a transfer 
sum is still due by the acquiring club, whereas this club can acquire nationals of other Member 
States who are in the same position for free.
Nevertheless, some observations deserve to be made in this respect. Firstly, it must be 
noticed that it is in conformity with the Court’s established case law on reverse discrimination to 
consider purely domestic transfers as lying beyond the scope of application of Community free 
movement law. However, in this context it is submitted that the concept of a ‘wholly internal 
situation* must be interpreted strictly. Arguably, one can only speak of a purely domestic transfer 
when a player of Member State A is transferred between two clubs of Member State A. The 
transfer in the summer of 2002 of German midfielder Michael Ballack from Bayer Leverkusen to
376 Bosman, par. 88.
377 Bosman, par. 90.
378 Bosman, par. 90.
379 Bosman, paras. 92-114.
117
Bayern Munich provides a good illustration of an entirely internal situation. The same can be said 
about the deal between Manchester United and Leeds United concerning England’s defender Rio 
Ferdinand. Presumably however, the move o f Holland’s midfielder ^ Clarence Seedorf from 
Intemazionale to AC Milan cannot be categorized as a wholly internal transfer.380 Certainly, this 
transfer is governed by the rules of the Italian football federation, as it is a transaction involving 
two Italian teams. However, arguably this transfer is also subject to Community law, as it 
concerns a Community national who has exercised his free movement rights. Under these 
circumstances, the principles enunciated by the Court’s ruling in Bosnian apply also to an 
otherwise internal situation. To a certain extent at least, the Bosman decision thus also entails 
direct consequences for domestic transfer systems. Furthermore, also the situation o f a Member 
State national who moved abroad to play for a club in another Member State and is subsequently 
transferred back to a club of his home Member State escapes in all likelihood the qualification of 
‘wholly internal*. This submission seems rather straightforward in the light of the previous case 
law of the Court on this particular issue.381 However, as Weatherill correctly observed, in this 
context, the possibility exists that clubs in different Member States conclude co-operation 
agreements with the sole or primary purpose o f deviating the rules.382 Hypothetically speaking, if 
Ajax Amsterdam were interested in a player from  Feyenoord Rotterdam and wanted to avoid 
having to pay a transfer sum to ensure itself of his services, it could call upon its Belgian partner 
to acquire the player for free. Subsequently, after having concluded the transaction, the Belgian 
team could then simply hand over the player their Dutch partners of Ajax. This kind of artificial 
constructions runs the risk o f being labeled as sham frontier-crossing by the Court, which would 
imply that the player concerned is incapable o f benefiting from the protection granted by 
Community law.383 The player may therefore be required to effectively play for a while for the
380 For a concurrent opinion, see MorteLmans and Temmink, “UEFA vs J-M Bosman: Het vrije verkeer van 
beroepssporters in de Europese Unie”, 45 Ars Aequi (1996) 166; similarly, Thill, “L ’airêt ‘Bosman* et ses 
implications pour la  libre circulation des sportifs à l ’intérieur de l’Union européenne dans des contextes factuels 
différents de ceux de l ’affaire ‘Bosman’”, 1 RMUE (1996) 100.
381 Cfr. cases such as Surinder Singh and Kraus.
382 Consult W eatherill, “Case C -415/93 Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Association ASLB v Jean- 
Marc Bosman”, 33 CMLRev. (1996) 1020.
383 See also Case 39/86 Lair v University o f Hannover [1988] ECR 3161; Case C-23/93 TV 10 SA v Commissariaat 
voor de Media [1994] ECR 1-4795. On the other hand, Weatherill observed that “the Court’s refusal to sanction 
challenges to domestic rules by ‘sham ’ migrants might not extend to a situation where the domestic rules in question, 
the transfer system, are not a  comprehensive regulatory regim e, but merely the tattered and anomalous remnants of a 
discredited system.”: see W eatherill, “Case C-415/93 Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Association 
ASLB v Jean-Marc Bosman” , o.c., at 1020.
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Belgian team before he can considered as a ‘genuine and effective’ economic migrant worthy of 
the status of Community worker with all the advantages it entails.384
Secondly, almost inevitably, the maintenance of domestic transfer regimes had a 
significant impact on transfer patterns on the players’ market.385 For the clubs, it became 
financially more attractive to engage players whose contract had expired from teams from other 
Member States rather than players from clubs from the same League, simply because they did not 
have to  pay transfer fees for the former players. At times, these economic considerations even 
prevailed over arguments about quality, in the sense that clubs sometimes preferred to acquire a 
player who was less good than another one, but cheaper. By the same token, also for the players 
the idea of trying their luck in other Member States had a certain -  often predominantly financial 
- appeal: as clubs in foreign Member States did not have to effectuate a transfer payment in the 
event o f a cross-border transfer, they were often able to offer these players considerably higher 
salaries than the clubs competing in the same Member State as the player’s previous club, which 
still had to pay a transfer fee for the services of the player. Consequently, as it was interesting 
both for the clubs as for the players to conclude international transfers, the number of cross- 
border moves within the European Union increased considerably in the aftermath of the Bosnian 
judgement. Moreover, in this context, it must be pointed out that national federations cannot 
attempt to curb this trend and force clubs to buy national players by setting limits on the number 
of foreign EU players who can be engaged and/or fielded during official matches, as the Court 
has equally invalidated similar national clauses in the Bosnian ruling. Consequently, it appears 
from the foregoing that the unrestricted possibility of acquiring out-of-contract players from other 
M em ber States renders it practically anomalous to maintain the national transfer systems, even 
though this is strictly legally speaking unobjectionable on the basis of the Community free 
movement provisions as they are currently interpreted by the Court of Justice in its case law.
384 In the light of the recently revised FIFA Regulations on transfers, establishing two periods in a season during 
which a  football player can be transferred internationally, it could forcefully be submitted that a player has to play at 
least for one period in between two such transfer windows for a foreign club before he can effectively be considered 
as having moved to another Member State. For a more elaborate analysis, see Chapter 5.
385 F or m ore detailed information, consult Weatherill, “European Football Law”, Collected Courses o f the Academy 
o f European Law, Volume VII, Book l  (Kluwer, 1999), at 376.
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Be that as it may, however, thirdly, there remains another legal issue to be resolved: 
hence, it appears unlikely that the domestic transfer regimes withstand ¿he test o f compatibility 
with the Community competition rules.386 Immediately after the Court’s decision in Bosnian, in 
which the Court, conspicuously refrained from addressing the issue from the competition law 
angle, former European Commissioner in charge o f competition affairs Karel Van Miert insisted 
on a number o f different occasions that the maintenance of the national transfer systems, even if 
their effects are normally limited to one M ember State, violates Article 81 EC.387 Furthermore, he 
hinted clearly at the fact that the Commission would not hesitate to take the necessary steps in 
accordance with its prerogatives under Regulation 17/62 to proceed to an official decision for 
infringement of the competition rules if the responsible football associations did not bring these 
anti-competitive practices to an end.388 More concretely, as has been demonstrated above, the 
existence of transfer systems within one single M ember State yields the effect that domestic clubs 
prefer to engage players from clubs from other Member States and contemporaneously induces 
players to move to clubs in another Member State. These domestic regimes thus clearly affect 
trade patterns between Member States within the meaning of Article 81(1) EC. It may very well 
be that that these practices actually lead to an increase in cross-border trade, but it cannot be 
denied that they hinder the realisation o f “a single market achieving conditions similar to those of 
a domestic market”,389 390which is one o f the principal objectives of the Community competition 
rules. Under these circumstances, domestic transfer systems remain caught under Article 81(1) 
E C 391 It is submitted that the precise distortion o f competition caused by the maintenance of 
national transfer systems consists in the fact that competition between clubs with regard to the 
recruitment of players is artificially directed at footballers playing for foreign clubs, because 
transfer fees must be paid for out-of-contract domestic players, and also in the fact that the 
salaries of domestic players are kept lower than they probably would have been in the absence of
386 See inter alia, Lenz AG in Bosnian, paras. 254-278; Fleischer, “Absprachen im  Profisport und Art. 85 EGV- eine 
kartellrechtliche Nachlese zum  Bosman-Urteil des Europâischen Gerichtshofs” , Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb 46 
(1996) 473; M om s, Morrow and Spink, ‘E C  Law and Professional Football: Bosman and its Implications”, 59 MLR 
(1996)893.
387 Van Miert, “Sports and Competition: Recent Developments and the Commission’s Action”, European Sports 
Forum, Luxembourg, 28 November 1997.
388 Van Miert, “L ’arrêt ‘Bosman’: la  suppression des frontières sportives dans le M arché unique européen” , 1 RMUE 
(1996)3.
389 Case 26/76 Metro-SB-Grossmürkte GmbH & Co. KG v Commission [1977] EC R  1875; Case 22/78 Hugin v 
Commission [1979] ECR 1869.
390 See for example, Craig & de Burca, o.c., at 936-937.
391 See Joined Cases 56&S8/64 Consten and Grundig v Commission [1966] ECR 299.
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these transfer systems.392 Furthermore, there seems to be no recourse available for an exemption 
of the domestic transfer systems under Article 81(3). In Bosman, the .Court had ruled that the 
objectives pursued by the contested transfer rules could be attained with alternative means which 
were less restrictive o f free movement. Consequently, the transfer rules were regarded as being 
not indispensable and thus failed to  pass the test of proportionality. In his opinion to the case, 
Advocate General Lenz argued that rules which are disproportionately restrictive for the purposes 
of Article 39 EC should not be able to benefit from an exemption under Article 81(3) EC.393 
Consequently, the existing domestic transfer regimes seem to be open to challenge under the 
competition rules.
Summarising, it appears the Community competition rules could efficiently be invoked to 
cancel the unwarranted situations of reverse discrimination caused by the maintenance of transfer 
systems within one single Member State, which are left unscathed as a result of the Court’s 
unwillingness to intervene in wholly internal situations in the context of Article 39 EC. 
Effectively, when the Commission in December 1998 sent a statement of objections to FIFA 
declaring that it intended to start an official procedure for infringement of the competition rules 
against -  amongst others- some remnants of the traditional transfer system, it clearly indicated 
that also the practice of domestic transfer regimes was under scrutiny. This initiative of the 
Commission resulted finally in an elaborate revision o f some of the salient points of the 
international transfer system. Rather surprisingly, however, during this whole process no 
particular attention was paid to the problematic issue of the domestic transfer systems. What is 
more, in the preamble of the amended FIFA Regulations on transfers, national associations were 
encouraged to maintain national transfer systems. Apparently, both the Community institutions as 
the football authorities led thus once again escape an excellent opportunity to finally and 
definitely abandon these national regimes.
By way of conclusion, it may be worth adding one more observation. The previous 
example of the continued existence of transfer systems at the level of one Member State and the 
consequences it entails convincingly demonstrates that the Court’s traditional refusal to tackle
392 In this respect, I concur completely with the in-depth analysis of Weatherill. Consult Weatherill, “Case C -415/93 
U nion Royale Beige des Sociétés de Football Association ASLB v Jean-Marc Bosman”, o.c., 1021-1026.
393 See Lenz AG in Bosman, paras. 277-278.
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situations which are internal to one Member Stale under Article 39 EC is subject to criticism and 
may ultimately need to  be revisited.394 It does indeed appear somewhat. anomalous that a whole
c . . tframework o f rights and entitlements is set up to ensure that Community nationals are ensured of 
being able to move freely to  other Member States, whereas they might encounter difficulties and 
even outright instances o f reverse discrimination when they want to move simply within their 
own Member State. This seems to go squarely against the whole idea of the internal market.395 
Evidently, this is an extremely complex issue for which no all-encompassing solution might be 
readily available, as it touches upon the delicate issue of the division of competencies between 
the Community and its Member States. It would exceed the purposes of this research to dig 
substantively deeper into this issue. M ay it simply suffice in this context to state that recently, 
some interesting actions o f the Community institutions can be noticed in this domain, which 
tentatively appear to go into the direction of some more Community involvement in what may be 
termed national spheres o f competence. Some recent remarkable judgements o f the Court of 
Justice in cases such as Angonese396 and Carpenter397 may be revealing in this respect. It remains 
of course to be seen whether this trend will be confirmed in subsequent case law and/or 
secondary legislation...
Conclusion
The picture that emerges clearly from this chapter is that the Community has gradually 
but certainly, and at times almost unnoticeably, deepened and extended its grip on the world of 
sport. It must be emphasised though that this is a general development, which has occurred in 
virtually all sectors o f  societal life, and which is therefore not specifically related to sport. 
Undeniably, this evolution is to a large degree the result of the work o f the Court of Justice. In the 
first place, the Court rejected allegations that the relevant free movement provisions could only
394 See, for example, Shuibhne, ox., at 731.
395 Mortelmans, “Zaak C-415/95 KBVB, Royal Club Lidgeois, UEFA tegen J-M. Bosnian”, 4 SEW (1996) 141.
396 Case C-281/98 Roman Angonese v Cassa di Risparmio di Bolzano [2000] E C R 1-4139.
397 Case C-60/00 Carpenter v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] ECR 1-6305. The case concerned a 
Philippine national who is m an ied  to a national of the United Kingdom and applies for the right o f residence in her 
spouse’s State o f origin. Carpenter resides in the UK and provides services abroad. In this case, the Court essentially 
extended the rights granted to  workers and their family members in Singh to the field of the provision o f services.
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be applied to public actors - and thus not to private bodies such sporting associations - and 
adopted a forthright stance on the issue of horizontal direct effect. In Angonese, it attributed full 
horizontal direct effect to Article 39 EC, leaving undecided only the question of whether this 
principle is limited to discriminatory measures or can also be extended to genuinely non- 
discriminatory measures. At the moment, there are no concrete indications that the Court would 
not be found willing to go equally far with regard to Articles 43 and 49 EC, even though it has 
not yet done so. The principle of free movement of workers -  and in the future maybe also the 
right to freedom to provide services -  may thus nowadays arguably be relied upon in a dispute 
between two private parties, for example a player and his club of affiliation. Secondly, as a result 
of the Court of Justice’s wide approach towards the concept of ‘economic activity’ within the 
meaning of Article 2 EC, many sportsmen are nowadays legitimately entitled to move around 
within the European Union while enjoying the full protection of the relevant Articles 39, 43 and 
49 EC. Besides, in this respect it is worth pointing out that even athletes who are active in sport 
on a mere amateur or recreational basis are presumably no longer a priori completely excluded 
from the ambit of this branch of Community law, through the use of the concepts of Union 
citizenship or corollary free movement rights or through some provisions of Regulation 1612/68. 
Thirdly, it has been tentatively indicated that the requirement of a cross-frontier element to is 
under serious doctrinal strain and that the Court recently might been showing signs of a possible 
more flexible or lenient approach to the matter, resulting in the application of Community law to 
situations which previously would have been earmarked as belonging to the exclusive preserve of 
member States’ competence. Finally, also the requirement that one must possess the nationality 
of a Member State of the Union to be able to invoke free movement rights has been moderated. 
By means of an extensive series o f international agreements with non Member State countries, 
these rights to freedom of movement have also been conferred, generally on the basis of 
reciprocity, and albeit mostly only to a greater or lesser extent and provided certain circumstances 
are complied with, to sportsmen who have the nationality o f these third-countries. Furthermore, 
some categories of third-country nationals -  spouses or dependent family members of 
Community workers -  may also derive some rights from Regulation 1612/68. And it is even 
entirely conceivable that third-country nationals could successfully invoke the Community
Potentially, this decision has far-reaching consequences, in view o f the wide interpretation of the concept of 
‘services’ and also because this freedom also contains the freedom to receive services...
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competition rules to object against the application o f rules which somehow function as a barrier 
when they wish to migrate, such as, for example, the contested transfer rules and/or nationality 
clauses. Consequently, in the light of these developments, it can relatively safely be stated -  with 
a sense of exaggeration - that a basic set of -  more or less extended - Community free movement 
rights nowadays seems to belong to the survival kit o f almost every athlete delivering sporting 
performances in the European Union and wishing to migrate!
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3Compatibility with free movement rules 
In ‘Restrictions’ We Trust?
Introduction
Once it has satisfactorily been established that the necessary preconditions for the 
application of the Community free movement provisions are fulfilled, the chronologically next 
issue to be addressed is whether any given national measure which is under challenge in a 
particular dispute does actually infringe the relevant Treaty Articles. The specific purpose of this 
-to  a large extent- purely theoretical chapter is to set out concisely the basic concepts and the 
core principles which are handled by the European Court of Justice to deal with this matter. After 
these foundations have been laid, the following chapters shall be dedicated to a practical 
evaluation, precisely on the basis of the instruments developed in this chapter, of whether certain 
contested sporting rules or practices do survive the test of compatibility with Community law or 
alternatively, are to be invalidated for violating the free movement provisions.
The structure of this chapter will be as follows: in the first section, the principle o f non­
discrimination on grounds of nationality, which has traditionally been the guiding principle in the 
Court’s case law with regard to freedom of movement, shall be briefly dealt with. The second 
section shall be devoted to a short description of the significant evolution in the Court’s approach 
of the free movement provisions from a discrimination-based examination to a more general and 
wider analysis centred around the notion of restriction. Subsequently, in the third section, it will 
be endeavoured to clarify this relatively vague concept of restriction, thereby paying particular 
attention to the idea of market access. Finally, in the fourth section, the different aspects of the 
issue of justification, to which the Court reverts having reached the conclusion that a contested 
rule is liable to prevent or render less attractive the right to freedom of movement, will be further 
elaborated upon.
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§L The principle o f  non-discrimination on grounds of nationality
In the case o f Ruckdeschelm , the Court of Justice explicitly stated that the general 
principle o f equality is “one of the fundamental principles of Community Law. This principle 
requires that similar situations shall not be treated differently unless differentiation is objectively 
justified.”398 99 Lenaerts maintains that with this statement, the Court has instituted a superior rule 
of law with general application.400 Be that as it may,401 this principle of equality or non­
discrimination also expressly appears in a number of different contexts of the Treaty.402 One of 
these areas is o f particular interest for the purposes of this research and concerns specifically the 
prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality, as laid down in Article 12 EC and further 
enunciated in the free movement field in the Articles 39,43 and 49-50 EC.403
I. ARTICLE 12 EC : GENERAL PR O H IB ITIO N
Article 12, situated in Part One on the Principles of the EC Treaty, generally provides that 
“within the scope of application o f this Treaty and without prejudice to any special provisions 
contained therein, any discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be prohibited...” 
Conceptually, the principle of non-discrimination is generally perceived in terms of arbitrarily or 
unjustifiable unequal treatment between nationals of the host Member State and nationals o f the 
other Member States within an area o f Community competence. Moreover, prohibited 
discrimination on grounds of nationality will also occur where a Member State treats nationals of 
a given Member State more favourably than the nationals of another Member State of the
398 Joined cases 117/76 and 16/77 Ruckdeschel v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-St.Annen [1977] E C R 1753, par. 7.
399 Ruckdeschel, par. 7.
400 Lenaerts, “Gelijke behandeling in het Gemeenschapsrecht”, in Alen & Lemmens (eds.), Gelijkheid en Non- 
Discriminatie. Verslagen voortgebracht op een colloquium te Leuven op 10 oktober 1990 (Kluwer, 1991), 50.
401 For a general application o f the principle o f non-discrimination, outside the sphere of a specific Treaty policy in 
which the Treaty referred to it, see for example Cases 75, 117/82 Razzouk and Beydoun v Commission [1984] ECR 
1509, paras. 16-17; or Case 20/71 Sabbatini [1972] EC R  345.
402 Craig & de Burca, EC Law: Text, Cases and Materials (OUP, 2003), 387-390.
403 In the first place, ther is the more general Article 13 EC. Furthermore, the principle of non-discrimination can also 
be found, for example, in the context of equal treatment o f m en and women as laid down in the amended Articles 2 
and 3, and in Articles 137 and 141; in the field of agriculture, as between producers and consumers, in accordance 
with Article 34(2); or in Article 90 EC, prohibiting the imposition of taxes discriminating between domestic products 
and products im ported from other Member States.
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European Union.404 405In the first case in which it pronounced itself on the scope of Article 12 EC, 
the Court ruled that a differential treatment of situations which are* not comparable is not 
discriminatory as such; measures which formally appear to be discriminatory are therefore not 
necessarily materially discriminatory. Material discrimination involves the different treatment of 
like situations or the similar treatment of unlike situations. On several occasions, the Court has 
held that this general principle of non-discrimination on the basis of nationality contained Article 
12 EC  can only be invoked independently o f the other Treaty provisions in situations within an 
area o f  Community competence with regard to which there exists no specific Treaty prohibition 
of discrimination.406 It has consistently stressed that these more specific Treaty prohibitions of 
nationality discrimination are to be interpreted in the light o f the general prohibition of Article 12 
EC.407 Furthermore, it also decided that national measures incompatible with the provisions laid 
down in the Article 39, 43 and 49 EC also automatically and inevitably constitute a violation of 
Article 12 EC.408
n . SPECIFIC EXPRESSIONS OF GENERAL PROHIBITION
1. F ree  movement for workers
Article 39(2) EC stipulates that the freedom of movement o f workers “shall entail the 
abolition of any discrimination based on nationality between workers of the Member States as 
regards employment, remuneration ands other conditions of work and employment”. Evidently, 
Article 39 EC represents an application, within the specific context of workers, of the general 
prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality as set out in Article 12 EC. It is 
unequivocally clear from the wording of this provision that the principle of non-discrimination 
forms the conceptual basis for the application of the free movement of workers. The only real 
difficulty which has arisen in the case law of the Court of Justice in this framework concerns the
404 S ch em ers  and Waelbroeck, Judicial Protection in the European Communities (Kluwer, 1992), 121; Handoll, 
Free Movement of Persons in the European Union (Wiley and Sons, 1995) at 133.
405 C ase 13/63 Italy v Commission [1963] ECR 165; Case C-370/88 Marshall [1990] E C R 1-4071, par. 21.
406 See, inter alia, Case C-10/90 Masgio v Bundesknappschcft [1991] ECR 1-1119, par. 12; Case C-419/92 Scholz v 
Opera Universitaria di Cagliari [1994] ECR 1-505, par. 6; Case C-18/93 Corsica Ferries Italia v Corpo dei Piloti 
del Porto di Genova [1994] ECR 1-1783.
407 C ase 186/87 Cowan v Le Trésor Public [1989] ECR 195.
408 C ase 305/87 Commission v Greece [1989] ECR 1461, par. 12
127
interpretation and the mutual relationship of the provisions of the second and third paragraph of 
Article 39 EC. It has been argued that since the second paragraph expressly restricts the 
prohibition cff discrimination to employment, remuneration and other conditions o f work and 
employment, the prohibition did not extend to the situations contained in the third paragraph.409 
However, in Saunders,410 the Court held that in application o f the general principle o f Article 12 
EC, “Article 39 aims to abolish the legislation of the Member States provisions as regards 
employment, remuneration and other conditions of work and employment, including the rights 
and freedom which that freedom of movement involved pursuant to Article 39(3), according to 
which a worker who is a  national of another Member State is subject to more severe treatment or 
is placed in an unfavourable situation in law or in fact as compared with the situation o f a 
national in the same circumstances”. Admittedly, this statement has not been repeated anymore in 
further judgements, but one can nevertheless assume, since the Court did not expressly override 
it, that it is still valid, that is to say, that the principle o f non-discrimination laid down in Article 
39(2) also covers the rights and freedoms guaranteed by Article 39(3).
2. Freedom to provide services
Article 49 EC provides that “Within the framework of the provisions set out below, 
restrictions on freedom to provide services within the Community shall be progressively 
abolished during the transitional period in respect of nationals of Member States who are 
established in a State o f the Community other than that o f the person for whom the services are 
intended”. Subsequently, Article 50 EC stipulates then that “Without prejudice to the provisions 
of the Chapter relating to  the right of establishment, the person providing a service may, in order 
to do so, temporarily pursue his activity in the State where the service is provided, under the 
same conditions as are imposed by that State on its own nationals” (emphasis added). Initially, 
the wording o f the respective Articles 49 and 50 EC may thus have given rise to some doubts or 
ambivalence as to the specific role or importance attributed to the principle of non-discrimination 
within the specific context of the freedom to provide services. However, the text of Article 54
409 Martin, ‘"Discriminations*, ‘entraves’ et ‘raisons impérieuses’ dans le Traité CE: trois concepts en quête 
d ’identité", CDE (1998) at 589-590.
410 Case 175/78 R  v Saunâers [1979J ECR 1129.
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EC411 412and the definition of restrictions in the General Programme for the abolition of restrictions
of freedom to provide services leave no doubt that the prohibition o f discrimination on grounds
{ ITof nationality in effect lies at the basis of the provisions concerning this fundamental freedom
This conclusion is further strengthened by the early judgements of the Court of Justice on the
matter.413
3. Freedom of establishment
Article 43 EC provides: “Within the framework of the provisions set out below, 
restrictions on the freedom of establishment of nationals of a Member State in the territory of 
another Member State shall be abolished by progressive stages in the course of the transitional 
period. [...] Freedom of establishment shall include the right to take up and pursue activities as 
self-employed persons and to set up and manage undertakings, in particular companies or firms 
within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 58, under the conditions laid down for its 
own nationals by the law of the country where such establishment is effected, subject to the 
provisions of the chapter on capital.” As was the case with Articles 49-50 EC in the field of 
services, it cannot clearly be deduced from the wording of Article 43 EC which is the specific 
function of the principle of non-discrimination within the domain o f establishment. In the first 
paragraph of Article 43 EC, mention is made of the broader term “restrictions”, whereas in the
411 Article 54 EC provides that “As long as restrictions on freedom to provide services have not been abolished, each 
M ember State shall apply such restrictions without distinction on grounds of nationality or residence to all persons 
providing services within the meaning of the first paragraph of Article 49”. In this respect, it must be acknowledged 
though that the Court of Justice seems to have never invoked this provision to interpret Article 49 EC: see Martin, 
“'Discriminations’, ‘entraves’ et ‘raisons impérieuses’ dans Ie Traité CE: trois concepts en quête d ’identité” , o.c., at 
562. See also Warner AG in Case 52/79 Procureur du Roi v Debauve [1980] ECR 833, and the Court’s subsequent 
rejection of his opinion in par. 16 of its judgement
412 General Programme for the abolition of restrictions o f freedom to provide services o f 18 December 1961, Official 
Journal of IS January 1962, Special Editions, Second Series, DC, p. 32: Restrictions are defined as “any measure 
which, pursuant to any provision laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in a Member State, or as a 
result o f the application of such a provision, or of administrative practices, prohibits or hinders the person providing 
services in his pursuit of an activity as a self-employed person by treating him differently from nationals of the State 
concernedFurthermore, are also to be regarded as restrictions, “any requirements imposed, pursuant to any 
provision laid down by law, regulation or administrative action or in consequence o f any administrative practice, 
where, although applicable irrespective of nationality, their effect is exclusively or principally to hinder the provision 
of services by foreign nationals" (Title III) (emphasis added).
413 Case 33/74 Van Binsbergen v Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging voor de Metaalnijverheid [1974] ECR 1299, par. 
25. It must be observed, however, that in paragraph 10 of the same decision, the Court already laid the foundations 
for a  potentially broader approach in the future. Be that as it may, this observation does not detract anything from the 
fact that the Court views the freedom to provide services as a specific expression of the general principle o f equal 
treatment or non-discrimination. See also Case 39/75 Coenen v Sociaal-Economische Raad [1975] ECR 1547.
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second part o f the Article the Treaty simply refers to “the conditions laid down for its own 
nationals” . Be that as it may, it is submitted that, in view of the parallel, structure of the Articles 
and the idenfical concepts used in the two sets of provisions, the observations that were being 
made in the field of services also hold true for Article 43 EC. This implies that an analogous 
outcome applies and that the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality also forms 
the conceptual basis o f the fundamental freedom of establishment. This conclusion is further 
corroborated by the provisions of the General Programme for the abolition of restrictions on 
freedom o f establishment414 and has been confirmed in the case law of the Court of Justice.415
§2: From discriminations to restrictions
It results clearly from the analysis in the preceding section that the principle of non­
discrimination on grounds of nationality lies at the heart of the application of the Community 
provisions on the free movement of workers, the freedom of establishment and the freedom to 
provide services. Originally, in the early case law of the Court, it even constituted the undisputed 
decisive criterion in the assessment of the Court of whether a contested national measure 
breached the relevant Treaty provisions. However, by the same token, it cannot be denied that 
Article 3(1.c) EC has stipulated from the outset that the activities of the Community shall 
comprise “an internal market characterised by the abolition, as between Member States, of 
obstacles to the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital.” As a result, it didn’t 
entirely come as a surprise that the Court gradually started to strengthen its grip on the free 
movement provisions, extending its supervision over the lawfulness of national rules from a pure 
discrimination-based control to a wider investigation into the existence of restrictions to the right 
to freedom o f  movement. This development occurred first in the sphere of the free movement of 
goods. Subsequently, the domains o f the other fundamental freedoms were characterised by an 
identical evolution.
4,4 General Programme for the abolition o f restrictions on freedom o f establishment, 03 Special Edition, Second 
Series, IX, 7.
415 Case 2/74 Reyners v Belgian State [1974J ECR 631.
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I. FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS
In a nutshell, the case law of the Court of Justice in the context of Article 28 EC with 
regard to the importance of the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality can be 
summarised as follows. As a starting point, the principle non-discrimination does not figure 
within the main provision on the free movement of goods.416 It seems thus obvious that it does 
not constitute the conceptual basis of Article 28 EC. However that may be, as from the early 
beginning, Directive 70/50417 defined measures having an effect equivalent to quantitative 
restrictions on the basis o f a reference to the principle of non-discrimination,418 even though it 
also foresaw already the possibility of bringing indistinctly applicable rules under the scope of 
Article 28 E C 419 The famous Dassonville formula,420 subsequently confirmed in Cassis de 
Dijon,421 established that as soon as a trading rule was found to be capable of restricting inter­
state trade, regardless of whether the measure was discriminatory or indistinctly applicable, 
Article 28 EC came into play. The decisive element to come to a measure having an effect 
equivalent to quantitative restrictions is thus the effect of a rule: it must be capable of restricting 
inter-state trade.422 A discriminatory intent is not required. In essence, therefore, the principle of 
non-discrimination originally only played a role of secondary importance, subordinate to the 
concept of ‘obstacle’ to the freedom o f movement, mainly exercising some influence on the issue 
of justification, as will be demonstrated below. After Cassis de Dijon, it was clear that Article 28 
EC covers discriminatory as well as indistinctly applicable national measures. How relatively 
straightforward this situation may have appeared from the outside, reality turned out to be all but
416 Article 28 EC simply provides that “Quantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having equivalent effect 
shall, without prejudice to the following provisions, be prohibited between Member States”. This Article makes no 
reference as such to the principle o f non-discrimination.
4,7 Directive 70/50/EEC of 22 December 1969 on the abolition of measures which have an effect equivalent to 
quantitative restrictions on imports and are not covered by other provisions adopted in pursuance o f the EEC Treaty, 
O JL  13/29.
418 Article 2(1) Directive 70/50: measures having equivalent effect are “measures, other than those applicable equally 
to domestic or imported products, which hinder imports which could otherwise take place including measures which 
make importation more difficult or costly than the disposal of domestic production.
419 Article 3 Directive 70/50.
420 C ase 8/74 Procureur du Roi v Dassonville (1974] ECR 837, par. 5.
421 Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentrale AG v Bundesmonopolvenvaltung für Branntwein (‘Cassis de Dijon’) [1979] ECR 
649, par. 8.
422 In a  more recent case, Advocate General Darmon argued that a non-discriminatory national measure could only 
infringe Article 28 EC if the rule had caused a specific restriction to inter-state trade. The Court however, rejected his 
opinion and followed the line o f reasoning it had adopted in Dassonville : see Case 207/83 Commission v United 
Kingdom [1985] ECR 1201.
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a bed of roses. The problem was that basically, all rules which concern trade, whether they are 
discriminatory or not, regardless of any protectionist intent, could in some way or the other be 
construed as*constituting an obstacle to the freedom of movement o f goods. Under the broad 
definition of measures having equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions adopted by the Court 
o f Justice in Dassonville, potentially all these measures were susceptible of violating Article 28 
EC. And this theoretical scenario did effectively materialise, as the Court found itself confronted 
with a huge workload of cases involving the application of Article 28 EC. The Court had to deal 
with a wide range of different and often very difficult or locally sensible factual situations, and 
was almost bound to render some judgements which are not always entirely convincing, logically 
consistent or reconcilable with each other.423 Hence, unsurprisingly, it came under increasing 
doctrinal strain to find a solution for this untenable situation.424 After a period of relative 
uncertainty, the Court considered it “necessary to re-examine and clarify its case law on this 
matter” in Keck and Mithouard,425 426Essentially, what the Court did in Keck was to institute a 
formal distinction between measures relating to product characteristics and measures concerning 
selling arrangements and to bring the principle o f non-discrimination all of a sudden to the fore 
front: on the one hand, as far as the former measures are concerned, everything remains as it was 
after Cassis de Dijon, but on the other hand, as for the latter measures, the picture has changed
drastically: whereas genuinely non-discriminatory selling arrangements walk free and escape 
scrutiny under Article 28 E C 427 discriminatory selling arrangements fall nonetheless under
423 See, for example, on the one hand Case 75/81 Blesgen [1982] ECR 1211; and to the same effect Case 148/85 
Forest [1986] 3448; Case C-69/88 Krantz [1990] ECR 1-583 and Case C-23/89 Quietlynn v Southend Borough 
Council [1990] ECR 1-3059; and on the other hand, Case 286/81 Oosthoek Uitgeversmaatschappij BV [1982] ECR 
4575; Case 382/87 Buet v Ministère Public [1989] ECR 1235; Case C-145/88 Torfaen Borough Council v B&Q 
[1989] ECR 3851 and Case C -312/89 Union départementale des syndicats CGT de VAisne v S1DEF Conforama 
[1991] ECR 1-997.
424 Mortelmans, “Article 30 o f the  EEC Treaty and Legislation Relating to Market Circumstances: Time to Consider 
a  New Definition?*’, 28 CMLRev. (1991) 115; Steiner, ‘D raw ing the Line: Uses and Abuses of Article 30 E E C ’, 29 
CMLRev. (1992) 749; White, “In Search of the Limits to Article 30 of the EEC Treaty” , 26 CMLRev. (1989) 235.
425 Cases C-267 and 268/91 Criminal Proceedings against Keck and Mithouard [1993] ECR 1-6097, par. 14.
426 Keck and Mithouard, par. 15.
427 Keck and Mithouard, paras. 16-17: “contrary to what has previously been decided, the application to products 
from  other Member States o f national provisions restricting o r prohibiting certain selling arrangements is not such as 
to hinder directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, trade between Member States within the meaning of the 
Dassonville judgem ent [...] provided that those provisions apply to all relevant traders operating within the national 
territory and so long as they affect in the same manner, in law  and in fact, the marketing of domestic products and of 
those from other Member States.” Subsequently, the Court concluded that “where those conditions are fulfilled, the 
application o f such rules to the sale o f products from another Member State is not by nature such as to prevent their 
access to the market or to impede access any m ore than it impedes the access o f domestic products. Such rules 
therefore fell outside the scope o f  Article 28 of the Treaty.”
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Article 28 EC and can only be upheld when adequately justified. Even though this decision hasn’t 
met with unanimous approval, the Court has continuously applied it rather rigorously in all 
subsequent chses concerning the free movement of goods which have co'me under its scnuinv. * 
Therefore, if the principle o f non-discrimination has not overtaken the concept of obstacle or 
restriction as the conceptual basis on which Article 28 EC is construed, it is nonetheless at least 
prominently present now within the framework of free movement of goods.
H. EVOLUTION WITHIN THE OTHER RELEVANT FREEDOMS
Under influence o f the Court’s jurisprudence on the free movement of goods in 
Dassonville and Cassis de Dijon, the emphasis in the Court’s reasoning with regard to the other 
fundamental freedoms has equally shifted from a discrimination-dominated analysis to a kind of 
two-steps legality procedure in which the Court firstly simply examines whether the national 
measure at stake constitutes a barrier to the right of freedom of movement and subsequently 
verifies whether this restriction can be properly justified. This development occurred 
chronologically first in the domain of services, before materialising as well within the sphere of 
workers and establishment. Interestingly however, instead of transposing to the other 
fundamental freedoms the whole mechanism elaborated in its case law concerning goods to 
trigger the application of the relevant Treaty provisions, the Court actually stopped one step short 
of doing so, conscientiously refusing for the moment to extend its threshold-test laid down in 
Keck to  the other freedoms. This particular feature of the Court’s case law will be further dealt 
with in detail in the next part of this chapter. 4289
428 C halm ers, “Repackaging the Internal Market -  The Ramifications of the Keck Judgement", 19 ELRcw (1994) 
385; M aduro, We the Court, the European Court of Justice and the European economic Constitution (Hart, 199S) 
83-87; R eich, “The “November Revolution” of the European Court of Justice: Keck, Meng and Audi Revisited”, 31 
CMLRev. (1994)459.
429 See fo r example, Case C-292/92 Hunermund v Landesapothekerkammer Baden- Wiintemberg [19931ECR 1-6787; 
Cases C-401&402/92, Criminal Proceedings against Tankstation 7 Heukske xof and Boermans [1994] ECR 1-2199; 
Cases C-69&258/93 Punto Casa SpA v Sindaco del Comune di Capena [1994] ECR 1-2355; Cases G 4 18-421. 460- 
462 and  464/93, 9-11, 14-15, 23-24 and 332/94 Semeraro Casa Uno Sri v Sindaco del Comune di Erbusco [1996] 
ECR 1-2975; Cases C-34-36/95 Konsumentombudsmannen v De Agostini (Svenska) Foriag AB <fc T\’-Shop i Sverige 
AB [1997] ECR 1-3843.
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1. Freedom to provide services
Advocate-General Jacobs had pleaded in favour of this transposition in his opinion in the 
case of Säger, in which he argued that “it may be thought that services should rather be treated by 
analogy with goods, and that non-discriminatoiy restrictions on the free movement of services 
should be approached in the same way as non-discriminatory restrictions on the free movement 
o f goods under the 'Cassis de Dijon* line of case law ...I do not think that it can be right to state 
as a general rule that a measure lies wholly outside the scope of Article 49 simply because it does 
not in any way discriminate between domestic undertakings and those established in other 
Member States. Nor is such a view supported by the terms of Article 49: its expressed scope is 
much broader.”430 The Court followed the opinion o f its Advocate-General, ruling that “Article 
49 requires not only the elimination of discrimination against a provider of services on the ground 
of his nationality, but also the abolition o f any restriction, even if it applies without distinction to 
national providers of services and to those of other Member States, when it is liable to prohibit or 
otherwise impede the activities of a provider o f services established in another Member State 
where he lawfully provides similar services.”431 432On precisely the same day as the decision in 
Säger, the Court built its judgement in the case o f Collectieve Antennevoorziening Gouda on 
exactly the same grounds.433 The wording of these decisions is clearly influenced and even 
modelled on the Court’s case law concerning the free movement of goods 434 It may be true, as 
Martin observes, that the theoretical definition given by the Court of the scope of application of 
Article 49 EC in these judgements in reality is purely reminiscent of what the General 
Programme of 1961 qualified as instances of indirect discrimination,435 but the fact remains that 
the Court unequivocally couched its rulings in terms of restrictions, in spite of the apparent 
discriminatory nature of the national provisions in question. These judgements therefore clearly
430 Jacobs AG in Case C-76/90 Säger v Dennemeyer [1991] E C R 1-4221, at 42344235.
431 Case C-76/90 Säger v Dennemeyer [1991] EC R  1-4221, par. 12.
432 Case C-288/89 Stichting Collective Antennevoorziening Gouda & Others v Commissariaat voor de Media [1991] 
ECR 1-4035; see also Case C-353/89 Commission v Netherlands [1991] ECR 14069.
433 Gouda, par. 14.
434 Marenco, “The Notion of Restriction on the Freedom of Establishment and Provision of Services in the Case-law 
oftheC ourt”, 11 YBEL( 1991) 111,at 142.
435 Martin, “ ’Discriminations’, ‘entraves* et ‘raisons impérieuses’ dans le Traité CE: trois concepts en quête 
d’identité”, a c ,  at 570-572.
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signal the Court’s determination to abandon its traditional discrimination-based analysis in favour 
of the broader approach to restrictions also within the field of the free movement of services.4*6
I*
2. Freedom of establishment and free movement of workers
A  similar approach to that adopted in the aforementioned cases on services has been 
pursued by the Court of Justice with regard to the freedom of establishment and the free 
movement of workers. In Stanton v INASTÎ ,* 437 for example, a case concerning social security 
exemptions for self-employed persons, the Court preliminarily held that the national legislation at 
issue was applicable without distinction to all self-employed persons working in Belgium and did 
not discriminate according to the nationality of those persons. In addition, it specifically stated 
that the national legislation in question could not be considered to result in indirect discrimination 
on grounds of nationality.438 Despite this conclusion, the Court proceeded stipulating that the 
provisions in the Treaty relating to the free movement of persons are “intended to facilitate the 
pursuit by Community citizens of occupational activities of all kinds throughout the Community, 
and preclude national legislation which might place Community citizens at a disadvantage when 
they wish to extend their activities beyond the territory of a single Member State.“439 More 
recently, in Kraus,440 the Court had to ascertain whether a Member State was legitimately entitled 
to prohibit one of its own nationals who holds a postgraduate academic title awarded in another 
Member state from using that title on its territory unless he has obtained administrative 
authorisation to do so. The Court stipulated that “Articles 39 and 43 preclude any national 
measure governing the conditions under which an academic title obtained in another Member 
State may be used, where that measure, even though it is applicable without discrimination on 
grounds o f nationality, is liable to hamper or to render less attractive the exercise by Community 
nationals, including those of the Member States which enacted the measure, of fundamental
434 O’Leary, “The Free Movement of Persons and Services”, in Craig & de Burca (eds.). The Evolution of EV Law 
(OUP, 1999) at 402.
437 Case 143/87 Stanton v INASTI [1988] ECR 3877.
438 Stanton, par. 9.
439 Stanton, par. 13,
440 Case C-19/92 Dieter Kraus v Land Baden-Württemberg [1993] ECR 1-1663.
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freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty.”441 The situation would be different only if such a measure 
were adequately justified.442
The Court’s judgement in Kraus is often marked as the starting point in the field of 
workers and establishment o f the ‘restriction-legality approach*. Again, Martin has questioned 
the appropriateness of the Court’s reasoning in this respect: he argues that the decision does not 
take into account that Articles 39 and 43 EC do not only restrict direct discrimination on grounds 
of nationality, and that the terminology o f  the Court does no more than repeat the wording o f the 
General Programme of 1961 on indirect discrimination.443 Intrinsically, these criticisms are no 
doubt correct indeed. However to may be, I tend to agree with Craig and de Burca who observe 
that even though this seems in fact an exemplary case of an indirectly discriminatory measure, 
the judgement o f the Court nevertheless seems to imply that “even if just as many or more 
German nationals than non-nationals established in Germany were obtaining LL.M. degrees in 
other Member States, the restriction would still fall within the scope o f Article 43 despite its non- 
discriminatory nature, and the fact that the complainant was a German national adds force to this 
suggestion.”444 In his opinion in the case of Bosman, also Advocate General Lenz forcefully 
argued that it need not be decided whether judgements in cases such as Ramrath and Kraus could 
also have been reached on the basis o f a - broadly interpreted - prohibition of discrimination.445 
According to him, “what is decisive is that the Court precisely did not choose that path.”446 The 
Court’s unambiguous statements in aforementioned cases have removed all his doubts as to 
whether the requirements of Article 39 go beyond the principle of treatment like a national o f  the 
host State. ‘I f  Article 39 was indeed limited to  imposing an obligation on the Member States to 
treat its own nationals and nationals o f other Member States in the same way, it would be neither 
necessary nor admissible to examine whether the relevant national provisions are lawful.
441 Kraus, par. 32.
442 To the same effect, see Case C -106/91 Ramrath v Ministre de la Justice [1992] E C R 1-3351.
443 See Martin, “ ’Discriminations’, ‘entraves* et ‘raisons impérieuses’ dans le Traité CE: trois concepts en quête 
d ’identité", o.c., at 587-588.
444 Craig & de Burca, EC Law. Text, Cases & Materials (OUP, 2003), at 786.
445 Lenz AG in Bosman, par. 187. hi this context, he also referred to Van Gerven A G  in Kraus, at 1677, who opined 
that the national m easure in question was discriminatory contrary to Article 39(2) EC. Conversely, AG Lenz 
considered it “irrelevant whether the provisions examined by the Court were perhaps cases of indirect 
discrimination.” See also Nachbaur, “Art.52 EW GV -  M ehr als nur ein DiskriminierungsverbotT’, Europäische 
Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht (1991) at 471.
446 Lenz AG in Bosman, par. 187.
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Precisely that question, however, is what the Court is examining here. That shows that in the 
Court's opinion Article 39 may also apply to provisions of a Member State which apply without 
distinction fc>r its own nationals and for nationals of other Member States.”*47 Advocate-General 
Lenz viewed the conventional interpretation of Article 39 EC as only prohibiting discriminatory 
measures as the most evident and most serious restriction on freedom of movement.
In Bosman, the Court first reiterated its statement of the Stanton decision to the effect that 
the Treaty provisions relating to the free movement of workers are aimed at facilitating “the 
pursuit by Community citizens of occupational activities of all kinds throughout the Community, 
and preclude national legislation which might place Community citizens at a disadvantage when 
they wish to extend their activities beyond the territory of a single Member State.”47 48 
Subsequently, it specified that in that context, “nationals of Member States have in particular the 
right, which they derive directly from the Treaty, to leave their country of origin to enter the 
territory of another Member State and reside there in order there to pursue an economic 
activity.”449 In the light of this, it ruled that “provisions which preclude or deter a national of a 
Member State from leaving his country of origin in order to exercise his right to freedom of 
movement therefore constitute an obstacle to that freedom even if they apply without regard to 
the nationality of the workers concerned.”450 In the light of the already rather unambiguous 
statements of the Court in Kraus and Ramrath, it is probably more accurate to say that the Court 
in Bosman unequivocally confirmed that genuinely non-discriminatory measures are covered 
under the scope of the free movement provisions. The specific importance of Bosman lies in the 
fact that it constitutes the first case in which a genuinely non-discriminatory measure were 
involved. Indeed, contrary to the rules at issue in the previous cases of Kraus and Ramrath, which 
arguably could still be considered as indirectly discriminatory, the transfer rules at stake in 
Bosman applied both legally and factually in an equal manner to professional football players.
447 Lenz AG in Bosman, par. 190.
444 Bosman, par. 94. See Stanton, par. 13; also case C-370/90 The Queen v Immigration Appeal Tribunal and 
Surinder Singh [1992] EC R 1-4265, par. 16.
449 Bosman, par. 95. See also, inter alia, Case C-363/89 Roux v Belgium [1991] ECR 1-273.
450 Bosman, par. 96. In this respect, the Court also referred to Case C-10/90 Masgio v Bundesknappschaft [1991] 
ECR 1-1119, paras. 18-19.
137
§3: The concept o f *restrictions’
On several occasions by now, the Court has reiterated that provisions which preclude or 
deter a national of a Member State from leaving his country of origin in order to exercise his right 
to freedom of movement must be regarded as a restriction to that freedom.451 This basic 
conception of restriction is an extremely wide one, and is in many aspects reminiscent of the 
famous Dassonville-fonmfa  the Court applied for many years in the field of the free movement 
of goods. Viewed in this way, the notion of restriction basically encompasses potentially almost 
every regulatory rule, even when it has, strictly speaking, nothing to do with the exercise of the 
right to freedom of movement.452 Hence, this situation might lead to a floodgate of challenges to 
existing national rules and regulations which may be perfectly legitimate at first sight, but which 
will now be captured by the free movement provisions under the -according to some, possibly 
unduly wide453- heading of restrictions. These contested measures will only be safeguarded if 
their existence can be backed up by an acceptable means o f justification. The Court faces the 
uphill task to deal with these cases one by one. Clearly, this is an unappealing perspective. In 
order to prevent this scenario from occurring, several suggestions have therefore been made to 
erect a kind of dam against the risk of too many challenges, similar to what happened in the field 
of goods in the posuDassonville period.
I. SOM E DOCTRINAL ATTEM PTS TO DELIM ITATE TH E CONCEPT
I. Transposition o f Keck?
Firstly, it has been suggested to transpose the essence o f the Court’s decision in Keck from 
the field of goods to the domain of persons and services. The issue was raised explicitly in the 
cases of Alpine Investments454 and Bosman. In Alpine Investments, the Court ruled that the 
legislation at issue was not analogous to the legislation concerning selling arrangements held in
451 Bosman, par. 96.
452 See also Hoskins, “The impact o f the free movement rules of the EC Treaty on sports”, “Sports: Competition Law 
and EC Law” Conference, London, 10 February 1999
453 See for example O’Keeffe & Osborne, “L'affaire Bosman: un arrêt important pour le bon fonctionnement du 
Marché unique européen”, 1 RM  UE (1996) 17
454 Case C-384/89 Alpine Investments v Minister van Financiën [1995] E C R 1-1141.
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Keck to fall outside the scope of Article 28 EC. It held that a “prohibition such as that at issue is 
imposed by die Member States in which the provider of services is established and affects not 
only offers nfade by him to addressees who are established in that State or move there in order to 
receive services, but also offers made to potential recipients in another Member State. It therefore 
directly affects access to the market in services in the other Member States and is thus capable of 
hindering intra-Community trade in services.”455 In principle, the Court thus didn’t outright 
exclude the possibility of implementing its Keck judgement in the spheres of the other freedoms, 
it solely distinguished from Keck on the basis o f the different factual circumstances: whereas the 
case of Keck turned around rules of the importing State relating to selling arrangements within 
the territory of that State, Alpine Investments concerned rules of the exporting State imposing 
respect for its own rules in the territory of other Member States.456 Similarly, in Bosman, as will 
be demonstrated in a later chapter, the Court rejected the analogy with Keck following the same 
logic.457 For the time being, the Court has thus resisted the temptation to simply transpose its 
Keck ruling to the other freedoms, without excluding the possibility that one day, it will do so. 
Furthermore, it is rather improbable that it will actually happen,458 as the Court conspicuously 
refrained from using Keck in the de Agostini case in the context of Article 49 EC,459 whereas it 
contemporaneously applied the Keck principles in the context o f Article 28 EC.460
2. ‘Access* versus ‘exercise’?
Alternatively, it has also been suggested in the legal doctrine to introduce a similar ‘filter test’ 
as the one introduced in Keck to the domain of the free movement of persons and the freedom to 
provide services, specifically adapted to the particularities o f these freedoms. In this respect, 
Advocate General Lenz in Bosman was of the opinion that if one wished to apply the case law on 
Article 28 EC by analogy, one might consider drawing a distinction between measures which 435*890
435 Alpine Investments, par. 38.
456 See also O ’Keeffe & Osborne, “The European Court Scores A Goal The International Journal o f Comparative 
Labour Law and Industrial Relations (Summer 1996) at 118.
457 Borman, paras. 102-103.
438 Stuyck, “Annotation of Joined Cases C-34/95, C-35/95 and C-36/95 Konsumentenombudsmannen (KO) v De 
Agostini (Svenska) FCrlag AB and Konsumentombudsmannen (KO) v TV-Shop i Sverige AB”, 34 CMLRev. (1997) 
1445.
439 Joined Cases C-34/95, C-35/95 and C-36/95 Konsumentenombudsmannen (KO) v De Agostini (Svenska) Forlag 
AB and Konsumentombudsmannen (KO) v TV-Shop i Sverige AB  [1997] E C R 1-3843, paras. 48-54.
440 De Agostini, paras. 39-47.
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regulate access to  occupational activity and measures which are directed more to the exercise o f 
that activity.^61 H e argued that Article 39 EC must apply to non-discriminatory restrictions on 
freedom of movement, at least when the restriction relates to access to the employment market in 
other Member States.461 62 In other words, he assimilated rules on access to rules relating to product 
characteristics and rules on exercise to rules regarding selling arrangements, in the sense that the 
latter, contrary to the former, may remain outside the scope of the free movement provisions. 
Interestingly in this respect, Advocate General Alber expressed a different opinion in Lehtonen. 
In principle, he did not exclude that the Court could envisage the possibility of drawing a 
distinction between rules on access and rules on exercise.463 Nevertheless, he argued, by 
reference to Keck, that rules on the exercise o f a profession/occupation are much closer to 
product-related rules than to rules on selling arrangements. According to him, “rules on exercise 
must, like product-related rules, be complied w ith directly by a citizen of the Union who wishes 
to assert the fundamental freedom under Article 39 of the Treaty. He must take account of new 
rules of exercise and acquire corresponding qualifications, possibly after every cross-frontier 
change of employment.”464 In his opinion in Graf \ Advocate General Fennelly tried to explain 
this “apparent disagreement” as arising “in part from a different understanding of what is meant 
by rules governing the exercise of an economic activity.” He submitted that “national provisions 
which require certain skills o f economic actors and thus tend to subject migrant workers to a dual 
regulatory regime are more readily classifiable as formally affecting access, or at the very least, 
as in Kraus and Choquet, as being sufficiently closely bound up with market access as to be 
subjected to a similar regime.”465 Be that as it may, in spite of this laudable attempt to reconcile 
both views, this rather essential difference o f opinion arguably clearly demonstrates that it is 
probably not feasible and possibly not even desirable to introduce or to maintain a rigid 
distinction between measures relating to access and those directed at the exercise of an 
employment activity. Two simple examples may serve to illustrate this point: Admittedly, a 
measure reducing the number of sport clubs participating in a certain league or competition does 
affect the exercise of that sport, but it does not have an impact on the access to the market o f that
461 Lenz AG in Bosman, at 5009, par. 205.
442 Lenz AG in Bosman, at 5008, par. 203.
463 Alber AG in Case C -176/96 Jyri Lehtonen and Castors Canada Dry Namur-Braine v Fédération Royale Beige 
des Sociétés de Basketball (‘FRBSB') [2000] E C R 1-2681, at 2695, par. 46.
464 Alber AG in Lehtonen, at 2696, par. 48.
465 Fennelly AG in Case C-190/98 Grafv Filzmoser Maschinenbau GmbH [2000] ECR 1-493, at 510, par. 33.
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sport, at least not directly. Conversely, however, transfer periods, limiting the possibility for 
athletes of moving from one sports team to another to certain prescribed periods daring the sports 
season, clearfy affect the exercise of any given spoits discipline that makes use of them. At the 
same time, arguably, they also affect the access to the employment market of sportsmen who 
want to be transferred to a team belonging to another national federation and thus wish to 
exercise their right to freedom of movement.466 Consequently, it is submitted that measures on 
access to a sports discipline and measures relating its exercise are partly overlapping 
categories,467 which renders them unsuitable as a filter test for the application of the free 
movement of persons and the freedom to provide services.
3. ‘Substantial restriction of access to the market1?
Another proposition ensued from the fact that the Court’s judgement in Keck and Mithouard 
could not count on unequivocal support and was widely criticised in the legal doctrine 468 In his 
opinion in the case of Leclerc-Siplec, Advocate General Jacobs commented on the issue.469 
Basically, he agreed with the outcome in Keck, but nevertheless, he found the decision 
unsatisfactory for two reasons. Firstly, he rejected the distinction between rules concerning 
selling arrangements and those relating to product characteristics as too rigid.470 Secondly, he 
remarked that the exclusionary rule amounted to re-introducing a test of discrimination in relation 
to restrictions on selling arrangements which he considered inappropriate.471 Instead, he favoured
466 See also Alber AG in Lehtonen, at 2695, par. 47.
467 See also Barnard, ‘Fitting the remaining pieces into the goods and persons jigsaw“, 26 ELRev. (2001) 58.
468 See, inter alia, Weatherill, “After Keck: Some Thoughts on how to Clarify the Clarification” , 33 CMRev. (1996) 
885; Barnard, ‘Fitting the remaining pieces into the goods and persons jigsaw“, o.c., at 51-52. Amongst others, it is 
submitted that the Keck decision is too rigid and that paragraph 17 is not always entirely accurate under all 
circumstances. It may actually turn out that contested measures which are factually and legally equal in application 
are not such as to deter or prevent access to the market -  such as was the case in Keck itself, or in Leclerc-Siplec -  
but arguably, one could equally envisage situations in which this presumption no longer holds true, and in which the 
measures at issue do effectively hamper access to the market, in spite of being genuinely non-discriminatory. This is 
demonstrated clearly in cases like Alpine Investments, Bosman, or Advocate General Jacobs' hypothetical example 
of the direct television marketer in Leclerc-Siplec. This is why it is perceived that the Court’s judgement in Keck, 
even though it may be correctly decided on its facts, is inappropriate to function as a general principle in the context 
of the scope of application of Community internal market law.
469 Jacobs AG in Case C-412/93 Société d*Importation Edouard Leclerc-Siplec v TFJ Publicité SA [1995] ECR I- 
179.
470 Jacobs AG in Leclerc-Siplec, at 194, par. 38.
471 Jacobs AG in Leclerc-Siplec, at 194-195, paras. 39-40: "The central concern of the Treaty provisions on the free 
movement o f goods is to prevent unjustified obstacles to trade between Member States. If an obstacle to inter-State 
trade exists, it cannot cease to exist simply because an identical obstacle affects domestic trade [...] Equally, from
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an approach which in essence amounted to a subtle refinement of the Æfedfc-formula, as he based it 
on the concept of market access, which was already present in Keck.*72 According to the 
Advocate-General, all undertakings which engage in legitimate economic activities should have 
unfettered access to the whole o f the Community market, unless there is a reason for denying 
them full access to a part o f that market. Only substantial restrictions on that access should be 
caught by the Treaty provisions. Measures affecting the goods themselves, as in Cassis-type 
cases, would be presumed to have this substantial impact. However sophisticated and appealing 
the Advocate General’s approach may have been, the Court was not receptive to it and declined 
to take up his suggestion, deciding the case simply on the basis of its traditional AT<?d:-formula.* 47273 
Conversely, in the legal doctrine Advocate General Jacobs’ alternative analysis was 
enthusiastically embraced. His proposition was welcomed by Weatherill for squarely addressing 
the core o f the “ATec£-probIem”, namely the need to place beyond the reach of Community law 
national rules that pose no real threat to the realisation of the internal market, while 
contemporaneously having the additional advantage of being sufficiently flexible, avoiding the 
rigid formalism of Keck itself.474
n .  ‘STATE O F THE A R T’ ON RESTRICTIONS
Currently, in the field of goods, the Court in principle still adheres to its dichotomy 
between rules regarding selling arrangements and rules relating to product characteristics in order 
to define the scope o f application of this fundamental freedom. In this respect, it must be 
acknowledged though that in more recent cases, the Court is somehow applying the formal 
criteria in Keck in a more flexible way, “with a relatively light touch”475, when it considers the 
access to the market to be materially threatened. In the case of D io r16, for example, the Court 
ruled that national legislation permitting the owner of a trade mark or holder of copyright to
the point o f view o f the Treaty’s concern to establish a single market, discrimination is not a helpful criterion: from 
that point of view, the fact that a  Member State imposes similar restrictions on the marketing of domestic goods is 
simply irrelevant. The adverse effect on the Community market is in no  way alleviated; nor is the adverse effect on 
the markets o f the other Member States, and so on the Community economy. Indeed the application of the 
discrimination test would lead to the fragmentation o f the Community market, since traders would have to accept 
whatever restrictions on selling arrangements happened to exist in each Member State, and would have to adapt their 
own arrangements accordingly in each State.”
472 Jacobs AG in Leclerc-Siplec, a t 195-198, paras. 41-49.
473 Case C-412/93 Société d'importation Edouard Leclerc-Siplec v TF1 Publicité SA [1995] E C R 1-179, paras. 18-24.
474 Weatherill, “After Keck: Some Thoughts on how to Clarify the Clarification”, o.c.,at 897.
475 Fennelly AG in Graf, at 502, par. 20.
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Aprevent parallel importers from advertising the further commercialisation of those goods fell 
within the scope of Article 28 EC as such a prohibition of advertising would render access to the 
market for th6se goods “appreciably more difficult”.476 77 478
As far as the fundamental freedoms of persons and services are concerned, the Court has 
clearly endeavoured to avoid adopting too wide an interpretation of the concept of restriction. In 
Alpine Investments and Bosnian, the Court already hinted at its willingness to limit the scope of 
these fundamental freedoms, narrowing it to catch as restrictions only rules which affect access to 
the labour markets of the other Member States. This supposition was recently officially 
confirmed in the case of G rafm  The dispute in Graf turned around the question whether a 
worker’s loss, upon voluntary resignation in order to take up employment in another Member 
State, of a contingent statutory right to compensation by his employer payable upon forced 
resignation, dismissal or retirement is capable of constituting such a restriction to the freedom of 
movement of workers, where the amount of any such compensation is related to the length o f the 
worker’s period of continuous service with his former employer. In its decision, the Court firstly 
simply reiterated its principled statement that “provisions which, even if they are applicable 
without distinction, preclude or deter a national of a Member State from leaving his country of 
origin in order to exercise his right to freedom of movement therefore constitute an obstacle to 
that freedom.” Additionally, it linked for the first time explicitly the concept of restriction with 
that of market access, stipulating that in order to be capable of constituting an obstacle to the 
freedom of movement, provisions must affect access of workers to the labour market.479 And the 
Court didn’t leave it at that. Subsequently, it ruled that legislation of the kind at issue in the main 
proceedings “is not such as to preclude or deter a worker from ending his contract of employment 
in order to take a job with another employer, because the entitlement to compensation on 
termination of employment is not dependent on the worker’s choosing whether or not to stay with 
his current employer but on a future and hypothetical event, namely the subsequent termination 
of his contract without such termination being at his own initiative o r attributable to him.”480 It 
considered such an event “too uncertain and indirect a possibility for legislation to be capable of
476 Case C-337/95 Parfums Christian Dior SA and Parfums Christian D iorB V  v Evora BV  [1997] E C R 1-6013.
477 Dior, paras. 50-52.
478 Case C-190/98 Volker G rafv Filzmoser Maschinenbau GmbH [2000] ECR 1-493.
479 Graf, par 23.
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being regarded as liable to hinder freedom o f movement for workers where it does hot attach to 
termination o f a contract o f employment by the worker himself the same consequence as it
I j p i
attaches to termination which was not at his initiative or is not attributable to him.”
If  it can already be taken for granted now that the Court has formally linked the concept o f 
market access to the concept of restrictions, at least with regard to the fundamental freedoms o f 
persons and services, that still doesn’t mean one has reached the end of the tunnel. Currently, 
several basic questions surrounding both concepts remain -  completely or partially -  
unresolved.480 182 In this respect, the Court, at most, has lifted the veil o f its intentions. For the sake 
of clarity and consistency, it is imperative that the Court formulates an unequivocal and 
straightforward answer to these issues. At present, the locus standi on barriers and market access 
can therefore only tentatively be summarised. The outcome of such a descriptive exercise would 
probably be something like this: firstly, in order to trigger the application of the relevant Treaty 
provisions on freedom of movement, the burdensome effects of a contested national measure 
must affect access to the labour market within a Member State. Presumably, they may also stem 
from regulation of the exercise o f an economic activity, provided this contemporaneously 
influences access to the market. Secondly, for them to be taken into consideration by the Court, 
the restrictive effects of the barrier in question must not necessarily be such as to actually 
preclude persons from exercising their free movement rights, for it suffices that they simply deter 
or hamper them in so doing.483 Thirdly, however, these preventive or dissuasive effects must 
probably somehow be substantial, that is to say, they must be o f a certain level o f gravity or 
intensity. This would essentially boil down to introducing a kind o f de minimis test in the field of 
free movement 484 485whereas the Court had previously preserved such a quantifiable threshold 
exclusively to the domain of competition. Advocate General Jacobs admitted that this test of 
substantial restriction on market access is hard to handle, not only for the European Court of
480 Graf, par. 24.
481 Graf, par. 25. To that effect, with regard to the free movement of goods, the Court referred in particular to Case 
C-69/88 Kraniz v Ontvanger der Directe Belastingen [1990] ECR 1-583, par. 11; and Case C-44/98 BASF v 
Präsident des Deutschen Patentamts [1999] ECR 1-6269, paras. 16 and 21.
482 Fennelly AG in Graf at 495, par. 1.
483 See for example Case C -18/95 Terkoeve v Inspecteur van de Belastingsdienst Particulieren/Ondememingen 
Buitenland [1999] ECR 1-345.
484 Jacobs AG in Leclerc-Siplec, at 195, par. 42.
485 See Fennelly AG in C ase C-67/97 Bluhme [1998] EC R  1-8033: “the slight effect of the Decision, in volume terms, 
cannot in itself prevent the application of Article 28.“
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Justice, but also, and especially, for the national courts. If it is applied too enthusiastically, the 
result would be that the free movement provisions are pushed back too far. Moreover, the test 
may entail some difficulty in securing the uniform application of the law. However, it cannot be 
denied that other areas o f Community law create comparable awkwardness. As Weatherill 
remarked, “these issues are unavoidable in the sustenance of a law appropriate to the dynamic 
process of internal market creation.”486 487Be that as it may, the fact is that it remains as yet 
thoroughly uncertain what precisely must be understood as substantial hindrance to market 
access. Fourthly and fifthly, the Court hasn’t satisfactorily solved either the dilemmas as to 
whether the restrictive effects of a perceived obstacle must be direct or may be indirect and 
whether they must be certain or may be merely hypothetical or contingent. The relatively 
frequently recurring use o f the formula “too uncertain and indirect a possibility to be capable of 
being regarded as liable to hinder freedom o f movement” seems to indicate that the Court 
might be willing to accept some leeway in this respect. However, it speaks for itself that this 
prediction remains utterly tentative and will therefore necessarily have to receive confirmation in 
future case law of the Court. In any event, the Court will also have to elaborate further on what 
precisely is covered under this vague terminology of “too uncertain and indirect”, be it with a 
principled decision or rather on a case-by-case basis, through gradual factual application in 
particular cases. Sixthly, surprisingly, and to a certain extent maybe also unacceptably, it remains 
also still doubtful whether the restrictive effects of a disputed national rule must in some way be 
conditional on the actual exercise of the rights of freedom of movement. At first sight, this issue 
appears to be trivial, an affirmative answer seemingly being the self-evident solution. However, 
the following situation will demonstrate that this matter is not as straightforward as initially 
expected. In the Bosman case, which will be discussed at length at a later stage, Jean-Marc 
Bosman argued that the transfer rules applicable to professional football players who wish to play 
for another club prevented him from moving to the club of his choice, thereby effectively 
hindering his mobility of labour. In the concrete circumstances of the case, there was effectively 
an inter-State element present, as Bosman wanted to be transferred from a Belgian to a French 
team, but it is submitted that this cross-border aspect was purely incidental and deprived o f any 
material significance. Basically, the core of the problem was that the transfer rules existed in the
486 Weatherill, “After Keck: Some Thoughts on how to Clarify the Clarification”, o.c., at 901.
487 See also, inter alia, Case C-69/88 Krantz v Ontvanger derDirecte Belastingen [1990] ECR 1-583, par. 11; Case 
C-44/98 BASF v Prasident des Deutschen Patentamts [1999] ECR 1-6269, paras. 16 and 21.
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first place, not so much the fact that they existed in a particular Member State. Consequently, it 
has been argued that it might have been preferable to resolve the case on the basis o f the 
competition rules.488 4890However that may be, the Court invalidated the transfer system for violating 
the free movement provisions. Finally, the Court still has to decisively cut the knot as to whether 
it will adopt a substantive or, rather, a merely formal approach to the notion of market access. As 
Barnard and Deakin argue, a mere formal test would imply that the Court contents itself with
J Q Q
verifying whether the formal obstacles of entry and exit to the market have been removed. 
Inhibited permission to accede to the market suffices to pass the formal test, regardless of the 
practical difficulties that may still be encountered subsequently, once the market has been 
formally penetrated. By contrast, a more substantive approach towards market access would 
additionally entail that also these practical barriers experienced after access to the market has 
been gained be abolished. According to these authors, the Court’s case law with regard to this 
aspect of free movement law is currently extremely inconsistent and appears almost to vary at the 
whim of the moment. In its rulings in Keck and Mithouard and Graf, the Court has presumably 
adhered to a strict formal notion of market access. Conversely, the cases of Alpine Investments, 
Bosman and Centros*90 have been cited as examples of judgements in which the Court favours a 
substantive version o f market access, which would in principle eliminate every national 
regulation unjustifiably precluding or hindering market access as contrary to the Treaty. Besides, 
arguably one can detect in the jurisprudence of the Court a spectrum of further attitudes on behalf 
of the Court which basically amount to more or less diluted versions of the two extreme tests of 
formal or substantive market access.491 This continued lack of uniformity is evidently to be 
deplored, not only for obvious reasons of certainty or predictability, but also, and especially, 
because the Court’s interpretation of the market access concept does not stand by itself, in a legal 
vacuum, but must be considered having regard to the larger picture of the internal market project 
and taking into account the requirements of the principle of subsidiarity, or in other words the 
division of competencies between the Community and its institutions and the Member States. In 
my opinion, a strong substantive test has the considerable advantage of securing maximum
488 See, for example, Weatherill, “European Football Law” , in Collected Courses of the Academy o f European Law, 
Volume VII, Book I (Kluwer, 1999) at 364.
489 Barnard and Deakin, ‘Market Access and Regulatory Competition“, in Barnard and Scott (eds.) The Legal 
Foundations of the Single market: Unpacking the Premises (Hart, 2002) 197.
490 Case C-212/97 Centros v Erhvers-og Selskabsstyrelsen [1999] E C R 1-1459.
491 Barnard and Deakin, ‘Market Access and Regulatory Competition” , o x . , at 204-213.
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guarantees of entry or exit to the labour market of the other Member States. Nevertheless, almost 
inevitably, there are also downsides to such an intrusive approach. It has far-reaching 
implications ‘‘upon national regulatory processes, as it invalidates in principle all national 
measures which restrict market access. Potentially, it has an adverse effect on national diversity 
as well, inducing uniformity and possibly leading to a race-to-the-bottom and/or to a deregulation 
of standards, to maintain national competitive positions vis-à-vis the other Member States. 
However, these often negatively perceived consequences can to a large extent be countered by an 
appropriate use o f the test of justification, which -  in combination with the requirements o f the 
principle o f proportionality - allows to a certain extent for national diversity to be safeguarded 
and for a degree o f national autonomy in law-making to be preserved. Furthermore, it should not 
be forgotten that, as Advocate General Tesauro forcefully argued in his opinion in the case of 
Hiinermund in the context of the free movement of goods, the free movement provisions are 
intended to liberalise intra-Community trade, instead of or rather than to encourage the 
unhindered pursuit of commerce in individual Member States.492 He considered that the purpose 
of the free movement provisions is to establish a single integrated market, eliminating therefore 
those national measures which in any way create an obstacle to or even mere difficulties for the 
freedom of movement; their purpose is not to strike down the most widely differing measures in 
order, essentially, to ensure the greatest possible expansion of trade.493 In this perspective and on 
these conditions, I believe a test based on material access to the market could legitimately be 
adopted.
§4: The issue o f justification
As has been demonstrated in the previous parts of this chapter, the current state of the approach 
of the Court of Justice with regard to the fundamental freedoms is thus predominantly centred 
around the concept of ‘restriction’ or ‘obstacle’, which has to a large extent replaced the 
traditional non-discrimination analysis. In this framework, the legality of a national measure 
under scrutiny hinges to a great deal on the specific reasons invoked to justify the continued
492 See Tesauro AG in Case C-292/92 Hiinermund v Landesapothekerkammer Baden-Wiirttemberg [1993] ECR I- 
6800.
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existence o f the measure. This increased importance attached to the issue of justification, in 
comparison with the former discrimination-based examination, can be .explained by the relative 
uncertainty detually still surrounding the concept of restriction. Up until now, the Court hasn’t 
completely and satisfactorily outlined the content and the limits of this concept, for example with 
regard to the principle of ‘market access’. As a result, this particular part of Community Internal 
M arket law finds itself in a transitional period, similar to the situation in the field of free 
movement of goods between the DassonviUe and Keck judgements. Hence, the Court is faced 
with a difficult situation, which it created itself, as it potentially will have to deal with an 
avalanche of cases in which it will have to confront the justification issue, in view of the fact that 
the threshold it appears to apply for the moment to conclude to the existence of a restriction to the 
freedom of movement in need of justification is much lower than the discrimination hurdle 
which had to be taken before coming to the matter of justification previously. Apart from being 
difficult or delicate, as it obviously creates the risk of docket congestion, this situation is also not 
entirely satisfactory, for it obliges the Court time and again to undertake a case-by-case 
evaluation on the basis of the concrete factual circumstances, a task for which it is not necessarily 
always well equipped, and which, more importantly, might be better carried out by the national 
courts.
In the light of all this, it is thus considered to be of the utmost importance to set out 
clearly from the outset, firstly, exactly which kinds o f justifications exist, and secondly, and more 
importantly, which type of restrictions can be upheld by which justifications. However 
straightforward, self-evident and even indispensable this latter starting point may seem to be, as 
Advocate General Tesauro pointed out in his joined opinion in the cases o f Decker and 
K o h lf94and repeated in his opinion in the case of Safir493 95, the Court has up until now failed to 
provide a precise and unequivocal solution to this matter. Moreover, it ignored in its rulings in 
these cases the Advocate General’s request to create clarity. Be that as it may, in the following 
paragraphs it shall nevertheless be attempted to set out a workable and straightforward
493 Tesauro AG in Hünermund, at 6814, par. 28.
494Tesauro AG in Case C -120/95 Decker v Caisse de maladie des employés privés [1998] ECR 1831 and Case C- 
158/96 Kohll v Union des Caisses de Maladie [1998] EC R  1-1935, at 1858 et seq.
495 Tesauro A G  in Case C -l 18/96 Safir v Skattemyndigheten i Dolamas Urn, formerly Skattemyndigheten i 
Kopparbergs Lan [1998] ECR 1-1899.
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framework for the issue o f justification, on the basis of the case law of the Court of Justice on the 
issue. <
L DIFFERENT GROUNDS OF JUSTIFICATION
In this first section, it will be examined which kinds o f grounds can be invoked to justify 
measures which are prima facie held to constitute barriers to the rights of free movement of 
persons and services. More specifically, it is possible to distinguish between two different types 
of justification: firstly, there are the derogations which are expressly provided within the EC 
Treaty, namely the public policy, public security and public health derogations, and the public 
service and the official authority exceptions; and secondly, there are the objective justifications 
which have been recognised by the European Court of Justice in its case law, under the so-called 
’rule o f reason’ doctrine.
1. Specific Community Treaty derogations
1.1. Public policy, public security and public health
Article 39(3) EC, establishing the rights attached to the freedom of movement of workers, 
stipulates that these rights are “subject to limitations justified on grounds of public policy, public 
security or public health.” Equally, Articles 46(1) and 55 EC permit Member States only to 
derogate from the Treaty provisions on the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide 
services on grounds of public policy, public security and public health.496 The precise scope of 
these three exceptions has been further outlined in secondary legislation497 and in the case law of
496 W ithin the domain of goods, more grounds of justification are available. Article 30 EC provides that “the 
provisions of Articles 28 and 29 shall not preclude prohibitions or restrictions on imports, exports or goods in transit 
justified on grounds o f public morality, public policy or public security, the protection of health and life of humans, 
animals or plants; the protection of national treasures possessing artistic, historic or archaeological value; or the 
protection of individual property.” See, inter alia, Case 34/79 R v Herrn and Darby [1979] ECR 3795; Case 231/83 
Cullet v Centre Leclerc [1985] ECR 305; Case 72/83 Campus Oil Ltd. v Ministry for Industry and Energy [1984] 
ECR 272; Case 251/78 Denkavit Futtermittel v Minister fur Ernährung, Landwirtschaft und Forsten des Landes
[1979] ECR 3369; Case 78/70 Deutsche Grammophon v Metro [1971] ECR 487.
497 Council Directive 64/221 on the co-ordination of special measures concerning the movement and residence of 
foreign nationals which are justified on grounds of public policy, public security or public health, (1963-64) OJ Spec. 
Ed. 117.
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the Court of Justice.498 Generally, the Court emphasised from the outset that these concepts must 
be interpreted strictly, so that their scope cannot be determined unilaterally by each Member State 
without being subject to control by institutions o f the Community.499''Nevertheless, it readily 
acknowledged that the competent national authorities do retain an area of discretion within the 
limits imposed by the Treaty in this matter.500 More substantively,501 Directive 64/221 stipulates 
that these grounds of justification “shall not be invoked to service economic ends”502 and that 
“measures taken on grounds o f public policy o r public security shall be based exclusively on the 
personal conduct of the individual concerned.”503 The Court added as a rule that “recourse by a 
national authority to the concept o f public policy presupposes, in any event, the existence, in 
addition to the perturbation of the social order which any infringement of the law involves, of a 
genuine and sufficiently serious threat to the requirements o f public policy affecting one of the 
fundamental interests o f society.”504 With regard specifically to the public health derogation, the 
Directive stipulated that refusal o f entry into a territory or refusal to issue a first residence permit
498 See, for more details, Hall, ‘T h e  ECHR and  Public Policy Exceptions to the Free Movement of Workers in the 
EEC  Treaty”, 16 ELRev. (1991) 466.
499 See Case 41/74 Van Duyn v Home Office [1974] ECR 1337, par. 18.
500 Van Duyn, par. 18. In subsequent case law, it subtly qualified this statement, ruling that Member States “must not 
base the exercise of its powers on assessments of certain conduct which would have the effect of applying an 
arbitrary distinction to the detriment o f nationals o f other Member States.” See e.g. Cases 115 and 116/81 Adoui and 
Com uaille v Belgian State [1982] ECR 1665, par. 7.
501 Apart from material limitations on the content of the concepts of public policy, public security or public health, 
the Directive also contains a  set o f procedural guarantees to protect a person against whom one of the grounds is 
being invoked (Articles 5-9 Directive 64/221). For m ore information, see for example. Case 48/75 Royer [1976] 
EC R  497; Case C-175/94 R  v Secretary o f State fo r the Home Department, ex parte Gallagher [1995] ECR 1-4253; 
Cases C-65/95 & C -l 11/95 R  v Secretary o f State fo r  the Home Department, ex parte Shingara and ex parte Radiom 
[1997] ECR 1-3341. Also O ’Keeffe, “Practical Difficulties in the Application o f Article 48 of the EEC Treaty”, 19 
CMLRev. (1982) 35. However, for the specific purposes o f  this research, it is not considered necessary to go deeper 
into detail into these procedural protections.
502 Article 2(2) Directive 64/221.
503 Article 3(1) Directive 64/221. Article 3(2) offered further concrete guidance, holding that “previous criminal 
convictions shall not in themselves constitute grounds for the taking o f such measures.” The Court clarified that the 
existence of a previous criminal conviction can only be taken into account “in so far as the circumstances which gave 
rise to that conviction are evidence o f personal conduct constituting a present threat to the requirements of public 
policy.” However, it did not exclude that it  is possible that past conduct alone m ay constitute such a threat to the 
requirements o f public policy. See Case 30/77 R  v Bouchereau [1977] EC R  1999, paras. 28-29.
504 Bouchereau, par. 35. In addition, in Case 131/79 R  v Secretary o f State fo r  Home Affairs, ex parte Mario Santillo
[1980] ECR 1585, par. 18, the Court considered it essentia] that “the social danger resulting from a foreigner’s 
presence should be assessed at the very time when the decision ordering expulsion is made against him as the factors 
to be taken into account, particularly those concerning his conduct, are likely to change in the course of time." See 
also Case C-348/96 Criminal proceedings against Calfa [1999] ECR 1-11.
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were only justified in the event of diseases or disabilities explicitly listed in Annex to the 
Directive.505
1.2. Employment in the public service
According to Article 39(4) EC, the provisions on freedom of movement of workers “shall 
not apply to employment in the public service.** Perfectly in line with its approach o f the 
derogations contained in Article 39(3) EC, the Court of Justice has stressed that also this 
exception “cannot have a scope going beyond the aim in view of which this derogation was 
included.*’506 Concretely, the Court has ruled that the “interests which this derogation allows 
Member States to protect are satisfied by the opportunity of restricting admission of foreign 
nationals to certain activities in the public service. On the other hand this provision cannot justify 
discriminatory measures with regard to remuneration or other conditions of employment against 
workers once they have been admitted to the public service.*’507 In the Commission v Belgium 
case508, the Court stipulated that Article 39(4) EC “removes from the ambit of Article 39(1) to (3) 
a series of posts which involve direct or indirect participation in the exercise of powers conferred 
by public law and duties designed to safeguard the general interest of the State or of other public 
authorities”, explaining that “such posts in fact presume on the part o f those occupying them the 
existence of a special relationship of allegiance to the State and reciprocity of rights and duties 
which form the foundation of the bond of nationality.”509 These two requirements seem to be 
cumulative rather than alternative.510 In 1988, the Commission endeavoured to provide some 
practical guidance on the sorts of State functions which it considered would or would not benefit
50S Article 4(1) Directive 64/221. Moreover, Article 4(2) Directive 64/221.emphasised that diseases or disabilities 
occurring after a first residence permit has been issued shall not justify refusal to renew the residence permit or 
expulsion from the territory.
508 Case 152/73 Sotgiu v Deutsche Bundespost [1974] ECR 153, par. 4.
507 Scholz, par. 4.
508 Case 149/79 Commission v Belgium [1980] ECR 3881.
509 Commission v Belgium, par. 10. In the words of M ancini AG in Case 307/84 Commission v France [1986] ECR 
1725, at 1727-1733: “In short, in order to be made inaccessible to nationals of another State, it is not sufficient for 
the duties inherent in the post at issue to be directed specifically towards public objectives which influence the 
conduct and action of private individuals. Those who occupy the post must don full battle dress: in non-metaphorical 
terms, the duties must involve acts of will which affect private individuals by requiring their obedience or, in the 
event o f disobedience, by compelling them to comply.”
510 See for example, O’Keeffe, “Judicial Interpretation of the Public Service Exception to the Free Movement of 
Workers”, in Curtin and O’Keeffe (eds.), Constitutional Adjudication in the European Community and National Law 
(Butterworths, 1992) 89, at 96; or Léger AG in Case C-473/93 Commission v Luxembourg [1996] ECR 1-3207, par. 
18.
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from the exception of Article 39(4):511 the armed forces, police, judiciary, tax authorities, and
certain public bodies engaged in preparing or monitoring legal acts were mentioned as examples
c ir
o f the former, whereas those which probably would not included nursing, teaching and non­
military research in public establishments. In many situations however, it remains unclear what 
does and what does not constitute a post reserved for Member State nationals.512
1.3 Exercise o f 'official authority ’
According to Article 45 EC, the provisions of the chapter on freedom of establishment 
shall not apply “so far as any given Member State is concerned, to activities which in that State 
are connected, even occasionally, with the exercise of official authority.” This ‘official authority* 
exception,513 extended to cover also the field o f services by the terms of Article 55 EC, can be 
legitimately considered as the functional equivalent of the ‘public service’ exception in the 
domain of the free movement of workers. As is the case with the other derogations, the official 
authority exception allowed by the Community Treaty cannot be given a scope which would 
exceed the objective for which this exemption clause was inserted.514 The Court has limited the 
right of Member States to exclude non-nationals from taking up functions involving the exercise 
o f official authority to “those activities which, taken on their own, constitute a direct and specific 
connection with the exercise of official authority.”515 It further specified that an extension of this 
exception to a whole profession would be possible “only in cases where such activities were 
linked with that profession in such a way that freedom of establishment would result in imposing
511 (1988) O JC  72/2.
512 It is argued that Member States could ‘abuse’ unequivocal, straightforward legislation with the purpose of 
deviating from or undermining the Court’s case law. Furthermore, it is observed that “such legislation could ossify 
the process o f creating a ‘citizen’s Europe”. See Mancini, ‘T h e  Free Movement o f  Workers in the Case-Law of the 
European Court of lustice” in Curtin & O ’Keeffe (eds.), o.c.,67; Craig & de Burca, EU Law. Text, Cases & 
Materials, at 724-727.
513 In his opinion in the case of Reyners, Advocate General Mayras defined official authority as “that which arises 
from  the sovereignty and majesty o f the State; for him  who exercises it, it implies the power of enjoying the 
prerogatives outside the general law, privileges of official power and powers o f coercion over citizens ” See Mayras 
A G  in Case 2/74 Reyners v Belgium [1974] ECR 631, at 664.
514 Case 2/74 Reyners v Belgium [1974] ECR 631, par. 43. For other examples, see Case C-306/89 Commission v 
Greece [1991] ECR 1-5863 on the activities o f traffic-accident experts; Case C-272/91 Commission v Italy [1994] 
EC R  1-1409 on operating a  computerisation system for a  national lottery; Case C-42/92 Thijssen v Controledienst 
voor de Verzekeringen [1993] ECR 1-4047 on commissioners of insurance companies.
515 Reyners, par. 45.
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on the Member State concerned the obligation to allow the exercise, even occasionally, by non­
nationals o f functions appertaining to official authority.”516
< t;
2. ‘Objective justification’ - doctrine
It may have seemed that national measures which were perceived to infringe the Treaty 
provisions on the fundamental freedoms and which could not be categorised under one o f the 
express Treaty exceptions had to be invalidated by the Court of Justice. However, gradually the 
Court came to realise that in spite of the fact that there may not have been grounds of justification 
readily available for certain contested measures within the formal Community framework, so that 
they in theory had to be considered unlawful, some of these measures nevertheless served 
objectively legitimate purposes and effectively deserved to be safeguarded. Consequently, the 
Court decided to elaborate a new ‘objective justification’-doctrine, in addition to the types of 
justification already explicitly provided in the Treaty. Essentially, this development boiled down 
to a recognition, on behalf of the Court of Justice, of an open category of supplementary grounds 
of justification. In the legal literature, this idea is also often referred to as the ‘rule of reason’.517
2.1 Mandatory or imperative requirements in the general interest
The Court officially introduced this doctrine in the field of the free movement of goods, 
and more concretely in the case of Cassis de Dijon, in which it solemnly declared that “obstacles 
to movement within the Community resulting from disparities between the national laws relating 
to the marketing of the products in question must be accepted in so far as those provisions may be 
recognised as being necessary in order to satisfy mandatory requirements relating in particular to 
the effectiveness of fiscal supervision, the protection of public health, the fairness of commercial 
transactions and the defence of the consumer.”518 The list of mandatory requirements enumerated
516 Keyners, par. 46. Conversely, it declared that the extension is not possible "when, within the framework o f  an 
independent profession, the activities connected with the exercise of official authority are separable from the 
professional activity in question taken as a whole.” (par. 47)
17 For more elaboration cm this issue of objective justification, consult Scott, "Mandatory or Imperative 
Requirements in the EU  and the WTO, in Barnard and Scott (eds.), The Legal Foundations of the Single market: 
Unpacking the Premises (Hart, 2002) 269.
518 Cassis de Dijon, par. 8. For an example of fairness o f commercial transactions: Case 286/81 Oosthoek’s 
Uitgeversmaatschappij BV [1982] ECR 4575; public health & consumer protection: see Case 178/84 Commission v 
Germany (German Beer) [1987] ECR 1227.
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by the Court in its judgement is not exhaustive, as is clearly evidenced by the use of the term ‘in 
particular’.51’
In the context of services, the Court developed a similar test o f justification alongside the 
express Treaty exceptions. In general, the Court formulates this as follows: “restrictions come 
within the scope of Article 49 EC if the application of the national legislation to foreign persons 
providing services is not justified by overriding reasons relating to the public interest”.519 20 Also in 
this context, the Court has already recognised a considerable number of justifications as 
overriding reasons in its case law.521 The Court didn’t hesitate either to transpose this objective 
justification test to the sphere of workers and establishment. In Kraus, it pointed out that the 
Articles 39 and 43 EC prevent the legislation o f a Member State from jeopardising or hindering 
the rights of freedom of movement, “unless such legislation pursues a legitimate aim, compatible 
with the Treaty, and is justified on imperative grounds of general interest.”522
519 For an early overview o f the mandatory requirem ents accepted by the Court of Justice, see Défalqué, “Les 
restrictions quantitatives et les mesures d ’éffet équivalent”, in Commentaire Mégret -  Le droit de la CEE. 1. 
Préambule. Principes, libre circulation des marchandises, (Editions de l ’Université de Bruxelles, 1992), at 235-237. 
In  further cases, the Court has accepted, inter alia, the protection of the working environment (Case 155/80 Oebel
[1981] ECR 3409), the protection of the environment (Case 302/86 Commission v Denmark [1988] ECR 4607), 
cinem a as form o f cultural expression (Case 60-61/84 Cinéthèque v Fédération Nationale des Cinémas Français 
[1985] 2605), the protection o f national or regional socio-cultural characteristics (Case 145/88 Torfaen Borough 
Council v B&.Q [1989] ECR 3851), the maintenance the plurality o f the press (Case C-368/95 Vereinigte 
Familiapress Zeitungsverlags -  und vertriebs GmbH v Heinrich Bauer Verlag [1997] ECR 1-3689), or the need to 
preserve the financial balance o f the social security schemes (Case C -120/95 Decker v Caisse de Maladie des 
Employés Privés [1998] EC R  1-1831.) as mandatory requirements.
520 See, for example, Gouda, par. 13.
521 See also Gouda, par. 14: in particular, professional rules intended to  protect recipients of services (Joined cases 
110& 111/78 Van Wesemael [1979] ECR 35, par. 28); protection of intellectual property (Case 62/79 Coditel [1980] 
E C R  881); protection of workers (Case 279/80 Webb [1981J ECR 3305; Joined Cases 62&63/81 Seco v EVJ [1982] 
E C R  223; Case C -l 13/89 Rush Portuguesa [1990] ECR 1-1417); consumer protection (See the Insurance cases: Case 
220/83 Commission v France [1986] ECR 3663, Case 252/83 Commission v Denmark [1986] ECR 3713, Case 
205/84 Commission v Germany [1986] ECR 3755, Case 206/84 Commission v Ireland [1986] ECR 3817; and the 
Tourist Guide cases: Case C -154/89 Commission v France [1991] ECR 1-659, Case C-180/89 Commission v Italy 
[1991] ECR 1-709, Case C-198/89 Commission v Greece [1991] ECR 1-727); conservation of the national historic 
and artistic heritage (Case C-180/89 Commission v Italy [1991] ECR 1-709); turning to account the archaeological, 
historical and artistic heritage of a  country and the widest possible dissemination o f knowledge of the artistic and 
cultural heritage o f a country (Case C-154/89 Commission v France [1991] ECR 1-659; Case C-198/89 Commission 
v Greece [1991] ECR 1-727); the need to safeguard the reputation of financial markets and to protect the investing 
public (Case C-384/93 Alpine Investments v Minister van Financiën [1995] EC R  1-1141); the need to prevent 
gambling and to avoid the lottery from becoming a source o f private profit (Case C-275/92 HM Customs and Excise 
v Schindler [1994] ECR 1-1039); or the protection of creditors of a company against the risk of insolvency (Case C- 
212/97 Centros v Erhvers- og Selskabsstyrelsen [1999] ECR 1-1459).
522 Kraus, par. 32.
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It must be acknowledged that the Court’s terminology when dealing with this particular 
aspect of tire justification issue in the field of the fundamental freedoms is far from uniform. Be 
that as it msfy, it is submitted that, despite this apparent linguistic difference, the concepts of 
‘mandatory requirements’, ‘overriding reasons relating to the public interest* or ‘imperative or 
pressing requirements of general interest’ are essentially identical. In fact, they all deal with the 
matter of safeguarding national measures which in se pursue objectively legitimate purposes and 
are therefore considered to be worthy of protection, even though these measures strictly legally 
speaking constitute a barrier to the right of freedom of movement and cannot plausibly be 
justified under the express Treaty derogations. Hilson describes these notions as being 
functionally equivalent.523 Scott subtly observed that if these doctrines were to represent really 
different tests of justification, it is strange that there are few, if any, good cases in which they 
have been advanced separately.524
2.2. The principle o f proportionality
In this context, it is also important to take into account that the Court has imposed the 
additional requirement of respect for the principle of proportionality.525 On several occasions, the 
Court has explicitly insisted that for the purpose of objective justification, apart from pursuing an 
overriding reason in the general interest, the national measures under investigation must also be 
“suitable for securing the attainment of the objectives which they pursue and they must not go 
beyond what is necessary in order to attain it.”526 Concretely, this implies that the Court will 
firstly verify the appropriateness of the means chosen to achieve the end in view, and will 
secondly review whether it is not possible to conceive a measure which is less restrictive of the 
freedom of movement under the given circumstances and nevertheless capable of producing the 
same result.527 It has been suggested that the test of proportionality contains a third element, i.e. 
even if there are no less restrictive alternatives, it must still be established that the contested
323 Hilson, ‘Discrimination in Community free movement law’’, 24 ELRev. (1999) at 449-450.
324 Scott, EC Environmental Law  (Longman, 1998), at 75.
523 la  general, see Ellis (ed.). The Principle o f Proportionality in the Laws o f Europe (Hart 1999)
326 See inter alia, Case C-106/91 Ramrath v Ministre de la Justice [1992] E C R 1-3351, paras. 29-30; Cebhard, par.
37.
327 Tridimas, “Proportionality in Community Law: Searching for the Appropriate Standard of Scrutiny”, in Ellis, o.c.,
65, at 68. See for a practical example Case 36/75 Rutili v Ministre de ITntérieur [1975] ECR 1219.
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measure does not have an excessive or disproportionate effect,528 but it is submitted that the 
Court in practice does not really seem to maintain a strict dividing line.between the second and 
the third element.529 ''
Essentially, the test of proportionality thus consists o f a balancing exercise between the 
aims pursued by the national measure and its restrictive effects on the exercise o f the right to 
freedom of movement. Consequently, a legal procedure in which the Court firstly concludes that 
a  measure under challenge is liable to hinder the right to freedom of movement, but secondly 
acknowledges that it pursues a legitimate aim and therefore in principle deserves to be justified, 
only to conclude finally that it must nevertheless be invalidated for not complying with the 
requirements of the principle of proportionality, is a perfectly feasible scenario.530 The transfer 
rules at issue in Bosman fell precisely on this hurdle, as will be explained at a later stage, and thus 
perfectly illustrate this point. In some instances, the Court itself applies the principle o f 
proportionality to the factual circumstances o f the particular case. In other situations, the Court 
wisely leaves the issue to be decided by the national courts. In this respect, Advocate General 
Jacobs stipulated that “it may be difficult always to draw the dividing line in the right place”, 
expressing nevertheless the opinion that it may be preferable for the Court to make the final 
assessment itself when it has the necessary technical expertise and has sufficient knowledge of 
the facts.531
n .  HOW TO JUSTIFY DISCRIMINATIONS AND RESTRICTIONS?
Having established which instruments -in casu the express Treaty exceptions or 
alternatively, the judicially created objective justifications under the rule of reason- are in 
principle available to justify national measures which are prima facie  considered to constitute a 
restriction to the freedom of movement and therefore to violate the relevant Treaty provisions, the 
logically next question to be tackled is how exactly these justifications do fit in within the
528 de Burca, “The Principle o f Proportionality and its Application in EC Law”, 13 YBEL (1993) 105.
529 Van Gerven, "The Effect o f Proportionality on the Actions o f Member States of the European Community. 
National Viewpoints from Continental Europe", in Ellis, o.c., 37.
530 Case C-193/94 Criminal Proceedings against Sofia Skanavi and Konstantin Chryssanthakopoulos [1996] ECR I- 
929.
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framework construed by the Court around the concept of restriction. It needs to be examined 
whether, in the analysis of the Court, the relation between obstacles and justifications is to be
c r
considered as straightforward and all-encompassing, in the sense that all types of justification can 
be invoked at any time to uphold regardless whatever kind of restrictions at stake in the 
proceedings before the Court; or rather whether the choice of potential justifications is limited in 
certain circumstances and is precisely dependent on the type of obstacle concerned?
It results from the foregoing that the Court basically distinguishes between three types of 
restrictions: there are firstly, the directly discriminatory measures, which are discriminatory in 
law and in fact; secondly, the indirectly discriminatory rules, which are indistinctly applicable in 
law but discriminatory in fact; and thirdly, the genuinely non-discriminatory provisions, which 
are legally and factually indistinctly applicable.
1. Traditional approach to justification
Traditionally, it was generally accepted that directly discriminatory provisions can only be 
upheld under the expressly provided Treaty exceptions, whereas for the justification o f the non- 
discriminatory provisions, in addition to these express derogations, also the judicially created 
imperative requirements in the general interest can be adduced. So far, everything was peachy 
keen. However, problems arose with regard to the final category of the indirectly discriminatory 
rules, which is situated somewhat uncomfortably between the genuinely non-discriminatory 
measures on the one hand, and the directly discriminatory provisions on the other hand: the 
indirectly discriminatory rules are indistinctly applicable in law531 32, just as the genuinely non- 
discriminatory rules, but they are also undeniably discriminatory in fact, like the directly 
discriminatory measures. This ‘bipolar’ feature of the concept of indirect discrimination did not 
only result in conceptual obscurity, as both the terms discriminatory and indistinctly applicable 
measures were commonly used to refer to indirectly discriminatory measures; it also entailed
531 Jacobs, “Recent Developments in the Principle of Proportionality in European Community Law”, in Ellis, o.c., 1, 
at 19-20.
532 Martin makes the distinction between indirectly discriminatory measures, which are according to him  “mesures 
faussement indistinctement applicables” and genuinely non-discriminatory measures, to which he refers as “mesures 
réellement indistinctement applicables”: see Martin, “Reflexions sur le champ d ’application matériel de l ’article 48 
du traité CE”, CDE (1993) at 574; read also Mattera, Le Marché unique européen, ses règles, son fonctionnement 
(Jupiter, 1988) at 242, note 64.
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substantive uncertainty as to the possibilities o f justification for these indirectly discriminatory 
measures. In essence, the crux of the matter o f the justification o f indirectly discriminatory 
measures seems to be the following: either one emphasises the discriminatory effect in practice of 
the indirectly discriminatory rules, in spite o f their formally legally indistinctly applicable 
character, which would result in the fact that these measures can only be upheld by one of the 
express derogations provided for in the EC Treaty, just as is the case with the directly 
discriminatory provisions; or one tilts the balance in favour o f the fact that the indirectly 
discriminatory provisions are formally indistinctly applicable, just as the genuinely non- 
discriminatory provisions, in which case one can also refer to an overriding reason in the general 
interest in order to justify them. In the opinion of Advocate General Tesauro, this issue is not as 
banal as it may seem at first sight, given that such a classification is not always easy to make in 
relation to the fundamental freedoms or rather that it is difficult to arrive at a clear and 
unequivocal definition o f discriminatory measures from the relevant case law.
These two mutually exclusive lines of thought can be found both in the legal doctrine533 as 
in the case law of the European Court of Justice.534 In the beginning of 1996, it was thus still not
333 In favour of the former opinion, see for example Kapteyn and VerLoren van Themaat, Inleiding tot het recht van 
de Europese Gemeenschappen -  Na Maastricht (Kluwer, 1995) at 395-397: they maintain that in assessing whether a 
particular national measure is indistinctly applicable, the Court goes further than a mere test o f formal 
discrimination, and also checks in relevant cases whether there is no factual discrimination. In other words, they 
argue that strictly legally speaking indirectly discriminatory measures are still discriminatory and can therefore only 
rely on express Treaty derogations for their justification. See also Mattera, “De l ’airêt ‘Dasson ville’ à l’arrêt ‘Keck’: 
l ’obscure clarté d ’une jurisprudence riche en principes novateurs et en contradictions” Revue du Marché Unique 
Européen 1 (1994) at 129-131; or Wyatt and Dashwood, European Community Law (Sweet & Maxwell, 1987) at 
138-143. Conversely, see Lenaerts and Van Nuffel, Europees Recht in hoofdlijnen, (Maklu, 1995) at 139-142: they 
hold the view that national measures, which are form ally indistinctly applicable but nevertheless materially 
discriminate, can invoke the mandatory requirements doctrine. Their opinion is supported by, for example, Brinch 
J0rgensen, Union Citizens- Free movement and non-discrimination (Jurist- og 0konomforbundets Forlag, 1996) 
208-214; Gairone, “La discrimination indirecte en droit communautaire: vers une théorie générale”, 30 RTD eur.
(1994) at 432-436; or Bernard, “Discrimination and Free M ovement in EC Law” , 45 ICLQ (1996) at 90-95. Bernard 
looked at the particular circumstances which led to the ruling in Cassis and decided that this was an inherent case of 
indirect discrimination. T he problem the Court dealt with in Cassis was that o f disparities between two different 
national laws. According to  him, the mandatory requirements doctrine is conceived especially for these measures. 
Goods which are to be m arketed in a certain state have to com ply with the national regulations of that state. These 
trading rules therefore have a  disparate impact on the im ported and the national goods which results in additional 
costs for the imported goods. This disparate impact o f the trading rules therefore means that the mere imposition of 
national requirements automatically leads to indirect discrimination.
334 In Case C-204/90 Bachmann v Belgium [1992] ECR 1-249, an indirectly discriminatory measure was upheld by 
the Court on grounds of the need to preserve the cohesion o f the applicable tax system, an imperative requirement in 
the general interest. Conversely, in Case C-484/93 Svensson & Gustavsson v Ministre du logement et de l ’urbanisme
[1995] ECR 1-3955, the Court held that a discriminatory measure could only be justified by the express Treaty 
exceptions.
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unequivocally clear whether the objective justification doctrine could be invoked for the
justification of indirectly discriminatory measures or whether one had to put reliance on the
< ITexhaustively 'enumerated Treaty exceptions in case of indirect discrimination. But then the Court
was faced with the case o f O'Flynn , in which the Social Security Commissioner referred to the
Court for a preliminary ruling some highly pertinent questions as to the concept of indirect
discrimination. The Court firstly defined the concept o f indirect discrimination, holding that
“conditions imposed by national law must be regarded as indirectly discriminatory where,
although applicable irrespective of nationality, they affect essentially migrant workers53 36, or the
great majority of those affected are migrant workers537, where they are indistinctly applicable but
can more easily be satisfied by national workers than by migrant workers538, or where there is a
risk that they may operate to the particular detriment of migrant workers539.” Subsequently the
Court stated that “it is otherwise only if those provisions are justified by objective considerations
independent of the nationality of the workers concerned, and if they are proportionate to the
legitimate aim pursued by the national law”540. The Court thus concluded that “unless objectively
justified and proportionate to its aim, a provision of national law must be regarded as indirectly
discriminatory if it is intrinsically liable to affect migrant workers more than national workers
and if there is a consequent risk that it will place the former at a particular disadvantage”.541 This
last statement of the Court was confirmed and reiterated in several subsequent cases.542 It
appeared thus very much as if the Court's judgement in O'Flynn had finally cut the Gordian knot
as to the existence and the possible justification of indirectly discriminatory measures.
535 Case C-237/94 O ’Flynn v Adjudication Officer [1996] ECR 2631.
536 See inter alia Case 41/84 Pinna v Caisse d ’Allocations Familiales de la Savoie [1986] ECR 1, par. 24; Case 33/88 
Aïlué and Another v Università degli Studi d i Venezia [1989] ECR 1591, par. 12; Le Manoir, par. 11.
537 See Case C-279/89 Commission v United Kingdom [1992] ECR 1-5785, par. 42; Case C-272/92 Spotti v Freistaat 
B ayem  [1993] ECR 1-5185, par. 18.
338 See Case Commission v Luxembourg, par. 10; Case C-349/87 Paraschi v Landesversicherungsanstah 
Württemberg [1991] ECR 1-4501, par. 23.
539 See Case C-175/88 Biehl v Administration des Contributions [1990] ECR 1-1779, par. 14; Case C-204/90 
Bachmann v Belgian State [1992] ECR 1-249, par. 9.
540 See to that effect for example Bachmann, par. 27; Commission v Luxembourg, par. 12; Joined Cases C-259/91, C- 
331/91 and C-332/91 Aüué and Others v Università degli Studi di Venezia [1993] ECR 1-4309, par. 15.
341 O ’Flynn, par. 21.
542 See for example Case C-29/95 Pastoors and Trans-Cap v Belgian State [1997] ECR 287; Case C-57/96 Meints v 
M inister van Landbouw, Natuurbeheer en Visserij [1997] ECR 1-6708; Case C -187/96 Commission v Greece [1998] 
EC R I-1110.
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2. Uniform restriction-justification approach?
By way of summary, it seems to correspond to the currently prevailing view to stipulate 
that contested national measures can only be safeguarded by the express Treaty derogations when 
they are directly discriminatory, whereas they can also be uphold by imperative requirements in 
the general interest when they are conceived to be only indirectly discriminatory or genuinely 
non-discriminatory. In  such a ‘restriction-justification’ construct, the principle o f non­
discrimination still clearly plays an important role in the debate on the lawfulness of any given 
national rule suspected of infringing the Community free movement provisions. Be that as it may, 
it must be observed that a careful reading of some recent decisions of the Court appears to reveal 
a possible new trend in the case law of the Court on the fundamental freedoms which would 
consist in a uniform obstacle-justification approach. Essentially, this would imply that all kinds of 
restrictions could be saved by all types of justification, thus necessarily entailing that also directly 
discriminatory measures could be justified under the imperative requirements doctrine and 
obliterating in a certain way the almost sacrosanct distinction between this judge-made doctrine 
and the express Treaty exceptions.
A first, albeit mainly implicit and admittedly still timid expression of this potentially new 
approach can be found in the so-called Walloon Waste case.543 In this case, the Commission 
challenged the compatibility with Community law of a ban in Wallonia on the disposal o f waste 
originating in other Member States or in other regions of Belgium. To justify the restrictions 
placed on the movement of waste, Belgium argued that the contested legislation meets 
“imperative requirements relating to environmental protection and the objective of protection of 
health, which takes precedence over the objective of freedom of movement for goods, and 
constitutes an exceptional and temporary protective measure to counter the inflow into Wallonia 
o f waste from neighbouring countries.”544 As such, this line of argumentation could have made 
sense, had it not been for the fact that environmental protection does not figure among the 
express Treaty derogations of Article 30 EC. Strictly legally speaking, Belgium was simply not 
entitled to rely on the mandatory requirements doctrine, as the contested legislation was aimed 
specifically at non-Walloon waste and therefore directly discriminatory. As a result, Advocate
543 Case C-2/90 Commission v Belgium  [1992] E C R 1-4431.
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General Jacobs rigorously concluded that the national legislation was incompatible with
Community law.54 45 However, the Court reached a different conclusion..It stated that in assessing
r
whether or not the barrier in question is discriminatory, account must tie taken of the particular 
nature of waste.” It proceeded holding that “the principle that environmental damage should as a 
matter of priority be remedied at source, laid down by Article 130r (2) of the Treaty as a basis for 
action by the Community relating to the environment, entails that it is for each region, 
municipality or other local authority to take appropriate steps to ensure that its own waste is 
collected, treated and disposed of; it must accordingly be disposed of as close as possible to the 
place where it is produced, in order to limit as far as possible the transport of waste.”546 
Ultimately, it concluded that having regard to the differences between waste produced in 
different places and to the connection of the waste with its place of production, the contested 
measures could not be regarded as discriminatory.547 Admittedly, in view of the Court’s 
reasoning, this case cannot stand as authority for the use of justifications which aren’t expressly 
mentioned in the Treaty to uphold directly discriminatory measures.548 But it can hardly be 
denied that essentially, this is precisely what the Court has done, even though it has not followed 
the conventional way.549
Possibly more straightforward in this respect was the Court’s treatment of the nationality 
requirements in Bosnian. As is commonly known, nationality clauses are the standard example of 
discriminatory, and even more, directly discriminatory treatment. Therefore, it was somehow in 
the line of expectations that the Court were to decide that the so-called ‘3+2’ rule550 was per se 
prohibited, unless it could be justified on grounds of public policy, public security or public 
health, as laid down in Article 39(3) EC. Quite surprisingly however, the Court firstly concluded
544 Walloon Waste, par. 29.
545 Jacobs AG in Walloon Waste. Subsequently, in Case C-379/98 PreussenElekjra AG v Schlesweg AG [2001] I- 
2099, AG Jacobs argued that the Court’s approach in Walloon Waste was flawed: according to the AG, the question 
whether a measure was discriminatory was logically distinct from whether it could be justified. However, he pleaded 
for a relaxation in the distinction between the express Treaty justifications under Article 30 EC and the objective 
justification doctrine. The Court in PreussenElehra did upheld the national measure on environmental grounds.
*4< Walloon Waste, par. 34.
547 Walloon Waste, par. 35.
548 Craig & de Burca, o.c., at 634-635.
549 Bernard, “Discrimination and Free Movement in EC Law”, ac ., at 93-94: “Denying the existence of 
discrimination is patent is, however, no solution either. The case was clearly wrongly decided."
350 According to this rule, during official matches only three foreign players could be fielded, plus two assimilated 
players. For more information, see chapter 6.
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that the nationality clauses amounted to a barrier to the free movement of workers and therefore 
constituted an infringement of Article 39 EC,551 rather than qualifying them as directly 
discriminatory, and subsequently proceeded to an investigation of possible justifications for these 
nationality clauses under the rule of reason.552 There are a number of plausible explanations for 
this at first glance incomprehensible approach. Firstly, the Court may very well have taken here a 
giant leap towards a single uniform procedural framework for the fundamental freedoms of 
movement, treating also the clearly directly discriminatory nationality clauses merely as 
restrictions and especially, introducing implicitly, but nevertheless undoubtedly, the possibility of 
justification of a directly discriminatory national provision under the rule of reason, in addition to 
the express Treaty derogations, which traditionally could already be invoked to justify such 
measures. This rather bold assertion with regard to the justification of directly discriminatory 
measures can be underpinned with a textual argument: in Gebhard, the Court had determined 
exactly which conditions needed to be complied with in order to justify a contested national 
measure under the rule of reason doctrine. It had to be “(i) applied in a non-discriminatory 
manner; (ii) justified by imperative requirements in the general interest; (iii) suitable for securing 
the attainment of the objective which they pursue; and (iv) not go beyond what is necessary to 
attain it.”553 This so-called 'Gebhard-formula* is reiterated in Bosman, with one slight difference 
however: the requirement that the disputed measure must be non-discriminatory in order to be 
eligible for objective justification has remarkably -  and perhaps strategically - disappeared and 
has been replaced by the condition that the rule pursues a legitimate aim compatible with the 
Treaty.554 In the light o f this rephrased formula, there would thus seem to be nothing to preclude 
directly discriminatory measures from being justified by imperative requirements in the general 
interest. Alternatively, it may equally have been that the Court did not really wish to go that far, 
but manifestly sensitive to the particularities and the importance of sport, it nevertheless tried by 
all means to come to a justification for the national clauses, probably also in view of the delicate 
situation o f the national teams,555 and therefore dealt with the national requirements under the 
heading of restriction rather than on the traditional basis of discrimination. This second
551 Bosman, paras. 116-120.
552 Bosnian, paras. 121-137.
533 Gebhard, par. 37, citing Kraus, par. 32.
354 Bosman, par. 104.
333 The specific situation o f representative national team s within the Community framework will be dealt with in 
chapter 6, §2, H.
162
explanation for the Court’s démarche, implying the existence of a kind of sut generis exception 
for purely sporting interests, somehow appears to be plausible and based on common sense, given 
that this particular situation, although potentially deserving protection/ does not fit under the 
heading of the expressly provided exceptions of public policy, public security and public 
health.556 Notwithstanding that, it cannot seriously be denied that the nationality clauses squarely 
infringe the Treaty provisions prohibiting discriminatory treatment on grounds of nationality. 
How well this approach may fit within the Court’s modem two-steps ‘restriction-justification’ 
procedure, it does not conceal the fact that the nationality requirements are unequivocally 
discriminatory. Finally, there is a third, eventually conceivable explanation for the Court’s 
dealing with the nationality clauses, namely that the Court of Justice has carried out its analysis 
on the basis of the concept of ‘sporting nationality’, rather than on that of legal nationality.557 
This notion implies that an athlete has the sporting nationality of the country' for which he is 
entitled to represent the national team. Viewed in this way, the nationality clauses would be 
solely indirectly discriminatory, and could therefore be objectively justified. After all, this third 
explanation is maybe the most plausible one.558
Be that as it may, it is clear that the specific issues dealt with in respectively Walloon 
Waste and Bosman highlight perfectly the limitations inherent to the rigid Treaty structure of 
prohibitions of discrimination and express derogations.559 Arguably, these kinds of difficult 
sensitive matters can be better dealt with under the broader and more flexible ‘restriction plus 
rule of reason’ analysis. The fact that the Court’s ruling in Bosman could be construed as having 
implicitly introduced the possibility for directly discriminatory measures to be justified under the 
imperative requirements in the general interest undoubtedly constitutes to a certain extent a 
remarkable and highly contestable innovation within the case law of the European Court of 
Justice. Admittedly, the traditional position of the Court with regard to direct discrimination has 
always been that no defence is available, unless the Treaty provides for an express derogation.560 
However, in this respect it should not be forgotten that it was within the framework of equal
556 O ’Keeffe & Osborne, “L ’affaire Bosman: un arrêt important pour le bon fonctionnement du Marché unique 
européen’*, 1 EMUE (1996) at 40.
557 W eatherill, “European Football Law”, o.c., at 354.
358 For a m ore detailed critical analysis, see chapter 6, §2, DL
359 See also Mortelmans, “Zaak C-415/95 KBVB, Royal Club Liégeois, UEFA tegen J*M. Bosman", 4 SEW (1996) 
141.
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treatment between men and women that both the Commission and Advocate General Van Gerven 
urged the Court for the first time to  accept the argument that direct.,discrimination could be 
justified. In Birds Eye Walls v Roberts?61, the Commission suggested that direct discrimination 
could be objectively justified “since the very concept of discrimination, whether direct o r 
indirect, involves a difference in treatment which is unjustified”. The Advocate General pointed 
out that the Court has never ruled that direct discrimination could not be justified by objective 
factors and held that it is often very difficult to distinguish between direct and indirect 
discrimination, which renders it arbitrary to grant the possibility o f justification only in the case 
that the discriminatory treatment is indirect. At that moment however, the Court did not take up 
this suggestion and dribbled away from the hot issue by deciding the case on a different point.560 162 563
Be that as it may, in the meantime, and also within the field of equal treatment, secondary 
legislation has been adopted in which it has been officially recognised that both direct and 
indirect discrimination can be objectively justified. This particular development could be 
interpreted as paving the way for a similar evolution within the field of the fundamental 
freedoms. Moreover, it would of course not be the first time in the history of the case law of the 
Court that it implicitly launches a new development in a particular case in order to vigorously 
confirm or ascertain the new principle in a subsequent case. However, up until now, the Court in 
my opinion hasn’t yet rendered such a judgement in which it expressly confirms this potential 
new trend. At this stage, one thus has to settle for a couple of decisions of the Court containing 
important indications to this effect.564 In any event, it can no longer be denied that the Court in
560 Barnard, EC Employment Law, (Wiley, 1995) at 182-184.
561 Case C-132/92 Birds Eye Walls v Roberts, 3 CMLR (1993) 822; see also Case C -152/91 Neath v Hugh Steeper 
Ltd, 1 All England Law Reports (1994) 929.
562 For further analysis, see Ellis, “The Definition of Discrimination in European Community Sex Equality Law” , 19 
ELRev. (1994) 563.
563 Article 4 o f Council Directive 97/80/EC o f 15 December 1997 on the burden of proof in cases of discrimination 
based on sex, OJ L  014, 6-8
564 In this respect, reference is sometimes m ade to the Court’s derision in Case C-250/95 Futura Participations SA v 
Administration des Contributions [1997] EC R  1-2471. Martin argued that the contested Luxembourg legislation 
establishing differential treatment for resident and non-resident taxpayers was directly discriminatory. (Martin, 
“’Discriminations’, ‘entraves’ et ‘raisons impérieuses’ dans le Traité CE: trois concepts en quête d’identité”, o.c., at 
611) To reach this conclusion, he based h im self on paragraph 25 of the Court’s judgement, in which it held that the 
legislation imposed a condition affecting “specifically” undertakings having their seat in another Member State. 
Although the Luxembourg measure under scrutiny in this case had clearly a  discriminatory effect, the Court 
nevertheless proceeded by holding that the measure would only infringe the Treaty provisions on the freedom of 
establishment if  it did not pursue a legitimate objective and could not be justified by a mandatory reason. 
Consequently, he considered this case as a  confirmation o f the supposition that even directly discriminatory 
measures can be justified under the objective justification doctrine. In my view, the measure at stake was not 
directly, but indirectly discriminatory. Be that as it may, the Court did reiterate the Gebhard-formvlz, laying down
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its language in practice reverts more and more often to a simplified approach in the context of the 
fundamental freedoms in which it seeks to ascertain whether the contested national measures
* i ■
amounts to afi obstacle to the fundamental freedom before moving on immediately to the issue of 
justification. The Court effectively seems to abandon its traditional two-tier approach, consisting, 
firstly, of a classification of the measures under scrutiny as discriminatory or as indistinctly 
applicable, followed by an evaluation of the grounds invoked to justify the measure, the 
availability of which is decisively determined by the outcome of the preceding classification.565 
Consequently, the principle of non-discrimination seems to have surrendered its primary role 
within the framework of these fundamental freedoms. Presumably, however, in the analysis of 
the Court, it will still be harder for discriminatory measures to pass the tests of objective 
justification and of the principle of proportionality than for indistinctly applicable measures. In 
this sense, the principle o f non-discrimination will probably still have a word to say in the 
debates. And it might always bounce back if the Court were to decide to transpose its Keck ruling 
to the spheres of free movement of persons and freedom to provide services anyway, or decided 
to take it into consideration as a delimiting factor when ultimately defining the precise scope of 
the concept of restriction.
the requirements to be fulfilled to objectively justify national measures, precisely as it was subtly modified in 
Bosnian. The original first condition that the measure must be indistinctly applicable seems thus somehow to have 
fallen into oblivion. This o f course adds further credence to the theory that even directly discriminatory measures 
may be objectively justified. Apart from that, my divergence of opinion with Martin as to the discriminatory nature 
of die Luxembourg rule underlines once again that Advocate General Van Gerven was probably right in holding that 
even the difference between direct and indirect discrimination is not always crystal clear. Also for that reason, a 
more uniform approach to the justification issue might be welcomed.
565 See C-158/96 KohU v Union des caisses de maladie [1998] ECR 1-1931, concerning a request by a  doctor 
established in Luxembourg for authorisation for his daughter to receive treatment from an orthodontist established in 
Germany. Instead of categorising the contested rules as indirectly discriminatory, as it probably would have done 
previously in the traditional framework, the Court solely decided that “such rules deter insured persons from 
approaching providers of medical services established in another Member State and constitute, for them and their 
patients, a barrier to the freedom to provide services.” (par. 35) Subsequently, the Court went on to assess the 
different reasons advanced to justify the restriction, without paying any particular attention as to whether these 
justifications could actually be invoked in the light of the particular -  in casu indirectly discriminatory -  nature of the 
contested rules.(paras. 37-53) It simply rejected both the argument concerning the risk of seriously undermining the 
financial balance o f the social security system, which could be construed as an overriding reason in the general 
interest, as the arguments concerning the necessity to guarantee the quality o f medical services and the aim to 
provide a balanced medical and hospital service open to all insured persons, which could be captured under the 
express public health derogation.
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Conclusion
Evidently, Community law with regard to the application o f the fundamental freedoms is 
currently standing at a crossroads, as the case law of the Court of Justice is fraught w ith  
substantial uncertainty concerning the new core concept o f restrictions. The Court now faces the 
important task of satisfactorily completing the reform it started when it decided to extend its 
examination of the compatibility o f national measures with the Treaty free movement provisions 
beyond the scope o f the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality. So far, the 
Court’s approach of the issue hasn’t always excelled in consistency and coherence, rendering it 
somehow difficult to extrapolate with precision useful indications or principles for future cases. 
For the time being the Court seems to be hesitating w hether it would be preferable to keep a 
‘standard-like’ test to define the concept of restriction, to borrow from the terminology 
introduced by Wils,566 or rather build a ‘rule-like’ test into the notion. A standard-like test has the 
advantage of reducing error costs, as it puts the emphasis of the Court's analysis on ex post 
adjudication, but it inevitably entails considerable administrative costs to resolve all the cases 
which come before the Court. Conversely, a more rule-like test, involving a predominantly ex 
ante evaluation of which measures infringe the free movement provisions, allows to diminish 
administrative costs, increasing however the risk of erroneous judgements. In the field of free 
movement of goods, the Court has adhered to a more rule-based regime since its decision in 
Keck, distinguishing between measures on selling arrangements and measures relating to product 
characteristics. In the domains of persons and services, the Court still adopts the standard o f 
prevention or hindrance of a national of a Member State from leaving his country of origin in 
order to exercise his right to freedom of movement to define the concept of restriction. However, 
there are strong indications that it is contemplating a move towards the other direction, with the 
introduction of a rule-like test centred around the notion o f market access. In this respect, it is 
essential that the Court strives to find a delicate balance between a high level of legal certainty, 
great precision in the application of the applicable norms and low administrative costs, regardless 
of whatever form the final test will turn out to take. Furthermore, in addition to shining light on 
the precise scope and interpretation of the concepts of restriction and market access, the Court is 
invited to reappraise the role of the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality, which
566 Wils, “The Search for the Rule in Article 30 EEC” , 18 ELRev. (1993) 475, at 480-482.
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sometimes appears to be downgraded to a principle of secondary importance in the more recent 
case law of the Court on the free movement of persons and services. It. is respectfully submitted 
that this prin6iple still has an important role to play on this matter. If it is not to exert any direct 
influence, for example on the issue of justification, by means of rendering the availability of 
certain grounds of justification dependent on whether the contested measure is discriminatory or 
not, even in a possibly new scheme of justification,567 it could definitely do so indirectly, if the 
Court were to apply more tightly the requirements imposed by the principle of proportionality in 
the event of discriminatory measures under challenge. Admittedly, the Court has never explicitly 
downplayed the role of the principle of non-discrimination, but nevertheless, in the face o f the 
latest developments, a formal recognition of its function would be welcome.
567 See in this respect the interes tin g proposais of Mortelmans, “Excepties bij non-tari faire intracommunautaire 
belemmeringen: assimilatie in het nieuwe EG-Verdrag?’, 5 5£W (1997) 182.
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4The Transfer Issue: 1
Chronicle of a Death Foretold?
- Gabriel Garcia Marquez -
Introduction
The Community does not have any direct powers in the domain of sport. This has not 
prevented the Court of Justice from reiterating regularly that to the extent that it constitutes an 
economic activity according to the terms of Article 2 EC, spoit nonetheless falls within the scope 
of Community law. The analysis effectuated in the preceding chapters has revealed that there is 
in principle nothing to preclude sportsmen from being qualified as workers or service providers 
within the meaning of the relevant free movement provisions. A first set of rules elaborated by 
the sports associations which have come in the line of fire from the point of view of compliance 
with the Community provisions on freedom of movement concern the so-called transfer system. 
Essentially, these transfer rules require the fulfilment of a certain number of formal, material and 
temporal conditions for a ‘transfer’ o f an individual sportsman from one club to another to be 
rendered effective. Clearly, in some way or the other, these provisions thus substantially limit the 
athlete’s freedom to change clubs when he deems it fit. It has been alleged on different occasions 
that several of these prerequisites also constitute restrictions to the right to freedom of movement 
as guaranteed in the European Community Treaty. This particular issue which will be examined 
in detail in the next two chapters. In this first chapter on transfers, it shall be evaluated in 
particular whether the Court of Justice in the Bosnian case has managed to find an appropriate 
balance between one the one hand, the exigencies of the Community to ensure compliance with 
Community law, and on the other hand, the claims of the sporting associations to respect their 
freedom of association and to take duly into account the special character of sport.
The purpose of this short introductory section is to convey a better understanding of the 
precise content o f the notion of ‘transfer’. Also, it will be explored already somewhat more in
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detail which particular shape these suspect transfer conditions take. However, initially, it is 
considered necessary to sketch briefly the framework of the mutual legal relationships in the 
triangular situation o f a sportsman, his club and the federation within which transfers o f 
individual sportsmen are effectuated
L DIFFERENT LINKS ATHLETE -  CLUB - FEDERATION
In general, one can discern different types of relationship in the particular situation o f a 
sportsman playing for a club in a given sports discipline.568 First o f all, a player must be affiliated 
to a certain sports club. This bond of allegiance between the player and the club can be limited to 
a simple membership o f association, as is often the case with regard to amateur sportsmen, and/or 
find expression in a contract of employment concluded between both interested parties, which is 
in principle the rule when sport is exercised on a more professional basis. Furthermore, an athlete 
must also be affiliated to the national federation responsible for the sport in which he wishes to 
perform his activities. And in order to be able to participate for his club in the official 
competitions organised by this federation, the athlete must receive specific authorisation to play 
for this club. This entitlement usually takes the form of a ‘qualification’ or ‘licence’ issued by the 
federation. Broadly speaking, the federations pursue a double objective with the imposition of 
this requirement: firstly, it is a means to enforce compliance with the internal laws and 
regulations of the federation, as the deliverance of the licence is conditional on the formal 
acceptance of these rules by the player, and secondly, it allows to exert control on the regularity 
of the competitions by preventing unauthorised athletes from participating.
II. THE NOTION OF ‘TRANSFER*
• +
Conceptually, a transfer can be defined as the transaction by which a player moves from 
one club to another and thus obtains a change o f club of affiliation and possibly, as the case may 
be, a change o f registration at a national federation.569 In the event o f a transfer, the membership 
of the player in question to the club or their contractual relationship thus comes to an end, after
368 For more detail, see Blanpain & Boyaert, De transfer van sportbeoefenaars (Peeters, 1995); Dubey, La libre 
circulation des sportifs en Europe (Bruylant, 2000), at 274-277.
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which the released player is free to conclude an agreement with the new club. The clubs have the 
obligation to mform the national federation(s) of the transfer, enabling the federation(s) to annul 
or withdraw the licence of the player to play for the selling club, and io deliver a new licence 
qualifying him to play for the buying club.569 70 It is important to bear in mind from the outset that a 
player will only be entitled to put his capacities and skills effectively at the service of his new 
club once all specific formalities with regard to the transfer have been respected.571 Remarkably, 
even though strict compliance with the conditions imposed by the transfer rules hinges in the first 
place on the clubs involved in the particular transaction, eventual sanctions resulting from 
violation or non-respect of the transfer rules in practice predominantly hit the player in question, 
as he will not receive the necessary licence to play from the competent federation, which will 
exclude him from taking part in the official competitions and thus bar him from exercising his 
profession.572
In this context, it is basically conceivable to distinguish between two different 
situations:573 on the one hand, there is the unequivocal, straightforward situation of an athlete 
who definitively and in principle permanently leaves one club to go and play for another one, in 
which one is confronted with a real or proper transfer. On the other hand, an athlete sometimes 
leaves his club only on a temporary basis, and defends the colours of another team solely for a 
determined period, after the expiry of which he returns normally to his previous club. Under these 
circumstances, the player continues to be affiliated to his club but is registered at the national 
federation as entitled to play for another club. This particular situation is generally referred to as a 
‘loan’. These loan agreements between clubs often contain a specific clause providing the new 
club with the option of acquiring the player on a definitive basis at the end of the loan period. If 
this hypothesis materialises and the club indeed decides to make use of this option, the 
transaction turns into a real transfer.574
569 Baddeley, L’association sportive face au droit -  Les limites de son autonomie (thesis Genève, Basel and 
Frankfurt, 1994) at 182.
570 Baddeley, o.c., at 183.
571 See also Füllgraf, Der Lizenrfussball- Eine vertragliche Dreierbeziehung im Arbeitsrecht (thesis Berlin, 1981), at 
76.
372 Dubey, o.c., at 277.
573 See also Sutter, Rechtsfragen des organisierten Sports -  unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des 
Einzelarbeitsvertrages (thesis, Basel, Bern, Frankfurt, New York, 1984), at 271-275: he talks about ‘echte* and 
‘unechte Transfer’.
374 In the remainder of this part of the thesis, only real transfers will be dealt with in principle.
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HI. DIFFERENT CONDITIONS TO BE FULFILLED IN CASE OF A TRANSFER
‘ r
A state of complete freedom on the players’ market, enabling sportsmen to leave their 
club of affiliation for another one at any moment in time without the official recognition of their 
move being subjected in whatever kind of way to the realisation of different sorts of conditions, 
would potentially entail serious repercussions, not only for the clubs concerned, which risk to be 
substantially weakened respectively strengthened by the departure or arrival of influential 
players, but also for the competitions to which these clubs participate, as their outcome could be 
influenced to a greater or lesser degree by the turnover of players, which would cast doubts on 
the regularity o f these sporting events.575 In order to prevent these scenarios from occurring, the 
competent federations have elaborated a set of transfer rules, submitting the achievement o f a 
transfer of a player to compliance with different requirements, thereby effectively restricting the 
possibility for players to freely walk out o f their club of affiliation to join a new team.576 57From 
the different transfer systems established by the diverse international and national federations, it 
is conceivable to derive three major types o f conditions. Firstly, one can distinguish temporal 
limitations. The rules introducing this factor of time generally stipulate that transfers can in 
principle only be effectuated within a certain period of time before, during or after the sporting 
season, or alternatively, until a certain date after which a transfer is no longer admissible. The 
Community institutions have already pronounced their opinion on this matter on two different 
occasions. Firstly, the Court of Justice dealt with the compatibility of transfer periods with the 
Treaty provisions on freedom of movement for workers in the case of LehtonenP1 Secondly, the 
issue was also raised in the negotiations between the football authorities UEFA and FIFA and the 
European Commission in the infringement procedure against certain rules of the transfer system 
in professional football.578 Furthermore, the federations have drafted provisions containing 
formal criteria which must also be respected for a transfer to be rendered fully effective. In this 
respect, it is possible to ascertain a great, variety of formal prerequisites, ranging from official 
requests for a transfer to be made, over enrolment on a transfer list to the use of exit letters or
575 For more detail, consult Dubey, o.c., at 277-3 IS.
576 See also Garrigues, Activités sportives et droit communautaire (thesis Strasbourg, 1982), at 298.
577 Case C-176/96 Jyri Lehtonen and Castors Canada Dry Namur-Brmne v Fédération Royale Belge des Sociétés de 
Basketball [2000] E C R 1-2681.
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retain lists, the deliverance o f international transfer certificates, etc. For the time being, especially 
some national courts or tribunals have rendered some decisions on this matter.578 79 Finally, the
' ttransfer systéms also contain provisions which materially restrict the possibility for players to 
change clubs. A first category of rules requiring respect for material conditions relate in some 
way or the other to numbers. One can detect clauses limiting the total number of players (or 
foreigners) under contract to a certain amount, clauses limiting the number of foreign players to 
be fielded in an official contest or clauses limiting the frequency with which players can be 
transferred. The principal material restriction, however, consists of the fact that the transfer of a 
player is dependent upon the payment, due by the new club to the previous club, of a transfer 
sum. In principle, the precise amount of the transfer fee must be agreed between the two clubs or 
determined in accordance with the relevant regulations of the sporting federations.580 Strictly 
speaking, the player in question is no party to the contract.581 In theory, the business relationships 
between the clubs should exert no influence on the activity of the player. Be that as it may, 
however, when the clubs fail to reach an agreement on the transfer sum to be paid, this 
eventuality will in practice prevent the player from providing sporting services to his new club. 
The questions raised by the material conditions linked to transfers, and especially the issue of 
transfer fees, have already been the subject of many intense debate at the heart of the European 
institutions. The judgement of the Court of Justice in the case of Bosnian undoubtedly constitutes 
the most important expression in this respect.582
It will not be attempted to examine all these specific transfer requirements exhaustively 
upon their compatibility with the Community principles of freedom of movement. Instead, it has 
been preferred to deal only with some of these conditions in detail. It is submitted that the 
findings from this study can be applied, muîaîis mutandis, to the other conditions. This chapter 
will almost entirely be dedicated to an analysis of the Bosman decision, in which the Court
578 The revised transfer rules will be analysed in detail in chapter 5.
579 On the use of exit letters in Switzerland, see for example, Case Perroud v Servette Genève (football), Receuil 
officiel des arrêts du Tribunal fédéral suisse 102 H, at 211, or Case Monn, Peter and Torche (basketball). Tribunal 
civil de rarrondissement de la Sarine, 20 June 1997, Revue Fribourgeoise de Jurisprudence (1998) at 51; on the use 
of the retain list in England, see Eastham v Newcastle United Football Club Ltd. [1963] All England Law Reports 
139.
580 Dubey.o.c., at 275-276.
581 Baddeley, o.c.f at 182,
582 Case C 4 15/93 Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Association ASIE v Jean-Marc Bosman [1995] ECR 
1-4921.
175
invalidated the long-standing practice of submitting the transfer o f a player who wished to move 
to another club in another Member State after the expiry o f his contract with his old club to the 
payment o f a transfer sum by the new club. In the next chapter, the viability with Community 
Internal Market law of the new FIFA Regulations on international transfers, which were 
introduced after long negotiations with the European Commission in the framework o f an 
procedure for infringement of the competition rules, will be critically evaluated. At the end of this 
part, some preliminary conclusions will be drawn on the place of sport within the Community 
framework and the extent to which account has been taken of the specific features of the sporting 
activity.
§1: The situation in the pre-Bosman era
Before the Court of Justice decisively tackled the issue of transfer payments, the European 
Parliament and, albeit to a lesser extent, also the European Commission had already expressed 
their opinion on the matter.
1. THE POSITION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAM ENT 
1. Initial Resolutions
In a general Resolution on Sport and the Community from 1984,583 the European Parliament 
requested the international sports federations to harmonise their rules in order to facilitate 
mobility and contacts among sportsmen. Already at the time, it requested the European 
Commission to take energetic steps against rules that limit the freedom of movement and 
establishment of Member State citizens engaged in certain sports and thus run counter to the 
Treaty of Rome.584 Some time later, in a Resolution on Sport in the European Community and a
583 European Parliament, Resolution on Sport and die Community, 13 April 1984, (1984) OJ C 127/142.
384 EP Resolution 1984, at 144,8. Interestingly, it also requested the Commission to hold consultations with all those 
concerned, that is to say sports authorities, advertising agencies and television authorities, with a view to adopting a 
European charter on the allocation to sports clubs and federations of the proceeds from the broadcasting of European 
sporting events.
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People’s Europe,585 the Parliament considered that Europe 1992 would affect the sporting world 
in a number of ways, such as the free movement of professional sportsmen and coaches, and 
called on the'Commission to draw up specific proposals in these areas.58*- Moreover, it expressed 
the opinion that the Commission should strongly oppose regulations in certain sectors of sport, if 
they contravene the Treaty o f Rome, and abolish or reform them where necessary, with a view to 
securing freedom of movement and freedom of establishment, while taking into account the 
position of the sports bodies responsible.587
2. The Janssen van Raay report
The Janssen van Raay Report on the freedom of movement of professional footballers in 
the Community,588 drawn up on behalf of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens’ rights, 
recognised that professional football players are employees who, like any other employee in the 
Community, should enjoy the protection of European law and benefit, in particular, from the 
provisions guaranteeing freedom of movement. In this respect, it considered the regulations of 
UEFA and the national football associations in breach of national and European law insofar as 
they impose on these sportsmen under contract a system of indefinite extensions of contract 
which precludes them from joining any other club of their choice at the end of their contract, 
unless the freedom to enter into a new contract is severed by payment of a transfer fee, on penalty 
of international suspension.
In an explanatory statement, the report further elaborated on this issue, clarifying that if a 
professional football player wants to play in another Community country after his employment 
contract has expired, he needs clearance from his national association, which grants it only if his 
previous club has agreed to the transfer. It pointed out that the latter will do so only after 
obtaining a transfer fee which often runs into seven figures. Entering more in detail, the report 
specifically condemned the system of payment of transfer fees in its present form as a latter-day 
version of slave trade, a violation of the freedom of contract and the freedom of movement
585 European Parliament, Resolution on Sport in the European Community and a People’s Europe, 17 February 1989,
(1989) O JC  69/234.
586 EP Resolution 1989, at 236, p t  4.
587 EP Resolution 1989, at 236, p t  7.
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guaranteed by the Treaties and a contravention of Article 81 of the EC Treaty. If the restrictive 
practices are to be declared illegal and invalid, the plaintiffs or intervening parties could be the 
sportsmen involved, the clubs, or the European Commission. The report correctly emphasised 
that individual professional sportsmen rarely bring actions, as they have no absolute right to a 
professional contract and moreover, if  they took court action, would have to reckon with being 
suspended and losing their jobs de facto. It also outlined that it is not primarily the task o f 
professional footballers to assert their right to freedom o f movement. Furthermore, it stipulated 
that even though also the clubs could bring actions in principle, they do not do so in practice, for 
the simple reason that most of them are happy with the existing arrangements and willingly apply 
them. In the light of this, it therefore explicitly called on the European Commission, as the 
guardian of the Treaties, to institute proceedings for infringement of Article 81 EC against UEFA 
and/or the national football associations, as well as individual clubs in the Community, in an 
endeavour to abolish the transfer fee system. In this respect, it did acknowledge, however, the 
benefit to the clubs of a controlled phasing-out of the system and the possibility of compensation 
for investment in apprenticeship and training, though this may be requested only while the 
apprenticeship is still in progress.
In annex to the Janssen van Raay report, the Committee on Social Affairs and 
Employment essentially confirmed the findings of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens’ 
rights, holding that in the European Community, the freedom of movement of professional 
footballers is decisively restricted by the rules governing transfer fees, as transfer fees obstruct 
workers in freely selecting their employer. Again, they didn’t yield from using the categorisation 
of the transfer system as ‘a modem form of serfdom’.58 89 Equally, the Committee on Youth, 
Education, Information and Sport expressed a similar opinion.590 However, against the 
background o f these clear, unequivocal statements regarding the compatibility o f the rules on the 
payment of transfer fees with Community law,591 it must be acknowledged that within the seat of
588 European Parliament, Report Janssen van Raay on the freedom of movement of professional footballers in the 
Community, PE DOC A2-415/88,1 March 1989.
589 Annex to the report: Opinion of the Committee on Social Affairs and Employment, PE DOC A2-415/88, 29 
March 1989, p.4.
590 Annex to die report: Opinion of the C o m m i t t e e  on Youth, Education, Information and Sport, PE DOC A2-415/88, 
29 March 1989, p.6.
591 Annex 2: motion for a resolution (document 2-1582/84) tabled by Vandemeulebroucke and Kuijpers, which calls 
on the Commission to take the necessary steps under the Treaty to ban the restrictive transfer system in all sports; or
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the European Parliament, also some more cautious or dissonant positions have been voiced. 
Members of Parliament Ford and Stewart tabled a motion for a resolution in which they urged the 
Parliament to'recognise the financial difficulties a change in the existing transfer rules will create 
because of differing economic strength of the football industry in Community countries and the 
consequent problems of harmonising subsidies from private, regional and national agencies to 
individual clubs, and demand that a full investigation of all issues be undertaken before 
premature decisions are taken.592 A subsequent motion for resolution, prepared by Ephremidis, 
Adamou and Alavanos, went considerably further. They highlighted in detail the negative 
consequences which would be engendered by a modification of the current transfer system. 
According to them, the possibility for an unlimited number of professional footballers to move 
freely within the Community would directly distort the whole character of football in the Member 
States. It would also lead to the excessive development of certain large football clubs with limited 
company status at the expense of the small ones, with the result that the difference in potential 
between teams would become even more pronounced. Furthermore, arguably, a complete 
freedom of movement would give fresh impetus to the tendency for small clubs to be taken over 
by larger ones, would to all intents deliver this extremely popular sport into the hands of the 
offices of the various middlemen and commercial agents, and would lead to an increased outflow 
of foreign exchange through reckless transfers, particularly from small countries to larger ones, 
since the larger ones have a more developed infrastructure. Consequently, in order to prevent 
these unwarranted developments from occurring, they called on the Commission to simply put a 
stop to initiatives that would alter the existing arrangements for the movement of professional 
football players in the Community Member States.593
also Annex 5: motion for a resolution (document B 2-81/87) tabled by Tridente, Alber, Andre, Bandres M olet, 
Betiza, Bombard, Bonino, Blumenfeld, Bueno Vicente, Chiabrando, Cicciomessere, De Bartolomei, Graziani, 
M attina, O’Malley, Kuijpers, Pegado Liz, Roelants du Vivier, Segre, Selva, Tognoli, Vandemeulebroucke, van Dijk, 
W elsh, W ijsenbeek, Amadei and Rogalla, calling on the Commission to take all appropriate action, including 
bringing the matter before the Court of Justice, to enforce the spirit and letter o f the Treaties with regard to  the 
freedom o f movement and establishm ent for Community citizens, with specific reference to this closed-door policy 
operated by some national football federations.
592 Annex 1: motion for a resolution (document 2-1167/84) tabled by Ford and Stewart.
593 Annex 4: motion for resolution (document B2 -1547/86) by Ephremidis, Adamou and Alavanos.
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In the Resolution which the European Parliament finally issued pursuant to the Janssen 
van Raay report,594 the Parliament adopted the conclusions of the reports regarding the system ofr t
the payment o f transfer fees in its present form a violation of the freedom of movement and a 
contravention o f Article 81 EC.595 Besides, it called on the Commission to persuade UEFA and 
the national football associations to accept the solution suggested in the report and, failing this, to 
use every remedy to enforce the application of Community law.596 It took the view that the 
Commission should use every remedy available to it under the Treaty to ensure complete 
freedom of movement by means of binding measures whose date o f entry into force and duration 
are clearly defined.597 In a subsequent Resolution on the same issue,598 59the Parliament reaffirmed 
its determined opposition to any restriction on or obstacle to the free movement of professional
f A A
footballers in the Community. As a result, it found unacceptable the practice o f large sums of 
money being paid by a player’s new club as a transfer fee to his old club, since it infringes both 
the contractual freedom and freedom o f movement guaranteed by the Treaties and is 
incompatible with Article 81 EC.600 Furthermore, it opposed any prior authorisation requirement 
laid down by employers’ organisation vis-à-vis professional footballers seeking a transfer and 
took the view that Articles 12 and 14 o f the FIFA constitution are automatically null and void in 
the Community since they constitute a breach of Community law.601
3. The Larive Report
At the time when the Bosman case was already pending at the Court of Justice in 
Luxembourg, the Larive report on the European Union and Sport vigorously condemned once 
again the existing system of payment o f transfer fees as contrary to the Articles 39, 81 and 82 
EC.602 The Committee adopted the same critical stance, especially since these rules apply equally
594 European Parliam ent, Resolution on the freedom  of m ovement of professional footballers in the Community, 11 
April 1989, (1989) O J C 120/33.
595 EP Resolution 1989, at 33, p t 1.
596 EPR esolution 1989, at 34, p t  14.
597 EP Resolution 1989, at 35, p t 17.
598 European P arliam ent Resolution on the freedom  o f movement of professional footballers, 21 November 1991, 
(1989) OJ C 326/208.
599 EP Resolution 1991, at 209, p t  2.
600 E P Resolution 1991, a t 209, p t  4.
601 EP Resolution 1991, at 209, p t  3.
602 European P arliam ent Larive Report on the European Union and Sport, 27 April 1994, PE DOC A3-0326/94.
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to children playing for a club already at a young age.603 The findings of this report were 
subsequently finalised in another Resolution on the European Community and Sport,604 in which 
the Parliamerit called for the right to join and leave spoits clubs freely to  be guaranteed without 
making it dependent on additional conditions which conflict with general law.605 Moreover, it 
urged the Commission to investigate immediately whether both the rules and practices of FIFA, 
UEFA and the national football associations and clubs are compatible with EU legislation, to take 
the appropriate decisions following this investigation and to act accordingly.606
2. THE POSITION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION
The constructive, pro-active and engaged approach of the European Parliament with 
regard to the issue of the lawfulness of the system of transfer payments in sport stands in stark 
contrast with the quasi-disinterested, virtually inert attitude of the European Commission 
regarding the matter. In spite of the fact that it has been formally requested on several occasions 
to undertake legal action against the transfer practices and institute proceedings against the 
responsible sporting associations for infringement of the Community competition rules, the 
Commission has consistently and obstinately refrained from doing so. The explanation for this at 
first glance incomprehensible stance is to be found in the Commission’s formal answer to the 
written question addressed to it on behalf of a Member of Parliament, as to whether it considered 
that the FIFA rules in question did indeed contravene Articles of the Treaty.607 The Commission 
firstly replied that the rules governing transfers which apply to all professional footballers, 
regardless of nationality, are not incompatible with the principle of freedom of movement of 
persons within the Community, as its scope is limited to abolishing all forms of discrimination 
based on nationality between workers who are nationals of the Member States. Secondly, as far 
as Article 81 EC is concerned, the Commission expressed the opinion that the provisions 
contained in the regulations of both national and international sports federations, including in 
particular football federations, and which establish a system of blockage and transfer for players
603 O pinion of the Com m ittee, 14 October 1993, PE DOC A3-0326/94, Part A. Proposition for resolution.
6(34 European Parliament, Resolution on the European Community and Sport, 6 May 1994, (1994) OJ C 205/486.
605 EP Resolution 1994, at 487, p t  8.
606 EP Resolution, at 488, pt. 9.
607 W ritten Question N° 2391/83 by Vandemeulebroucke to the Commission of the European Communities regarding 
the violation o f the Treaty o f Rom e by the FIFA, (1984) OJ C 222/21.
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who wish to change clubs, do not fall under the Community’s competition rules applicable to 
undertakings. Subsequently, it elaborated somewhat further on thiSo statement. It held that 
individuals participating in professional sports normally do so as employees of a club on the basis 
o f an employment contract and as such are not undertakings. As a result, limitations o f their 
freedom to choose another club/employer resulting from this system do not constitute restrictions 
o f competition in the sense of Article 81(1) EC. On the other hand, the Commission 
acknowledged that sport clubs will normally be deemed to be undertakings, so that the 
regulations of their federations could in principle constitute decisions of associations o f 
undertakings under Article 81(1) EC. However, in this respect it submitted that even though the 
regulations may be found to have as their object or effect a restriction on the economic freedom 
o f their member clubs and thus on competition, it is unlikely in the present situation that these 
restrictions could affect trade between Member States to any appreciable extent. Therefore one of 
the constitutive elements o f Article 81(1) EC is lacking.608
As it didn’t perceive any violation of Community law in the existing transfer rules, the 
Commission obviously had no incentive to open an infringement procedure before the Court of 
Justice. In 1985, in response to the request to state what position it had taken in the talks with 
UEFA on freedom of movement for footballers as regards the role o f agents in the transfer o f star 
footballers, exorbitant and completely uncontrolled transfer fees and the fact that the players 
themselves have no say in these transactions,609 the Commission settled for the statement that at 
the meeting of the Commission and the UEFA on freedom o f movement for footballers, the 
questions referred to were simply not discussed.610 As far as it was concerned, the matter 
apparently was to be vertically classified. Also, it wasn’t until 1994 that the Commission finally 
took position on the complaint filed by Jean-Marc Bosman against the existing transfer 
arrangements.611 But then, when it was finally asked to submit its written observations in the 
framework of the preliminary ruling procedure, the Commission, quite surprisingly, held that the 
transfer rules under scrutiny constituted an infringement of Article 81 EC. Initially, it left open
608 Answer given by R ichard on behalf of the Com mission, 28 June 1984, (1984) O J C  222/21.
609 W ritten Question N° 1592/84 by Van Hemeldonck to  the Commission o f the European Com m unities cm the 
freedom  o f m ovement for footballers, (1985) OJ C 111/31.
610 Answer given by Sutherland on behalf of the Com mission, (1985) OJ C 111/32
611 See also Dupont, “Le d ro it communautaire et la situation du sportif professionnel avant l ’arrêt ‘Bosm an“’, 1 
RMUE (1996) 65.
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the point whether they were also in breach of Article 39 EC. However, at the hearing before the 
Court, it regarded the transfer rules equally incompatible with the free movement of persons, 
unless they could be justified by imperative reasons in the general interest and did not go beyond 
what is necessary to attain those objectives.612
§2: The Bosman case: Crusade on football boots
“C-415/93: une lettre et cinq chiffres qui changent une vie. "
- Le Soir, 14 December 1995 -
Ultimately, and almost against all odds, the European Court o f Justice was seized of the 
matter of transfer payments anyway, in a case which would virtually immediately turn out to 
become a true milestone, not only from a practical point o f view, concerning the results it 
engendered for football, or sport in general, but also theoretically, with regard to the principles it 
enumerated or confirmed and the impact it effectuated on the whole of the European law 
construct. Much, if not all, o f the credit of this goes to one man, one professional football player 
who defied everything and everyone when in 1990 he decided to undertake legal action because 
the existing football rules did not allow him to play for the club of his choice, even though he was 
no longer contractually bound to a club. The name is Bosman, Jean-Marc Bosman. 
Notwithstanding a distressing lack of support by his colleague football players, an almost general 
boycott by the clubs, heavy pressure and blackmail by the whole football establishment to drop 
the case or at least settle it out of court, coupled with sometimes cunning legal manoeuvres to 
slow down the process of the case in court, this lone cavalier persisted in his legal challenge, 
determined to go all the way. His personal crusade finally ended in Luxembourg, where the 
European Court of Justice, in an already legendary judgement,613 made firewood of some of the 
ancient football customs.
The structure of this paragraph is the following: in a first section, a short overview will be 
given o f the applicable transfer rules at the time of the proceedings in Bosman, both at
612 Lena AG in Case G 415/93 Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Association ASLB v Jean-Marc Bosman 
[19951E C R 1-4921, at 5012, par. 212.
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international and at domestic level. Secondly, the factual circumstances which gave rise to the 
particular dispute will be outlined. In a third section, the progress o f the, case before the national 
courts will be1 described. Subsequently, special attention will be devoted to the preliminary ruling 
o f the Court of Justice on the transfer issue. In the fifth and final section, the more salient aspects 
o f the case will be discussed in detail.
I. TRANSFER FEES
1. International transfer rules
In the case of football, both FIFA and UEFA have elaborated regulations on the status and 
the transfer of football players. FIFA organises football at world level. UEFA is the confederation 
o f the European national football associations. According to the FIFA Statutes, UEFA must 
comply with and ensure compliance with the statutes and regulations of FIFA.613 14 It is important 
to state from the outset that the applicable provisions elaborated by the international associations 
are not directly applicable to players but are included in the rules o f the national associations, 
which alone have the power to enforce them and to regulate relations between clubs and players. 
In any event, however, the national federations are bound to respect the regulations o f  the 
international federations and must equally ensure compliance with these rules by their member 
clubs.
1.1. FIFA transfer rules
At the material time of the events leading up to the Bosnian case, the relevant FIFA 
Regulations provided, in particular, that a professional player could not leave the national 
association to which he was affiliated so long as he was bound by his contract and by the rules of 
his club and his national association, no matter how harsh their terms might be. An international
613 Case G 415/93 Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Association ASLB v Jean-Marc Bosman [1995] ECR 
1-4921.
614 A rticle 9(3) FIFA  Statutes 2001.
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transfer could not take place unless the former national association issued a transfer certificate
acknowledging that all financial commitments, including any transfer fee« had been settled.615
1 £
In April 1991, FIFA had adopted new Regulations governing the status and eligibility of 
players whenever they effect a transfer from one national association to another. These 
Regulations, as amended in December 1991 and December 1993,616 provided that a non-amateur 
player shall only be free to conclude a contract with another club if: (a) his contract with his 
present club has expired or will expire within six months; or (b) his contract with his present club 
has been rescinded by one party or the other for valid reasons; or (c) his contract with his present 
club has been rescinded by both parties after mutual agreement.617 As ‘non-amateur* players were 
regarded players who have ever received, in respect of participation in or an activity connected 
with association football, remuneration in excess of the actual expenses incurred in the course of 
such participation, unless they have reacquired amateur status.618 According to these specific 
rules, if a  non-amateur player is transferred, his former club is entitled to a compensation fee for 
his training and/or development.619 If an amateur player concludes a contract with a new club 
which he joins in a non-amateur capacity, his former club shall be entitled to compensation for 
his development.620 Finally, if an amateur player is transferred to another club and has the same 
status there, the former club has no claim to compensation.621 However, if an amateur player who 
has been transferred as such to another club assumes non-amateur status within three years o f his 
transfer to this club, his previous club is entitled to compensation for his development from the 
club w ith which he assumes non-amateur status.622 The amount of compensation is to be agreed 
upon between the two clubs involved. In the event of disagreement, the dispute is to be submitted 
to FIFA, unless the confederation which has both clubs under its jurisdiction has drawn up its 
own regulations to settle differences o f this kind.623 Furthermore, it is also stipulated explicitly 
that any disagreement between two clubs regarding the amount of compensation for the training
615 Bosnian, par. 16.
616 T he revised version o f these Regulations entered into force on 1 January 1994. For the purposes o f this chapter, 
see especially  Chapter V  on International Transfers o f FIFA Regulations 1994: A rticles 12-20.
617 A rticle FIFA Regulations 1994, see also Bosnian, par. 18.
618 A rticle FIFA Regulations 1994, see also Bosnian, par. 19.
619 A rticle 14.1 FIFA Regulations 1994.
620 A rticle 14.2 FIFA Regulations 1994.
621 A rticle 14.3 FIFA Regulations 1994.
622 A rticle 14.4 FIFA Regulations 1994.
623 A rticle 16 FIFA Regulations 1994.
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or development of a player shall not affect his sporting or professional activity. An international 
transfer certificate may not be refused for this reason.624 The player shall therefore be free to play 
for the new élub with which he has signed a contract a contract as soon as the international 
transfer certificate has been received.625
1.2. UEFA transfer rules
The provisions applicable at the time of the facts in Bosman to transfers between clubs in 
different Member States or clubs belonging to different national associations within the same 
Member State626 were contained in a document entitled *Principles o f Co-operation between 
Member Associations o f  UEFA and their Clubs*, approved by the UEFA Executive Committee 
on 24 May 1990 and entered into force from 1 July 1990. According to the provisions o f this 
document, a player is free to enter into a new contract with the club o f his choice at the expiry of 
his previous contract.627 This new club must immediately notify the old club of the conclusion of 
the contract; in turn, the old club is to notify its national association, which must issue an 
international clearance certificate.628 629However, the former club is entitled to receive from the new 
club compensation for training or development o f the player in question. Compensation for 
training is due when the player is transferred for the first time. For every subsequent transfer, a 
development fee is to be paid to compensate the selling club for the progress it allowed the player 
to make. If the clubs concerned fail to reach an agreement on the precise amount of 
compensation due, it is to be fixed by a board of experts set up within UEFA.630 When 
calculating this transfer fee, the board makes use of a scale of multiplying factors, from 12 to 1 
depending on the players* age, to be applied to the players’ gross income, up to a maximum of
5.000.000 Swiss Francs.631
624 Article 20.1 par. 1 FIFA Regulations 1994.
625 Article 20.1 par. 2 FIFA Regulations 1994.
626 This is the case of the U nited Kingdom, in ,«hich there are four different national associations: the English, 
Scottish, W elsh and the N orthern Irish.
627 Article 12 UEFA Regulations 1990.
628 Article 13 UEFA Regulations 1990.
629 A rticle l.e  Annex UEFA Regulations 1990.
630 Article 14 UEFA Regulations 1990.
631 A rticle 3 Annex UEFA Regulations 1990.
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Furthermore, the document explicitly stipulates that the business relationships between 
the two clubs in respect of the compensation fee for training and development are to exert no 
influence on the activity of the player, who is to be free to play for his new club.632 However, this 
does not exclude that if the new club does not immediately pay the fee to the old club, the UEFA 
Control and Disciplinary Committee is to deal with the matter and notify its decision to the 
national association concerned, which may also impose penalties on the debtor club.
After the events which gave rise to the main proceedings, UEFA started negotiations with 
the European Commission. In April 1991, it undertook specifically to incorporate in every 
professional players' contract a clause permitting him, at the expiry o f his contract, to enter into a 
new contract with the club o f his choice and to play for that club immediately. Provisions to that 
effect were incorporated in the new ‘Principles of Co-operation between Member Associations of 
UEFA and their Clubs’ adopted in December 1991 and entered into force from 1 July 1992.633 
Furthermore, this new version of the transfer rules introduced some modifications in the way the 
transfer sum was calculated, and there seemed no longer to exist a maximum transfer sum in the 
event o f a transfer of a professional player.634
These rules have subsequently been replaced by an UEFA Regulation governing the 
fixing of a transfer fee supplementing the FIFA Regulation relating to the status and transfer of 
football players, adopted in June 1993635 and in force since 1 August 1993.636 This Regulation did 
not introduce substantial changes to the previous rules. The new rules retain the principle that the 
business relationships between the two clubs are to exert no influence on the sporting activity of 
the player, who is to be free to play for the new club with which he has signed the new 
contract.637 In the event of disagreement between the clubs concerned, it is for the appropriate 
UEFA board of experts to determine the amount of the compensation fee for training or 
development.638 For non-amateur players, the calculation of the fee is based on the basis o f the 
player’s gross income in the last 12 months or on the fixed annual income guaranteed in the new
632 A rticle 16 UEFA Regulations 1990.
633 Bosman, par. 17.
634 See Lenz AG in Bosman, par. 18.
635 On the basis of A rticle 16,2 FIFA Regulations; see Pream ble UEFA Regulations 1993.
636 Bosman, par. 21.
637 A rticle 2.2 UEFA Regulations 1993.
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contract,638 39 increased by 20% for players who have played at least twice in the senior national 
representative team for their country and multiplied by a factor between 12 and 0 depending on 
age, from 14 \o  39 years.640 In any event, the total amount o f compensation can not be higher than 
the sum demanded by the previous club.641 The compensation for training awarded to the club for 
which the player in question has played as an amateur by the club for which he will play as a 
non-amateur is calculated on the basis of the fixed yearly income guaranteed by the contract. 
However, it cannot exceed 600.000 Swiss Francs.642 If an amateur player leaves a club for 
another one in which he will retain his amateur status, no compensation for training is due.643
2. National transfer rules
At the time of the events giving rise to the different actions in the main proceedings in the 
Bosman case, in Belgium the transfer rules were applicable as laid down in the Regulation of the 
Royal Belgian Football Association (the ‘Koninklijke Belgische Voetbalbond’, further referred to 
as the ‘KBVB’) of 1982. Under these KBVB rules, all professional players’ contracts, which 
have a duration between one and five years, run to 30 June. Before the expiry of the contract, and 
by 26 April at the latest, the club must offer the player a new contract, failing which he is 
considered to be an amateur for transfer purposes as from 1 May and thereby falls under a 
different section of the rules. The player is free to  accept or refuse that offer.644 If he refuses, he is 
placed on a list of players available for a ‘compulsory’ transfer. The term ‘compulsory* signifies 
that the transfer can be realised without the approval of the club of affiliation; as it suffices that 
there is an agreement between the player and the new club. However that may be, for the transfer 
to become effective, the acquiring club still owes the previous club payment of a compensation 
fee for ‘training’, calculated by multiplying the players* gross annual income by a factor varying 
from 14 to 2 depending on the players’ age. These compulsory transfers can be effectuated
638 See also Bosman, par. 21.
639 See in particular A rticle 8.2 UEFA Regulations 1993.
640 Article 6 UEFA Regulations 1993.
641 Article 10 UEFA Regulations 1993.
642 Article 7.2&3 UEFA Regulations 1993.
643 Article 7.1 UEFA Regulations 1993.
Bosman, par. 7.
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between 1 and 31 May.645 June marks the opening of the period for ‘free’ transfers, involving the
agreement of both clubs and the player, in particular as to the amount o f the transfer fee which
1 Cthe new club must pay to the old club, and subject to penalties which may include striking off the
new club for debt.646 In the event that still no transfer takes place, the players’ club of affiliation
is obliged to offer him a new contract for the duration of one season on the same terms as that
offered prior to 26 April. If  the player refuses, the club has the opportunity until 1 August to
suspend him, failing which he is reclassified as an amateur. A player who persistently refuses to
sign the contracts offered to him by his club may obtain a transfer as an amateur, without his
club’s agreement, after not playing for two seasons.647 Amateur players can be involved in a
compulsory transfer subject to the payment of a lump sum of maximum 1.000.000 BR
The 1993 KBVB transfer rules, which replaced the 1982 Regulation, also contain specific 
provisions dealing with the transfer towards a Belgian club of a player previously affiliated to a 
club belonging to a foreign federation,648 making explicit reference to the applicable FIFA 
Regulation in this respect.649 A player in a similar situation can only receive entitlement to play 
for a Belgian team if the federation of his previous club of affiliation has delivered an 
international transfer certificate to the KBVB.650 If the foreign federation fails to produce the 
document, the competent body of the FIFA can order its deliverance or alternatively, take an 
official decision to the same effect.651 In certain circumstances, the KBVB may also deliver a 
provisional certificate to the player in question.652
n . FACTUAL CIRCUMSTANCES O F THE CASE 653
Jean-Marc Bosnian was a professional football player of Belgian nationality, bom in 
1964. In 1985, he signed his first professional contract for Standard Liège, one of Belgium’s
645 Bosman, par. 8.
646 Bosman, par. 9.
647 Bosman, par. 10. .
648 A rticle IV/70 KBVB Regulation 1993.
649 A rticle IV /70.11 KBVB Regulation 1993.
650 A rticle IV /70.121 KBVB Regulation 1993.
651 A rticle IV /70.122 KBVB Regulation 1993.
652 A rticle IV /70.123 KBVB Regulation 1993.
653 For a  detailed description o f the factual background o f the case, see Blainpain and Inston, The Bosman case: The 
End of the Transfer System? (Peeters and Sweet & M axwell, 1996).
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leading clubs. This contract had a duration of two years and ran from 1 July 1985 until 30 June 
1987. It guaranteed him a basic monthly salary o f Belgian Francs (‘BF’),30.000 and foresaw the 
possibility of gaining various bonuses, which resulted in an average monthly salary o f BF 80.000. 
When his contract was about to expire, he was offered to prolong his stay at Sclessin with one 
year, against improved contractual terms providing him with average monthly earnings of BF
100.000. Subsequently, at the end of thel987-88 season, he was transferred to the neighbours of 
RC Liège for a transfer fee of BF 3.000.000.
As a result, from 1988, he was employed by RC Liège, another Belgian first division club. 
He signed a contract for two seasons which was due to expire on 30 June 1990, and which 
assured him an average monthly salary o f BF 120.000, including bonuses.654 On 21 April 1990, 
in accordance with the applicable transfer rules, RC Liège offered Bosman a new contract with a 
duration o f one season, considerably reducing his pay to BF 30.000, the minimum permitted by 
the federal rules of the KBVB. Bosman refused to sign and was put on the transfer list. The 
compensation fee was set at BF 11.473.000, in accordance with indicators such as age and 
salary.655 Since no club showed any interest in a compulsory transfer, Bosman entered into 
contractual negotiations with US Dunkerque, a club playing in the French second division, which 
successfully resulted in his engagement for a period of one year. The contract concluded would 
provide him with a monthly salary around BF 100.000 plus a signing-on bonus of some BF
900.000. 656 On 27 July 1990, also the two clubs involved reached an agreement for the temporary 
transfer of Bosman, against payment by US Dunkerque to RC Liège of a fee of BF 1.200.000. 
This transfer sum was to be paid on receipt by the French Football Federation (the ‘Fédération 
Française de Football’, hereinafter referred to as the ‘FFF’) of the transfer certificate issued by 
the KBVB. The contract also contained a clause giving US Dunkerque an irrevocable option for 
the full transfer o f the player for the prize of BF 4.800.000.657 However, both contracts, the one 
between US Dunkerque and RC Liège on the one hand and the one between US Dunkerque and 
Bosman on the other hand, were subject to the suspensive condition that the required transfer 
certificate be sent by the KBVB to the FFF before 2 August 1990, which would allow US
654 Bosman, par. 28.
655 Bosman, par- 29.
656 Bosman, par. 30. 
Bosman, par. 31.
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Dunkerque to field Bosman in the first match o f the season.658 Apparently, RC Liège had serious 
doubts as to US Dunkerque’s solvency, and hence did not make a request to the KBVB to send 
the transfer certificate to the FFF. As a result, neither contract took effe<k. On 31 July 1990, RC 
Liège also proceeded to suspend Bosman, thereby effectively preventing him from playing for 
the entire 1990-91 season.659 *
HI. SUMMARY OF THE PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE NATIONAL COURTS —
Bosman was determined, however, not to leave it at that. On 8 August 1990, he did the 
almost unthinkable, and instituted legal proceedings against RC Liège before the Tribunal of First 
Instance of Liège (the ‘Tribunal de Premiere Instance’). This was the official starting shot o f his 
long and lonesome journey through a legal labyrinth of actions, claims, injunctions and appeals, a 
journey which would only come to an end more than five years later in Luxembourg. With his 
claim, he challenged the lawfulness of no less than two of the sacred ‘Football Commandments’, 
claiming that the rules establishing a transfer regime allowing a club to ask a transfer fee for a 
player whose contract of affiliation with that club has already expired, and also the nationality 
clauses, limiting the number of migrant EU-nationals in national competitions, were contrary to 
the Treaty rules on freedom of movement of workers and the provisions on free competition. 
Concurrently with that first action, he applied for an interlocutory decision, firstly ordering RC 
Liège and the KBVB to pay him an advance o f BF 100.000 per month until he found a new 
employer, secondly, restraining the defendants from impeding his engagement by another club, in 
particular by requiring the payment of a transfer sum, and finally, referring a question to the 
European Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling.661 By order of 9 November 1990, the judge 
hearing the interlocutory application imposed on RC Liège the payment to Bosman of a monthly 
advance o f BF 30.000 and ordered RC Liège and the KBVB to refrain from impeding Bosman’s 
engagement. He also requested the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling662 on a question
658 Bosman, par. 32.
659 Bosman, par. 33.
m  See, inter alia, Dupont, ac ., at 74-76; Blainpain and Inston, o.c., at 12-20.
661 Bosman, par. 34.
662 This request was put on the roll of the Court o f Justice as Case C-34G/90.
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concerning the interpretation of Articles 3c and 39 EC in relation to  the rules governing the 
transfers of professional football players.663
* K
In the meantime, Bosnian had signed a contract with the French second-division club 
Saint-Quentin in October 1990, subject to the condition that his interlocutory application 
succeeded. His contract was terminated, however, at the end o f the first season. In February 1992, 
he started playing for the French club Saint-Denis de la Reunion, but again only until the end of 
the season. After looking for further offers in Belgium and France, Bosnian finally joined 
Olympic de Charleroi, a Belgian third-division club.664 Since he decided to initiate legal 
proceedings, Bosnian has evidently struggled to find a new employer. This may be partly due to 
the fact that his performances on the pitch did not live up to the expectations, raised probably by 
a promising start of a football career as member o f the Belgian national youth team, evidenced by 
RC Liège’s readiness to offer him only the minimum contract at the expiry of his initial contract. 
However, a more plausible explanation is readily available. In the opinion of the national judge, 
there was strong circumstantial evidence to support the view that, notwithstanding the ‘free* 
status conferred on Bosman by the interlocutory order, he has been boycotted by all the European 
clubs which considered engaging him.665 Clubs were apparently strongly ‘encouraged* not to 
make use of the services of the player.666
On 28 May 1991, the Court o f Appeal of Liège (the ‘Cour d’Appel’) revoked the 
interlocutory decision of the Tribunal of First Instance insofar as it referred a question to the 
Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling. Nevertheless, it upheld the order against RC Liège to 
pay monthly advances to Bosman and enjoined RC Liège and KBVB to make Bosman available 
to any club which wished to engage him, without it being possible to require payment of any 
transfer fee. By order o f 19 June 1991, Case C-340/90 was removed from the register of the 
Court o f Justice.667 On 3 June 1991, the KBVB, which, contrary to the situation in the 
interlocutory proceedings, had not been summoned as a party in the main action before the 
Tribunal of First Instance, decided to intervene voluntarily in that action. Two months later, on
663 Bosman, par. 35.
664 Bosman, par. 36.
665 Bosman, par. 37.
666 Read maybe: clubs were threatened with sanctions if  they considered engaging him .
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20 August 1991, Bosman issued a writ with a view to joining UEFA to the proceedings which he 
had brought against RC Liège and the KBVB and also with the purposex)f bringing proceedings 
directly against it on the basis of its responsibility in drafting the rule s'as a result of which he 
claimed to have suffered damage. He requested that UEFA be enjoined to make an end to its 
practices concerning transfer fees and nationality clauses and withdraw these rules within 48 
hours. On 5 December 1991, RC Liège joined US Dunkerque as a third party to the proceedings, 
in order to be indemnified against any order which might be made against it. On 15 October and 
27 December 1991 respectively, a French professional footballers’ union, the Union Nationale 
des Footballeurs Professionnels (‘UNFP’), and an association of football players governed by 
Netherlands law, the Vereniging van Contractspelers ( ‘W C S ’), also intervened voluntarily in the 
proceedings.67 68
In new pleadings lodged on 9 April 1992, Bosman not only amended his initial claim 
against RC Liège, he also brought a new preventive action against the KBVB and elaborated 
further upon his claim against UEFA. In those proceedings, he sought a declaration that the 
transfer rules and the nationality clauses were not applicable to him, and further an order against 
RC Liège, the KBVB and UEFA to pay him a sum of BF 11.368.350 in respect of damage 
suffered by him from 1 August 1990 until the end of his career, on the basis of their wrongful 
conduct or negligence at the time of the failure o f his transfer to US Dunkerque, and another BF 
11.743.000 in respect o f loss of earnings since the beginning of his career as a result of the 
application of the transfer rules. In addition, he also applied again for a question to be referred to 
the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling.669 The Tribunal o f First Instance rendered its 
judgement in the main action on 11 June 1992. Firstly, the Tribunal decided that it had the 
necessary jurisdiction to entertain the main actions. It also held admissible Bosnian’s claims 
against RC Liège, KBVB and UEFA, seeking in particular, a declaration that the transfer rules 
and nationality clauses were not applicable to  him and orders penalising the conduct of these 
three organisations. Conversely, however, it dismissed RC Liège’s application to join US 
Dunkerque as a third party and indemnifier, arguing that no evidence of fault in the latter’s 
performance of its obligations had been adduced. Finally, deciding that the evaluation of
667 Bosman, par. 38.
668 Bosm an  par. 39.
669 Bosm an  par. 40.
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Bosnian’s claims against UEFA and the KBVB involved consideration of the compatibility o f the 
transfer rules^with the EC Treaty, it made a reference to the Court o f Justice for a preliminary 
ruling670 on the interpretation of Articles 39, 81 and 82 EC.671 The KBVB, RC Liège and UEFA 
appealed against this decision. Since those appeals had suspensive effect, the procedure before 
the Court of Justice was suspended.672 No appeal was brought against the UNFP or the W C S , 
which did not seek to intervene again on appeal.673
By order of 8 December 1993, Case C-269/92 was removed from the register in 
Luxembourg, following the judgement of the Court of Appeal of Liège. The Court of Appeal 
upheld the judgement under appeal insofar as the Tribunal of First Instance held that it had 
jurisdiction, that the actions were admissible and that an assessment of Bosnian’s claims against 
UEFA and the KBVB involved a review of the lawfulness o f the transfer rules. Moreover, it 
considered that also a review of the lawfulness o f the nationality clauses was necessary, since 
they perceived Bosnian’s claim to be based on Article 18 o f the Belgian Judicial Code, which 
permits actions ‘with a  view to preventing the infringement of a seriously threatened right’. 
According to the Court, Bosnian had brought forward factual evidence suggesting that the 
damage which he fears -tha t the application of those clauses may impede his career- would in 
fact occur.674
Besides, the national court was of the opinion that Article 39 EC, just like Article 28 EC, 
prohibits not only discrimination on grounds o f nationality, but also non-discriminatory barriers 
to freedom of movement for workers if these could not be justified by imperative requirements in 
the general interest.675 With regard to Article 81 EC, it considered that the FIFA, UEFA and 
KBVB regulations might constitute decisions o f associations o f undertakings by which the clubs 
restrict competition for players between themselves. Transfer fees were regarded as dissuasive 
and tended to depress the level of professional sportsmen’s pay. In addition, the nationality 
clauses prohibited foreign players* services from being obtained over a certain quota. Finally,
670 This case was registered as C ase C-269/92.
671 Bosnian, par. 41.
672 Bosnian, par. 42.
673 Bosman, par. 43.
674 Bosman, par. 44.
675 Bosman, par. 45.
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trade between Member States was affected, in particular by the restriction of players* mobility.676 
Equally, the Court of Appeal contemplated that the KBVB, or the football clubs collectively, 
might be in aMominant position within the meaning of Article 82 EC, and that the restrictions on 
competition mentioned in connection with Article 81 EC might constitute abuses prohibited by 
Article 82 EC.677 The Court dismissed UEFA*s request to ask the Court of Justice whether the 
reply to the question submitted on transfers would be different if the system permitted a player to 
play freely for his new club even where that club had not paid the transfer fee to the old club. It 
pointed out specifically that, because of the threat of severe penalties for clubs not paying the 
transfer fee, a player’s ability to play for his new club remained dependent on the business 
relationships between the clubs.678 Ultimately, in view of the foregoing, the Court of Appeal 
decided to stay the proceedings and refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a 
preliminary ruling:
‘Are Articles 48, 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome of 25 March 1957 to be interpreted a s :
• Prohibiting a football club from requiring and receiving payment o f a sum of money upon the 
engagement of one of its players who has come to the end of his contract by a new employing 
club;
• Prohibiting the national and international sporting associations or federations from including 
in their respective regulations provisions restricting access o f foreign players from the 
European Community to the competitions which they organise?*679
On 3 June 1994, the KBVB applied to the Belgian Supreme Court (the ‘Cour de Cassation*) 
for a review of the decision of the Court of Appeal, requesting that the judgement be extended to 
apply jointly to RC Liege, UEFA and US Dunkerque. By letter of 6 October 1994, the Principal 
Crown Counsel (the ‘Procureur General*) informed the Court of Justice that the appeal did not 
have suspensive effect in this case.680 And on 30 March 1995, the Supreme Court dismissed the 
appeal and ruled that as a result the request for a declaration that the judgement be extended was 
otiose.681
676 Bosman, par. 46.
677 Bosman, par. 47.
678 Bosman, par. 48.
679 Bosman, par. 49.
680 Bosman, par. 50.
681 Bosman, par. 51.
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IV . DECISIO N  O F TH E EUROPEAN COURT O F JU STICE - 1 6  DECEM BER 1995 
* C
After preliminarily having reached the conclusion that Article 39 EC applied to rules laid 
down by sporting associations which determine the terms on which professional sportsmen can 
engage in gainful employment»682 the Court essentially had to ascertain in substance whether this 
Treaty provision precluded the application of these transfer rules, under which a professional 
football player who is a national o f a Member State may not, on the expiry of his contract with a 
club, move to play for a club of another Member state unless the latter club has paid to the former 
a transfer, training or development fee.
1. Existence o f an obstacle to freedom o f movement for workers
Initially, the Court reiterated that the provisions of the Treaty relating to freedom of 
movement of persons are intended to facilitate the pursuit by Community citizens of occupational 
activities o f all kinds throughout the Community, and preclude measures which might place 
Community citizens at a disadvantage when they wish to pursue an economic activity in the 
territory of another Member State 683 It specified that in that context, nationals of Member States 
have the right, which they derive directly from the Treaty, to leave their country of origin to enter 
the territory o f another Member State and reside there in order to pursue an economic activity.684 
As a result, provisions which preclude or deter a national o f a Member State from leaving his 
country of origin in order to exercise his right to freedom o f movement are to be considered as 
constituting an infringement of that freedom, even if  they apply without regard to the nationality 
o f the workers concerned.685 Subsequently, the Court drew a parallel between Articles 39 and 43 
EC, emphasising that even though these provisions are directly mainly to ensuring that foreign 
nationals are treated in the host Member State in the same way as nationals of that State, the 
rights guaranteed in these provisions would practically be rendered meaningless if the Member
682 Bosman, paras. 68-87.
683 Bosman, par. 94. The Court also referred to  Case 143/87 Stanton v INASTl [1988] ECR 3877, par. 13 and Case C- 
370/90 The Queen v Immigration Appeal Tribunal and Surinder Singh [1992] ECR 1-4265, par. 16.
684 Bosm an, par. 95. The Court also m entioned Case C-363/93 Roux v Belgium [1991] ECR 1-273, par. 9 and Singh, 
par. 17.
85 Bosman, par. 96. It based this conclusion on Case C -I0/90 Masgio v Bundesknappschaft [1991] ECR 1-1119, 
paras. 18-19.
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State of origin could prohibit nationals from leaving that State in order to take up work in another 
Member State.686i
K C
The Court acknowledged that the contested transfer rules apply also to transfers o f players 
between clubs belonging to different national associations within the same Member State and that 
similar rules govern transfers between clubs belonging to the same association.687 However, this 
observation did not prevent the conclusion that those rules are nevertheless likely to restrict the 
freedom of movement of players who wish to pursue their activity in another Member State by 
preventing or deterring them from leaving the clubs to which they belong even after the expiry of 
their contracts of employment with those clubs.688 These transfer rules are regarded as an obstacle 
to freedom of movement of workers, since they provide that a professional football player may 
not pursue his activity with a new club established in another Member State unless it has paid his 
former club a transfer fee agreed upon between the two clubs or determined in accordance with 
the regulations of the sporting associations.689 690The Court specifically pointed out that this finding 
is in no way affected by the fact that the transfer rules adopted by UEFA in 1990 stipulate that the 
business relationship between the two clubs is to exert no influence on the activity of the player, 
who is to be free to play for his new club. The new club must still pay the fee in issue, otherwise 
it faces penalties which may include its being struck off for debt, which thus prevents it just as 
effectively from engaging a player from a club in another Member State without paying that 
fee. Furthermore, in the opinion of the Court, this conclusion isn’t negated either by its 
previous decision in Keck in the field of goods, as was argued by the KBVB and UEFA.691 In this 
respect, the Court simply noted that although the transfer rules at issue in the proceedings apply 
also to transfers between clubs belonging to different national associations within the same 
M ember State and are similar to those governing transfers between clubs belonging to the same 
national association, they still directly affect players’ access to the employment market in other 
Member States and are thus capable of impeding the principle o f freedom of movement for
686 Bosman, par, 97. In this respect, the Court referred to  its judgement in  the context of freedom of establishm ent in 
C ase 81/87 The Queen v HM Treasury and Commissioners of Inland Revenue ex parte Daily Mail and General Trust 
pic [1988] ECR 5483, par. 16.
687 Bosnian, par. 98.
688 Bosnian, par. 99.
689 Bosman, par. 100.
690 Bosnian, par. 101.
691 Bosman, par. 102.
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workers, as prohibited by Article 39 EC. Hence, they could not be deemed comparable to the 
rules on selling arrangements for goods which in Keck were held to fall outside the ambit of 
Article 28 EC?.692 ^
2. Existence o f a justification
At the first stage o f its judgement, the Court did thus establish that the transfer rules 
constitute an obstacle to  the free movement of persons and therefore infringe in principle Article 
39 EC. Hereinafter, the Court immediately proceeded indicating that it could be otherwise only if 
those rules pursued a legitimate aim compatible with the Treaty and were justified by pressing 
reasons of public interest. Additionally, application of these rules would still have to be such as to 
ensure achievement o f the aim in question and not go beyond what is necessary for that 
purpose.693
In this respect, the Court accepted that the aims of maintaining a balance between clubs 
by preserving a certain degree of equality and uncertainty as to results and of encouraging the 
recruitment and training o f young players, were in principle legitimate objectives, in view o f the 
considerable social importance of sporting activities, and in particular football, in the 
Community.694
Be that as it may, however, as regards the first of those aims, the Court stated that the 
application of the transfer rules is not an adequate means of maintaining financial and 
competitive balance in the world of football. It considered that those rules neither preclude the 
richest clubs from securing the services of the best players, nor prevent the availability of 
financial resources from being a decisive factor in competitive sport, thus considerably altering 
the balance between clubs.695 Furthermore, as regards the second aim, the Court acknowledged
692 Bosman, par. 103. At th is point, the Court recalled C ase C-384/93 Alpine Investments v Minister van Financiën 
[1995] ECR 1-1141, paras. 36-38, with regard to  the freedom  to  provide services, in which it reached the same 
conclusion.
693 Bosman, par. 104. Here, the Court rem em bered its decisions in  Case C-19/92 Kraus v Land Baden-Württemberg 
[1993] ECR 1-1663, par. 32 and Case C-55/94 Gebhard v Consiglio deWOrdine degli Awocati e Procuratori di 
Milano [1995] ECR 1-4165, par. 37.
694 Bosman, par. 106.
695 Bosman, par. 107.
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that it must indeed be accepted that the prospect of receiving transfer, development or training 
fees is likely to encourage football clubs to seek new talent and train young players.696 However, 
because it is impossible to predict the sporting future of young playersSvith any certainty and 
because only a limited number of such players go on to play professionally, it held that those fees 
are by nature contingent an uncertain and are in any event unrelated to the actual cost borne by 
clubs of training both future professional players and those who will never play professionally. It 
concluded therefore that the prospect of receiving such fees cannot be either a decisive factor in 
encouraging recruitment and training of young players or an adequate means of financing such 
activities, particularly in the case of smaller clubs.697 Moreover, the Court ruled that these aims, 
even though legitimate in se, could be achieved at least as efficiently by other means which do 
not impede the freedom of movement for workers 698 casually referring to the conclusions of the 
Advocate General.699
Furthermore, it has also been argued that the transfer rules are necessary to safeguard the 
worldwide organisation o f football.700 The Court rejected this argument by simply pointing out 
that the proceedings concern application o f those rules within the Community and not the 
relations between the national associations o f the other Member States and those o f non-member 
countries. In any event, it also held that application of different rules to transfers between clubs 
belonging to national associations within the Community and to transfers between such clubs and 
those affiliated to the national associations o f non-member countries is unlikely to pose any 
particular difficulties. The rules which have so far governed transfers within the national 
associations of certain Member States are different from those which apply at the international 
level.701 Finally, also the argument that the rules in question are necessary to compensate clubs 
for the expenses which they have had to incur in paying fees on recruiting their players could not 
be accepted by the Court, since it seeks to justify the maintenance of obstacles to freedom of 
movement for workers simply on the ground that such obstacles were able to exist in the past.702
696 Bosman, par. 108*
697 Bosman, par. 109.
698 Bosman, par. 110.
699 L enz AG in Bosman, at paras. 226 et seq.
700 Bosman, par. 111.
701 Bosman, par. 112.
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In view of the foregoing considerations, the Court reached the conclusion that the transfer 
system failed to comply with the requirements of the principle of proportionality and could 
therefore notice justified. Hence, Article 39 o f the Treaty precludes the application of rules laid 
down by sporting associations, under which a professional football player who is a national of 
one Member State may not, on the expiry o f his contract with a club, be employed by a club of 
another Member State unless the latter club has paid to the former club a transfer, training, or 
development fee.702 03
V. ANALYSIS OF THE JUDGEMENT 704
In this section, some more salient aspects of the Bosman decision relating to the transfer issue 
will be subjected to further scrutiny. The purpose of this examination is twofold: firstly, it will be 
assessed whether the Court has rendered a judgement which is acceptable from the point o f view 
of Community law; and secondly, it will be evaluated whether it has duly respected the private 
autonomy o f the sporting associations and whether it has adequately considered the specific 
features of sport.
1. Access to Justice
One of the most intriguing aspects of the Bosman case is probably not its final outcome, 
which is after all relatively unsurprising, but rather the factor of time. For years, strong doubts 
had been cast, both by the European Parliament705 as in legal doctrine706, upon the compatibility
702 Bosman, par. 113.
703 Bosman, par. 114.
704 This particular case has been extensively com m ented in the legal doctrine. See, inter alia, Fernandez M artin, 
‘T ree M ovement o f W orkers and Social Security: Re-defining obstacles to the free movement of w orkers”, 21 
ELRev. (1996), 313; Jessurun d ’O liveira, “Book Review: Blanpain, D roit e t S port L ’affaire Bosman: La F in de Père 
des Transferts?”, 34 CMLRev. (1997) 1061; Kranz, "T he Bosman case: The Relationship between European Union 
Law and the T ransfer System in European Football” , 5 Col JEL (1999) 431; Lee, “The Bosman Case: Protecting 
Freedom o f M ovem ent in  European Football”, 19 Fordham Ira. LJ (1996) 1255; M orris, M orrow and Spink, “EC
, Law and Professional Football: Bosman and its Im plications” , 59  MLR (November 1996) 893; M ortelm ans and 
Temmink, “UEFA vs J-M  Bosman: Het vrije verkeer van beroepssporters in de Europese Unie”, 45 ArsAequi (1996) 
166; O ’Keeffe and Osborne, “L’affaire Bosman: un arrêt im portant pour le bon fonctionnement du M arché unique 
européen”, 1 RMUE (1996) 17; Ram say, “Case and C om m ent European Court Tackles UEFA Rules”, The Juridical 
Review  (1996) 289; Séché, “Quand les Juges Tirent au But: L ’A irêt Bosman du 15 Décembre 1995” , 32 CDE 
(1996) 355; W eatherill, “Case C-415/93 Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Association ASLB v Jean- 
M arc Bosman” , 33 CMLRev. (1996), 991.
705 See earlier on in this chapter 4 , § 1 ,1.
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of the existing transfer rules with the Community provisions on the free movement of workers. 
Evidently, these interventions have had little or no practical impact, as the first real legal 
challenge agâinst these unlawful practices within the world of football was launched only in the 
beginning of the nineties. The reasons for the fact that it took so long before the European Court 
of Justice finally got the opportunity to express its opinion on the matter are probably twofold. 
Firstly, there is the particular way in which the world of football is structured.706 07 Football 
constitutes almost a world apart. Under the cloak of ‘the autonomy of sport*, the leading football 
organisations FIFA and UEFA operate as if they were immune from legal control. There is a 
deeply rooted aversion to any interference by state law in the world of football. Problems and 
conflicts are solved internally. Those who do not abide by the rules and seek to find justice 
through state courts, are outlawed. Moreover, legal proceedings tend to be extremely time- 
consuming, an important deterrent factor to be taken into consideration in a sector characterised 
by annual competitions and limited playing careers. This explains for a great deal the reluctance 
of individual players or clubs to actually file a complaint against existing rules or practices before 
the national courts. Secondly, some Community institutions such as the Commission have also 
adopted a cautious attitude towards the issue o f the lawfulness o f  football rules. This prudent 
approach is definitely inspired by the immense popularity o f the game and its potential impact on 
the on-going integration process within the European Union.708 Of greater direct influence, 
however, is the acute awareness of the fact that the Community does not have direct powers in 
this domain. The Community institutions are very conscious of the fact that they must not act 
beyond their powers, especially in an area such as sport in which the responsible associations 
vigorously hold on to their prerogatives.
In the light of the foregoing, it is hardly surprising that when the Court of Justice finally 
got the opportunity to dot the i’s and cross the t’s and demarcate the borderlines o f the 
competence and the powers of the football organisations, it was determined not to let this
706 See, inter alia, Steindorff, “Berufssport im  Gemeinsamen M arkt”, Recht der Internationalen Wirtschaft (1975), at 
253-255; Petzold and Safaris, “Europäische Freizügigkeit von Benifsfussballspielern, Europarecht (1982) 76; H ilf, 
“D ie Freizügigkeit des Berufsfussballspielers innerhalb der Europäischen Gem einschaft, NJW (1984) 517; G iardini, 
“D iritto communitario e libera circolazione dei calciatori”, Diritto communitario e degli scambi intemazionali 
(1988)437.
707 W eatheriU, “Case C-415/93 Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Association ASLB v Jean-M arc 
Bosman”, a c ., at 991-993.
708 See Jessurun d’OIiveira, a c ., at 1061-1062.
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occasion slip away. Furthermore, viewed in one way, the fact that an individual with necessarily 
limited -financial- resources and in spite of vigorous opposition has been able to achieve this 
particular reshit, can only be enthusiastically applauded. The story o f  David defeating Goliath has 
always been a popular one of course. This affair clearly demonstrates that individual rights 
conferred by the European Community Treaty cannot be dealt with light-heartedly.709 However 
that may be, it would be simplistic to simply overlook the other -darker- side of the medal. In the 
end, Bosnian had to pay a high price, both privately as professionally, for a little bit of legal glory 
and -  taking everything into consideration- a relatively moderate amount of compensation, which 
was awarded to him after the matter was referred back to the Belgian courts.710 As already 
indicated, the duration o f a players’ career is necessarily relatively short and therefore inevitably 
fits uncomfortably with lengthy legal proceedings. Bosman went to court at the age of 26, with a 
substantial part of his career and his best playing years in principle still laying ahead of him. 
When he finally obtained justice at the age o f 31, he was playing for a fourth division club in 
Belgium, his career completely in tatters. In the light of this, it seems one may legitimately 
wonder whether this particular case doesn’t also convey a message o f  warning to potential future 
litigants.711 As O ’Keeffe and Osborne put it generally, “for every Mr. Bosman there may be 
hundreds of European Union citizens deterred from the free exercise of their Community law 
rights.”712 It may very well be an acquired fact by now that sporting authorities or associations 
such as FIFA, UEFA or the national federations are not immune from legal challenge,713 it 
remains unquestionably true that they are still extremely powerful and influential organisations. 
On the basis o f the principle of freedom of association, they often still act under the presumption 
that they are legally untouchable and they remain extremely reluctant to accept legal intrusions 
into their perceived sphere of competence and to comply with the decisions of the national and 
supranational courts and tribunals. This point will be convincingly proven in the next chapter.
709 See also Dupont, o.c., at 77.
710 On 22 December 1998, after a legal struggle of almost eight years, the KBVB, desperate to start the organisation 
of.the European Championships in 2000 with a clean sheet and a polished blazon, settled the dispute and awarded 
Bosman a compensation fee o f 16 million Belgian Francs (approximately 400 000 Euro): see “Jean-Marc Bosman 
vooral opgelucht”, De Standaard, 23 December 1998,17.
711 See Weatherill, “European Football Law”, Collected Courses o f the Academy o f European Law, Vol VII, Book I 
(Kluwer, 1999), at 350.
712 O’Keeffe & Osborne, “The European Court Scores a Goal”, The International Journal o f Comparative Labour 
Law and Industrial Relations (Summer 1996) at 113.
713 See, for example, Nafeiger, “International Sports Law as a Process for Resolving Disputes”, 4 5 ICLQ (1996) 130.
Some examples may illustrate this point. Firstly, after the Court of Justice in its 
preliminary ruling in Walrave and Koch714 had rendered a decision/which was apparently
c tfavourable to*the applicants, the two pacers in question seemed almost guaranteed of a successful 
outcome of their complaint before the national court. Nevertheless, they snatched away defeat 
from the jaws of victory when they ultimately declined to press for judgement from the Dutch 
Arrondissementsrechtbank. Seemingly, the International Cycling Union had insinuated it was 
contemplating to withdraw the paced cycling race from the official programme of the world 
championships.715 Secondly, the tragic events in the Heysel stadium in Brussels at the occasion of 
the European Cup final between Liverpool and Juventus induced UEFA to ban all English clubs 
for five seasons from participating in the three European Cups. As Weatherill rightly pointed out, 
this measure probably constituted a disproportionate interference with economic freedoms 
guaranteed under Community law, but it remained nevertheless unchallenged before the ordinary 
courts.716 UEFA also did not respond immediately to the decision of the Court of Justice in 
Bosman. It decided unilaterally to uphold the transfer rules and nationality clauses until the end 
of the ongoing 1995-96 football season, so as to avoid disrupting the normal progress o f the 
European Cups, in which one had reached the stadium o f the quarter-finals by the time of the 
judgement717 Although this was a clear violation of the Court’s ruling, not one of the quarter- 
finalists issued a complaint. Moreover, UEFA seems to have a particularly hard time drawing 
lessons from earlier experiences: when Anderlecht, Belgium’s leading football team, was accused 
of having bribed the Spanish referee in the second leg of its semi-final tie with Nottingham Forest 
in the UEFA Cup edition of 1983, UEFA decided to ban the Brussels team for one year from the 
European scene, although there had been no conclusive evidence of corruption. Furthermore, and 
even more importantly, the limitation period for alleged corruption had already expired. When 
Anderlecht qualified for the UEFA Cup at the end of the season in the Belgian competition and 
subsequently decided to take the matter to court, the outcome was predictable: the Tribunal of 
First Instance of Brussels rendered an interlocutory decision enjoining UEFA to allow Anderlecht 
to its UEFA Cup competition, after which UEFA definitively threw the towel...
714 Case 36/74 Walrave v Union Cycliste Internationale [1974] ECR 1405.
715 Van Staveren, Sport and the Law -  18th Colloquy on European Law (Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 1989) at 67,
716 See Weatherill, “European Football Law”, o.c., at 351; also Evans, ‘Freedom o f Trade under the Common Law 
and EC Law: the Case of the Football Bans”, 102 LQR (1986) 510.
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2. The contested transfer rules in Bosman
A first interesting feature of this part of the Court’s actual decision concerns the 
approach it adopted when confronted with the issue of assessing which specific transfer rules 
were to be considered relevant for the purposes of the solution o f  this dispute.71 18 719During the 
proceedings, some controversy had indeed arisen as to which set o f  rules was applicable to the 
particular circumstances o f the case. As has been demonstrated above, the rules relating to the 
transfer of professional football players are in the first place laid down in regulations of the 
national associations. Accordingly, there may be differences between the different national 
transfer systems. On top o f the national regulations, there are supranational and international 
rules governing transfers elaborated by UEFA and FIFA, which are not directly applicable to 
players but are nevertheless enforced at national level so as to regulate the relationships between 
the players and the clubs. The Belgian Court of Appeal of Liège, which had stayed the national 
proceedings in order to refer the case to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling, considered 
that in the case at hand the FIFA regulations were applicable, rather than the UEFA
719regulations.
Instead o f examining the lawfulness of the particular details o f the perceivably applicable 
transfer systems, however, the Court o f Justice has preferred to focus its attention exclusively on 
the basic principle which invariably underlies all sets of transfer rules and thus operates as a kind 
o f common denominator, namely the fact that professional football players whose contract with 
their club of affiliation has expired, are not free to sign a contract and play for a new club before 
the two clubs involved in the transaction have reached an agreement on the payment of a transfer 
sum by the ‘buying* club to the ‘selling’ club for the services of the player. This longstanding 
practice, essentially consisting o f a restraint on the contractual freedom, has finally been 
earmarked by the Court as amounting to a restriction to the right o f freedom o f movement of 
workers and therefore has been condemned as incompatible with Article 39 EC. The Court 
reached this conclusion despite the fact that the transfer rules supposedly had been significantly
717 “L’UEFA alza bandiera bianca”, La Gazzetta dello Sport, 20 February 1996,13.
718 See Dupont, o.c., at 70-71.
718 Bosnian, par. 34.
719 Bosnian, par. 15.
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relaxed during the course of the court proceedings, by means of the introduction of a provision to 
the effect that the business relationship between the two clubs involved, in the transaction is to 
exert no influence on the activity of the footballer, who is to be free to play for his new club. The 
Court rightfully completely failed to be impressed by this purely theoretical modification of the 
rules, which doesn’t really bring along any change in practice, as the buying club is still bound to 
pay the transfer fee, under pain of severe penalties being imposed upon it. Consequently, as the 
Court correctly pointed out, the buying club is deterred just as effectively from contracting a 
player in another Member State without paying that fee,720 which effectively entails that a 
player’s opportunities o f finding new employment are obstructed.
This somewhat more generalist -  ‘back to basics’- approach of the Court has contributed in 
conferring the ruling a supplementary dimension which exceeds the sphere of football, or sport in 
general. Stripped off the casual details and reduced to the essentialities, the Bosman judgement 
signifies that if rules drafted by collective arrangements of employers create obstacles to the 
worker’s freedom to offer his services elsewhere on the employment market after the expiry of 
his contract of employment, they risk falling foul of Article 39 EC.721 To this extent, this specific 
piece o f the Court’s judgement in Bosman can be considered as exemplary of the pro-active 
attitude the Court at times displays in this decision.722 Hence, alternatively, instead of pursuing 
the greater goal by focusing on the true essence of all transfer systems and condemning it in 
unequivocal terms, the Court could easily have contented itself with a simple, case-based 
disapproval of the restrictive features of the Belgian transfer system applicable to Bosman as 
incompatible with the Community principles of freedom of movement for workers, which might 
have denied this decision the wider significance it has now managed to acquire. The Court’s 
preference for the former approach may be explained by the fact it was acutely aware o f the 
uniqueness of the opportunity to finally call a halt to the reprehensible features of the transfer 
system, and contemporaneously to firmly reiterate once again the basic principles o f the 
Community’s intervention in sports matters, a chance which it was clearly determined not to let 
slip sliding away. After all, since Walrave and Koch and Dona in the seventies, it had almost
720 Bosman, par. 101.
721 See also Weatherill, "European Football Law”, o.c., at 359-360.
722 Joerges, Furrer and Gerstenberg, "Challenges of European Integration to Private Law”, Collected Courses o f the 
Academy o f European Law, Volume Ml, Book I  (Kluwer, 1999) at 331-332.
205
been 20 years since a sports related case had reached the stage of the European Court of Justice. 
Previously, in his opinion to the case, Advocate General Jacobs had already drawn the Court’s 
attention to this particular circumstance.723 Simultaneously, this approach arguably presents 
another advantage: by dealing with the transfer rules in a somewhat more generalised way, the 
Court has subtly avoided a clear-cut condemnation of any specifically designated rule. Viewed in 
this way, the Court’s ruling is less ‘interventionist’ and more respectful for the position of the 
sporting organisations than might appear at first sight and clearly shows its sensitivity with regard 
to the issue.724 725
3. Article 39 EC v A rticles 81-82 EC: the right choice?
The question referred to the Court o f Justice by the Belgian Court of Appeal for a preliminary 
ruling not only made reference to the lawfulness under the Community free movement provisions 
of the rules on the payment of transfer fees by a new employing club for the engagement o f 
players who have come to the end o f their contract with their old club, but also included a request 
concerning the interpretation of the Treaty competition rules in this respect. However, after 
having reached the conclusion that the transfer rules constituted an infringement o f Article 39 
EC, the Court did not deem it necessary any longer to examine whether the contested rules also 
violated Articles 81 and/or 82 EC.726 This particular declination on behalf of the Court doesn’t 
really have to surprise, as it belongs to a rather common practice of the Court to effectuate only a 
partial analysis once a breach of Community law has been established. Be that as it may, it cannot 
be contested that this hands-off approach o f the Court on this particular point stands in stark 
contrast with its generalising, all-encompassing attitude when deciding which particular rules 
were to be scrutinised in these proceedings. Joerges, Furrer and Gerstenberg were thus 
undoubtedly correct when they pointed out that the Court of Justice deployed a remarkable 
mixture of judicial activism and of self-restraint in this case.727 To a certain extent, the Court’s 
silence on this point is to be deplored, for a number of reasons. First of all, the case presented an
723 Lenz AG in Bosnian, paras. 112-117.
724 In the sense that the Court renders a principled judgem ent and then passes the responsibility back to the sporting 
associations for resolution. Ultimately, if necessary, the matter may enter the ‘political arena’ for negotiation with 
Commisison and the sport’s representative organisations.
725 See above, Bosman, par. 49.
726 Bosman, par. 138.
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excellent opportunity for the Court to set forth some of its views on the application of the 
competition rules to sports rules and practices. In his opinion to this case, Advocate General Lenz 
didn’t shrink'from this issue and dedicated some highly interesting paragraphs to it. Remarkably, 
the same pattern repeated itself when the next sports cases of Deliège72 28 and Lehtonen!29 reached 
the Court in Luxembourg: while the respective Advocates-General Cosmas730 and Alber731 
addressed the matter o f the interpretation o f the competition law provisions in their opinions, the 
Court solved both disputes on the basis o f the free movement provisions732 and consistently 
refused to tackle the sports issues from a competition angle.733 This part of the Community’s 
Internal Market law with regard to sports finds itself thus still very much in its infancy. However, 
regrettably as the Court’s renunciation may be in principle or theoretically speaking, from a more 
practical point of view, this decision appears to be somewhat more understandable, and in the 
given context of the Bosman case maybe even rather wise. As former Commissioner in charge of 
competition Van Miert already indicated, because of the specific structure of the competition 
rules, they potentially have a much heavier impact on the sporting world than the free movement 
rules.734 Arguably, the application of the principles of the freedom o f movement of workers to the 
transfer rules at stake in Bosman, which, after all, definitely sufficed to resolve the case, already 
entail sufficiently strong consequences for the organisation of football. It may very well have 
been that the Court simply judged that, for the time being, its intervention into the organisation of 
football was sufficient and that it has granted the football authorities the opportunity to bring 
about some modifications to some of its other rules and practices autonomously, without 
interference from outside.735 Again, also in this respect the Court has thus shown a lot of 
deference towards the sporting associations. Arguably, a solution o f the case on the basis o f the
727 Joerges, Furrer and Gerstenberg, o.c., at 331-337.
728 Joined Cases C-51/96 and C -191/97 Christelle Deliège v Ligue Francophone de Judo et Disciplines ASBL and 
Others [2000] EC R 1-2549.
729 Case C-176/96 Jyri Lehtonen and Castors Canada Dry Namur-B raine v Fédération Royale Belge des Sociétés de 
Basketball [2000] ECR 1-2681.
730 Cosmas AG in Deliège, paras. 89-114.
731 Alber AG in Lehtonen, paras. 94 -114.
732 Deliège, paras. 41-69; Lehtonen, paras. 31-60.
733 In both cases, the questions referred with regard to the interpretation of the competition rules were considered to 
be inadmissible: Deliège, par. 40; Lehtonen, par. 30.
734 Van Miert, “L’arrêt ‘Bosman’: la suppression des frontières sportives dans le M arché unique européen”, 1 RMUE 
(1996) 3. Similarly, Spink and Morris, “EC Law and Professional Football: The Bosman Case”, European Business 
Law Review  (March 1996) at 57-58.
735 See also Demaret, “Introduction. Quelques observations sur la signification de l’arrêt ‘Bosman’”, 1 RMUE 
(1996), at 12-13.
207
Community competition law provisions would probably have required an immediate, more all- 
encompassing settlement of all aspects of the transfer issue, whereas the.currently chosen path o f 
free movement, due to the inherent limitations of the free movement principles, is necessarily 
more piecemeal, incomplete and haphazard. But sometimes it is simply better to proceed slowly 
or more gradually.
Secondly, it has also been suggested that the competition provisions may have been the more 
correct legal basis for analysis and moreover, that the dispute in question simply may not have 
asked for resolution under the free movement provisions at all.736 This observation merits to be 
scrutinised further. Firstly, the argument has been advanced that the provisions on freedom of 
movement for workers could not be applied to the contested transfer rules, as their scope of 
application was limited to prohibiting instances of direct or indirect discrimination, whereas the 
transfer rules are regarded as being genuinely non-discriminatory.737 In the traditional conception 
of Article 39 EC, this constituted no doubt a valid and even decisive argumentation. However, in 
the light of the subsequent evolution from an exclusively discrimination-based analysis towards a 
broader restriction-orientated examination, which has gradually occurred in the field of the 
respective fundamental freedoms,738 a similar line of reasoning nowadays no longer seems to be 
tenable. Admittedly, it must be acknowledged that, at the time of Bosman, the Court hadn’t yet 
unequivocally extended the domain o f the free movement of workers so as to cover equally really 
indistinctly applicable measures, but even though, after the Court’s unambiguous statements in 
Ramrath739 and Kraus740, its willingness to do so couldn’t reasonably be questioned any longer. 
The waiting was simply for the right occasion, which finally presented itself in Bosman. As a 
result, it seems no longer possible to exclude the transfer rales a priori from the scope of 
application o f Article 39 EC for the simple fact that they are non-discriminatory.741
736 W eatherill, “European Football Law”, o.c., at 364.
737 Apart from the initial positioning of the European Commission, discussed above, see also Coccia, “L’indemnita di 
trasferimento e la libera circolazione dei calciatori professionisti nelT Unione europea”, Rivista diritto sponivo 
(1994) at 350-356.
738 See supra, chapter 3.
739 Case C-106/91 Ramrath v Ministre de la Justice [1992] EC R 1-3351.
740 Case C-19/92 D ieter Kraus v Land Baden-Württemberg [1993] ECR 1-1663.
741 In this respect, it must be recognised that it would not be entirely accurate to claim that all the transfer rules 
always required the fulfilment of exactly the same conditions, regardless of whether football players wanted to move 
between clubs within a single national federation or between clubs belonging to different federations. In its 
reasoning, the Court did not attach any importance to this fact though- What does matter in the eyes of the Court, the
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If it is nevertheless submitted by an eminent author that the free movement rules may not 
have been the most appropriate legal basis for addressing the transfer fees issue under 
Community law, the reason for it must lay elsewhere. At stake in the Bosman case was the 
viability of certain restraints on the mobility of labour of football players created by the transfer 
rules of the different competent associations. The dispute in the case at hand arose in the context 
of a cross-border transfer, Bosman envisaging a transfer from a Belgian to a French club. 
However, if, hypothetically speaking, Bosman had preferred to play for another team in Belgium 
rather than to be transferred to a club in France, the Belgian club in question would just as well 
have had to pay a transfer sum to RC liège to complete the transfer of the player. Basically, the 
problem encountered by Bosman and all the other players who arrive at the end of their contract 
of employment with their club of affiliation was thus that the transfer rules which denied them 
free access to the employment market existed in the first place, rather than that they existed in a 
certain Member State. From this point of view, the cross-frontier element in Bosman appears thus 
to be purely incidental and deprived of any material significance.742
However correct this argument may be, it is nevertheless not entirely convincing. It must be 
acknowledged that the restrictions resulting from the application of the transfer rules are in 
principle not conditional upon the exercise of the right to free movement. For the application of 
the contested transfer rules, it is indeed completely irrelevant whether the transfer in question 
contains a cross-border aspect or not. For this reason, it could legitimately be wondered whether 
this case really called for resolution under Article 39 EC.743 However, it appears to be equally 
true that it cannot be denied that if a football player expresses the wish to move abroad at the end 
o f his contract with his club, he is effectively deterred from doing so by the application of the 
transfer rules. Specifically, these rules are undoubtedly liable to impede access of players to the 
football markets of the other Member States. And this is precisely the definition of what 
constitutes a restriction prohibited under Article 39 EC. The mechanism of transfer payments
different transfer systems essentially hinder all transfer moves identically. Conversely, Advocate-General Lenz did 
address the issue, but he too carried out his final analysis on the basis of the wider concept of ‘restrictions'.
742 W eatherill, ‘European Football Law”, o.c., at 364.
743 See also Hoskins, "The impact of the free movement rules of the EC Treaty on sports”, "Sports: Competition Law 
and EC Law” Conference, London, 10 February 1999: “Such rules have nothing to do with free movement, nor with 
the objective of the free movement rules, i.e. to facilitate the creation of the internal market.”
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starts working as a result of the move abroad o f the player. Admittedly, the presence of a trans- 
frontier element may not have had any material significance in this respect, as it is the move as 
such which rfeally matters for the application o f the rules, but this appears to me being a factor o f 
minor importance. It is submitted that the focus should be on the core of the business, namely the 
fact that the system of transfer payments effectively hinders players in the exercise of the 
Community free movement rights. To this extent, the Bosman case might even be considered as a 
paradigm example o f a free movement case, as it truly concerns mobility of labour. This 
suggestion unmistakably implies a wide conception of the principle of freedom of movement, but 
arguably it fits squarely within a broad interpretation o f the realisation of the internal market 
idea. In a certain way, it would seem to follow from this that the criterion that restrictions 
should be conditional upon, or the result of the exercise o f the free movement rights74 45 may prove 
not to be very useful in the face of measures which are genuinely non-discriminatory. 
Summarising, the decision of the Court to deal with the transfer issue under the heading o f 
Article 39 EC appears to be relatively unobjectionable in principle in a wide free movement 
context.
4. Article 39 E C  & th e  Interpretation of the concept of ‘ restrictions’
In any event, the Court of Justice seemed to  go through relatively little trouble in holding that 
the transfer rules constitute an obstacle to freedom of movement for workers prohibited by 
Article 39 of the Treaty. It is worth looking somewhat more in detail at some elements of the 
reasoning which brought the Court to this conclusion. Firstly, the Court specifically stated that 
the provisions of the Treaty relating to freedom of movement for persons “preclude measures 
which might place Community citizens at a disadvantage when they wish to pursue an economic 
activity in the territory of another Member State.”746 Apparently, as has conclusively been 
demonstrated in the previous section, football players are no more disadvantaged by the contested 
transfer rules if  they seek to move abroad than if they change clubs within the same Member 
State. The unlawfulness of the transfer rules resides in their simple existence, amounting to a 
hindrance of cross-border transfers. Clearly, the Court has thus given a very wide interpretation
744 Article 14 EC.
745 See above, chapter 3, §3.
746 Bosman, par. 94.
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to the ‘disadvantage’ encountered by footballers wishing to make use of their free movement 
rights. As O’Keeffe and Osborne correctly pointed out, in this particular context, the notion of 
disadvantage^ used not so much in a comparative way, in the sense of comparing footballers 
with their colleagues in another Member State, but merely in an abstract way, clarifying the 
relative current disadvantage of the player as opposed to the ideal position in which he would 
find himself in a situation of complete market access.747 Consequently, the Court appears to 
adhere to a market liberalising approach in its judgement.748 According to these authors, by 
extending the scope of application o f Article 39 EC beyond the principle of non-discrimination, 
the Court has pushed the concept o f restriction to its outer limits. They argue that if the internal 
market is characterised as a market operating under the same conditions as a national market and 
if the conditions for access to markets are identical in both the cross-border and the domestic 
context, then to that extent the internal market has already been realised and there is no longer 
any justification for a Community intervention. Granting complete freedom of access may just 
have been one bridge too far. They warn that the Court may very well have opened a box of 
Pandora within the domain of persons similar to the famous D&ssonviZ/e-formula for goods.749 At 
this point, it is time to make some observations. First of all, the Court has clearly asserted the 
right to freedom of movement of workers in Bosman. However, I do not completely concur with 
the fact that the Court has adopted an extremely wide approach to the concept o f restriction. It 
seems that the Court has already clearly hinted at the direction it intends to follow with the 
explicit reference to the market access principle, evidently in order to avoid similar escalated 
scenarios with which the Court was faced after Dassonville from occurring. Furthermore, I agree 
that guaranteeing complete freedom o f access may indeed be regarded as going a little bit too far, 
but I fail to read in this decision any statement to this effect. After all, there is still the possibility 
for intrinsically restrictive measures of being uphold when there exist satisfactory means of 
justification. Finally, I am not entirely convinced by the argumentation that insofar as measures 
lay down identical or grossly similar conditions for access to  markets in both the trans-frontier 
and the national sphere, the internal market has been established and hence there is no longer 
need for a Community intervention. According to the terms of-Article 14 EC, the internal market
747 O ’Keeffe & Osborne, "The European Court Scores a Goal”, o.c., at 117.
748 O ’Keeffe & Osborne, “The European Court Scores a Goal”, o.c.t at 123.
749 O ’Keeffe & Osborne, "L’affaire Bosman: un arrêt important pour le bon fonctionnement du Marché unique 
européen”, o.c., 17.
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is characterised by the abolition of restrictions to the fundamental freedoms. In my opinion, it 
cannot be excluded a priori, and the particular circumstances in Bosnian.*omehow seem to make 
the point, thaf measures, even though they are genuinely non-discriminatory and impose grossly 
the same conditions for access to markets in both the trans-national and domestic context, 
nevertheless constitute a restriction to the freedom of movement o f persons. If this effectively 
appears to be the case, it necessarily implies that the internal market is not yet fully realised and 
thus is there still room for legal intervention on behalf of the Court.750
Secondly, the Court swiftly dismissed UEFA’s argumentation that the transfer rules are to be 
regarded as selling arrangements which comply with the Keck-cút&ña. laid down in the field o f 
goods, namely they apply to all relevant traders operating within the national territory and they 
affect in the same manner, in law and in fact, the marketing of domestic products and those of 
other Member States, and that as a result, by analogy with Article 28 EC, Article 39 EC should 
not apply to these measures. The Court simply noted that although the rules at issue were indeed 
factually and legally indistinctly applicable, they still directly affect players* access to the 
employment market in other Member States and are thus capable of impeding freedom of 
movement for workers. Consequently, they could not be deemed comparable to the rules on 
selling arrangements for goods which in Keck and M ithouard were held to fall outside the ambit 
o f Article 28 EC. Two short remarks deserve to be made in this regard.751 Just like in Alpine 
Investments, the Court didn’t explicitly exclude the possibility of transposing its Keck decision to 
the field of free movement of persons, but merely distinguished Keck on the basis of the specific 
circumstances of the case. Whereas the dispute in Keck turned around measures of the importing 
State concerning certain selling arrangements within that State, in Bosman the exporting State 
required compliance with its own rules in the territory of the other Member States. However, an 
even more important reason for not applying Keck to the facts of Bosman lies in the fact that the 
Court accepted the principle that factual and legal equality in application in se is not sufficient to 
place a measure outside the reach of the Community free movement provisions, for it may still 
directly affect* access to the labour markets o f the other Member States. Implicitly, the Court thus
750 One only has to  imagine a  system of very restrictive rules within a State: even if  the European Court o f Justice 
could not touch these rules, that is no reason for saying that the Court could not tackle the same rules if they are 
imposed between States.
751 For more elaborate analysis, see above, chapter 3.
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appears to retreat somehow from its earlier statements in paragraph 17 of its Keck decision, 
edging closer to the more flexible market access approach favoured by Advocate General Jacobs
< i"in his opiniorf in the case o f Leclerc-Siplec.
5. The issue of justification
Having arrived at the partial conclusion that the contested transfer rules were in principle 
unlawful, the Court went on to address the logically subsequent issue, namely whether the 
condemned rules could be justified by overriding reasons in the general interest, in spite of their 
restrictive character. From the specific perspective of this research, this clearly constitutes the 
crucial aspect of the decision.
5.1. Two legitimate objectives
The Court considered that of all the arguments brought forward before it by the sporting 
associations, two could be withheld as possible grounds o f  justification. A priori, the need to 
maintain a certain sporting and financial equilibrium between clubs and the need to ensure the 
training and development o f young players were conceived as legitimate objectives to be 
pursued,752 possibly by the application of the transfer rules.
This assessment of the Court deserves is worth commenting upon. In the first place, it is 
beyond any doubt that the training and education of young football players constitutes a laudable 
aim in se, which clearly deserves to be achieved. Young players o f today will be the stars of 
tomorrow. The youngsters represent the future of the ball game. Consequently, they must be 
treated with utmost care. However that may be, from this to saying that encouraging the 
recruitment and training o f young players amounts to an overriding requirement in the general 
interest which justifies the erection or maintenance of regulations which are restrictive of the free 
movement of workers may be jumping to conclusions too hastily. Arguably, this is an objective 
which is pursued in all sectors of the industry and which is therefore not distinctive to sport. 
Clubs claim that if they were no longer to receive compensation for costs incurred in the training 
of young players, they would have no incentives to carry on with their recruitment programmes,
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but this arguments fails to convince. Besides, clubs nor sporting associations have adduced any 
relevant evidence to support this statement. It is submitted that clubs will always continue 
training youifg talented players, even if it were only for compelling sporting reasons: clubs that 
neglect their youth training programmes simply risk sporting misfortune. Arguably, clubs should 
endeavour to ensure themselves of the continued services of young players after their training has 
been completed by offering them attractive contractual terms and agreeable working conditions. 
In this context, sport seems to be no different from other commercial industries. Consequently, by 
recognising the need to guarantee the recruitment an training of young players as a legitimate aim 
worthy of justification, the Court has presumably been too generous to the sporting associations 
and has overrated the special status o f sport.* 753
Conversely, it does indeed seem desirable or even indispensable that there is a certain 
economic and competitive balance between clubs participating to a given league or 
championship. Football, or sport in general, contains some characteristic features which to a 
certain extent, distinguish it significantly as an economic sector from most other types of 
industry.754 Undoubtedly in common with the other ordinary markets is the underlying and 
omnipresent motivation to grow, to improve, to  win, to be stronger than the opponents. However, 
it is essential to realise that contrary to what is the case in many other market, the undertakings 
active in the field, in casu the sport clubs, in their quest to be the best, do not have the intention to 
drive their competitors out of the market. Intrinsically, the sportive strive does not have 
exclusionary effects. Conversely, football clubs are mutually dependent upon each other.755 
Football clubs are rivals and partners at the same time. In England, Manchester United would 
have never reached its current sportive status and financial wealth without the presence o f and 
rivalry with other teams such as Liverpool, Arsenal or Newcastle. It takes two teams meeting 
each other to schedule a  simple fixture. And even more teams are needed to set up an entire club
732 Bosman, par. 106.
753 For a similar opinion, see Weatherill, “Do sporting associations make law or are they merely subject to  i t ? ’, 13 I
Journal o f the Society fo r Advanced Legal Studies {January 1999) 24. I
754 See Sloane, ‘Econom ics o f  Professional Football”, Scottish Journal o f Political Economy (June 1971) at 124: “A |
club cannot aim simply to  maximise its financial benefits and to remove competitors from the m arket The |
maximisation o f success w ithout any regard to  the financial aspects is no  more desirable either. The objective should |
be more that o f obtaining the  best result in the competitions, and thus the prestige, on condition o f making a |
minimum profit.”
755 See also Lenz AG in Bosman, par. 227.
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competition.756 Furthermore, it is submitted that a professional league can only truly flourish if 
there is no too glaring sportive imbalance between the competing clubs.757 To a certain extent, 
each club hasHhus a direct interest not only in the continued existence of fee other clubs, but also 
in their financial health or economic viability as competitors.758 If the outcome of the competition 
is a foregone conclusion or if the league is clearly dominated by only a few teams, necessarily 
reducing the attractiveness and/or the tension of the single matches or the whole contest, this is 
almost bound to have an adverse impact, both from a sporting point of view as economically. 
From a sporting point o f view, not only on the national level, for the fact that the gold of the cup 
won after a hard-fought victory always shines more brightly, but also on the European plane, as 
teams coming from strong national leagues participating in the UEFA Cup competitions have 
more experience with even encounters and are better prepared to face strong opposition, factors 
which undoubtedly increase their chances of success. And also economically, as spectator interest 
is likely to wane gradually and contemporaneously sponsors’, advertisers* and broadcasters* 
incentives to invest money in football. For these reasons, it is important that a certain balance of 
strength between clubs is carefully safeguarded. What the public at large really cares about, is a 
necessary degree of unpredictability of results and uncertainty about the final outcome o f the 
championship’s race.759 Essentially, it doesn’t matter all that much if traditional favourites such 
as Juventus, Intemazionale or AC Milan at the end of the race clinch yet another Italian 
‘scudetto’, as long as somewhat more occasional contenders such as Lazio or AS Roma regularly 
provide them with a good challenge and smaller teams such as Udinese or Perugia once in a 
while cause a minor or major upset. A certain competitive equilibrium is thus the recipe to keep 
spectators interested and investors happy. It speaks for itself that this goes hand in hand with a 
certain financial balance, for it cannot be denied that nowadays it takes a lot of money to acquire 
and employ the necessary football players in order to field a competitive team.760 Both are 
inextricably linked. This particular assessment of the Court was thus certainly correct.
756 K isenne, “De economic van de sport. Een overzichtsbijdrage”, Economisch en Socianl Tijdsckrift (1993) 376.
757 Lenz AG in Bosnian, par. 219.
758 Sloane, “Sport in the Market The Institute o f Economic Affairs (1980) at 16.
759 See in this sense also Van Miert, “Sport and Competition: Recent Developments and the Commission's Action” , 
European Sports Forum, Luxembourg, 28 November 1997.
760 See Van Miert, “Sport and Competition: Recent Developments and the Commission’s Action”, o .c .: “In this logic 
of global interest, the market is unstable by nature as long as there is a financial imbalance between the clubs.”
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5.2 . Test o f proportionality
£ KNow it may be one thing that both the training and development of young players as the
maintenance of a competitive and financial balance between clubs are -  appropriately or not -
recognised in se as being legitimate ends to  be pursued, it is still an entirely different matter
whether the contested transfer rules are to be conceived as suitable and necessary means
deployed to  reach these particular objectives and consequently deserve to be justified. It is
precisely on this final hurdle, constituted by the two-prong test o f the principle o f proportionality,
that the system of transfer fees in the event of a player’s move after the end o f his contract has
fallen.
The football associations have strenuously defended the transfer system as an indispensable 
means of redistribution of money within the game.761 They argue that the system of transfer rules 
is necessary to ensure the organisation of football as such. Smaller clubs often invest a lot of 
time, effort and money to nurture young talented players. The transfer fees they receive when 
these youngsters move to a bigger club often take an important place in the club’s budget, as they 
generally generate less income from ticket sales and sponsorship contracts, and enable these 
clubs to survive financially and to keep competing with the bigger teams. It is asserted that if 
transfer fees were no longer payable when players move, the wealthy clubs would easily secure 
themselves with the services of the best players, as they are able to offer these players more 
favourable contractual terms. The abolition of the transfer system would also remove the 
incentive for smaller clubs to search for and breed new talent, thereby not only undermining the 
future of the game, but also bringing these clubs into serious financial difficulties. The rich clubs 
would always become ever richer and the less well-off even poorer. Some would possibly even
761 UEFA submitted a study on English football carried out by Touche Ross to prove its point In England there is a 
four-level professional league divided up into the Premier League and the First, Second and Third Divisions. From 
the figures mentioned in the report it can be derived that in the 1992-93 season, the clubs in the Premier League 
spent a total o f around £  18,5 million net (after deducting income from transfer fees received by them  on new 
players). After deducing that sum from total receipts, the clubs still made a total profit o f £  11,5 million. The clubs in 
the First Division, by contrast, managed to make a surplus on transfer deals o f some £ 9,3 million, those in the 
Second Division a gain of £  2,4 million and those in the Third division a surplus o f something like £ 1,6 million. It is 
also interesting to note that each o f the latter three divisions was faced with a loss on ordinary trading, which 
nevertheless was more than covered by the receipts from transfers. As Advocate General Lenz pointed out, those 
figures are an impressive demonstration of what an important role the lower divisions play as a reservoir o f talent for 
the top division. They also show that income from transfers represents an important item in the balance sheets of the 
lower division clubs. See Lenz AG in Bosnian, par. 222.
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have to cease their professional activities. Consequently, touching the transfer system somehow 
risks endangering or at least weakening the competitive and financial structure of the league.
i' %
5.2.1. Maintenance of a certain sporting and financial equilibrium
In his opinion, Advocate General Lenz explicitly recognised the great importance of football 
in the Community, both from an economic and from a sentimental point of view. He was even 
prepared to go as far as considering it a possibility to regard the maintenance of a viable 
professional league as a reason in the public interest which might justify restrictions on freedom 
of movement.762 Be that as it may, however, after detailed analysis, he came to the conclusion 
that it was doubtful whether the contested transfer rules were capable of fulfilling the objective as 
stated by the associations.763 The Court shared the same opinion as the Advocate General on this 
particular point.764
5.2.1.1. ‘Suitability*
It is estimated that it is very likely one has reached the right conclusion in Luxembourg 
condemning the transfer system in its contested form as an inadequate means to reach the 
legitimate objectives desired by the sporting associations. First of all, the transfer system does not 
appear to be an appropriate instrument to achieve a reasonable distribution of player talent 
between the different clubs within a league. Arguably, the transfer rules are therefore not 
particularly suitable to preserve a certain competitive balance between the clubs.765 According to 
the economic theorem of Coase, if clubs are free to buy and sell footballers on the players’ 
market, the richest clubs will always secure the services of the best players, with or without the 
transfer system. The daily practice seems to confirm this theoretical model. Under the application 
of the transfer rules, many small professional clubs are -to  a greater or lesser degree- dependent 
on the income they receive from transfer deals to their balance sheets. As a rule, the bigger clubs 
are only interested in the better or at least the most promising players of the smaller clubs.
762 Lenz A G  in Bosman, par. 219.
763 Lenz AG in Bosman, par. 223.
764 Bosman, par. 107.
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Almost inevitably, these transactions weaken the smaller clubs from a sporting point of view.
Admittedly, this straightforward logic could easily be countered by the argument that the transfer
1 Cfees, in principle, should enable these selling clubs to acquire on their turn equally valuable
players from other clubs. Be that as it may, simple theory does not always correspond to reality.
Small clubs can hardly ever compete with wealthier clubs on the issue of transfers for several
reasons. First of all, most of these clubs are net-sellers of players, in the sense that generally, they
reinvest only a partiality of their transfer income in the engagement of new players, while —
necessarily- using the remainder to cover other expenses. Conversely, wealthy teams sometimes
give the impression o f having almost unlimited resources of money and are often prepared to
spend astronomic amounts of money to engage a certain player. Furthermore, the transfer fees are
normally calculated on the basis o f the players’ earnings. Top teams usually pay higher wages,
rendering it virtually impossible for smaller clubs to pay the transfers sums required to buy a
class player from these teams. As the Court correctly observed, the transfer rules do not prevent
the availability of financial resources from being a decisive factor in competitive sport.765 66 In this
respect, the transfers rules thus even seem to strengthen the discrepancy which exists in any case
between rich and less wealthy clubs, rather than safeguarding a certain equilibrium between the
teams.767 Indeed, empirical studies have failed to demonstrate a significant correlation between
the existence of the transfer system and a competitive balance between clubs.768
Secondly, it seems that the thesis that the transfer rules are necessary to guarantee the survival 
of the smaller clubs can equally be rebutted on the basis of the law of economics. An analysis of 
the dynamics of the market shows that the abolition of the transfer system does not necessarily 
need to have a harmful effect on the financial position of the smaller clubs.769 It is submitted that 
one of the consequences of the transfer system is that the smaller clubs pay their players too 
much in relation to their intrinsic value and productivity in comparison with the players of the big
765 See Késenne, “L’affaire Bosman et l’économie du sport professionnel par équipe”, 1 RMUE (1996) 80-82. 
Rottemberg went even further, asserting that no type o f regulation whatsoever is necessary to preserve a competitive 
equilibrium: see Rottemberg, ‘T he Baseball Players’ Labour Market”, J. Pol Econ. (1956) 64.
Bosman, par. 107,
767 See Lenz AG in Bosman paras. 218-234.
768 See, for example, Késenne, “Player M arket Regulation and Competitive Balance in a Win Maximising Scenario”, 
in Jeanrenaud & Késenne, Competition Policy in Professional Sports -  Europe After the Bosman Case (Antwerp, 
1998) at 117; oc also Bourg, “Dualisme et rapport salarial dans le sport professionnel”, in Bourg & Gouguet, Analyse 
économique du sport (Paris, 1998) at 171-172.
769 Késenne, “L ’affaire Bosman et l’économie du sport professionnel par équipe” , o.c., at 80-84.
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clubs, with the sole objective of raising the amounts of the transfer payments, which are 
calculated on the basis o f the salary of the player in question. Arguably, it will ensue from the 
abolition of the transfer system that players’ financial rewards will be more in proportion to their 
contribution to the receipts of the club. Players will thus earn low er salaries in smaller clubs and 
higher salaries in big clubs. Clubs will therefore endeavour to compensate the loss of potential 
transfer income incurred as a result of the disappearance of the transfer system by offering their 
players reduced contractual conditions. In the end, the balance of power between big and small 
clubs will not undergo radical changes. Consequently, in principle the financial situation of the 
clubs shouldn’t deteriorate in a market situation without the contested transfer rules. As Kisenne 
suggested, if problems nevertheless arise, it is mainly due to the fact that many a club manager 
has not yet learned to cut his coat according to the cloth. He acknowledged that ultimately, some 
clubs may be driven out of the market, and that there may thus also be a reduction in the total 
number of professional footballers, but he explained this as a matter of sound management, rather 
than linking it to the removal of the transfer system.
This affirmation is further corroborated by empirical evidence. Analysis carried out by 
Deloitte & Touche for England has demonstrated that the transfer system has only a very limited 
redistributive effect between the bigger and the smaller clubs.770 The study reveals that the money 
spent on transfers of players circulates in the first place between the big clubs of the same league, 
or is passed on to other big clubs abroad771. Only a small part of this comes to the benefit of a 
small number of smaller clubs.772 The other clubs have to count on other means of income to
770 Deloitte & Touche, Annual Review of Football Finance 1999 (seasons 1995/96, 1996/97 and 1997/98). 
Conversely, from a comparison o f the transfer transactions of the big and smaller clubs, which often demonstrated a 
loss o f money for the big clubs and a gain for the smaller ones, one author had derived die conclusion that the 
transfer sums allowed to keep the financial inequalities between the clubs within acceptable proportions: see Plath, 
Individualrechtsbeschränkungen im Berufsfussball -  Eine Untersuchung unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der 
Bosman-Entscheid des EuGH, (Hamburger Studien zum Europäischen und Internationalen Recht, volume 17, 1999) 
at 164-165.
771 In three years time, the total amount of money spent by English clubs for the transfer of football players aborad 
has ¡creased from 16,9 million £ in 1993/94 to 100,4 million £ in 1996/97. (Source: Deloitte & Touche, Annual 
Review o f Football Finance 1999,35.)
772 In the 1993/94 season, the clubs (21 out of 24 for whom the figures were available) of the second Division have 
realised a profit of £  10,2 million on transfers. However, £ 8.9 million, or almost 87% of total profit, have been 
gained by only 7 clubs. The other clubs have only realised marginal profits, and 6 of them have even lost money on 
transfers. The figures for the other seasons are comparable, (source: Deloitte & Touche, Annual Review of Football 
Finance 1999,74. Appendix 9)
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survive financially. Consequently, the transfer system does not constitute an adequate means to  
realise a financial balance between the wealthier and the smaller clubs.
5.2.1.2. ‘Necessity’
In all likelihood, the contested transfer rules thus do not constitute an appropriate instrument 
to maintain a certain competitive and financial balance between clubs, an objective which the 
Court of Justice had recognised as being an imperative requirement in the general interest. In any 
event, however, both Advocate General Lenz as the Court seem to be convinced of the fact that 
there do exist alternative means which would guarantee with more certainty that the ends pursued 
by the contested transfer rules will effectively be attained and which are supposed to have less 
restrictive effect, or even better, no adverse effect at all, on the exercise of the right o f the players 
to freedom of movement. The transfer rules are therefore not indispensable either for attaining the 
desired objective, and can thus not be regarded as complying with the principle o f 
proportionality. Basically, the Court left it at th a t To this principled general statement, it solely 
added a subtle reference endorsing the Advocate General’s observations on this matter.773 74
Arguably, the Court wisely showed self-restraint in this respect, essentially leaving it up to the 
sporting associations themselves to work out viable alternatives for the unlawful transfer system 
which will withstand the test of compliance with the Community free movement and competition 
law provisions.
Advocate General Lenz showed the football authorities the way forward, discussing in his 
opinion the possibility of adopting two different arrangements as alternatives to the transfer 
system. Firstly, he suggested that it could possibly be envisaged to determine by a collective 
wage agreement specified limits for the salaries to be paid to the players by the clubs. He 
probably found the inspiration for this proposal in the USA, where in a number of professional 
sports, such as for example the National Basketball Association, the so-called system o f ‘salary 
caps’ is effectively in force. In essence, this system entails that all teams performing in the league 
can only spend a certain nominal amount of money, to be specifically agreed upon in advance, on
773 Bosman, par. 110.
774 Lenz AG in Bosman, par. 226.
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players’ salaries. In principle, as such, this system seems much better suited than the transfer 
rules to preserve a certain competitive balance between clubs participating in the same league. 
Moreover, it ‘‘doesn’t seem to raise any particular problems under Article 39 EC, as it doesn’t 
really produce any directly restrictive effects on the right to freedom of movement of the 
sportsmen. However, it should be emphasised that the basic principle of salary caps can and is 
actually being circumvented to a certain extent by the existence of some secondary rules in the 
system, allowing the clubs under certain circumstances and to a limited degree to exceed the 
salary threshold. As a result, these loopholes threaten to disrupt again in some way the sportive 
equilibrium aimed at. Furthermore, before a transposition of the salary cap rule into sports 
disciplines in the European Union can even remotely be considered, it still very much remains to 
be seen whether it satisfactorily passes the test of compliance with the Treaty competition law 
provisions. In the EU, there exists no such thing -  at least not for the time being - as a statutory 
or regulatory exemption from antitrust liability, from which for example professional baseball in 
the USA does benefit, so a priori, one has to go out from the assumption that the competition 
rules are in principle applicable to the sports sector. Wage agreements of the kind at issue are to 
be considered as private labour agreements. The application of Article 81 EC to this type of 
agreements is an intricate issue. It probably depends on the actual form they finally take whether 
they are excluded from competition scrutiny, or rather fall within the scope of Article 81 EC and 
subsequently might require an exemption under Article 81(3) EC. Collective or vertical 
agreements, involving both employing clubs’ as employed players’ associations, would appear to 
belong to the former category, whereas horizontal agreements between employers would be in 
the latter situation. In any event, probably precisely in view o f the relative uncertainty 
surrounding the lawfulness o f this proposal involving collectively agreed wage limits with regard 
to the Community competition rules,775 the Advocate General didn’t really attach much 
importance to it, considering it less effective than his second proposal.776
For his second proposal, the Advocate General started from the assumption that if every club 
were to rely exclusively on financing its sporting activities by the receipts from the sale of tickets,
775 See also Weatherill, “European Football Law” , o.c., 370-371.
776 It must be pointed out though that this option of collectively introduced ‘salary caps* has recently officially been 
mooted, both at the level of UEFA as at national level: many associations are contemplating the idea of introducing a 
rule enjoining clubs not to spend more than a certain % o f their annual budget to players* salaries.
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radio and television contracts and other sources of income such as advertising deals, members’ 
subscrip tions^  donations from private sponsors, the balance between the clubs would very soon 
be endangered.777 Certain clubs, of which Real Madrid, Bayern MunichSand Manchester United 
are probably the paradigm examples, do indeed exercise in some way or the other a magnetic 
power of attraction on the crowd, due to a  whole spectre of reasons, varying from particular 
traditions and legendary stories over social factors to sporting success, etc. This results in the first 
place in high attendance figures at the stadium for the home matches of the team in question. 
Correspondingly, this also raises the interest o f the television broadcasters and the advertising 
sector to invest in these clubs, allowing them  to generate sometimes enormous amounts o f 
money. Conversely, other teams’ comparatively relative lack of attractiveness almost inevitably 
leads to lower ticket sales and less and/or smaller commercial contracts and thus to a lower 
income. In turn, this reduces the possibilities o f strengthening the team and of preserving the 
equilibrium between the different clubs. In view of these observations, the Advocate General 
launched a potential second method for achieving the aim o f maintaining a certain balance 
between the clubs. He suggested it would be conceivable to distribute the clubs’ receipts among 
the clubs.778 “Specifically, that means that part o f the income obtained by a club from the sale of 
tickets for its home matches is distributed to the other clubs. Similarly, the income received for 
awarding the rights to transmit matches on television for instance, could be divided up between 
all the clubs.”779
Taking into consideration that the competitive relationship between undertakings on the 
football market differs significantly from that on the markets of other industries, in the sense that 
football clubs are dependent upon each other and thus do not strive to drive their opponents out 
off the market, it must be acknowledged that a  reallocation of receipts does indeed appear a 
sensible solution. As big clubs have reached their name and fame and wealth also thanks to the 
smaller clubs, they have a certain interest in the health of these clubs and thus it seems logic that 
they financially support them. Furthermore, it can hardly be disputed that the model of 
redistribution o f  income appears as a reasonable alternative for the transfer system. To a certain
777 Lenz AG in Bosnian, par. 227.
778 Lenz AG in Bosnian, par. 226.
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extent, it was even already in use in professional football at European level at the time of the 
proceedings in Bosman. The proceeds of the UEFA Champions League .are not only to be for the 
benefit of the clubs taking part, but all the national associations are to receive a share of it. This 
competition was introduced in 1992 with the specific objective of promoting the interests of 
football.79 80 Moreover, while £49 million of the total amount of profit of £69 million realised 
during the final stage of the 1996 European Championships in England were divided between the 
16 teams participating in the finals o f the tournament, £22 million were deposited in a special 
UEFA fund for the development o f the game in emerging countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe.
Importantly, a number of economic studies show that redistribution of a proportion of income 
may effectively represent an appropriate means of promoting the desired balance.781 The crucial 
issue with regard to the viability of such a system presumably involves striking the right balance 
between the need for competition and the need for mutual support.782 On the one hand, if too 
much o f the income is divided between all clubs, the incentives for the clubs to perform well 
would be reduced too much, whereas on the other hand, if the redistributed share is too small, the 
system  will simply not be effective.783
Sharing a part of income seems a substantially more suitable means to reach the desired 
purpose of maintaining a certain balance between clubs than the current system of transfer fees. It 
has the invaluable advantage of introducing a factor of stability and certainty into the world of 
football, a precious feature which the transfer system with its inherently hypothetical and
779 In th is connection, it is interesting to note that the Advocate General explicitly did not include financial support 
by m eans of State subsidies among the alternatives discussed here. The reason for that is that such subsidies in his 
opinion would go beyond what is possible for the football associations, on the basis of their autonomy.
7® A  balance of the 1992/92 season makes this clear. According to that, the eight clubs which took part in the 
com petition each X  the receipts from the sale of tickets for their home matches. In addition to that, the competition 
produced an income o f 70 million Swiss Francs from the marketing of television and advertising rights. That amount 
was divided as follows: the participating clubs received 38 million SFR (54%). A  further 12 million (18%) was 
distributed to all the clubs which had been eliminated in the first two rounds of the three UEFA competitions for club 
team s. SFR 5,8 million (8%) was distributed between the 42 member associations of UEFA . The remaining SFR 14 
m illion (20%) went to UEFA to be invested for the benefit of football, in particular for the promotion of youth and 
w om en’s football.
781 S ee, inter alia, Kisenne, “De economic van de sport. Een overzichtsbijdrage”, Economisch en Sociaal Tijdschrift 
(1993) 376.
782 W eatherill, “European Football Law”, o.c., at 372-373.
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uncertain is desperately lacking. It permits the clubs concerned to organise their activities on a 
considerably ^more reliable basis. As Advocate General Lenz correctly remarked, solidarity 
between club! is probably better served by the guarantee of the receipt o^a certain basic amount 
of money than by the possibility o f receiving a large sum for one o f the club’s own players.783 84 
However, the absolutely crucial point in favour o f a system of redistribution of income in relation 
to the transfer rules is that it does not appear to be objectionable from the point o f view the 
application o f Community law. Firstly, contrary to the transfer system, this particular expression 
of solidarity between football clubs does not adversely affect players’ freedom of movement. 
And secondly, it does not appear to create insurmountable obstacles under Article 81 EC either. It 
is cautiously submitted that agreements between clubs on the issue of income sharing may either 
remain completely outside the scope o f application of Article 81(1) EC for being indispensable 
for the working of the industry, or alternatively benefit from an exemption under Article 81(3) 
EC after notification o f the agreement to the Commission.
5.2.2. Compensation for the costs of training
The football authorities have also expressed their concern about the fact that clubs may be 
less inclined to continue investing the necessary money and energy in the training and 
development of young players, if they run the risk of having to let their talented youngsters move 
to another club without being properly compensated for their efforts as a result o f the abolition of 
the transfer system. All parties involved in the dispute have recognised the fundamental 
importance o f this issue. There is unanimous consensus about the fact that clubs should in some 
way or the other be entitled to enjoy the fruits o f their labour in youth training centres. However, 
once again, it is submitted that the contested transfer rules in Bosnian can not be considered as a 
suitable tool to realise this objective.785 It cannot convincingly be asserted in the first place that 
the transfer fees are merely compensation for the costs incurred in the training and development 
of a player, if only for the simple reason that their amount is not linked to the actual costs borne 
by the training clubs, but to the player’s earnings and therefore in many cases is an extravagantly
783 Caims, Jennett & Sloane, “The Economics of Professional Team Sports: A  Survey of Theory and Evidence”, 
Journal o f Economic Studies (1986) at 3.
784 Lenz AG in Bosman, par. 233.
783 See also Lenz AG in Bosman, paras. 236-238,
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large sum of money. A second argument pleading against conceiving transfer fees as a simple 
reimbursement of the training expenses lies in the fact that such fees invariably have to be paid 
even when experienced professional players change clubs. Thirdly!* within this particular 
framework, reimbursement of training expenditure is entirely dependent on the eventuality of 
whether or not the player in question is actually transferred to another club. In this respect, the 
Court correctly stipulated that since it is impossible to predict the sporting future of young 
players with any certainty and because only a limited number of these players do effectively 
pursue a professional career, the transfer fees are by nature contingent and uncertain. In the light 
of this, the Court concluded that the “prospect of receiving those fees cannot [.,.] be either a 
decisive factor in encouraging recruitment and training of young players or an adequate means of 
financing such activities, particularly in the case of smaller clubs.”786
At this point, it is interesting to remark that in his opinion, Advocate General Lenz subtly 
observed that the fact that the transfer rules at issue in the Bosman case were not acceptable, 
doesn’t necessarily entail that a demand for a transfer fee for a player would have to be regarded 
as unlawful in every case.787 He thus appeared not to exclude a priori the possibility that the 
transfer rules could be construed in such a way that they might become acceptable.788 However, 
as he pointed out himself, even if this were turn out to be the case, it would still remain to be seen 
of course whether the pursued objective of encouragement of training and development of young 
talents could not be attained by an alternative system which is less restrictive of the players* right 
to freedom of movement. In the next chapter this matter will be dealt with more extensively.
Conclusion
The Court in Bosman was undoubtedly right in holding that the contested transfer rules 
were liable to hinder access of professional football players to the employment markets of the 
other Member States and therefore constituted a restriction to their right to freedom of movement 
for workers as prohibited by Article 39 EC. Even though the Court had to extend the material
786 Bosman, par. 109,
787 Lerxz A G  in Bosman, par. 239.
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scope of application o f Article 39 EC to cover also non-discriminatory measures to obtain this 
specific result^ this ruling did not really come as a surprise, as the Court had already hinted on 
earlier occasions that it was contemplating to make this step. Th^B osnian  decision thus 
prominently constitutes an clear assertion of free movement rights.
Furthermore, detailed analysis has demonstrated that the Court correctly reached the 
conclusion that the transfer rules could not be safeguarded under the objective justification 
doctrine. However, there is something to be said about the way it reached this legally satisfactory 
outcome. It recognised the need to preserve the training and development of young players and 
the need to maintain a certain sporting and economic balance and as two imperative requirements 
in the general interest, thereby clearly evidencing its openness to the sporting cause and offering 
sport clubs and federations to a certain extent shelter from purely market-based solutions within 
the framework of the Treaty. Presumably, both the admission that the need to preserve a certain 
competitive and financial equilibrium between clubs is sport-specific and amounts to a legitimate 
aim and the subsequent assessment that the contested transfer rules were not an appropriate nor 
an indispensable means to realise this objective are in se unobjectionable. Conversely, arguably, 
the Court overestimated the specific character o f sport in relation to other commercial activities 
in accepting the need to ensure the recruitment and training of young players as a legitimate 
objective for upholding regulatory barriers to freedom of movement. Consequently, in its search 
to reconcile the requirements of the internal market with the claims of autonomy of the sporting 
associations under the cloak of the freedom of association, the Court has tilted the balance too 
much in the direction o f the latter. In practice, this particular -  exaggerated - recognition of the 
special status of sport yielded no immediate consequences in this concrete context, as the Court 
subsequently regarded the contested transfer rules in their current form as an inadequate 
instrument to  achieve the aim pursued and thus as a violation of the principle of proportionality. 
However, as will appear from the next chapter, it has significantly influenced the search for a 
revised transfer system.
The reluctance o f the Court to interfere too much in sporting matters, inspired both by the 
consciousness of the lack of legislative competence in this field of the Community and the claims 78
788 See also Dubey, o . c at 591-595.
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for self-regulation of the sporting associations, is clearly evidenced by other aspects of the 
judgement. The Court wisely refrained from imposing one or the other solution, ultimately 
leaving it up to the sports authorities themselves to elaborate possible alternatives for the 
condemned transfer system. Presumably, also the Court’s decision to tackle the transfer rules -  
solely - from the point o f view of their compliance with the Community free movement 
provisions, instead of addressing the issue of their lawfulness under the Treaty competition rules, 
has to be regarded in that perspective. Hypothetically, a principled pronunciation of the Court of 
Justice on the applicability o f the competition rules to sports rules and practices would potentially 
have had a much wider impact on the sporting world than the current ruling on Article 39 EC, 
which, although it was couched in principled terms, strictly speaking remained limited to the 
factual circumstances of the case, and thus left several concrete issue unresolved. This way, the 
Court implicitly bought the sports authorities some extra time to autonomously implement some 
changes or modifications to probably contestable mies or practices without legal interference. 
Whether the sporting associations have actually made use of this opportunity offered by the 
Court, shall be examined in the next chapter. In any event, on top of reaching an after all legally 
satisfactory outcome on the transfer issue in the concrete case, also the way in which the Court 
has tackled and solved the issue can thus be described as rather intelligent.
<
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• The Transfer Saga: The Sequel
J’accuse!?
- Emile Zola, L* Aurore, 13/01/1898 -
5
Introduction
In this second chapter centred around transfers, the legal and factual developments which 
have occurred in the world o f sport in the aftermath of the Bosman ruling will be subjected to 
further scrutiny. A kind of ‘law in context approach* will be adopted with regard to the transfer 
issue in the following pages. In the first place, the focus will be on a legal analysis of the new 
FIFA Regulations on international transfers in football, which will be tested upon their 
conformity with Community law, in particular Article 39 EC. On top of the purely legal 
examination, special attention will be paid to the emergence of this new set of rules and to then- 
potential practical impact. This should allow for an insight to be provided in the respective 
interests of the different actors in the field -  the European institutions, the sporting associations, 
and the athletes - in the process of revising the traditional transfer rules and also in their mutual 
relationships.
§1: Bosman: The Day After...
1. TO  RECAPITULATE...
On 16 December 1995, the undivided attention of the entire sporting “world was focused -fo r 
once- on the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg. That day, the European Court of Justice finally 
pronounced its long-awaited judgement in the Bosman case, simply outlawing certain provisions 
of the traditional transfer system in professional football for breach o f the Community law
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provisions on free movement of workers.789 According to these long-standing transfer rules, 
professional football players whose contract with their club of affiliation had expired, were not 
free to play for a new club in another Member State of the European Union before the two clubs 
in question had agreed on the payment of a transfer sum by the new club to the former for the 
services of the player. The lawfulness of this particular system had already been questioned on 
previous occasions,790 but in the end, what it took to effectively plunge the whole football 
industry into a temporary state of complete chaos, was a lone Belgian cavalier, in the person of 
Jean-Marc Bosman.
The decision, which in almost no time acquired a place in the Court’s ‘Hall o f  Fame’ of 
legendary judgements, can be earmarked without the slightest exaggeration as a ‘classic*. In the 
first place, this is due to the fact that the actual impact o f the judgement goes far beyond the 
sphere of football, or sport in general. Some of the principles laid down by the Court in this case 
undoubtedly have a great relevance for the purposes of Community law as such. To mention but 
the obvious, for the first time, the Court applied Article 39 EC to measures which are genuinely 
non-discriminatory, thereby completing the trend initiated within the field of goods to extend the 
scope of application o f the different free movement provisions from measures which discriminate 
on grounds o f nationality to measures which are liable to  restrict the freedom of movement.791 792
Furthermore, the Court also paved the way for the recognition o f horizontal direct effect of 
Article 39 EC, a matter which was subsequently unequivocally settled in the case of AngoneseJ92 
Be that as it may, however, at this stage, our attention will be predominantly focused on the legal 
and factual consequences of the judgement for the world o f football, o r sport in general.
789 Case C-415/93 Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Association ASLB v Jean-Marc Bosman [1995] ECR 
1-4921.
790 Both by Community institutions such as the European Parliament, as in legal doctrine: see,.inter alia, European 
Parliament, Report Janssen van Raay on the freedom o f movement o f professional footballers in the Community, PE 
DOC A2-415/88, 1 March 1989; Petzold and Safaris, ‘Europäische Freizügigkeit von Berufsfussballspielem, 
Europarecht (1982) 76. For more information, see supra, chapter 4, §1.
791 See, for example, O’Keeffe and Osborne, ‘T he European Court Scores a Goal”, The International Journal of 
Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations (Summer 1996) at 125.
792 Case C-281/98 Roman Angonese v Cassa di Risparmio di Bolzano [2000] ECR 1-4139. For a m ore elaborate 
discussion, see supra, chapter 2, §1.
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In its decision in Bosnian, the Court of Justice displayed a principally judicially activist 
approach coupled with a dose o f self-restraint in the practice of the principle.793 In the first place, 
the Court firmly reiterated its previous statement from its Walrave794 795anS Donò195 decisions that 
sport is part of EC law insofar as it constitutes an economic activity.796 In spite of the fact that the 
Community Treaty contains no explicit reference to sport and that the Community therefore in 
principle has no specific competence in this field on the basis of the principle of the attribution of 
competencies,797 the Court thus expressed its determination to ensure respect for Community law 
from the part of the sports authorities. It also assured the effet utile of the Treaty free movement 
provisions by applying Article 39 EC to the strictly legally speaking private sphere of the football 
federations.798 Essentially, in denouncing the transfer system as incompatible with Article 39 EC, 
the Court called the bluff of FIFA and UEFA, who had operated during the proceedings on the 
basis of the assumption that the autonomy of sport would be preserved and that they were 
immune from legal intervention.
As a result, it didn’t come as a surprise that when finally confronted with the Court’s 
judgement, clubs, associations and federations initially seemingly all cried blue murder, 
predicting with the necessary degree of pathos worthy of ancient Greek tragedy various doom 
scenarios ranging from the death of grassroots football due to the disappearance of local clubs, to 
the complete destruction of the popular ball game.799 Incrementally, however, as the dust settled, 
one started looking at things somewhat more in perspective. Indeed, however unequivocal and 
sweeping the terms of the decision may have been at first glance, it should not be forgotten that 
the Court of Justice in Bosman also clearly showed signs of openness to the sporting cause. The 
Court did not abolish transfer sums all together.800 It did recognise the aims of maintaining a 
financial and competitive balance between clubs and of supporting the search for talent and the
793 See supra, chapter 4, §2, V. In particular, also, Joerges, Furrer and Gerstenberg, “Challenges of European 
Integration to Private Law*’, Collected Courses of the Academy of European Law, Volume VII, Book I (Kluwer, 
1999) at 331-336.
7W Case 36/74 Walrave and Koch v Union Cycliste Internationale [1974] ECR 1405.
795 Case 13/76 Donò v Maniero [19761 ECR 1333.
796 Bosman, par. 73.
797 Article 5 EC.
798 Bosman, paras. 82-83.
799 For some spicy reactions from the sporting world to the Bosman decision, see Blainpain and Inston, The Bosman 
case: The End of the Transfer System? (Peeters and Sweet&Maxwell, 1996); or the editorials of Riccardi, Europe, 
15-16 January 1996, at 2; 17 January 19%, at 2; 29-30 January 19%, at 2; 1 March 1996, at 2.
800 See for example, Van Nuffel, “Case law: Bosman”, 2 Col JEL (1996), at 357-359.
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training o f young players as legitimate objectives compatible with the Treaty “in view of the 
considerable t social importance of sporting activities and in particular football in the 
Community”? 01 Be that as it may, in the opinion of the Court, the transfer system in its current 
form  was not the most appropriate way to  achieve these commendable objectives. Actually, the 
Court thus merely held that the transfer system failed to satisfy the requirements of the test of 
proportionality, as it considered that the perceived aims could be achieved at least as efficiently 
by other means which do not impede freedom of movement of workers.801 02 At this point, however, 
the Court called a halt and did not impose its own judgement on the matter. It simply refrained 
from advancing concrete solutions, leaving the door thus very much ajar for the football 
authorities to formulate alternative proposals to the transfer system or to modulate the transfer 
system in such a way that it would become acceptable under EU law.
Furthermore, it must be borne in mind that strictly legally speaking, the immediate impact of 
the Bosman decision is restricted to the particular circumstances of the case.803 This implies that 
only a transfer of a professional football player, who is a European Union national, and whose 
contract of affiliation with his club in one Member State of the European Union has expired, to 
another club in another Member State cannot be made subject to the condition of the payment of 
a transfer fee by the latter club to the former. As a result o f the European Economic Area 
Agreement, the implications of Bosman have been extended from the 15 Member States of the 
EU to the territories o f Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, because it grants workers and self- 
employed people the right to move and establish themselves freely within the Community.804
In their observations before the Court, UEFA and KBVB have drawn the Court’s attention to 
the serious consequences which might ensue for the organisation of football as a whole if it were 
to consider the transfer rules to be incompatible with the Treaty and sought to limit the temporal
801 Bosman, par. 106.
802 Bosman, par. 110.
803 See especially, Thill, ‘L ’arrêt Bosman et ses implications pour la  libre circulation des sportifs à l'intérieur de 
l ’Union européenne dans des contextes factuels différents de ceux de l’affaire Bosman”, 1 RMUE (1996) 89; also 
Spink and Morris, “EC Law and Professional Football: The Bosman Case”, European Business Law Review (Mardi 
1996) at 57-58.
804 Blanpain, Het statuut van de sportbeoefenaar naar internationaal, Europees, Belgisch en Gemeenschapsrecht 
(Larder, 2002), at 13.
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effects of the judgement.805 This submission did not entirely fall on deaf ears. The Court 
admitted that overriding considerations of legal certainty militate against calling into question 
legal situatiohs whose effects have already been exhausted, providing an exception though in 
favour of persons who have timely taken steps to safeguard their rights.806 Consequently, it held 
that Article 39 EC could not be relied upon “in support of claims relating to a fee in respect of 
transfer, training or development which has already been paid on, o r is still payable under an 
obligation which arose before the date of this judgement, except by those who have brought court 
proceedings or raised an equivalent claim under the applicable national law before that date.”807 
Be that as it may, however, the Court’s decision as such is immediately effective and does not 
provide for a transition period. This entails that the concrete terms of the ruling must be complied 
with as from 15 December 1995.808
According to the terms of Article 211 EC, it is up to the European Commission to ensure that 
the provisions of the Treaty and the measures taken by the institutions pursuant thereto are 
applied “in order to ensure the proper functioning and development of the common market.” In 
the wake of the Bosman ruling, the Commission did indeed express on several occasions its firm 
intention to effectively use its powers of ‘guardian of the Treaty* to ensure that the principles 
spelled out in the Court’s judgement were respected.809 In this respect, its task was somehow 
complicated to a certain extent by the fact that the Court had contented itself with declaring the 
international transfer system only incompatible with the Community free movement rules and 
had failed to pronounce on its lawfulness with regard to the Community competition provisions, 
despite the fact that the national court in its request for a preliminary ruling had made an explicit 
reference to the competition rules as well. The reason for this particular circumstance is to be 
found within the specific structure o f the Treaty and has to do with the precise attribution and 
division of competencies between the Community institutions. Within the domain o f competition 
law, the Commission has been expressly empowered to undertake enforcement action against 
private undertakings under Regulation 17/62. Be that as it may, in the field of the fundamental
805 Bosnian, par. 139.
806 Bosman, par. 144.
807 Bosman, par. 145.
808 Blanpain, Het statuut van de sportbeoefenaar m a r intemationaal, Europees, Belgisch en Gemeenschapsrecht, at 
13.
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freedoms, the Commission has not been granted corresponding powers -  at least not for the time 
being.809 10 Here, the only -indirect- route open to the Commission to act against Treaty violations 
essentially cohsists of initiating infringement procedures against Member States on the basis of 
Article 226 EC for failure to take all necessary and appropriate measures to ensure that the 
fundamental freedoms are respected on their territory.811 Appealing as this practice may appear at 
first sight, it must not be forgotten that the Court of Justice readily admitted that the Member 
States retain exclusive competence as regards the maintenance of public order and the 
safeguarding o f public security and public health, and moreover, unquestionably enjoy a margin 
of discretion in determining what measures are most appropriate to eliminate barriers to the 
freedom of movement in a given situation.812 Ultimately, the actual usefulness of this solution 
depends on how much discretion the Court is willing to grant the Member States and how much 
control it will exert over the ‘appropriateness* of Member States acts.813 However this may be, it 
seems clear that the Commission, when confronted with Treaty infractions committed by private 
parties, can operate much more efficiently and directly under the competition law provisions to 
enforce compliance with the Treaty than under the free movement Articles. For this purely 
practical reason alone already, the silence of the Court on the issue o f the compatibility of the 
transfer rules at issue with the Community competition rules is therefore somehow to be 
deplored.
Be that as it may, this eventuality didn’t prevent the Commission from sending formal 
notification on 19 January 1996 to FIFA and UEFA with the message that it was launching an 
infringement procedure on the basis of Article 81(1) EC and Article 53(1) EEA against the 
transfer regulations the Court had declared incompatible with Article 39 EC.814 The letter of the 
Commission informed FIFA and UEFA that in the light of the Court’s decision in the Bosman 
case, the condemned international transfer system, which had been notified to the Commission on 
28 July 1995 with the purpose of obtaining a negative clearance or, alternatively, an individual
809 Van Miert, “L ’arrêt ‘Bosman’: la suppression des frontières sportives dans le M arché unique européen” , 1 RMUE 
(1996)3.
810 See however, Council Regulation 2679/98 of 7 December 1998 on the functioning of the internal market in 
relation to the free movement of goods among the Member States, (1998) OJ L 337/8.
811 See for example, Case C-265/95 Commission v France [1997] E C R 1-6959.
812 Commission v France, par. 35.
813 Muylle, “Angry Farmers and Passive Policemen: Private Conduct and the fre e  Movement of Goods”, 23 ELRev. 
(1998)469.
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exemption, could not be granted such an exemption under Article 81(3) EC and Article 53(3) 
EEA. The Commission gave the football authorities six weeks to-.inform it o f the steps
'■ ir
undertaken to comply with the Court’s decision. Subsequently, FIFA and UEFA duly let the 
Commission know that the international transfer system would no longer apply to football players 
who left their clubs at the end of their contracts to move to another team in a different country 
within the European Economic Area.814 15
In spite of the fact that the condemned aspects of FIFA’s and UEFA’s international transfer
system had now been informally abolished within the Community and the European Economic
Area, it still remained necessary to clarify the legality of a certain number of situations in the
light of the rules of the Treaty. Hence, it was clear that the judgement of the Court in Bosman did
not exhaustively cover all possible factual scenarios with regard to transfers. Proceeding along
the lines of an a contrario reasoning, the Court did not pronounce itself on the conformity with
European law of, for example, firstly, transfer fees in the event of internal transfers, within one
Member State; or secondly, transfer payments in the event o f international transfers, involving
third countries; or thirdly, transfer fees for third-country national football players or; fourthly,
transfer sums for football players who are still under contract with their club of affiliation.816 As
the Court stuck with the specific circumstances of the case, it thus did not explicitly invalidate the
practice of transfer payments in these related situations. Albeit that it speaks for itself that the
silence of the Court in this respect could in no way be interpreted as a safe-conduct on behalf of
the Court, most of the football associations nevertheless grabbed the opportunity offered by the
Court o f Justice with both hands and, rather than being provident and working out a uniform,
comprehensive solution encompassing also all above-mentioned situations, only complied -
besides, with reticence, and only after the ongoing football season had finished- with the Court’s
decision to the minimum extent necessary, leaving the traditional system untouched to the*
greatest extent possible.817
814 Van Miert, o.c., at 5-6.
815 Blanpain, Het statuut van de sportbeoefenaar naar internationaal, Europees, Belgisch en Gemeenschapsrecht, at 
13-15.
816 See for an analysis o f these situations, Thill, o.c., 89; or Weatherill, “Case C-415/93 Union Royale Belge des 
Sociétés de Football Association ASLB v Jean-Marc Bosman”, 33 CMLRev. (1996), 991.
817 Exceptions always confirm the rule, of course, and for example, the English Football Association made use o f  the
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This meant that one was left with a number of somewhat awkward and sometimes in se
thoroughly unsatisfactory situations. If, hypothetically speaking, Italy’s playmaker Francesco
I CTotti, at the end of his contract, wanted to move from AS Roma to the arch rivals of Lazio Roma
on the other side of the Tiber, a transfer sum would be due, just as would be the case if he wanted
to defend the colours o f the Turks o f Galatasaray Istanbul, whereas he could freely walk out of
the eternal city to join the ranks of the ‘red devils’ of England’s Manchester United, always after
the expiry o f his contract with Roma. If United’s manager Sir Alex Ferguson wanted to reinforce
the attacking compartment of his picked troops while Totti was still under contract with Roma,
again a considerable amount of money would have to be transferred to the bank account of the
club of president Sensi. And the same would apply for the transfer of Roma’s Brazilian defender
Cafu to the Mancunians, regardless o f whether or not he has arrived at the end of his contract
with the ‘giallorossi’.
The reaction of the European Commission wasn’t long in coming. Already on 27 June 1996, 
it informed FIFA and UEFA of the fact that, in its opinion, two particular matters on which the 
Court had not explicitly ruled in Bosnian, posed problems in the light of the Community 
competition rules. The Commission’s concerns were about firstly, the payment of a transfer fee 
for an international transfer within the Community or the EEA of a player with the nationality of 
a third country at the end of his contract with a club from the Community or the EEA, and 
secondly, the obligation imposed by FIFA on the national football associations within the 
Community and the EEA to establish national transfer systems. Both issues were considered to be 
caught in principle by Article 81(1) EC and not in a position to be exempted under Article 81(3) 
EC. FIFA and UEFA were requested to take these observations into consideration when formally 
amending their regulations to comply with the dicta o f the Court in Bosman within the European 
Economic Area. However, FIFA and UEFA refused to take up this suggestion and replied that 
they intended to carry through only the reforms which had become indispensable as a result of 
the judgement of the Court. The Commission alerted them that under these circumstances, it 
would find itself compelled to start formal proceedings to make an end to the perceived 
irregularities. At a later stage, we will come back to this issue and address it more in detail.
opportunity to abolish also all internal systems immediately.
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H. ADJUSTMENTS IN THE GAME IN THE AFTERMATH OF BOSNIAN
Most football clubs’ way of adjusting their market behaviour to this new post-Bosma/i reality 
was rather predictable and twofold.818 In the first place, as the nationality clauses limiting the 
number of foreign European Union football players to be fielded in an official match had been 
repealed,819 there has been a rather spectacular influx of foreign EU players within the national 
domestic leagues. Many clubs have started engaging players from other Member States, not 
necessarily because these footballers were always qualitatively better than the national players, 
but predominantly since they had become more attractive to club managers than the local players, 
for the simple fact that they were often much cheaper, given that the clubs no longer had to pay a 
transfer sum to acquire them once their contract with their previous club had expired.820 This 
tendency was further reinforced by the fact that many end-of-contract players openly aspired to 
an international transfer themselves as well, mainly for monetary purposes. As the obligation to 
pay transfer sums had disappeared for international transfers within the EU, players were often 
able to touch higher signing-on fees and negotiate ampler salaries with clubs in other Member 
States than they would receive in the event of a transfer to another club in the Member State of 
their club of registration, which still had to cough up transfer sums for the services of the players. 
In other words, money which was previously paid by the acquiring club to the selling club for it 
to release the registration of a player was now -  at least partially- being pocketed by the player 
himself in the form of income. Contemporaneously, also the number of foreign non-EU players 
in the European leagues increased significantly. Strictly speaking, the Bosman decision o f the 
Court of Justice had not changed their situation with regard to the transfer system or the 
nationality clauses, both sets of rules remaining applicable to them, but agents from the European 
clubs successfully roamed about the world in search for talents they could regularly hook for a 
bargain, so that it was economically still profitable to prefer them above local players. Especially
818 See also Gardiner & Welch, “ ’Show Me the Money*: Regulation of the Migration of Professional Sportsmen in 
Post-Basman Europe”, in Caiger & Gardiner (eds.), Professional Sport in the EU: Regulation and Re-regulation 
(The International Sports Law Centre, TMC Asser Press, 2000) 107
819 Bosman, paras. 115-137; see infra, chapter 6.
820 Conversely, for domestic transfers, transfer payments were still due in principle, even after the expiry o f  the 
contract of the player in question. The Bosman decision didn’t expressly deal with this situation.
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African, Eastern European and South American players proved to  be in vogue.821 And so it 
happened that already in 1999, Gianluca Vialli, the Italian manager of London based Chelsea 
Football Club, fielded not one single English player for a given Premier League game...
Secondly, clubs started more or less systematically signing on players on long-term contracts,
in a desperate attempt to avoid the situation where players would arrive too easily at the end of
their contract and subsequently walk out freely to another club. Evidently, this approach is not
entirely risk-free, because one can never completely discard the possibility that the player's
return on the pitch would not live up to the investment, in which case a considerable amount of
contractually stipulated salary money would be sent down the drain. However, at least this
technique o f contractually binding the player to the club for longer periods of time has the
advantage that a club is more or less ensured o f the continued services of a player that it really
wants to keep. And if  the club nevertheless wanted to get rid of a player and his contract, it
simply had to sell him before the expiry of his contract, as the Bosnian decision did not concern
this particular situation, so that it still would in principle be entitled to cash a transfer fee. In fact,
it quickly became current practice to transfer players before the expiry of their contract.
Furthermore, in this respect, clubs generally didn't shrink from using questionable methods in
their efforts to receive transfer payments.822 A footballer approaching the end of his contractual
term was often presented the following choice: either he would accept a prolongation of his
contract, o r he would be transferred to another club without further due. If the player in question
agreed with the former option, that of course didn’t preclude him from being transferred
prematurely anyway, in the event o f a good financial offer from another club. The case of
Brazil’s superstar Ronaldo provides an excellent example of this: only a couple of months after
he had extended his contract with FC Barcelona with several years in 1997, the pride o f Catalonia
yielded for the astronomic amount o f money Intemazionale’s president Massimo Moratti was
prepared to spend to engage ‘il Fenomeno’. However, not all players were willing to play along
with this game. Sometimes they refused to agree with the proposed extension of their contract ,
and simply preferred to serve their originally contractually foreseen time, after which they would *
I
_____________________________ (
821 In Belgium for example, first division club SK Beveren has concluded a co-operation agreement with the football |  
academy of Jean-Marc Guillou in Ivory Coast. Currently, 5 out of the 11 players o f the regular starting line-up of the 
former Belgian champion are Ivorians, with some others sitting cm the bench.
822 Meulenaere, “Commissie op transfers”, Knack (2001) 7 March 2001,136. J
J
be in a position to offer their services freely on the player’s market to the highest bidder.823 It 
speaks for itself that the players are perfectly entitled to behave in this way, they have a right to 
refuse to renew their contract with their club. Experience has shown, however, that this kind of 
attitude hasn’t gone down all that well at club level, as it necessarily entails the loss of a potential 
amount of transfer revenue. In such a situation, in order to ‘persuade’ the player in question to 
sign on, clubs often had recourse to drastic measures such as sidelining the player for the 
remainder of his contract or even relegating him to the reserve teams, or at least threatened to do 
so. These measures could possibly engender negative financial consequences for the player, in 
the form of decreased income, as a result of the loss of match premiums, or a lower market value, 
due to a lack of match play.824 In the great majority of cases, they produced the desired effect. By 
way of summary, long term contracts were thus not always necessarily indicative o f the 
willingness on behalf of the club to keep the player for the entire duration of the contract, they 
also -  and I daresay sometimes even principally- served as a kind of insurance to the club, 
guaranteeing more or less that the player would not just walk out of the club for free.
It emerges clearly from the foregoing that the football world accommodated itself rather 
swiftly and handily to the new legal situation in the so-called post-Bosman era. It may indeed be 
one thing that transfer payments are no longer allowed when a player moves between clubs in 
different Member States after the expiry of his contract, but if players hardly ever arrive at the 
end of their contractually stipulated period of stay with a club, the rules are practically 
circumvented. In the first years after Bosman, the transfer market even blossomed as never 
before, players continuously changing clubs, transfer fees thereby being rocketed into 
unprecedented heights.825 Whereas only in 1988, Holland’s captain Ruud Gullit was transferred 
from PSV Eindhoven to AC Milan for 8,5 million Euro, hardly more than a decade later in 2000 
Argentine strikers Gabriel Batistuta and Heman Crespo moved from respectively Fiorentina and 
Parma to AS Roma and Lazio Roma for the sums of 37,5 and 57,5 million Euro. The pièce de
823 This is what happened for example in the summer of 2002 with Alin Stoica, the young Romanian start of 
AnderlechL He consistently refused to extend his contract with the Brussels team, and finally joined the ranks o f the 
arch-rivals of Bruges after the expiry of his contract, so that no transfer sum had to be paid between the two teams 
Remember, since 1 April 1999 third-country nationals playing within the EU/EEA must be treated in the same way 
as EU citizens for transfer purposes: consult FIFA Circular 616 at http://www.fifa.com. See also supra, chapter 2, §3.
824 Arguably, the lawfulness of these measures can successfully be challenged under national labour law.
825 This had a lot to do with the fact that revenue from the selling of broadcasting rights suddenly increased 
enormously in the second half o f the nineties.
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résistance, topping all preceding transactions, was delivered by Florentino Perez, who won R eal 
Madrid’s presidential elections in 2000 by strapping away Portugal’s Luis Figo from the enem ies 
of Barcelona *by paying more than 62,5 million Euro, as provided in theSrescission clause o f his 
contract But only one year later, in the summer of 2001, Real pulled out another stunt, by luring 
to the Spanish capital and away from  Juventus Turin France’s Zinedine ‘Zizou’ Zidane, arguably 
the world’s best player, for a record-breaking 70 million Euro. These gigantic transfer fees can be 
coughed up by the clubs thanks to the growing amount of money circulating within the football 
circuit, generated by gate receipts, world-wide sponsoring contracts and merchandising and 
above all by the revenues from the television deals.
§2: CASE N° IV/36.583 - FIFA
I. THE COURSE O F TH E PROCEDURE
1. Complaints
However harmonious and straightforward this current situation may seem at first sight, one 
shouldn’t forget that mere appearances often deceive. And indeed, the football reality 
immediately under the surface of illusion is not simply a bed of roses.826 The football world has 
managed to  create this state of affairs by successfully making use o f the loopholes in the law. 
Strictly legally speaking, FIFA rigorously complied with the letter of the law, amending its 
regulations where required to do so, while it at the same time imperturbably continued to apply 
its international transfer rules to situations not directly addressed by the ruling of the Court o f 
Justice in Bosnian. In principle, there is nothing inherently objectionable about this attitude as 
such. At most, one could reproach FIFA for an excess of tenacity and/or regret its lack o f a long­
term vision with regard to the remainder of the transfer system, the future of which had inevitably 
been put in doubt after the Court’s intervention and the subsequent observations from the 
Commission. In practice, however, this new tendency to transfer players no longer at the end of 
their contract but rather before its expiry, so that transfer payments remain due, essentially boils
826 Gardiner & Welch, o.c., 107; McAuley, “They think it’s all over ...It might just be now: unravelling the 
ramifications for the European Football Transfer System Post-Bosman”, ECLR (2002) 331.
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down to circumventing the ratio legis o f the Court’s decision. Besides, it was also far from 
established that this new situation would withstand the test of conformity with the requirements 
of Community law. ^
In this vein, it was clear that the entire transfer issue would have to be addressed again 
sooner or later. Ultimately, it turned out to be the Walloon socialist trade union SETCA-FGTB 
(le ‘Syndicat des Employés Techniciens et Cadres de la Fédération Générale de Travailleurs de 
Belgique’) which filed a complaint with the European Commission on 1 July 1997, raising the 
question of the compatibility with Article 81 EC of the prohibition of unilateral termination of a 
contract, as foreseen in the applicable FIFA Regulations. Another complaint of 24 October 1997, 
issued by the Belgian association Sport and Freedom ( ‘Sport en Vrijheid’), aimed at safeguarding 
the rights of amateur and professional sportsmen. Two further complaints were submitted by 
Italian Serie A football club Perugia, which refused to pay for the transfer of a player still under 
contract with his club, but they were withdrawn subsequently.827 In 1998 and 1999, the 
Commission received two more complaints from Italian clubs, Reggiana and Palermo, dealing 
with the obligation to pay a transfer sum in the event of a transfer after the expiry of a contract of, 
respectively, a third-country national and a EU national.
2. Statement of objections
Further to these complaints, the Commission sent a statement of objections to FIFA on 14 
December 1998, informing it that it intended to declare certain provisions of the FIFA 
Regulations for the Status and the Transfer of Players of 1 October 1997 incompatible with 
Article 81 of the EC Treaty (and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement). The Commission considered 
that the following constitute a restriction or distortion o f competition within the meaning of 
Article 81 EC: (i) a number of situations not covered by the Bosnian ruling; (ii) the standard-type 
contract between player and club drafted by UEFA, the introduction of which appears to  be the 
responsibility of FIFA; (iii) the obligation imposed by FIFA on the national associations to • 
elaborate national transfer systems; and (iv) the prohibition imposed by FIFA on national
827 Perugia recruited Massimo Lombardo, who was - at the material time - still under contract with Grasshoppers 
Zurich, from Switzerland, and refused to pay a sum for the transfer of the player.
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associations, clubs and players to have recourse to national courts and tribunals in the event of a 
dispute regarding transfers.< L.
% K
In the remainder of this chapter, the attention will be predominantly focused on the first 
objection of the Commission, namely the payment of transfer sums in a number of situations not 
appreciated by the Court of Justice in Bosman.m  The following circumstances were outlined:
•  International transfers of third-country nationals from a non-HEA country to an EEA country 
and vice versa, at the end of their contract or during their contract;82 29
•  International transfers of players following a unilateral termination of contract. These 
transfers are prohibited, even if the player has acted in accordance with the requirements 
stemming from national employment law;830
• International transfers of players within the EEA, during their contract, in the event of 
termination of the contract by mutual consent of the three parties involved - club, player and 
new club.831
The Commission considered that as a result of the agreement with or the decision o f FIFA to 
pay a transfer sum in the event of a change o f clubs of a player, the national federations and their 
associated clubs have voluntarily renounced the freedom to freely engage players without paying 
a transfer fee or a sum of compensation corresponding to the amount of money which has been 
effectively invested in the formation o f the player and which has been calculated objectively. In 
this respect, it is of no importance whether the move is effectuated during the contract or only 
after the expiry of it. In the opinion of the Commission, the transfer rules therefore constitute an 
agreement between undertakings or a decision by associations of undertakings which directly or
828 In the remainder of this thesis, the Commission's concerns with regard to the issues of the standard-type contracts 
and the prohibition to have recourse to ordinary courts and tribunals will not be examined any further. May it suffice 
it to say in this respect that such standard-type contracts are no longer applied in most countries. In the Netherlands 
for example, the national federation KNVB already makes use of its own standard-type contract that is adapted to die 
requirements of Dutch national legislation since the 1954/55 season, (see van Staveren & Boetekees, 
Voetbaltransfers onder vuur van de Europese Commissie en. de FIFA?, 50 Ars Aequi 4 (2001) at 226). Furthermore, 
the right to a fair trial before ordinary courts is guaranteed by several national constitutions and also by Article 6 of 
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights. Therefore, a prohibition on recourse to ordinary courts 
would not stand up to legal challenge for violation of the ECHR.
829 Article 7, Article 12.4, Article 13.1 and 13.2, and Article 14 -  apart from point 8 - of FIFA Regulation 1997.
830 Point 2 of FIFA Circular n° 616 of 4 June 1997, interpreting Article 12.1 and Article 7.2a of FIFA Regulation 
1997.
831 Article 7, Article 12.4, Article 13.1 and 13.2, and Article 14 -  apart from point 8 - of FIFA Regulation 1997.
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indirectly fixes purchase or selling prices, which may appreciably affect trade between Member 
States and which has as its object or effect the restriction of competition between clubs within the 
common market in the terms of Article 81.1(a) EC. As a result o f this1 agreement, the actual 
transfer amounts artificially inflate, which goes to the detriment of the global economy o f the 
transfer system and consequently also of the production of the professional football scene.
Furthermore, the Commission also envisaged that the rules concerning the payment of 
compensation and those which prohibit a club to engage a player who has unilaterally breached 
his contract (after having complied with the conditions for breach o f contract) have as their object 
and effect to limit the sources of supply o f players for the clubs in the sense of Article 81.1(c) 
EC. The competition between clubs is restricted by reason of the fact that the normal regime of 
supply and demand has been replaced by a uniform mechanism that basically helps preserving 
the existing situation and denies many clubs of the opportunity to contract players who would 
present themselves under normal market conditions within the Community and the EEA. As a 
result of the transfer system, clubs cannot compete for the services o f a player simply on the basis 
of salary or other working conditions for the football players. Consequently, these players would 
not be encouraged to improve their individual performances to obtain a higher income and to 
strive for sporting success which is indispensable for clubs to climb on the rankings and to attract 
larger audiences. Moreover, the small clubs are only rarely able to guarantee themselves of the 
skills of talented players as they simply cannot afford to pay the often exorbitantly high sums 
which are requested for the transfer of these players. Almost all o f them end up at a big club, as 
these sums can only be paid by the rich clubs, which effectively allows them to maintain their 
position of strength within the league, whereas it remains difficult for small clubs to get to the top 
positions on the ranking. According to the Commission, all this leads to a decrease in the overall 
quality and in the attractiveness of the sporting spectacle.
Even though FIFA refused to acquiesce in the Commission’s assertions, it nevertheless 
informed the Commission of its willingness to envisage-modifications to the challenged transfer 
rules. The Commission in its turn displayed remarkable patience towards the football authorities, 
waiting for more than a year for FIFA to present alternatives to the present system, clearly in the 
hope that an equitable and mutually satisfactory solution could be reached by consensus.
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However, in January 2000, in the absence of structured and clear proposals which would finally 
bring the transfer system into line with European competition rules, the.-Commission decided to 
trigger the mechanism of the formal procedure that would eventually leaa to a negative decision. 
Even at this stage, the Commission remained loyal to its commitment to collaborate with FIFA in 
its search for a new system in accordance with the Treaty rules. At the end of April 2000, FIFA 
formulated some ideas of which it seemed they might lead to a -  partial - breakthrough. In 
particular, it was proposed that (i) football players at the age of 18 would have to sign their first 
professional contract with their club of training, with a duration of 3 years; alternatively, the club 
would receive compensation for the training and development of the player; (ii) a certain 
percentage of the compensation would be redistributed over the all clubs which played a role in 
the ‘pre-training’ of the player; (iii) unilateral termination of a contract by the player or the club 
is permitted in principle, but it does give rise to the payment of compensation for breach of 
contract; (iv) the duration and the number of the periods during which transfers can be 
effectuated ( ‘transfer windows’) should be restricted. These reflections, though maybe a bit 
vague at times, provided much to comment upon and could definitely serve as a floor for 
discussion. Yet, instead of pushing forward for a solution which seemed within reach for the first 
time since the start o f the whole affair, the momentum somehow got lost. Subsequently, the tone 
of the dialogue suddenly changed, especially after a letter of Commissioner Monti to FIFA 
Secretary General Zen-Ruffinen, dating from the end o f July, in which he rejected FIFA’s request 
to suspend the ongoing procedure with would lead to a negative decision on the transfer system 
and urged FIFA to speed up proceedings while contemporaneously reiterating once again the 
Commission’s willingness to work out a solution which would be acceptable from the point of 
view of Community law, was leaked to the press, causing tumult. Football officials looked for 
and found support from some leading statesmen: French President Chirac declared that during the 
French Presidency, something concrete had to be achieved, and British Prime Minister Blair and 
German Chancellor Schroeder went even further, issuing an official statement in which they 
acknowledged that the current transfer system was not perfect, but urged the parties in the 
proceedings to elaborate a solution respectful o f the legitimate interest at stake of both the 
football players, clubs and associations and pledged to fight for the preservation of the specific 
nature of professional football. At the end of August, FIFA announced for the first time publicly 
that it intended to carry through a reform of its transfer regulations. A special Task Force,
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composed of representatives of FIFA, the national federations, the leagues and the professional
football players, was entrusted with the specific mandate of drafting an official proposal
c rconcerning transfers which would have to reconcile the particularities of football with the
exigencies of the application of European Union law. Its conclusions would be presented to the
Commission by 31 October, so as to allow the new system to enter into force as from 1 January
2001.
3- FIFA/UEFA Task Force proposals o f 31 October 2000
The FIFA/UEFA Task Force developed a kind of package proposal, claiming the different 
constituent elements to be indissolubly linked, “to take or to leave in their entirety”. It 
distinguished the protection of young players, the education and training of young players, and 
the stability of contracts as the fundamental principles underlying its specific proposals. It 
emphasised that the whole package had been elaborated bearing in mind the aims of maintaining 
the uncertainty and the comparability of results and thus the regularity of competition, the 
solidarity between the top actors and the grass roots of the sport and the integrity of the game.
Broadly outlined, the actual proposals were the following:832
•  Prohibition on the international transfers o f players under 18  years old, except when the 
family of the player is moving along to the other country for professional reasons involving 
one of the parents and sets up a home in that country.
•  Introduction of a ‘training and education package ’ intended to reward clubs investing in the 
training of young players.
•  Respect fo r  contracts: any contract for a period up to 3 years must be respected, both by the 
player and the club. The minimum duration of a contract would be of 1 year, the maximum 
being 5 years.
•  Limitation in the timing and in the amount of transfers: transfers can only be effectuated 
during 2 unified transfer periods per year and are restricted to l transfer per player per season.
832 For the entire text of the Task Force’s proposals, consult Blanpain, Het Statuut van de Sportbeoefenaar naar 
internationaal, Europees, Belgisch en Gemeenschapsrecht, annex V, at 175.
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•  Introduction of a new arbitration system  in case o f breach o f contract (for a player of any 
age), based on the two pillars o f respect for national labour law and respect for the specificity 
of sport. Arbitration will be voluntary, and will not preclude the rightfor the parties involved 
to freely agree on a transfer amount or to have recourse to national courts.
•  Acceptance of appropriate transitional measures protecting, at a minimum, existing 
contractual arrangements between clubs and players
This document proved to be everything but a watertight solution. After profound analysis 
and reflection, the Commission services decided to approve only some of the individual 
proposals as they stood -fo r example the proposal on limited transfer windows-, describing the 
other principles at times as too general, vague, insufficiently precise or -sometimes even 
manifestly- contrary to  Community law. In the end, the document almost raised almost as many 
questions as it answered. Is there no less restrictive way of protecting young players than an 
almost absolute prohibition on international transfers? How would the compensation fee for 
training and education be calculated exactly? Can contracts be unilaterally terminated during the 
first three years? etc. These were but some o f the questions which begged for an answer. 
Hereupon, the Commission started an new round of discussions with the interested parties, with 
this document as the platform for the negotiations. Especially FIFPRO, the international 
association of professional football players, moved heaven and earth to obtain more freedom for 
the players, rejecting the original Task Force proposals as too restrictive.
4. FIFA W orking Docum ent o f 10 January 2001
On 10 January 2001, FIFA presented a working document containing a set of new 
proposals to the Commission. It contained several elements which clearly constituted a 
significant step forwards in comparison with the ideas launched so far. First o f all, international 
transfers o f minors would be permissible in principle, albeit under certain well-defined 
circumstances, which thus cautiously but nevertheless unmistakably implied that the football 
authorities finally accepted to depart from the previously vigorously and stubbornly defended 
prohibition o f international transfers of minors which was always going to be completely 
unacceptable for the Commission. Moreover, players would no longer be obliged to sign their
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first professional contract with their club of formation within the EEA; an upper limit would be
introduced to the amount of compensation payable in the event of a transfer of a player under the
i ifage of 23; aniple explicit references were being made to the applicable national laws, etc. This
new initiative constituted exactly the impetus needed to breathe new life into the negotiations
which were slowly but surely threatening to drift into a stalemate. For the first time since the
beginning of the whole affair really, a solution satisfying all different actors * both FIFA and
FIFPRO and the Commission could find themselves to a great extent in this non-paper - seemed
within reach, had it not been for UEFA, which vehemently opposed to these proposals,
categorising them as creating too much freedom for the players. UEFA’s stance was definitely
dictated by the categorical ‘njet’ o f the G-14, a group of 14 leading European clubs833, to the
plans of FIFA. The G-14, openly contemplating the move towards a separate Euro-League, which
would effectively reduce UEFA’s Cup competitions, especially its Champion’s League, to events
of secondary importance,834 and also flirting with the idea of no longer releasing their main
players for games of their representative national teams, imperilling in this way the future of the
European Championship, exerted heavy pressure on UEFA to bring FIFA to a halt. In a desperate
attempt to secure the continued existence of its showpieces, UEFA decided to play its trump card
and hinted that if FIFA were to continue playing cavalier seul and were to insist drawing the
negotiations to an end on the terms and conditions as laid down in the non-paper of 10 January
2001, it just might leave the next FIFA World Cup in Japan and Korea for what it was and
organise itself, contemporaneously, a European Championship in Belgium and the Netherlands,
to which all the major European countries would participate, of course.835 Questionable way of
acting, maybe, but in any event, it paid off. FIFA got the message, weighed its chances and gave
in, withdrawing the working document from the negotiation table.
Checkmate? This withdrawal, in practice essentially turning the clock back to 31 October 
2000, leaving the Task Force proposals officially as the only remaining document on the
833 The G-14 are: Real Madrid and Barcelona from Spain; Juventus, Inter Milan and AC Milan from Italy; Bayern 
Munich and Borussia Dortmund from Germany; Manchester United and Liverpool from England; Marseille and 
Paris-Saint-Gennain from France; PSV Eindhoven and Ajax from the Netherlands; and Porto from Portugal. They 
have set up a permanent office in Brussels, headed by Thomas Kurth.
834 The last 10 years, the Champion’s League has always been won by a team that belongs to the G-14.
833 For the record: in the last World Cup, in 1998 in France, 6 quarter-finalists came from Europe, the rest of the 
world being represented by Brazil and Argentina; and in the previous World Cup *94 in the USA, even 7 European 
teams reached that stage of the competition, admittedly with Brazil as the final winner.
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discussion table, definitely appeared to be the coup de grâce for the negotiations. It seemed no 
longer possible to come to a solution satisfying all parties involved in the debate, since they all 
firmly held dn to their own - sometimes outright opposing- points of view, FIFPRO being 
zealous for the greatest player freedom possible, with UEFA, G-14 and the intervening leagues 
preventing or obstructing this at all costs, considering the actual system as the most appropriate 
one. In their opinion, if the Treaty opposed in some way to the current transfer system, then the 
Commission simply had to modify the Treaty, and the problem would be resolved. In this picture, 
FIFA could be situated somewhere floating in the middle, desperately trying to reconcile water 
and fire. The deadlock seemed complete, the ghost of the negative decision one small step away. 
And yet, contrary to  all expectations, after a meeting on 14 February 2001, the Commission 
accorded the football authorities one final opportunity to escape the impasse, setting 5 March as 
the ultimate deadline to reach a solution. In the weeks that were to follow, many meetings were 
held to conclude the discussions.
5. FIFA -  European Commission Agreem ent o f 5 March 2001
And this time, in a meeting on 5 March 2001, the three Commissioners in charge of the affair, 
Monti, Reding and Diamantopoulou, and the Presidents of FIFA and UEFA Blatter and 
Johansson, did indeed manage at last to finalise their discussions on the FIFA Regulations on 
international football transfers, agreeing upon a set of principles which reconcile the specific 
needs of the sport with the requirements of Community law.
These principles are the following:836 
1. Protection o f  minors
International transfers of players under the age of 18 shall be permitted, provided that (i) the 
family of the player moves into the country of the new training club for reasons not related to 
football; or (ii) within the territory of the EU/EEA and in the case of players between the 
minimum working age in the country of the new training club and 18, suitable arrangements are
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guaranteed for their sporting training and academic education by the new training club. For this
purpose a code of conduct will be elaborated by the football authorities.
* ^
2. Training compensation fo r  young players
All clubs, in particular the small ones, involved in the education process o f young players 
should be appropriately rewarded for their contribution. The training and education of a player is 
conceived to take place between the ages of 12 and 23. When a player signs his first contract as a 
professional a sum of compensation shall be paid to the club(s) involved in the training and 
education of the player. Subsequently, on each occasion the player changes club up to the time 
his training and education is complete, regardless of whether his contract has expired or not, 
compensation still needs to be paid, possibly in addition to compensation for breach of contract, 
as the case may be. As a general rule, the amount to be paid shall reflect the costs incurred which 
were necessary to train the player. Moreover, there shall be a ceiling -  still to be regularly 
established and quantified by FIFA in consultation with UEFA for the EU/EEA area -  to ensure 
that training compensation sums levied are not disproportionate.
3. Maintenance o f contractual stability in football
Contracts shall have a minimum and maximum duration of respectively 1 and 5 years, subject 
to national law. Furthermore, with regard to all contracts signed up to the 28th birthday of the 
player, if there is unilateral breach during the first 3 years without just cause or sporting just 
cause, compensation shall be payable and additionally, sporting sanctions will be applied. In the 
case o f contracts signed after the 28th birthday, the same principles shall be applicable, but only 
during the first 2 years. Moreover, unilateral breach without just cause or sporting just cause is 
prohibited during the sporting season. Unilateral breach without just cause or sporting just cause 
after the first 3 or 2 years will no longer result in the imposition o f sanctions on the player, but 
compensation shall remain payable. The amount of compensation for breach of contract shall be 
calculated with due respect to applicable law, the specificity of sport, and all objective criteria 
which may be relevant to the case, unless otherwise provided for in the individual contract.
For the entire text of the agreement, Principles fo r  the amendment o f FIFA rules regarding international 
transfers, consult http://www.fifa.com or alternatively, Blanpain, Het Statuut van de Sportbeoefenaar naar 
internationaal, Europees, Belgisch en Gemeenschapsrecht, annex XVI, at 195.
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4. Solidarity Mechanism
In the event of a transfer of a player during the course of his contract ¡after he has reached the 
age of 23 or after his second transfer (whichever comes first), a proportion of 5% of the 
compensation paid to  the previous club of affiliation will be divided over the club(s) involved in 
the training and development of the player. The distribution will be effectuated in proportion to 
the number of years the player has been registered with the clubs in question between the age of 
12 and 23.
5. Transfer windows
Two unified transfer windows per season will be introduced, with the proviso that there is a 
limit of one transfer per player per season. As to the mid-season transfer window, it shall be 
limited to transfers for strictly sport-related reasons, such as technical adjustments of teams or 
replacement of injured players, or exceptional circumstances.
6. Rest-category
Furthermore, the agreement provided for the creation of an effective, quick and objective 
dispute resolution and arbitration system. Recourse to arbitration is supposed to be voluntary and 
does not prevent players to seek redress before a civil court. Besides, transitional arrangements 
were inserted in the agreement, stipulating that these principles shall enter in full force and effect 
only for contracts concluded after the date of formal adoption of the principles by the appropriate 
authority. Finally, FIFA committed itself to analyse, in particular, the application of training 
compensation and review its findings with the various members o f the football family in the third 
season after the adoption of these principles.
FIFA, in agreement with UEFA, undertook to proceed immediately to change its existing
Regulations on the status and transfers of players, specifying that the amended rules were
scheduled for adoption by the FIFA Executive Committee at its meeting in Buenos Aires on 5
•
July 2001, and would be submitted to the FIFA Congress for information in the following days. 
Hereupon the Commission indicated its readiness to terminate its competition procedure against 
FIFA, provided that the principles agreed upon are indeed fully reflected in the FIFA Regulations 
to be amended. These resolutions were formalised through an exchange of letters between FIFA
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President Blatter and Commissioner Monti. In his letter, Blatter still could not refrain from 
emphasising once more that in the opinion of the FIFA, its current regulations did not violate 
European law, explaining the whole affair as follows: “While we continue to think that FIFA’s 
present regime is compatible with all relevant laws, we have indicated for some time already that 
this system can be improved to better reflect the interests of the family of football.”837 Monti 
limited himself to solemnly replying that ‘T o u r undertaking contains sufficient elements for me 
to be able to confirm that I no longer have the intention to propose that the Commission adopts a 
negative decision in the procedure that is opened against FIFA as regards the international 
transfer rules, subject to compliance with Article 6 of Regulation 2842/98.”838
An official press statement of the next day 6 March 2001 issued by the European 
Commission on behalf of President Prodi reflected its satisfaction with final outcome of the 
football transfer talks. *1 am delighted that we have been able to find a satisfactory and workable 
outcome with FIFA on international player transfers in the European Union that not only respects 
the special needs of the sport but also Community law”, commented the European Commission 
President. ‘Europe has risen to the occasion and won the match, ensuring a great victory both for 
football and for Europe. Club football represents much of what we are striving to achieve in 
Europe in terms of exchange of players, fans and ideas. Together, European football is stronger, 
more dynamic and more entertaining than if each national league played in its own comer. We 
have managed to achieve an outcome that will preserve the legitimate rights of players to move 
from one country to another whilst ensuring European football will be able to go from strength to 
strength. I pay tribute to all those involved and in particular my colleagues Mario Monti, Anna 
Diamantopoulou and Viviane Reding.”
On 5 July 2001, the football family did effectively introduce the new transfer system at a 
congress in Buenos Aires. The date of entry into force was set at 1 September 2001 at the latest. 
All relevant clauses are laid down in two separate documents: firstly, the FIFA Regulations for
837 Blanpain, Het Statuut van de Sportbeoefenaar naar internationaal, Europees, Belgisch en Gemeenschapsrecht, 
annex XI, at 190.
838 Blanpain, Het Statuut van de Sportbeoefenaar naar internationaal, Europees, Belgisch en Gemeenschapsrecht, 
annex XI, at 191.
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the Status and the Transfer o f Players,839 and secondly, the Regulations governing the 
Application of the Regulations for the Status and the Transfer o f Players.840 These two sets o f 
provisions were accepted with an overwhelming majority of 178 out‘ of 186 votes. Only 8 
representatives of the national federations voted against the introduction of the revised transfer 
rules. This result is somewhat remarkable, and to a certain extent probably even surprising, in 
view of the fact that FIFA Circular n° 769,841 containing relevant additional information 
concerning the practical application of the transfer regulations, was made public only on 24 
August 2001. En bloc, the members of the national associations had thus voted in favour of a new 
system of which they did not necessarily know all details. Or how the motto under which the 
congress had been held, ‘one house, one game, one world* had effectively reflected the spirit o f 
the participants! This induced a famous Dutch columnist to write that “in the landscape of FIFA, 
only the shadow of the clouds actually moves”.
Embroidering on the same theme, even this undisputed sign of confidence from the 
national associations didn’t affect the fact that a thick thundercloud-layer is still menacingly 
covering the sky above the amended FIFA transfer rules, however. Right from the outset, 
FIFPRO had already expressed its firm disapproval with the final agreement reached between the 
Commission and FIFA in March which led to the closure of the infringement procedure under 
Article 81 EC. As such, the dissent of FIFPRO with the outcome of the transfer discussions 
didn’t really constitute an obstacle towards the finding of a solution, as the player’s organisation 
was not officially a party to the proceedings, which were instituted against FIFA. Since the 
procedure touched transfers, a matter of general sporting interest, the Commission was found 
prepared to hear the observations of FIFPRO, which had been informally accorded the status of 
interested third party, but its agreement was not required to arrive at a kind o f cease-fire, which 
strictly legally speaking only had to be agreed upon between the Commission and FIFA. 
However, as FIFPRO considered that its remarks weren’t sufficiently taken into consideration
839 Hereinafter further referred to as ‘FIFA Regulation 2001'. For the entire text of the Regulation, consult 
http://www.fifa.com. or alternatively Blanpain, Het Statuut van de Sportbeoefenaar naar internationaal, Europees, 
Belgisch en Gemeenschapsrecht, annex XX, at 234.
840 Hereinafter further referred to as ‘FIFA Application Regulation 2001’. For the entire text of the Application 
Regulation, consult http://www.fifa.com.. or alternatively Blanpain, Het Statuut van de Sportbeoefenaar naar 
internationaal, Europees, Belgisch en Gemeenschapsrecht, annex XXI, at 247.
841 Consult http://www.fifa.com.. or alternatively Blanpain, Het Statuut van de Sportbeoefenaar naar internationaal, 
Europees, Belgisch en Gemeenschapsrecht, annex XXII, at 257.
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and consequently that it did not share in the consensus reached between the Commission and 
FIFA, there was nothing to prevent it in principle from having formal recourse to national civil 
courts and thûs basically reopening the whole affair. And that is preciselySvhat the player’s union 
did when it instituted proceedings against FIFA and UEFA on behalf of player José Amorim 
Goncalves before the Tribunal o f First Instance of Brussels. FIFPRO submitted that the transfer 
system, even after the reform of March 2001, remained incompatible with the provisions of 
Article 39 EC and 81 EC. Apart from FIFA and UEFA, also the Belgian national football 
association KBVB was summoned to appear before the Court during the first audience scheduled 
on 28 May 2001. It was specifically requested not to apply the new transfer legislation in 
Belgium. As a result of FIFPRO’s action, the revised transfer system thus immediately faced 
another test o f conformity with European law. In view of the fact that the Commission had only 
just given his fiat to the new transfer rules, and hence had abandoned its infringement procedure 
under Article 81 EC against FIFA’s old transfer regulation, the odds were that the national court 
would have stayed the proceedings and would have referred the hot potato to the European Court 
of Justice, requesting it to formulate a preliminary ruling on the issue. In the end, however, things 
didn’t come that far. Ultimately, FIFPRO decided to accept a proposal of reconciliation from 
FIFA: in return for a guaranteed representation in the Dispute Resolution Chamber, which task 
will consist o f settling all transfer disagreements within a month, FIFPRO withdrew its 
complaint.842 Rather than seeking open confrontation to definitively solve the matter, the player’s 
union thus settled for the promise of some influence within an organ which still has to be 
instituted as a result o f the implementation o f the new transfer system and therefore hasn’t proven 
its efficiency yet.843 As a result, there was nothing to prevent the new FIFA transfer system from 
entering into force on 1 September 2001 no longer.
842 Van Leeuwen, “FIFA brengt vakbond in gewetensnood”, Voetbal Internationaal 30 (2001) 65.
843 Theo Van Seggelen, spokesman of FIFPRO, defended the union’s position as follows: “My heart says: continue 
proceeding. My brain says: do not proceed and opt for influence. If  we proceed and we do not win, we will be 
excommunicated. Are we still defending the players’ rights appropriately then? Not proceeding could be interpreted 
as a sign of collaboration. Conversely, proceeding stands for independence: we are not for sale. That is consistent, 
that is the task of a union. However, if there’s anything I've learned ova- the past 20 years, it must be that being 
consistent doesn’t beingt you anywhere. I t ’s not about being right, but about getting it right And the chances of that 
happening are greater if we drop the complaint” See Van Leeuwen, ’FIFA brengt vakbond in gewetensnood”, 
Voetbal Internationaal 30(2001)65.
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n . ANALYSIS OF THE NEW TRANSFER RULES
Wheiv the Commission on 5 March 2001 reached an agreement with FIFA on the 
international transfer system reform and did not pursue any further its procedure of infringement 
of Article 81 EC, this meant that it considered that the new transfer rules were compatible w ith 
Community law. In the following analysis, it will be enquired whether this is actually the case. It 
will predominantly be evaluated whether the recently implemented transfer rules do comply with 
the requirements of the Community provisions on freedom of movement of workers. The 
examination will be effectuated in two steps: firstly, in this section, the main principles o f the 
agreement concluded between the Commission and FIFA will be assessed separately, before 
subsequently, in the conclusion, a more general evaluation of the whole system will be expressed. 
For each aspect of the agreement, it will be evaluated whether the European Commission has 
satisfactorily reconciled the requirements of Community law with the special characteristics o f 
sport. The starting point of the examination is that, if the Court were asked to express a 
judgement on the conformity of the FIFA rules with Article 39 EC, it would again strongly assert 
the rights to freedom of movement o f the sportsmen, as it has previously done in Bosnian. At this 
stage, it might also be worth pointing out already that even if the Commission has given its fiat to 
the new FIFA Regulations, the lawfulness of certain of its rules will ultimately hinge upon their 
compatibility with the relevant national legislation in the different Member States.
1. Protection of minors
It was only at the final stage of the negotiations that FIFA was found willing to mitigate 
its firm stance on the international transfers of minors. Even more so, in fact, it agreed upon 
making a complete U-tum, reversing the originally postulated prohibition of international 
transfers o f minors into a principled permission, albeit subject to compliance with a certain
Q A A
conditions. This ulterior development deserves no less than unequivocal approval.
Nowhere in the European Community Treaty, any mention is made of a minimum age one 
has to reach before one can legally be considered as a ‘worker*. Indirectly, the European Court of 84
844 Article 12 FIFA Regulation 2001.
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Justice has offered more guidance in this respect. In its case law on the subject» it has always 
emphasised that the term ‘worker* in Article 39 EC may not be interpreted differently according 
to the law of each Member State, but has a Community meaning.845 And rt has added that since it 
defines the scope of that fundamental freedom, the Community concept of a ‘worker* must be 
interpreted broadly,846 It proclaimed that any person who pursues an activity which is “effective 
and genuine, to the exclusion of activities on such a small scale as to be regarded as purely 
marginal and ancillary**, is to be treated as a worker. Entering more into detail in the seminal case 
of Lawrie-Blum*47, the Court held that this concept of ‘worker* must be defined in accordance 
with objective criteria which distinguish the employment relationship by reference to the rights 
and duties of the persons concerned. It specified that the essential feature of an employment 
relationship is that “for a certain period of time a person performs services for and under the 
direction of another person in return for which he receives remuneration.*’848
In view of the case law of the Court of Justice, it is clear that, as such, there is nothing to 
prevent young players who haven’t reached the age of 18, a priori, from being regarded as 
workers within the meaning of Article 39 EC. Strictly speaking, from the point of view of the 
application of Community law, all that is required is that they fulfil the above-mentioned criteria 
laid down in the case law of the Court. Indeed, to complete the whole picture, in Walrave, the 
Court had already pointed out that the particular sphere -  in casu football- in which the activity is 
carried out, is of no importance to the categorisation of someone as a ‘worker*.849 Moreover, even 
if the young players are initially merely employed by the clubs as trainees or apprentices, so that 
their work is perceived as a kind of practical preparation directly related to the actual pursuit of 
the occupation in point, that is not a bar to the application of Article 39 EC if the service is 
performed under the conditions of an activity as an employed person.850
845 Case 75/63 Hoekstra v Bestuur der Bedrijfsvereniging voor Detailhandel en Ambachten [1964] EGR 177.
846 Case 53/81 Levin v Staatssecretaris van Justitie [1982] ECR 1035.
847 Case 66/85 Lawrie Blum v Land Baden-Württemberg [1986] ECR 2135.
848 Lawrie-Blum, par. 17.
849 Case 36/74 Walrave and Koek v Union Cycliste Internationale [1974] ECR 1405; also Lawrie-Blum, par. 20.
850 See Lawrie-Blum, par 19. This case involved Miss Lawrie Blum, a British national, who, after passing at the 
University of Freiburg the examination for the profession of teacher at a secondary school, was refused admission, 
on the grounds of her nationality, to the period of preparatory service leading to the Second State Exam, which 
qualifies successful candidates few appointment as teachers in a secondary school, by the Secondary Education Office 
in Stuttgart See also Case C-27/91 Union de Recouvrement des Cotisations de Sécurité Sociale et d ’Allocations 
Familiales de la Savoie v Hostellerie Le Manoir [1991] ECR 5531, par. 8. The case concerned employers’ social
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Undeniably, employment of minors is an economic reality-,. The European Union( (f
responded to ^ his situation by drafting some legal and political instruments in which it manifested 
its accommodation to these situation, by permitting work to be carried out by young people to a  
certain extent. The Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers, adopted by  
the European Council in Strasbourg on 9 December 1989, states the following, in point 20: 
“Without prejudice to such rules as may be more favourable to young people, in particular those 
ensuring their preparation for work through vocational training, and subject to derogations 
limited to certain light work, the minimum employment age (emphasis added) must not be lower 
than the minimum school-leaving age and, in any case, not lower than 15 years.” This resolution 
found its way in Community secondary legislation a couple of years later, when Directive 94/33 
on the protection of young people at work stipulated explicitly in Article 1.1 that “Member States 
shall ensure, under the conditions laid down by this Directive, that the minimum working o r 
employment age is not lower than the minimum age at which compulsory full-time schooling as 
imposed by national law ends or 15 years in any event.”851 Moreover, in its Article 5, the 
Directive allows even the employment o f children852 for the purposes of performance in cultural, 
artistic, sports or advertising activities, this possibility however being subject to prior 
authorisation to be given by the competent authority in individual cases.853
By the same token, these documents also convey the unequivocal message that young 
people are a particularly vulnerable category of workers, worthy and in need of specific 
protection. Hence, labour activities performed by minors, if permitted at all, must be strictly 
regulated. In the Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers, this concern 
was formulated as follows: **22. Appropriate measures must be taken to adjust labour regulations 
applicable to young workers so that their specific development and vocational training and access 
to employment needs are met. The duration of work must, in particular, be limited -  without it
security contributions due from Le Manoir in connection with practical vocational training which Miss Haugh, an 
Irish national who was undergoing vocational training at a technical college in Ireland, had undertaken at Lfe Manoir.
851 Council Directive 94/33/EC of 22 June 1994 on the protection of young people at work, OJ. L  216/12.
852 According to Article 3, for the purposes of this Directive: ‘child’ shall mean “any young person of less than 15 
years of age who is still subject to compulsory full-time schooling under national law.”
853 To be complete, in Article 5.3, die Directive foresees in an exception to the first paragraph: “By way of 
derogation from the procedure laid down in par. 1, in the case of children of at least 13 years of age, Member States
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being possible to circumvent this limitation through recourse to overtime -  and night work 
prohibited in^the case of workers of under 18 years of age, save in the, case of certain jobs laid 
down in national legislation or regulations.” The same preoccupation underlies Directive 94/33 
on the protection of young people at work, in which it is stipulated explicitly that “Member States 
shall ensure that young people are protected against economic exploitation and against any work 
likely to harm their safety, health or physical, mental, moral or social development or to 
jeopardise their education.”854
Consequently, it must be acknowledged that Community legislation cautiously approves 
o f the employment o f minors, under certain circumstances. Young football players of under 18 
years o f age can be considered as workers within the meaning o f  the Community Treaty. They 
should therefore be able to benefit from the right to freedom of movement. Nevertheless, for a 
long time during the negotiations, FIFA held on to the prohibition of international transfers of 
minors. At first glance already, this firm stance seems to violate the youngsters’ rights to freedom 
of movement. For a somewhat more accurate account of the particular issue, two distinct 
situations have to be distinguished. Firstly, when there exists no interdiction of transfers of 
minors at the national level, an international transfer prohibition does appear to be indirectly 
discriminatory. A purely hypothetical example serves to clarify this statement. Let us assume that 
young players under 18 can effectively be transferred between clubs in France. This means that a 
boy from Perpignan is entitled to move to PSG, whereas a boy from Lisbon or Brussels or 
Copenhagen couldn’t play for the Parisian team. The rule may be neutral in appearance, applying 
to all youngsters equally, regardless of their nationality, but in fact it works predominantly to the 
detriment of the non-French boys, because they will be much more affected by the rule than the 
French minors, since most of them don’t live in France. The same example could be used to point 
out already an inconvenience or an anomaly that the prohibition of international transfers of 
minors would engender. The rule is clearly aimed at the protection o f young players, which is 
undoubtedly a legitimate objective, and one of the means to achieve this aim is to avoid these 
youngsters from being distanced too much from home and their family. But under the application 
o f the rules, the same boy from Perpignan wouldn’t be allowed to play for Barcelona, a mere 200
may authorise, by legislative or regulatory provision, in accordance with conditions which they shall determine, the 
employment of children for the purposes of performance in cultural, artistic, sports or advertising activities.”
854 Article 1.3 Directive 94/33.
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km away, whereas he could go to Paris, at almost 1000 km distance from home! Secondly, if  
there is a similar interdiction at the national level, then the prohibition of international transfers 
loses its discriminatory character, but remains in any event a clear restriction on the free 
movement of persons, for it precludes nationals of a Member State from leaving their country of 
origin to enter the territory of another Member State in order to pursue an economic activity 
there.855 Even if this provision applies without regard to the nationality of the workers concerned, 
it still directly affects young players* access to the employment market in other Member States.856
At this stage o f the affair, the questions that inevitably need to be addressed are whether 
the obstacle to the freedom of movement constituted by the prohibition of international transfers 
of minors, regardless o f whether it has an indirectly discriminatory character, as in the first 
situation, or merely is of a non-discriminatory nature, as in the second situation, can be justified 
by a legitimate aim and whether the measure at issue passes the test of proportionality, in order to 
avoid an actual infringement of Article 39 EC. It is beyond the slightest doubt that the objective 
of protecting young players can be qualified as an imperative requirement in the general interest. 
And probably it can even be maintained to a certain extent that imposing a prohibition of 
international transfers is also an apt way o f achieving this objective. However, it is highly 
questionable whether a ban on international transfers of minors is really necessary to reach that 
objective. It seems clear that the same aim can be achieved as effectively in a way which is less 
intrusive o f the free movement rights. To give but an example, allowing transfers within precisely 
described frontier zones or within a certain mile or minute radius from home could already have 
amounted to a tentative first step in the right direction.
Ultimately, however, the final outcome of the negotiations is by far the most preferable 
result from the point o f view of free movement. In principle, international transfers within the 
EU/EEA are thus allowed, provided that the new training club is able to offer stable and suitable 
training and education arrangements for the young players,857 who are between the minimum
855 Bosman, par. 96.
856 Bosnian, par. 103.
857 To that m d, the football instances are required to set up an official Code of conduct.
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working age in the country of the new training club858 and 18.859 In my opinion, this rule
adequately reflects the exigencies of the Directive on the protection of young people at work and
C Csucceeds in reconciling them with the principles on freedom of movement of workers. In this
respect, it is also to be applauded that the transfer of young third-country national players is made
subject to the precondition that their family also comes to reside in the new country.860 In
principle, their relatives are expected to move along ‘for reasons not related to football’, but even
a blind man can see that this requirement will probably often be successfully circumvented
somehow. Presumably, many parents of prodigious players will suddenly find a job in the service
o f the new club of their child, or alternatively start working for one of the sponsors of the team in
question. But in any case, apart from this slight ‘inconvenience*, this rule should be able to
impede the unfortunately currently still widespread practice o f slave-trade o f young African,
Asian, Eastern European or Latin or South American players.
2. Training compensation for young players
This particular aspect of the new FIFA Regulations is inspired by the idea that clubs 
should be compensated for their efforts to train young football players. In the previous chapter, it 
has been alleged that the need to ensure the training and development of young players, even 
though it undoubtedly constitutes a laudable objective, may not be sufficiently distinctive to sport 
so as to deserve being treated as an overriding requirement in the general interest justifying 
restrictions to the free movement of workers.861 As a result, it is argued that the entire set o f rules 
relating to compensation for training of young players may very well be incompatible with 
Article 39 EC. However, the Court of Justice has been more lenient to the sporting associations in 
this respect in Bosman, and has accepted this particular objective as a legitimate aim under the
858 In Belgium, for example, the Royal Decree of 18 July 2001, Belgisch Staatsblad, 2001, has set the minimum age 
at which an employment contract as remunerated sportsman can be concluded in basketball, football, volleyball and 
cycling at:
16 years when the athlete signs a contract for part-time work according to which he has to be at the disposition 
o f his employer during less than 80 hours per month;
18 years when the athlete signs a contract for part-time work the terms of which stipulate that he has to be at the 
disposition of his employer for more than 80 hours per month, or when he concludes a labour agreement for full­
tim e work.
859 A rticle 12 (b) FIFA Regulation 2001.
860 Article 12(a) FIFA Regulatie« 2001.
861 Concurring, Weatherill, “Do sporting associations make law or are they merely subject to it? ’, 13 Journal o f the 
Society fo r  Advanced Legal Studies (1999) 24.
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objective justification doctrine.. For the purposes of this analysis, I will therefore proceed on the  
assumption that this recognition still holds true.
2.1. Principles
The new FIFA Regulations provide that a player’s training takes place between the ages 
of 12 and 23.862 As a general rule, training compensation shall be payable up to the age of 23 for 
training received up to the age o f 21, unless it is evident that a player has already terminated his 
training period before the age of 21. In the latter case, compensation shall be due until the player 
reaches the age of 23, but the calculation o f the amount of compensation shall be based on the 
years between 12 and the age when it is established that the player has actually completed his 
training.863 Consequently, in total, maximum 10 years of training are taken into consideration 
when calculating the amount of compensation to be paid in the event of a transfer.864
When a player signs his first contract as a non-amateur, a sum of compensation shall be 
paid to the club(s) involved in the training and education o f the player.865 Moreover, 
compensation shall be paid each time a player changes from one club to another up to the time 
his training and education is complete,866 which, as a general rule, occurs when the player reaches 
23 years of age,867 irrespective of whether the player moves before or at the end of his contract.868
862 Article 13 FIFA Regulation 2001.
863 Article 13 FIFA 2001. In Article 5.1 of the FIFA Application Regulation 2001, it is further stipulated that for the 
purposes of calculating compensation, the training period starts at the beginning of the season of the player’s 12th 
birthday, or at a later age, as the case may be, and finishes at the end of the season of his 21st birthday.
864 See Circular n° 769 of 24 August 2001.
865 Article 14 FIFA Regulations 2001.
866 Article 5.2 FIFA Application Regulations 2001 unequivocally stipulates that compensation for training is due:
a) for the first time, when the player acquires non-amateur status according to Article 1 of the FIFA Regulations 
for the Status and Transfer of Players
b) afterwards, for every transfer up to the age of 23, depending on the player’s status, i.e.
from amateur to non-amateur status
from non-amateur status to non-amateur status.
A contrario, Article 5.3 FIFA Application Regulations 2001 provides that compensation for training is not due:
a) for transfers from amateur status to amateur status or for transfers from non-amateur status to amateur status 
(reacquisition of amateur status), unless the player (re)acquires non-amateur status within a period of three 
years.
b) if a club unilaterally terminates a player’s contract without just cause, but without prejudice to the compensation 
due to the previous training clubs.
867 Article 15 FIFA Regulations 2001.
868 Article 18 FIFA Regulations 2001.
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No training compensation has to be paid any longer when a player over the age o f 23 is 
transferred.86* The actual amount of compensation due for training-.and education must be 
calculated in Accordance with the parameters set out in the Application Regulations, which also 
stipulate how the total sum shall be allocated between the clubs involved in the training and 
education of the player.869 70
2.2. First prong o f principle o f proportionality: test o f 'appropriateness'
Embroidering on the principles enounced by the Court of Justice in Bosman, the principle of 
training compensation for young players is likely to restrict the freedom of movement of young 
players who wish to pursue their activity in another Member State, for it precludes or deters them 
from leaving the clubs to which they belong, even after the expiry of their contracts of 
employment with these clubs,871 directly affecting their access to the employment market in other 
Member States.872 At first sight, Article 39 EC therefore seems to be infringed by this aspect of 
the revised transfer rules. The objective which underlies this set o f rules is that clubs should have 
the necessary financial and sporting incentives to invest in training and educating young players. 
It is important to emphasise once again that the Court already in Bosman readily acknowledged 
that “in view of the considerable social importance of sporting activities and in particular football 
in the Community, [...] the aim of encouraging the recruitment and training of young players 
must be accepted as legitimate.”873 The big issue to be addressed in this respect is thus whether 
the means deployed are appropriate and necessary to achieve this objective. In other words, it 
must be examined whether the new transfer rules, even though intrinsically still restrictive, 
nevertheless pass the test of the principle of proportionality.
In this respect, it is useful to recall that the Court in Bosman also accepted that the 
prospect of receiving transfer, development or training fees is indeed likely to encourage football 
clubs to seek new talent and train young players. Nevertheless, taking into account that it is 
impossible to predict the sporting future o f young players with any certainty and that only a
869 Article 20 FIFA Regulations 2001.
870 Articles 16-18 FIFA Regulations 2001.
871 Bosman, par. 96.
872 Bosman, par. 103.
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limited number of such players go on to play professionally» it ultimately held that “those fees are
by nature contingent and uncertain and are in any event unrelated to the actual cost borne by
\ it
clubs of training both future professional players and those who will never play professionally/*
The Court therefore concluded that "the prospect of receiving such fees cannot be either a
decisive factor in encouraging recruitment and training o f young players or an adequate means of
financing such activities, particularly in the case of smaller clubs.*’873 74 In addition, it stated that the
same aims could be achieved at least as efficiently by other means which do not impede freedom
of movement for workers.875 In the opinion of the Court o f Justice, the transfer system as it stood
at the material time of the proceedings in Bosnian thus failed to pass the test of proportionality.
Contrary to some expectations maybe, the Court didn’t dwell on the issue any longer, seemingly
contenting itself with a simple reference to Advocate General Lenz’ opinion. Nevertheless, this
should not lead us to underestimate the particular importance of this last statement of the Court.
With its last sentence on the issue, the Court killed two birds with one stone. Firstly, it hinted
clearly at the fact that it would not object to alternatives to the transfer system which effectively
succeed in encouraging football clubs to invest in the search, development and training of young
players and which at the same time do not pose particular problems from the point of view o f
freedom o f movement. Secondly, the Court did well to step on the brakes at this point, wisely
showing some self-restraint as to the issue o f justification, not substituting its own assessment for
that of the sporting federations, thereby leaving them the space or freedom so as to make up their
own mind and work out possible solutions autonomously.
Be that as it may, the Court’s last statement on the issue, containing the somewhat cryptic 
and at first sight rather deceptively simple reference to  the opinion of the Advocate General, 
appears to be somewhat unfortunate at closer scrutiny. Admittedly, Advocate General Lenz did 
advance some propositions which he considered as more suitable than the transfer rules to reach 
the aim o f maintaining the sporting and financial equilibrium,876 pondering the possibility of 
determining by collective wage agreement specified limits for the salaries to be paid to the 
players and envisaging the distribution o f the clubs’ receipts amongst all clubs, but technically
873 Bosman, par. 106.
874 Bosman, par. 109.
875 Bosman, par. 110.
876 See Lenz AG in Bosman, paras. 226-234.
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speaking, he did not really unequivocally do the same with regard to the objective of encouraging 
the recruitment and training of young players.877 In this respect, he.jather examined which
£ r
changes to thé existing transfer rules were necessary to make them comply with the requirements 
of Community law. In the opinion of the Advocate General, the transfer fees at stake in Bosman 
could not be regarded as compensation for possible costs of training for a number of reasons.878 
First of all, there was the simple fact that their amount was not linked to those costs but rather 
calculated on the basis o f the player’s earnings.879 A second argument against regarding those 
transfer fees as a reimbursement of the incurred training costs was the fact that such fees were 
demanded even when experienced professional players changed clubs. The Advocate General 
acknowledged that any reasonable club will certainly incur costs to train all its players and to 
provide them with all the development necessary, but he considered that as expenditure which is 
in the club’s own interest and which the player recompenses with his performance, concluding 
that it is not evident therefore why such a club should be entitled to claim a transfer fee on that 
basis.880 Finally, he claimed that the logic of the system entails that reimbursement of the 
expenditure incurred for the training and development of a player depends on whether or not that 
player is transferred to another club, even though it is clear that the training of that player 
involves expense even if he doesn’t change club. However, in spite o f the foregoing, he didn’t 
reach the conclusion that a demand for a transfer fee for a player would have to be regarded as 
unlawful in every case.881 On the contrary, he recognised that clubs should be able to seize the 
fruits of their training and development labour and considered that appropriate transfer rules for 
professional footballers might be acceptable, provided these rules satisfied two specific 
preconditions. Firstly, in his view the transfer fee would have to be limited to the amount actually 
expended by the previous club (or previous clubs) for the training o f the player. And secondly, a
877 See Lenz AG in Bosman, paras. 235-239.
878 Lenz AG in Bosnian, paras. 237-238.
879 A good demonstration of this argument can be found in the DFB transfer rule, for the transfer of an amateur 
player to a professional club. Under that rule, a first division club had to pay a transfer fee of DM 100 000, whereas a 
second division club had to pay only DM 45 000 for the same player. That shows that the amount of the transfer fee 
quite evidently is not orientated to the costs of training. Arens endorsed this statement in a humorous way: see Arens, 
“Der Deutsche Bosman -  Anmerkungen zum Kienas-Urteil des Bundesarbeitsgericht vom 20.11.1996” [1997] SpuRt 
127: “[w]ie hoffnungslos untalentiert mussten also Spieler vom Kaliber eines Romano oder eines Ronaldo sein, für 
die Transferentschädigungsfordeningen in Grössenordnungen von 30 Mio., 50 Mio. oder 70 Mio. Dm genannt 
werden, wenn sie Aus- und Weiterbildungskosten in dieser Grössenordnung verschlungen haben sollen.“
880 In this respect, he referred to the regulations of the R-ench and Spanish associations which provide that no transfer 
fees can be demanded any more after a specified moment in time.
881 Lenz AG in Bosman, par. 239.
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transfer fee would only be due by the acquiring club in the case o f the player’s first transfer and
only if the previous club has trained the player. Additionally, account should be taken of every
< Cyear the player has played for that club after having received his education, so as to reduce the
transfer fee proportionally, since during that period the training club will have had the
opportunity to benefit from its investment in the player.
Summarising, instead of elaborating a real alternative to the unlawful transfer fees of the 
pie-Bosman era, the Advocate General opined that revisited transfer rules could be acceptable 
under Community law. It goes without saying that this leaves us to a certain extent in an 
awkward situation: on the one hand, the Court decided that the transfer rules in Bosman 
constituted a restriction to the Treaty principle of freedom of movement of persons and could not 
be justified under the mandatory requirements doctrine for the aims it pursued could be reached 
as efficiently by other means which do not impede the freedom of movement of workers, 
explicitly referring to the Advocate General’s opinion for this matter, whereas on the other hand, 
precisely the Advocate General declared that appropriately amended or modified transfer could 
possibly be regarded as compatible with the requirements of Community law (emphasis added). 
Admittedly, with some goodwill, the adapted transfer rules can indeed be regarded as another 
means than the traditional transfer system to reach the objective pursued, even though the basic 
features undeniably remain the same, rendering it somehow necessary to stretch the meaning of 
an ‘alternative’ to the illicit transfer system. Leaving this matter aside however, it still does not 
change anything about the fact that the Court clearly spoke o f  means not hindering the free 
movement o f workers, whereas it is unmistakably so that even new transfer rules do still impede 
the right to move guaranteed under Article 39 EC and are therefore also in need of justification. 
However, it is submitted that this difference might be more apparent than real. In the legal 
doctrine, there is some theoretical debate on when a measure exactly constitutes an infringement 
of the free movement rights.882 On the one hand, some maintain that a certain measure only 
amounts to an obstacle when it appears that there is no objective justification available, whereas 
on the other hand, others argue that one is confronted with a restriction as soon as the measure in 
question is liable to impede the free movement rights, even though it may still be uphold 
subsequently if it can adequately be justified. I f  the Court of Justice in the case o f Bosman, at
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least terminologically, adhered to the former group, this would explain the then purely textual 
difference of opinion between the Court and its Advocate-General. But even if this weren’t the 
case, there would still be no need to dramatise this difference of opinion,“ for the Court of Justice 
always has the last word on the matter. All this could then be reduced to an imprecise and 
unnecessary or superfluous reference of the Court to the Advocate General’s opinion. In this 
scenario, the Court could have avoided this inconvenience by referring more accurately to the 
opinion or simply omitting the reference to it. It would of course imply that in the opinion of the 
Court, even an amended transfer system would be incompatible with Article 39 EC. But then. 
Advocate General Lenz already explicitly acknowledged that it was not impossible that even a 
modified transfer system could be countered by the argument that the objectives pursued by it 
could also be attained by a system of redistribution of a proportion of income, without the 
players* right to freedom of movement having to be restricted for that purpose, which would 
therefore have to be preferred for that reason.* 883
Up to today, the main football authorities UEFA and FIFA did not manage to develop into 
practice a new system preserving the training and education of young football players which 
could provide a viable alternative to the former transfer rules and is contemporaneously also 
compatible with Community free movement law. Some ideas were brought forward, but they 
never went beyond the stage of good intentions. At the European Sports Forum in 1997, former 
Member of the Commission responsible for Competition Karel Van Mien pointed out that UEFA 
played with the idea o f implementing a system consisting of a pool of solidarity out of which 
training clubs would be reimbursed for the charges for the actual training of young amateurs aged 
between 14 and 24 who are transferred to another national association which is a member of 
UEFA as non-amateur players.884 Moreover, he indicated that UEFA also intended to recommend 
that national associations should implement the so-called ‘pattern contract’ for club players, 
divided in two periods of three years (three years training and three years as a first professional
S82 Weiler, “From Dassonville to Keck and beyond: An Evolutionary Reflection on the Text and the Context of the 
Free Movement of Goods”, in Craig &de Burca (eds.), The Evolution ofEU Law (OUP. 1999), chapter 10.
883 Lenz AG in Bosman, par. 239.
884 Van Miert, “Sports and Competition: recent Developments and the Commission’s Action", speech at the 
European Sports Forum, Luxembourg, 28 November 1997, point 4.
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contract). This contract would contain a provision for the payment of compensation in the event 
of transfers taking place at the end o f the first contract period.885* (r
Even though both proposals were not finalised in the end, it seems nevertheless useful to 
examine them  on their face value. The idea of the ‘pattern contract’ had its origins in France.886 
Article 15(1) o f Chapter 4 of Title HI of the French Professional Football Charter, dealing with 
the status o f  professional footballers, provides that “any move by a player from the club with 
which he had signed his first professional contract to another club shall entitle the former club 
(the club which has trained him) to receive compensation for training.” Article 15 (2) furthermore 
stipulates that “the former club shall be entitled to compensation for training if that club has 
trained the player as a ‘stagiaire’ for a period of at least one season and if that training has taken 
place in a recognised football training centre.” The French system is particular because it compels 
a football player to sign his first professional contract with the club that provided him his 
training. A compensation for training887 is only due in the event o f the first transfer of the player, 
and then only when the above conditions are fulfilled. This specific obligation to sign the first 
professional contract with the training club is unique in Europe. It enabled French football 
authorities to  organise the system of payment of compensation in this given way, as every 
footballer only played for one club before being transferred for the first time. In the aftermath of 
Bosmariy this system was abolished, only to be reintroduced already in 1999 in the French 
legislation in order to reverse or halt the trend which saw French clubs, some of whose ‘centres 
de formation’ are in excellent repute all over Europe888, all too frequently being stripped off their 
most talented youngsters by the big European clubs889 whose financial means allow them to offer
885 Van Miert, "Sports and Competition: recent Developments and the Commission's Action”, speech at the 
European Sports Forum, Luxembourg, 28 November 1997, point 4.
886 For more detail, see See Dubey, La libre circulation des sportifs en Europe (Bruylant, Brussels, 2000), at 313- 
314.
887 See Article 15 (3) et seq. of the ‘Charte du FootbalLProfessionner: The amount of the compensation for training 
corresponds to the basic compensation or part thereof, according to the length of the training. The basic 
compensation corresponds in principle to the player’s gross income in the preceding two years, if the training has 
lasted for more than three seasons, the full basic compensation is payable; if it lasted for only one season, the transfer 
fee is only 10% of that am ount
888 Especially the ‘centre de formation’ La Jonelière of FC Nantes and the one in Auxerre guided by Guy Roux often 
serve as an example for clubs wishing to invest in the development and education of young football players.
889 Dubey even called it “pillage systématique”.
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to these players salaries with which most French clubs simply cannot compete.890 The immediate 
cause or maybe the last straw which induced this legislative course of action might have been the 
much talked-of transfers of Sylvestre and Dabo from Rennes to Intemazionale. The Italian giant 
acquired the two French prodigal talents almost for free, subsequently making huge profits 
selling them respectively to Manchester United and Parma only one year later, whereas Rennes, 
the team that had really ‘formed* the players, was left with almost nothing. Quite understandably, 
many felt situations like this had to be avoided. As a result, during the recent transfer talks with 
the Commission, it was again suggested to adopt this obligation to sign the first professional 
contract with the club o f training as a general FIFA rule, which would be applicable all over 
Europe. However, it became immediately apparent that this proposition would raise serious 
questions as to its compatibility not only with Article 39 EC, but also with Article 81 EC. For this 
reason, the Commission vigorously opposed this idea and it was not pursued any further. It is 
submitted however that as such, this ascertainment, which is no doubt correct, does not constitute 
sufficient ground for completely discarding the idea of the pattern-contract already. For it cannot 
be excluded a priori that there are simply no better alternatives available, which are less 
restrictive of free movement and are suitable to attain the objective of preserving the training of 
young players. Under these precise circumstances, the adoption o f the pattern-contract could be 
envisaged anyway, in spite of the inherent weakness ingrained in this system. This final decision 
requires a comparative analysis of all proposals, which will be carried out in the end.
The major downside of this first proposition, namely its doubtful lawfulness under the 
Community free movement provisions, is nowhere to be found in the second proposition 
concerning the redistribution of a certain amount of income between clubs. A system of pooling 
of resources by clubs for the promotion of the development of young talent might indeed be a 
potential way forward.891 In practice, such a system would consist in the establishment of a 
common, central fund which would be financed by contributions from all clubs and would be 
used to defray expenditure incurred by so-called ‘breeding* clubs. Weatherill anticipates correctly
m  Article 15-4 de la Loi n® 84-610 du 16 juillet 1984 relative à l’organisation et à la promotion des activités 
physiques et sportives modifiée par la loi n® 2000-627 du 6 juillet 2000, reproduit in: Dictionnaire Permanent Droit 
du Sport, Bulletin 53 du 8 juillet 2000.
891 See Weatherill, “Case C-415/93 Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Association ASLB v Jean-Marc 
Bosman”, Common Market Law Review 33 (1996) 1015-1016; also Weatherill, "European Football Law”, Collected 
Courses o f the Academy o f European Law, Volume V m , Book I (1996), at 374.
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that under such a system, clubs investing in the training of youngsters would no longer be able to 
accrue ‘windfall profits’ from the transfer o f a promising young player, -but on the other hand, it
e twould provide them with a more reliable and predictable source of income through a collectively 
agreed system of support. He regards such a system as a “more sophisticated and reliable method 
than the transfer system for sustaining and improving the quality of youth training within the 
industry”. Furthermore, it has the important additional advantage of being unconnected to  any 
restrictions on the contractual freedom of the players. In the transfer reform negotiations between 
FIFA and the European Commission, the idea of introducing a pool of resources effectively came 
into the limelight. As mentioned above, it even figured amongst the official proposals o f the 
UEFA/FIFA Task Force, which envisaged the establishment o f a general Football Solidarity 
Fund for the purpose of promoting training of young players, by granting for example financial 
rewards to clubs that carry out very good youth development work. However, for some as yet 
obscure reason, in the final agreement reached in March, every reference to this solidarity fund 
was -  again - omitted. This radical omission is to be deplored, for it is clear that such a 
redistribution of income, inspired by the wish to encourage recruitment and training of young 
players, lives up to the requirement of not impeding the right to freedom of movement of 
workers. At this stage of affairs, this solution therefore seems to be the one that -  at first sight - 
succeeds better than all the alternatives in safeguarding and reconciling both the basic 
characteristic features of sport and the exigencies o f the application of Community law. 
Interestingly, as Advocate General Lenz already pointed out, the associations have not submitted 
anything yet which might refute that objection.892
Be that as it may, however, when confronted with the Commission’s allegations in the 
statement o f objections, the football authorities ultimately decided to cling to the essential 
features o f the old transfer system with regard to this issue o f compensation for training and 
education o f young players, introducing though a number of necessary modifications to it on the 
basis of the guidelines offered by both the Court of Justice and the Advocate General in Bosman 
in order to ensure compliance with Community law. This decision somewhat came as a surprise, 
in the light of the Court’s apparently straightforward ruling that “the prospect of receiving such 
fees could neither be a decisive factor to encourage clubs to recruit and train young players nor an
892 Lenz AG in Bosman, par. 239.
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adequate means of financing such activities.”893 894Taking into consideration this vigorous and 
unequivocal condemnation of the former transfer rules, the exercise of nevertheless trying to 
remould thes£ rules into a lawful system without touching its traditionaTfoundations appears to 
be a daunting, if not outright impossible task. In this respect, FIFA and UEFA, together with 
the European Commission, might thus very well have been fighting a lost cause from the outset.
In order to examine whether this ‘rescue operation* has nevertheless been carried out 
successfully, it seems useful to recall to mind at this point briefly the crucial statements of the 
Court and the Advocate General on this matter, out of which a number of criteria can indeed be 
extracted which a transformed transfer system in all likelihood would have to satisfy to be 
potentially acceptable under Community law. Firstly, the Court of Justice emphasised that 
transfer fees are by nature contingent and uncertain, as it is impossible to predict with certainty or 
precision the sporting future of young footballers and only a restricted number of them will 
actually play on a professional basis. Secondly, it stated that transfer fees are unrelated to the 
actual investments made by the clubs to train their youngsters. Leaving aside for a moment the 
conclusion it drew out of these assertions, and proceeding along the lines of an a contrario 
reasoning, one could estimate that fees which are no longer contingent and uncertain and 
moreover accurately reflect the costs borne by clubs in training and development, could in 
principle be accepted by the Court. Advocate General Lenz had outlined two further elements 
which according to him had to be taken into consideration. He was of the opinion that a transfer 
fee could only be demanded in the case of the first change of clubs where the previous club had 
trained the player. Also, transfer fees had to be reduced proportionately for every year the player 
had played for his training club, since the club would receive a return on its investments during 
that period. These last two elements were not explicitly taken up by the Court of Justice, but they 
nevertheless merit our closer attention. Let us now put the revised rules to the test.895
893 Bosnian, par. 109.
894 See, however, Dubey, o x., at 591-595: he is of the opinion that an appropriately modified transfer system might 
be acceptable under Community law.
895 Similarly, see Dubey, o x., at 602-611.
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2.2.1. Compensation based on actual expenses incurred
From a practical point of view, by far the most intricate problem to resolve was to find a 
coherent way to calculate the compensation fee for clubs which had to be based on the actual 
costs incurred by these clubs for the training and development of young football players. 
Previously, the amount of compensation was related to the earnings of the player, but both the 
Advocate-General and the Court in Bosnian had categorically rejected this. For this reason, in the 
annex o f the Agreement reached between FIFA and the Commission in March 2001, it was 
stipulated expressly, ‘for the avoidance o f doubt’, that the salaries paid to any player who has 
ever played in the first team may not be included for the purposes of calculating training costs.
In its Application Regulation, FIFA effectively stipulated that as a general rule, the 
amount of compensation due shall reflect the expenses which were necessary to train the player 
and shall be paid for the benefit of every club which has contributed to the training of the player 
in question, starting from the age of 12,896 Besides, it elaborated an intricate mechanism with 
different calculation parameters.897 Firstly, FIFA engaged itself to establish 4 different categories 
in which all football clubs shall be divided in accordance with their financial investments in the 
training o f players.898 Each year the national associations in the EU/EEA shall determine the
896 Artivle 5.4(a) FIFA Application Regulation 2001.
897 Article 6 FIFA Application Regulation 2001.
898 Article 6.1 FIFA Application Regulation 2001. In Article 6.2 FIFA Application Regulation 2001, FIFA 
established the 4  categories according to the following guidelines::
• Category I (top level, e.g. high quality training centre):
all clubs o f the first division of national associations investing on average a similar amount in the training of 
players. These national associations will be defined on the basis of effective training costs, and this 
categorisation can be revised on a yearly basis
•  Category 2 (still professional, but on a lower level):
all clubs of the second division of the national associations of category 1 
all clubs of the first division of all other countries having professional football
• Category 3:
- all clubs of third division of the national associations of category 1
all clubs of second division of all other countries having professional football
• Category 4:
all clubs of fourth and lower divisions of the national associations of category 1
- all clubs of third and lower divisions of all other countries having professional football 
all clubs of countries having only amateur football
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categories to which their clubs belong, after hearing the views of representatives of players and
clubs.899 Since it is considered impossible to calculate the effective training costs for every single
< C
player, a fixéd rate will be set for each category which corresponds to "the average amount of
money necessary to train one player of a club belonging to that category for a period of one year.
Subsequently, this flat rate will be multiplied by a so-called ‘player factor*, which determines the
ratio between the number of players who need to be trained to produce one professional
players.900 Ultimately, the final sum of compensation due for the training and education shall be
obtained by multiplying the amount corresponding to the category of the training club for which
the player was registered by the number of years of training from the age of 12 until 21.901
As a general principle, compensation is based on the training and education costs of the 
country in which the new club is located.902 However, within the EU/EEA area, the opposite 
applies, as compensation for training is based in principle on the costs of the country in which the 
training club was located. The following rules apply: (i) when a player is transferred to a club 
belonging to a higher category, the compensation amounts to the average of the training costs for 
the two categories involved in the transaction; (ii) when a player moves to a club in a lower 
category, the calculation is based on the training costs of the new -lower category -  club; (iii) 
when a player goes from a club in category 1, 2 or 3 to a club in category 4, no compensation for 
training is to be paid.903
In addition, FIFA agreed to the introduction of a ceiling, to be defined objectively, to 
compensation fees to ensure that these fees levied by the training clubs are not disproportionate. 
In the EU/EEA area, every national association shall notify FIFA of a ceiling for every club 
category at the beginning of the sports season, after hearing the views of representatives of 
players and clubs. These ceilings will be acknowledged by FIFA, subject to their
899Article 6.4 FIFA Application Regulation 2001. This provision further stipulates that the national associations shall 
notify FIFA of this categorisation at the latest by the mid-saeson registration period every year and FIFA will publish 
this informatie» via a circular letter and its internet sites. The categorisation shall be valid for 12 months or two 
registration periods.
900 Article 6.3 FIFA Application Regulation 2001.
901 Article 7.1 FIFA Application Regulation 2001.
902 Article 7.3 FIFA Applicatie» Regulation 2001,
903 Article 7.4. FIFA Application Regulation 2001.
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proportionality. In another attempt to avoid training compensation reaching an unreasonably 
high level, FIFA also decided that for very young players between 12 and 15 years o f age, 
compensation shall always be calculated on the basis of category 4.904 05
Finally, with regard to the distribution of the compensation for training and education, the 
Application Regulation also provides that in the event of a first payment, the amount to be paid is 
for the benefit of every club which has contributed to the training of the player, starting from the 
age of 12, and shall be distributed on a pro-rata basis depending on the full years o f proper and 
proven training, and in relation to the category to which the clubs belong.906 In the case o f 
subsequent transfers from clubs belonging to the third or fourth categories, the new club shall pay 
the former club the costs which it incurred in training the player as well as the training 
compensation costs which it incurred when registering the player.907 When a player moves from a 
club in the first or second category, the amount of training compensation payable shall be the 
training cost of the previous club.908 Supplementary, the Application Regulation also stipulates 
that in certain prescribed circumstances, the redistribution of the amount o f compensation is 
effectuated on the basis of the following cascade principle909:
(a) For the transfer of a player from a club in the third or fourth category to  a club in a higher 
category, 75% of the amount exceeding the costs of the category of the former club shall be 
redistributed on a pro-rata basis to all the club that have trained the player from the age o f 12 
onwards.
(b) For the transfer of a player from a club in the second category to a club in the first category, 
50% o f the amount exceeding the costs of the category of the former club shall be 
redistributed on a pro-rata basis to all the club that have trained the player from the age o f 12 
onwards.
(c) For a transfer between two clubs of the same category, 10% of the amount calculated as 
described under Article 7.3 and Article 7.4 shall be redistributed on a pro-rata basis to all the 
clubs that have trained the player from the age o f 12 onwards.
904 Article 7.5 FIFA Application Regulation 2001.
905 Article 7.2 FIFA Application Regulation 2001.
906 Article 5.4(b) FIFA Application Regulation 2001
907 Article 5.4(c) FIFA Application Regulation 2001,
908 Article 5.4(f) FIFA Application Regulation 2001.
909 Article 8 FIFA Application Regulation 2001.
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(d) If a player’s career cannot be traced back to the age of 12, any missing years will be based on 
category 4 for the purposes o f determining training compensation^and the amount will be 
distributed to the player’s national association of origin and be earmarked for training young 
players.
This entire set of rules appears to be extremely complicated.910 Nevertheless, I will endeavour 
to illustrate these principles on the basis o f some practical hypothetical examples. Presume that 
an Italian boy started playing for his local club at the age of 11. He is transferred to a non- 
amateur club in another Member State of the European Union at the age of 22 and 3 months. 
Firstly, his old club is still entitled to compensation for the training expenses it incurred, because 
he was transferred before his 23th birthday. It will be compensated for 10 years of training, even 
though the player has stayed longer at the club.911 Ten years is simply the maximum. 
Furthermore, the amount of compensation will in principle be calculated on the basis of the 
category to which the old club belongs. In this respect, it should not be forgotten that between the 
age of 12-15, compensation is always calculated on the basis of category 4, regardless to which 
category the club actually belongs.
Presume that a Dutch boy has received training at a Dutch club of category 3 from the age of 
15. At 18, he signs his first contract as a non-amateur with his training club. One year later, he is 
transferred to a non-amateur club in Belgium of category 3. The Belgian club has to pay for 4 
years of training in a club of category 4. His training continues in Belgium for another year, until 
he starts regularly appearing into the first team. At the age o f 21, he is subsequently transferred to 
an English club, also of the third category. The English club has to compensate the Belgian team 
for only one year of training in a club of category 3, and on top of that it has to reimburse the 
Belgian team for the compensation it paid to the Dutch team previously.
Finally, let us use figures once. Presume that a Belgian boy of 7 years old starts playing for 
Meerbeke, a fourth-division team in-Belgium. At 15, he is transferred to Cambridge, an English
910 Johan Crayff, one of the best players ever, once told a journalist who told him he hadn’t understood his match 
analysis: "If I had really wanted you to undserstand, I would have explained it better." It seems FIFA might have 
borne in mind these words when drafting this set of rules...
911 Again, unless it is clear that his training has ended before reaching the age of 21.
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second-division club. Four years later, he moves abroad to Fiorentina, an Italian first-division 
team, where he signs his first non-amateur contract. After two years, he joins the ranks of 
Besançon, anTrench third-division team. At the age of 24, he returns to Belgium to play for first- 
division club Anderlecht. Supposedly, for the sake of the example, the KBVB has set the flat-rate 
sums of compensation in Belgium at 25.000 Euro for clubs from category 1, 15.000 Euro for 
category 2 clubs, 5.000 Euro for category 3 and 2.500 Euro for category 4. In England, Italy and 
France, the national federations have established the amounts due at respectively 30.000, 18.000, 
6.000 and 3.000 Euro for the different categories. Furthermore, for the purposes of the example, 
the player factor is set at 10. Which sums of compensation for training and development are due?
1) fo r  the transfer from  Meerbeke to Cambridge: No compensation has to be paid as the 
player kept his amateur status.
2) For the move from  Cambridge to Fiorentina: At the age o f 19, the player acquired non­
amateur status. Fiorentina has to pay an amount o f compensation which is to the benefit 
of every club which has contributed to his training. Compensation for training and 
education only has to be paid from the age of 12 onwards. In casu, Fiorentina has to pay 
for 7 years o f training. The money is to be distributed on a pro-rata basis, depending on 
the full years o f proper and proven training. As a result, Meerbeke will be paid for 3 years 
of training, Cambridge for 4 years. Meerbeke is a  fourth-division team, and thus belongs 
to category 4. In any event, compensation for players aged between 12 and 15 is always 
based on the training expenses for category 4. In the EU, compensation is based on the 
expenses of the country in which the training club was located, in casu Belgium. 
Meerbeke will thus receive the following amount of compensation: 2.500 Euro (category 
4 Belgium) x  10 (player factor) x 3 years = 75.000 Euro. For Cambridge, the situation 
appears somewhat more difficult: as Fiorentina belongs to a higher category, 
compensation should in principle amount to the average of the training costs of both 
categories. However, as Cambridge belongs to category 2, this is not the case and the 
general rule applies. Therefore, it receives 18.000 Euro (category 2 England) x 10 (Player 
factor) x 4 years = 720.000 Euro
3) fo r  the move from  Fiorentina to Besançon: Compensation is still due, as the player hasn’t 
reached the age of 23 yet. Besançon belongs to a lower category than Fiorentina, and both 
clubs are located in the EU, thus the calculation of the compensation is based on the
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training costs o f the lower category club, Besançon, even though the player has been 
trained in Florence and moves to France. The Tuscan club will receive 6.000 Euro 
(categbry 3 France) x 10 (player factor) x 2 years = 120.000 Euro."'
4) fo r the change between Besançon and Anderlecht: The player arrived in France at the age 
of 21. This is the age at which training ends. In principle, compensation remains due for 
every transfer up to the age o f 23. However, the player returns to Belgium at the age of 
24, or after the deadline of 23 years. In other words, in this instance no compensation 
needs to be paid.
Presume a Belgian boy starts his training at 13 at Tremelo, a Belgian team of category 4. At 
16, he goes to Leuven, a Belgian team of category 3. At 18, he signs his first professional 
contract for Venezia in Italy, a second division team. After two years, he moves to Bilbao in the 
Spanish first division. The national federations have set the amounts for compensation at 
respectively 30.000,18.000,6.000 and 3.000 Euro for the different categories.
1) fo r  the transfer from  Leuven to Venezia: Mutatis mutandis, the same rules apply as in the 
previous example. Concretely, at the age of 18, the player acquired non-amateur status. 
Venezia has to pay 5 years o f compensation for training to Tremelo (3 years) and Leuven 
(2 years), is a fourth-division team, and thus belongs to category 4. Tremelo will receive 
the following amount of compensation: 3.000 Euro (category 4 Belgium) x 10 (player 
factor) x 3 years = 90.000 Euro. Leuven will receive the average of the training costs of 
both clubs, as Venezia belongs to a higher category. In casu: Leuven: 6.000 Euro 
(category 3 Belgium) x 10 (player factor) x 2 years =  120.000 Euro; Venezia: 18.000 Euro 
(category 2 Italy) x 10 (playing factor) x 2 years = 360.000 Euro. The average of the two 
gives 240.000 Euro which Leuven finally receives as compensation.
2) For the move from  Venezia to  Bilbao:
This is the precise moment to call it a halt and make two observations, strictly related to the 
content of the rules. Firstly, it needs to be clarified whether the cascade principle laid down in 
Article 8 of the Application Regulation applies only in the event of subsequent transfers, or also 
already in case of a first payment. Arguably, the former option holds true, but this does not 
appear clearly from the text of the rules. Secondly, some rules simply seem to be completely 
incompatible with each other. The last example illustrate this point: Bilbao belongs to a higher
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category than Venezia, thus in principle, the compensation payable by the Basque club should b e  
the average of the training costs for the two categories.912 Moreover, i t is  also stipulated that in  
the case of a 'player moving from a club in the first or second category; the amount o f tra in in g  
compensation payable is the training cost of the previous club.913 As such, there is no p ro b lem  
with that. However, this last rule is mutually exclusive with the rule providing that for a tran sfe r 
o f a player from a club in the second category to a club in the first category, 50% of the am o u n t 
exceeding the costs of the category of the former club shall be redistributed on a pro-rata basis to  
all the club that have trained the player from the age of 12 onwards.914 It is one or the other, y o u  
cannot have it both ways.
Apart from these preliminary remarks related to the content o f these rules, there remains q u ite  
a lot to be said about the lawfulness o f this renewed system of awarding compensation fo r  
training and development of young football players to breeding clubs in the event of a transfer o f  
these players. In the first place, instead o f reflecting the real costs incurred by a club for th e  
training o f the young football players, a requirement which clearly seemed to have been im posed  
by both the Advocate General and the Court in Bosnian as an absolutely indispensable condition 
for a revised transfer system to be able to  be considered as an appropriate means to reach th e  
objective of preserving the training and development of young players, this system goes out from  
flat-rate estimated costs, corresponding to the average financial investments of clubs w hich 
approximately make the same or similar expenses for training and are therefore classified in the 
same category. The football authorities have worked out this alternative mechanism o f  
calculating compensation on the basis o f approximate expenses because they claim it is 
impossible or at least unworkable in practice to determine the effective training costs for a 
particular player. To a certain extent at least, the validity of this argumentation appears doubtful. 
Nowadays many football clubs -  especially the clubs playing in the higher divisions of a national 
league - are large professional undertakings with big budgets and huge turnovers. It is therefore 
indispensable that they keep a detailed account of their revenue and expenses during a financial 
year. It seems thus only natural that one should be able to assess quite precisely the expenses 
made for the training and the development of young players on the basis of the club’s
912 Article7.4 (a) FIFA Application Regulation 2001.
913 Article 6.4 (f) FIFA Application Regulation 2001.
914 Article 8 (b) FIFA Application Regulation 2001.
accountancy. Admittedly, this may prove to be somewhat more difficult for smaller clubs and/or 
clubs playing in the lower divisions o f a national league. Compensation based on approximate 
flat rate training expenses therefore appears to be more readily acceptable for players coming 
from these clubs. Presumably, however, for the sake of simplicity and homogeneity, this 
generalised way o f calculating compensation might nevertheless be acceptable anyway, as long 
as the national associations ensure convincingly that the average approximate flat rate sums 
remain sufficiently close to the actual expenses.915
Secondly, according to the FIFA rules, the proposed flat training rates have to be multiplied, 
not only by the number of years the player in question has spent with the training club, which is 
perfectly logical and understandable, but also by the so-called ‘player factor*, in order to obtain 
the final amount of compensation due by the acquiring club. This factor is taken into account to 
clarify that for every young player who has the capacities and skills to make it professionally, the 
club also has to train a number o f players who, ultimately, won*t make it to the top. This issue 
has created some controversy. Advocate General Lenz was of the opinion that the compensation 
fee must be limited to the amount expended for the training of that particular player taken in 
isolation.916 Be that as it may, the Court of Justice subsequently decided in Bosman that the 
transfer fees were “unrelated to the actual cost borne by clubs of training both future professional 
players and those who will never play professionally**.917 The Court appears thus to disagree with 
its Advocate General on this point, conveying the impression that expenses incurred for the 
training of young players who won’t pursue a professional career in the end can be included in 
the determination of the compensation fee to be paid for the transfer of a more gifted player. The 
position of the Court of Justice seems to be preferable. It seems reasonable that also expenses 
made for a certain number of less talented players are taken into consideration when calculating 
the compensation fee. Otherwise, clubs will continue to lose money on its youth programmes, 
which might have repercussions on their eagerness and determination to pursue their efforts to 
train young players. Arguably, a system of compensation for training excluding costs incurred for
915 In this respect, it is interesting to note that in Belgium, controversy has already risen about the first list of actual 
figures which has been sent by the KBVB to FIFA to constitute the basis for the calculation of the amount of 
compensation for training of young football players: Blanpain has rejected these figures as irresponsibly high and 
illegal (source: De StandaarcL, 22 August 2002)
916 Lenz AG in Bosman, at par. 239.
917 Bosman, par. 109.
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training other youngsters than the one particular player who is the centre of the transaction 
between two clubs seems to be no adequate means to attain the objective of encouraging the
c L'recruitment arid training of young players. The next issue is thus to fix a reasonable player factor, 
or the ratio between the number of trainees and the number o f professional players. In other 
words, how many trainees does it take to form one professional player? In this respect, when 
determining this multiplying factor, account should be taken o f the fact that it doesn’t suffice 
simply to multiply the costs made to train one player by the number of players that do not 
succeed in professional football, for there are a number of fixed costs.918 For example, a club 
does not necessarily need an extra coach for one more player, a second or third coach (or physical 
trainer or physiotherapist or keeper trainer, etc.) will only be required after a certain number of 
players has been exceeded. All in all, 10 seems to constitute a reasonable player factor. In 
practice, it should be avoided at all costs that the final compensation fee turns out to be a figure 
which amounts in fact to a restriction to the freedom of movement of players. At some point, 
rumours were that FIFA intended to accept player factors which would allow clubs with famous 
youth education centres such as Ajax to ask enormous compensations in the event o f a transfer o f 
a young player...919 Be that as it may, the official contemporaneous introduction o f a ceiling to 
the amount of compensation constitutes a sufficient guarantee to avoid this danger.920
In the initial transfer reform proposals forwarded to the Commission by the UEFA/FIFA Task 
Force in October 2000, mention was made of the possibility o f adding still other multiplying 
factors to further increase the amount of compensation due.921 It was argued that if the young 
football player in question had already participated in official games of the first team of his club 
on a number of occasions or if he had represented his country in matches of the national team a 
number of times, these factors also needed to be taken into consideration when calculating the 
amount o f compensation to be paid in the event of a transfer o f such a player. They were meant to 
reflect the added value of the player, from which the club which recruited and trained him should 
be able to benefit by way of an increased compensation due by the acquiring club. It is clear that
918 See Dubey, o.c., at 605-607.
919 Van Leeuwen, ‘FIFA  biengt vakbond in gewetensnood”, www.viplanet.nl.
920 With regard to this ceiling, FIFA has suggested to calculate this ceiling by dividing the average costs for training 
of the breeding clubs by the number of players who are offered a contract of non-amateur. See Blanpain, Het Statuui 
van de Sportbeoefenaar naar intemationaal, Europees, Belgisch en Gemeenschapsrecht, at 61-62.
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these supplementary elements would take the amount of compensation beyond the level of the 
expenses the( club made for the training and education of the player, and are therefore 
unacceptable 'from the point of view of compliance with Community law.^HFA wisely decided to 
drop every reference to these multiplying factors in the final agreement it reached with the 
Commission in March 2001.
For basically the same reason, namely ensuring that the compensation fee effectively reflects 
the costs incurred for training by the breeding clubs, the Commission has insisted during the 
transfer negotiations that the FIFA change its general principle of basing compensation on the 
costs corresponding to the category of the country in which the new club is located, within the 
EU/EEA area into a rule basing compensation on the costs of the category o f the training club. 
Again, FIFA duly followed the Commission’s instruction to this effect in its Application 
Regulation.921 22 Arguably, the further specifications FIFA added to that general rule are acceptable 
only to the extent that they do not increase the level of compensation so as to arrive at an amount 
which exceeds the expenses made by a club for the training o f the young player concerned. 
Practically speaking, upholding the rule envisaging the compensation fee to be the average of the 
training costs of the different categories involved if a player is transferred to a club belonging to a 
higher category923 may therefore prove to be problematic, for this calculation method will lead to 
an excessive compensation fee. The underlying motive for this ‘gesture’ from the bigger clubs 
might very well be solidarity with the smaller clubs, but in holding that compensation for training 
had to be related to the actual costs borne by the clubs, the Court has implicitly indicated that it 
considers there are better ways to achieve this laudable aim. On the other hand, there seems 
nothing to object against rules dictating a lower compensation or even no compensation 
whatsoever in case of a transfer of a young footballer to a club from a lower category,924 
solidarity again being the guiding principle. As in these particular situations, compensation does 
not go beyond the expenses made by the training clubs, there is nothing wrong or objectionable 
about these rules.
921 See Blanpain, Het Staiuut van de Sportbeoefenaar naar internationaal, Europees, Belgisch en 
Gemeenschapsrecht, annex , at 183.
922 See Article 7.4 FIFA Application Regulation 2001.
923 Article 7.4 (a) FIFA Application Regulation 2001.
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2.2.2. Condensation due after every transfer before end training period?
^ ......  CThe nfew FIFA rules stipulate that compensation shall be paid on each occasion the player
changes clubs up to the time his training and education is complete. As a rule, training
condensation is payable up to 23 for training incurred up to 21, unless it is evident that the player
has already finished his training period earlier. These provisions evidently seem to be
irreconcilable with the opinion o f Advocate General Lenz in Bosman, according to whom for a
compensation fee to  be appropriate, it could come into question on only one occasion, namely in
the case of a first change of clubs where the previous club had trained the player.924 25 The Court of
Justice didn’t express its opinion on the issue yet, which at first sight leaves us to guess as to
whether this silence should be interpreted as an implicit acknowledgement or rather as a rejection
of its Advocate General’s suggestion. However, further analysis permits us to ascertain what
would be, in all likelihood, the position of the Court when asked about it. It is important to
emphasise that the differences exposed between the new FIFA Regulations and Advocate
General Lenz’ considerations may turn out to be more apparent than real to a certain extent. The
Advocate General’s opinion is clearly inspired by the system prevalent in France, according to
which a football player must sign his first professional contract with the club that provided him
his training. Compensation is only due in the event o f the first transfer between professional
clubs. This implies that in France, the formation of the player is considered to be terminated in
principle at the moment of his first transfer. The basic underlying principles of this system, that
compensation is to be paid only until the end o f the period of training and that the training club
deserves to be rewarded for its efforts, also lie at the basis of the new FIFA Regulations. Only the
practical elaboration, especially concerning the end o f the period of training, is different in the
two systems. Be that as it may, these differences should also not be entirely underestimated.
Contrary to what happens in France, where players normally pass through all youth categories of
one single club, in other countries it is not all that uncommon that players change clubs on a
number of occasions before signing their first professional contract. The Advocate General
himself recognised that a  club should be compensated for the training work it has done.
Transposed to the European scene, this rule becomes that all clubs which have invested time,
924 Article 7.4 (b) & (c) FIFA Application Regulation 2001.
925 Lenz AG in Bosman, at par. 239.
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effort and money in the formation o f a player therefore deserve to be compensated in proportion
to their contribution. Moreover, the way the French system is conceived, it may have the
1 ifadvantage of assessing the end of the period of training somewhat more flexibly and suited to the
particular situation of each individual case, making it coincide it in principle with the moment of
the first transfer of the player in question, but this only holds true under the presupposition that a
club transfers a player only after he has effectively finished his training. And it seems
conceivable that this will not necessarily always be the case. Nantes may decide to transfer a
young player to Bordeaux at the age of 19 simply because there is no place for him (yet?) in the
first team of ‘les canaris’, or because Bordeaux shows particular interest in acquiring the services
of the player. Arguably, in practice this does not necessarily mean that his formation is
completed, but in any event, the way the French system is organised, it does entail that *les
girondins’ won’t be able to receive compensation in the possible event of a further transfer of the
player concerned, even if he did actually complete his formation with them. As a result, the FIFA
system setting an after all, also relatively flexible upper age limit to compensation for training
and providing for this compensation to be paid for each transfer o f the young footballer until the
end of his formation period seems therefore to be preferable. It is submitted that the inherent
weakness of the French system, namely that it is inherently restrictive from the point of view of
free movement, is less prominently present in the revised FIFA Regulations, which nevertheless
contemporaneously succeed in awarding all training clubs equitable compensation according to
their investments.
2.2.3. Proportional reduction of the compensation fee?
In his opinion in Bosnian, Advocate General Lenz imposed one more additional condition 
which must absolutely be satisfied for compensation fees in case o f a transfer possibly to be 
considered as an appropriate means to reach the legitimate objective of preserving the training 
and education of young players. According to him, sums of compensation also have to be reduced 
proportionately for every year the player has spent with a club after having received its formation 
there.926 It is useful to situate this precondition in its precise context. As has been outlined already 
at an earlier stage, in the French system, which the Advocate General took as the exemplary
926 Lenz AG in Bosman, par. 239.
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model for his proposals, football players are obliged to sign their first professional contract with 
their club of formation. A first transfer to another dub occurs therefore often only at a relatively 
later stage o fth e ir career in comparison with the situation of young players in other countries. 
Undoubtedly, the Advocate General derived the need for a proportional reduction of the 
compensation fee for training from the fact that, since players often stayed with a club even after 
they had terminated their formation, the training club was offered the opportunity during to 
benefit from its investments in the player during that period.927 This reasoning appears logical 
and understandable, for it can indeed reasonably be maintained that for a player appearing for the 
first team of his club on the pitch is the most direct and proper way of reimbursing his club for 
the expenses it made for his training. In this context, the next issue would then be how to 
amortise the costs borne for the player: firstly, one would have to determine the number of years 
during which a fee can still be demanded in the event of a transfer, because after a certain period, 
the player will be estimated to have refunded all training costs, and secondly, one would have to 
establish a precise way of reducing the transfer sum for that period. This reduction could be 
effectuated in various ways: one could diminish the transfer sum with a fixed equal percentage 
throughout the whole amortisation period - for example 25% annually during a period of 4 years - 
, or opt for increasing or sinking percentages -  for example, 40% after the first year, 30% after 
the second, 20% after the third and the remaining 10% after the fourth and final year- depending 
on whether one wishes to put the stress on the beginning or rather on the end of the amortisation 
period. To complicate things a little bit further, proceeding along the same reasoning, one could 
probably argue with equal force that young players can already render services to  their club 
during -  and thus not only after * their training period, which would possibly entail that they 
deserve to be taken into consideration as well and should somehow also lead to a further 
reduction of potential future compensation fees in the event of a transfer.
Interesting as the Advocate General’s suggestion unmistakably may be, it is nevertheless 
important to emphasise that the Court of Justice, as yet, has not reiterated nor confirmed it 
implicitly. Again, this silence of the Court, however, does not entirely render the previous 
discourse devoid o f purpose. Certainly, all the Court did in Bosman is stating that the transfer 
fees at issue were by nature contingent and uncertain and also unrelated to the actual expenses
927 Concurring with Advocate General Lenz in this respect: Dubey, o.c., at 610.
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bome by clubs for training and were therefore unacceptable. It limited itself to these observations 
for they sufficed to condemn the former transfer system. For now, the Court hasn’t pronounced 
itself explicitly on which criteria would have to be satisfied for a new transfer system to be 
compatible with the exigencies of Community law. Consequently, it would be unwise and 
definitely premature to deduce positively from the foregoing that it is not vital for compensation 
fees in case of a transfer to be reduced proportionately under certain circumstances to be 
acceptable. Consequently, it still remains very much to be seen whether the new FIFA system of 
compensation for training and education can be regarded as appropriate even if it does not 
provide for an equitable reduction of the amount of compensation in case the player concerned 
has rendered services to the benefit of the training club.
The mechanism of compensation for training has been elaborated as an attempt to achieve 
the legitimate objective of encouraging football clubs to seek new talents and train young players. 
However, it is submitted one might wonder whether clubs will still have the necessary incentives 
to search for young players and train promising footballers if they are completely stripped of all 
advantages this training and education can engender. Already, the compensation fee to which 
training clubs are entitled in the event of a transfer of one of their young players to another club is 
limited to the actual costs incurred by this club for his training; if it has to be reduced further 
when or because the player has rendered services to the club which could be regarded as 
reimbursement for this training, clubs might just find this revised system of compensation 
completely ‘denatured* and decide that it is no longer worth to pursue their efforts and 
investments in this field. One might just be balancing on a thin rope here.
Arguably, the specific terms of the FIFA Regulations could leave some interesting space 
for manoeuvring on this issue. The new FIFA rules provide firstly, that for the purposes of 
calculating compensation, the training period of a player finishes at the end of the season of his 
21st birthday, and secondly, that a football club is entitled to claim compensation for training 
until the player in question has reached the age of 23. Therefore, it could be contemplated taking 
the Advocate General’s proposal literally: if a player stays at the club after his training and 
education has terminated, in principle at the age of 21, then the compensation payable in case of a 
transfer before he has reached the age of 23 could possibly somewhat be reduced. If, conversely,
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1a young player already appears occasionally for the first team of the club while his training 
period has not been completed yet, these performances should probably still be considered as part 
of his learning process and/or as an acceptable benefit in kind for the training club and should not 
lead to a diminution of an eventual compensation fee. At present, no mention is made in the 
current FIFA Regulations of a possible proportional reduction o f the compensation fee in the 
event of a transfer before the player has become 23 years old. Probably, this does not per se have 
to be problematic. Presumably, however, an auto-imposed proportional reduction of the 
compensation fee to which training clubs are entitled along the lines of the proposed subtle 
division might just render the Court o f Justice more inclined to accept the mechanism o f 
compensation for training and education as an appropriate means to reach the outlined aims of the 
system if it ever were forced to express its opinion on the issue.
2.2.4. Contingent and uncertain character of compensation fees
In its Bosman decision, the Court o f Justice has ruled that since the sporting future o f 
young players cannot be predicted with any certainty and because only a limited number of them 
actually succeed in playing professionally, fees received in case of a transfer are by nature 
contingent and uncertain. For this reason also, it ultimately held that the prospect of receiving 
these fees cannot be either a decisive factor in encouraging recruitment and training of young 
players or an adequate means of financing such activities, particularly in the case of smaller 
clubs.928 However correct and precise the premises may be, I respectfully disagree with the 
Court's conclusion, at least in part. Despite the indeed undoubtedly uncertain and aleatory 
character o f transfer fees, football clubs in general do still count on transfer income to finance 
their activities. Statistics demonstrate that for many o f  them, transfer fees even constitute a 
principal means of revenue, as well as income from ticket sales, sponsoring, merchandising and 
the selling o f television rights.929 Some clubs are really dependent -  to a greater or lesser extent - 
on regular income from out-going transfers.930 Consequently, it seems that it cannot be ignored
9:8 Bosman, par. 109.
929 See Demets & Killemaes, “Luis Figo naar WesterloT’, Trends, 10 August 2000, at 18, on the importance of 
transfers for the financial situation of the Belgian first division clubs,
930 Also Demets & Killemaes, “Voetbalmecenassen in ademnood” , Trends, 8 August 2002, at 38: one of the reasons 
for the currently precarious financial situation of many Belgian football clubs is the fact that they haven’t been able 
to conclude lucrative transfer deals.
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that the prospect o f receiving compensation fees does effectively constitute a decisive motivation
for many clubs to invest in the training and development of young players. Subsequently, the
* £ 
question remáins whether compensation fees are an adequate means of financing these activities,
in spite of their unpredictable and contingent character. In  this respect, it is interesting to observe
that Advocate General Lenz in his opinion in Bosman didn’t seem to attach too much importance
to this particular feature of the sums of compensation, for he didn’t consider their uncertain
nature as a stumble block for them to be regarded as appropriate. Obviously, however, the Court
thought of this differently and seemed to attach a lot of weight to this element. It must be
acknowledged that transfers are indeed a risky business, both from a financial and a sporting
point of view.931 The example of the recent adventures of Ajax Amsterdam serves perfectly to
illustrate this point. Under the direction o f coach Louis Van Gaal, the Dutch pride literally won
everything there is to win in the world o f club football in the mid nineties, from several national
championship titles and cup victories over the UEFA Champion’s League to the Intercontinental
Cup, with a team that was almost exclusively composed of players who had received their
training at the club. As a result, Ajax concluded several extremely lucrative transfer deals, as the
likes of Kluivert, Davids, Seedorf, Reiziger, Overmars & co. left the Netherlands to try their luck
in countries such as Italy, Spain or England. Subsequently, part of the money generated from
these transfers was invested again in the youth education centre of the club. However, the next
generation turned out to be much less talented, and immediately, the club had to adopt a much
lower profile, financially, because the young players, if the club already managed to transfer them
at all, yielded much lower fees, and contemporaneously also from a sporting point of view, as
these players were simply less good as their predecessors. Inevitably, this casts some doubt on the
adequacy of financing youth training programmes by means of compensation fees. However, it is
submitted that the importance o f this should not be overrated either. If this example proves
something at all, it must surely be that it would indeed be a mistake to put all eggs in one basket.
Admittedly, clubs which always and completely depend on the revenue generated from transfers
to support the recruitment and training programmes of their youth categories are bound to get in
to trouble sooner or later and will find themselves continuously facing ups and downs. Spreading
of the risk is therefore to be recommended. However, immediately deriving from this that
931 Financial manager Smets of Belgian first division club Sint-Truiden formulated it as follows: “Basing the budget 
on the income from out-going transfers is as playing roulette.”
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compensation fees in case of a transfer of a young player cannot be considered as an adequate 
means of financing the formation o f young football players is maybe jumping to conclusions a 
little bit too quickly. Arguably, where the money comes from does not really matter, whether it 
results from transfers or from gate receipts or other sources o f income, what counts is that a  
certain percentage o f the club’s income is invested in the training of young football players. For 
this purpose, all bits and pieces help. Besides, it is submitted that compensation received for the 
training and education of a young player is essentially no more uncertain or contingent than 
revenue generated from ticket sales, sponsoring, merchandising or selling o f television rights. For 
many a club’s cashier, it makes a huge financial difference whether the visiting opponent in one 
of the European competitions is one or the other obscure and unappealing Eastern European team 
or rather a sporting blockbuster such as Real Madrid. Clearly, even a simple draw for a 
competition thus has an undoubted influence on the attendance at the stadium or on the viewing 
figures at the television. Also straightforward sporting results have a great impact on the balance 
sheets of the clubs: successful performances will increase the financial potential o f a club, as 
more fans will come to cheer for their team live, television channels will be interested to 
broadcast the team’s matches, sponsors and advertisers will be attracted by the team’s success. 
Conversely, there’s another side to the medal: a sporting disappointment or an elimination may 
forcefully induce a club to review its ambitions. Nobody wants to be associated with a losing 
team. Summarising, the point which is being made here is the following: compensation fees for 
the training o f young players are admittedly inherently uncertain, the element of unpredictability 
is innate in their nature, for one will never be able to proclaim with absolute certainty that this or 
that young football player, however promising he may be, will make it into the professional 
world. The road to sporting success is covered with just too many hindrances. However, to a 
certain extent, the same can be said about virtually all other sources of income of football clubs. 
The elements of uncertainty and contingency are characteristic features of the football industry as 
a whole. Consequently, as such there seems to be no real reason why a system providing a club 
for compensation for training and education in the event of a transfer of one of its young players 
to another club could not be regarded as an acceptable means to attain the objective o f preserving 
the recruitment and development of young players.
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2 .3 . Second prong o f  the principle o f  proportionality: test o f  *necessity’
At thi& stage of the analysis it is already crunch time for the possible subsistence of a 
system based on compensation for training and education in case of a transfer, because we have 
arrived at the parting of the ways. The new FIFA Regulations implementing this mechanism of 
compensation for training and development in case of a transfer of a player under the age of 23 
are liable to constitute an obstacle to the freedom of movement of players, and are therefore in 
principle prohibited by Article 39 EC. However that may be, the restrictive features of this set of 
rules might be justifiable, as it does occupy an important place in the policy of encouraging 
football clubs to recruit and train young talents, which is recognised as a legitimate objective. 
Ultimately, the outcome of the proportionality test will therefore be decisive for the fate of the 
new compensation system. In this particular occasion, it is clear that this will be a close call.
Firstly, it is already not completely crystal clear whether the first hurdle of 
‘appropriateness*, which means that application of the measure has to be such as to ensure 
achievement of the legitimate aim in question, is satisfactorily taken. The analysis effectuated 
above has demonstrated that it appears possible to regard the revised system as an appropriate 
one, but then, by the same token, it cannot be taken for granted either, as there are still a couple 
o f incognita which will have to be clarified before one can render a final judgement on the issue. 
In  the first place, and most importantly, it is still unclear exactly how much weight has to be 
attached to the fact that the element of uncertainty is again omnipresent in the new system, as a 
football club will only be financially compensated for the expenses it made for the training and 
the education of a young player when he is effectively transferred to another club. If the Court of 
Justice remains indeed strenuously opposed to the aleatory character of transfer fees, as it 
appeared to be in Bosnian, then that would immediately mean the end of the story, given the fact 
that this uncertainty about transfers is clearly inherent. Under this worst case scenario, it would 
thus become virtually impossible to establish any alternative system of compensation in the event 
o f a transfer, for the*Court would in all likelihood reject any proposal as an-inappropriate means 
to realise the aims of recruitment and training of young players. This would inevitably signify the 
end of the long-standing tradition o f this important aspect of the transfer system. If however, on 
the other hand, the Court’s objections against the uncertain and contingent nature of the
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compensation mechanism prove to be less vigorous or exclusionary, and it has been argued above 
that this attitude seems to be preferable, there could possibly be a way out of the conundrum. 
However that* may be, even if the Court o f Justice were to be found willing to turn a blind eye to 
this particular feature of compensation fees, it still remains to  be seen whether it would accept 
that the calculation o f the amount of compensation payable by the acquiring club is based on an 
approximate lump sum, corresponding to the average of the expenses made for training and 
education of young players by all clubs belonging to the same category, rather than on the real 
costs incurred by the selling club for the training and education of the player in question. 
Presumably, this issue shouldn’t pose too many problems, as the flat-rate sums should approach 
very much the actual costs. The new mechanism undoubtedly has the advantage of having 
established precisely in theory how the amount of compensation will be determined, but it is still 
unsure what will be the practical impact of the use of the ‘player factor’ and whether its 
application will not, in fact, amount to a restriction to the freedom of movement. Caution is 
therefore still required in this respect. Finally, it will also have to be ascertained in practice 
whether this mechanism, basically limiting compensation to the actual costs borne by the clubs 
for training of the player concerned and stripped of any other factors linked to the skills of the 
player and thus liable to increase the amount of compensation due, will still figure as a sufficient 
impetus or stimulus for the clubs to continue pursuing the objective of seeking and developing 
young footballers. Allegedly, this is going to be the case. Clubs with a youth training centre will 
always or at least regularly be able to draw out of their own reservoir some young talents to 
strengthen their first team. In this way, young football players can repay their club in kind on the 
field for the investments made in them  I f  these youngsters are transferred to another team  the 
application o f the new rules on compensation for training does prevent selling clubs from asking 
extravagant transfer sums, as they sometimes used to do in the past in search for the jackpot, but 
the introduction of the player factor in the calculation mechanism guarantees the training clubs of 
an equitable and adequate return on investment if they can transfer one of their youth products on 
a more or less regular basis. Besides, the introduction o f the so-called ‘solidarity mechanism’ in 
the new FIFA Regulations -yields further potential financial rewards for training clubs: it is stated 
that if a non-amateur player moves during the course of a contract, a proportion of 5% o f any 
transfer sum paid to the previous club will be distributed as a solidarity contribution to the club(s)
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that played an active role in the training and education of the player.932 This solidarity
contribution will be apportioned between the clubs with which the player has been registered in
* Cfunction of the number of years they provided him with training and education between the ages
of 12 and 23:933
- 12-13 years and 13-14 years: 5%
- 14-15 years and remaining years up until 23:10%
Let us now briefly take up the previous hypothetical example again. If our player in question 
is transferred subsequently from Anderlecht to Benfica Lisbon for the amount of 2 million Euro, 
5% or 100.000 Euro will be distributed over all the player’s previous training clubs:
- Meerbeke: 3 years between 12 and 15: 20.000 Euro
- Cambridge: 4 years between 15 and 19: 40.000 Euro
- Fiorentina: 2 years between 19 and 21: 20.000 Euro
- Besançon: 3 years, out of which 2 useful between 21 and 23: 20.000 Euro
The prospect of potentially receiving supplementary amounts of money as a kind of ‘delayed 
compensation’, this time no longer strictly linked to the actual costs for training but also 
somehow reflecting the success of the sporting career of the player in question, might become an 
determining factor in a football club’s decision to continue o r even start with its youth 
recruitment and formation programmes. Adding it all up together, it is asserted that the entire 
compensation package remains sufficiently attractive for clubs to invest in the development of 
young football players.
However, even if the new system o f compensation for football training elaborated by the 
football authorities were to be considered as an appropriate means to achieve the preconceived 
objective by their European counterparts, that does not do the thing yet, as it still has to receive 
the predicate 'necessary' in order to be finally acceptable from the point of view of the 
Community provisions on freedom of movement of workers, in the sense that it must be the least 
restrictive means to realise the objective pursued This implies that there are no means available
932 Article 25 FIFA Regulation 2001.
933 Article 10 FIFA Application Regulation 2001.
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with which the same legitimate aim can be achieved in a less restrictive way, in other words in a
way which poses less problems with regard to the relevant Treaty provisions on free movement.
C
2.3.1. Alternative 1: ‘Pattern-contracts’
As has been demonstrated above, the football bodies FIFA and UEFA briefly flirted w ith  
some possible ideas, firstly in the aftermath of the Bosnian decision and more recently during th e  
transfer reform negotiations with the European Commission, but never gave a firm impression o f  
considering these as real, valuable alternatives to the transfer system. In view of the specific 
requirements of Community law, we are compelled though to give these proposals som ewhat 
more room for consideration. Firstly there is the possibility o f introducing the mechanism o f  th e  
so-called ‘pattern contract*, applicable already in France, which involves the obligation upon th e  
player to sign the first professional contract with the football club that provided him with h is  
training. Comprehensible and legitimate as it may appear at first scrutiny to allow the developing 
club to pick the first fruits of their efforts and investments in the young players, from a legal po in t 
of view this solution is clearly problematic: not only does it uphold the technique o f  
compensating the training club for the training of the player when he is transferred for the first 
time, which has already been held to be restrictive under Article 39 EC in itself, it also introduces 
yet another obstacle to the rights of free movement of players, for it requires them to join th e  
professional ranks o f their training club. This particular obligation for players to sign their first 
professional contract with their training club goes even beyond a simple barrier to the exercise o f  
the free movement rights, it amounts to a complete, albeit temporary, ban or negation of the right 
to freedom of movement. Instead of being less restrictive than the system of compensation fo r 
training, this proposed alternative seems to erect even more obstacles to the freedom o f  
movement. In spite o f its apparent strengths or advantages such as its simplicity, the security 
which it offers with regard to the protection of young football players and, importantly, its 
workability in practice, as the example o f France clearly demonstrates, in the end this possibility 
should nevertheless probably be rejected -in my opinion.
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( 2.3.2. Alternative 2: Redistribution of income through pooling of resources
The second possible alternative then, which consists of a pooling of resources in a 
centrally administered fund which are subsequently to be redistributed over the football clubs that 
make efforts to recruit and train young players, sounds more appealing at first sight, for it is not 
hindered by two important downsides o f  the FIFA transfer mechanism of compensation for 
training. First of all, the element of uncertainty or unpredictability which is indissolubly 
connected to a system based on transfers o f  players from one club to another, is absent in this 
system. Clubs involved in the recruitment and development of young football players will no 
longer be dependent on a possible reimbursement a posteriori, they will a priori be ensured of 
financing for their costs and efforts, coming out of the central fund. This undoubtedly constitutes 
a significant step forwards, because it allows clubs to rationalise their efforts and to plan things 
more accurately. Secondly, also from a legal point of view, this solution seems to be laudable, for 
it does not create any obstacle to the freedom of movement of workers and does thus not risk to 
infringe any Treaty provisions. For these reasons, the mechanism of pooling and redistribution of 
resources deserves unequivocal support, provided it can be set to work in practice. Indeed, this 
alternative to the FIFA system of compensation for training is to be preferred if and only if it also 
succeeds in achieving the same objective o f  recruitment and training of young football players. 
Building castles in the air is relatively easy, realising them effectively is yet a completely 
different matter. This requirement might prove to be the Achilles heel of the proposal, for it will 
involve a complete change in the mindset o f football clubs, which have all been dependent on 
revenue from transfers since decades, albeit in differing degrees. And practice has shown that 
football clubs are often extremely resilient to  change.
Presumably, the crucial issue, namely how to finance this operation, will not prove to be 
too problematic. One can imagine many possibilities to finance the fund: first of all, in view of 
the undisputed educational or vocational characteristics of youth football training programmes, 
even more so now that the modified FIFA Regulations explicitly emphasise the need to guarantee 
suitable arrangements for the academic education of the youngsters, Member State governments 
appear to be at liberty to dedicate a specific item in the annual budget to this programme and
291
deposit a given amount of money in the central football fund. Furthermore, money could also be 
generated from various other sources: to name but a few, private undertakings, especially firms 
with products'aimed at the market of the youngsters, could invest sums of money to sponsor the 
youth programmes, a part of the money received from the selling of television rights or a certain 
percentage o f the clubs* gate receipts (ticketing) could be reserved for this purpose, etc. All the 
money will be gathered together in one central fund, preferably to be administered by the 
respective national football associations. Subsequently, one has to establish objective criteria on 
the basis o f which all incoming revenue can be redistributed over the football clubs. Relevant 
criteria will include available materials, equipment and infrastructure, amount of personnel such 
as teachers, coaches, physical trainers, physiotherapists, numbers of young players, etc. It is 
probable one will also have to fix minimum standards, below which no money will be granted, 
and maximum numbers, above which clubs will have to bear the costs themselves. These criteria 
will have to be reviewed on a regular basis. And supervision will be necessary to verify that the 
money is used for the right purposes.
Feasible and appealing as all this may look, there remains one major issue which casts a 
dark shadow over the ultimate viability o f this ‘redistribution through pooling* project: the 
motivation o f the clubs to organise the best training and education programmes possible. 
Basically, the entire system for the search of talent and the promotion of youth football boils 
down to the fact that clubs provide young players with a kind of education, schooling, as they 
receive vocational training, a ‘training on the job*, which culminates, ideally speaking, if 
everything turns out well, in a professional football career. It speaks for itself that clubs which 
undertake to nurture young football talents need financial means so as to be able to realise their 
endeavours. In the past, many clubs have invested a lot of money, time and effort in training 
centres in the hope of developing young talented football players who could represent the first 
team of the club and/or be transferred to another team. This way, they generated revenue through 
transfer fees for the training club part of which was reinvested in the club’s youth work to keep it 
* running. Nowadays, many clubs still count on income from outgoing transfers of young players 
to survive financially. In a new system based on pooling of resources in a central fund which 
would then be redistributed between the clubs, clubs would be assured of receiving money to 
invest in youth programmes for the simple reason that they exist, or that they have a youth
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centre.934 The reverse side of the medal is that clubs evidently will not be paid a second time for 
the training of the player if he then moves to another club at a later time.-Jfust like a normal school 
or education 'centre does not receive money if a pupil changes school. This particular feature of 
this system may considerably weaken the incentive of the clubs to look for the so-called ‘black 
pearl* or the ‘white blackbird’. Guaranteed of the money and deprived of the potential ‘extra 
advantages’ o f a transfer-based system, clubs risk falling into a state of complacency with regard 
to the recruitment and training o f youngsters. It speaks for itself that this would have an 
extremely harmful effect on the functioning of the youth schemes. But then, it must be 
acknowledged that this risk also already exists in a system in which the compensation payable in 
case of a transfer appropriately reflects the costs incurred for the training of the player.
2.4. Evaluation
In the first place, it must be reiterated once more that the new rules on compensation for 
training, which are liable to hinder the freedom of movement o f footballers, can only be 
objectively justified if the Court were to confirm that the need to ensure the recruitment and 
training of young players constitutes an overriding requirement in the general interest.
Furthermore, it must be observed that the test of compliance with the principle of 
proportionality has been strictly applied in this context.935 Admittedly, it is by no means certain 
that the Court of Justice would actually carry out such close scrutiny of the new rules on 
compensation for training if it were asked to deliver a judgement on their lawfulness under 
Community law. These rules are not manifestly inappropriate, and it cannot be excluded that the 
Court would not be willing to engage in a profound examination o f the imponderables of the 
potential alternatives, for example the redistribution of money through pooling of resources, just 
to consider whether they might constitute a good ‘less restrictive alternative*.
934 As also pointed out by Dubey, o.c., at 640-605.
935 Scott, “Mandatory or Imperative Requirements in the EU and in the WTO’*, in Barnard and Scott (eds.), The 
Legal Foundations o f the Single Market: Unpacking the Premises (Hart, 2002) at 269-270: The principle of 
proportionality has been strictly applied by the Court in its case law to prevent Member States making abuse of the 
flexible instrument of ‘objective justification.’
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In any event, both the method of compensation for training in the event of a transfer as the
mechanism of redistribution of money through pooling of resources, in a central fund can
c~ v*probably be Withhold as an appropriate means to ensure the need of preserving the search for
talent and the training and education o f young football players. However, both alternatives fail to
convince completely. It could therefore be envisaged to combine the strengths of each system, in
an attempt to eradicate the downsides of it. In this vein, Dubey already suggested that it would be
a matter of introducing somehow an element of security or certainty into the general framework
of transfers to compensate for the uncertain character of transfers for the whole picture to become
acceptable to the Court.936 He advanced the proposal that a system based on a redistribution of a
fixed amount of money to all clubs, originating from a financial fund, to be used for youth
development purposes, in combination with a mechanism of compensating for costs incurred for
training in the event o f a transfer, could turn out to be workable. The fund could, for example, be
financed by a contribution of all clubs consisting of 5% of the budget they annually spent of
players’ wages. He considered that such a redistribution of a fixed sum would have the advantage
of rendering the uncertain character of transfers unobtrusive, for it would be independent of the
number of players formed or effectively transferred to another team. Subsequently, this sum of
redistribution will be supplemented with a  compensation in the event of a transfer, in order to
ensure that clubs would effectively do efforts to recruit and train young football players in the
best possible way. Clearly, the system of compensation in the event of a transfer constitutes the
core of his proposal. This is effectively one possibility. And probably it is even an realistic one,
in view of the club’s and association’s obvious reticence to renounce completely from a transfer-
based system. Be that as it may, from a Community free movement law point of view, the
opposite option, going out from a pooling o f resources and with only a minor ‘transfer touch’,
might be preferable. Evidently, this will require a more substantial amount of money to be
collected in the central fund than in the system proposed by Dubey, as the clubs will receive no
compensation for training anymore in the event of a transfer o f a young player. On the basis of
the money which is redistributed out of the pool, the clubs should be enabled to set up their
training and -education centres. It is clear that clubs are entitled to invest more money into their
youth programmes than the amount they receive out o f the pool. This way, a certain club’s
training centre may become an attraction pole for promising youngsters. Clubs may start
936 Dubey, o.c., at 604-605.
competing with each other for the services of the talented young players, offering them a high- 
level formation. Generally, these clubs will be the first to benefit from their quality training and 
education as fhey can be repaid in kind by these players if or when they make it into the first team 
of the club. O f course, the danger always exists that some young players will be lured away by 
talent scouts of other clubs. It is even inevitable that this happens, as some clubs have simply 
much more financial means than others. However, it is submitted that this should not negatively 
affect club’s efforts in their youth centres: well-structured clubs will never or rarely lose all their 
good youngsters at once, as many of them will be happy to stay at the club, at least during the 
initial stages of their career. France’s newest superstar Djibril Cissd is probably the best example 
at the moment. In spite of the fact that managers from the best teams all over Europe promise him 
mountains of gold, he has decided to stay a little longer at Guy Roux* Auxerre, where he has 
received his formation and where he quietly gets the chance to improve gradually and steadily. 
Only a couple of hundred miles away, Nantes* young goalkeeper Michael Landreau took exactly 
the same decision, turning down a concrete offer from Barcelona. In any event, one could 
consider to transpose the so-called ‘solidarity mechanism* which appears in the new FIFA 
Regulations into this system: if players move between clubs before the expiry of their contract at 
a later stage of their career, a portion of the transfer sum could be redistributed over the training 
clubs. The prospect of possibly receiving an extra later if a player really makes it in the 
professional world, success which is reflected in the transfer sum that clubs are willing to pay to 
engage him, should be an interesting additional incentive for clubs to keep up with the good 
work!
3. Maintenance of contractual stability
From the outset, it must be indicated that the issue of contractual stability is highly 
contentious. The FIFA rules relating to respect for contracts may prove to be not only 
problematic from the point of Community free movement law, but also risk falling foul of the 
relevant national labour laws in the different Member States of the European Union and even of 
the national contract laws.937 Arguably, especially in this context the individual rights to freedom
937 In this respect, consult Caiger and O ’Leary, "The End of the Affair: The ‘Anelka’ Doctrine -  The Problem of 
Contract Stability in English Professional Football", in Caiger and Gardiner (cds.). o.c., 197.
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of movement of the sportsmen must be carefully weighed against the claims for special treatment 
of the sporting associations.
c:
3.1. Minimum and maximum duration o f contracts
According to the new FIFA Regulations for the Status and the Transfer of Players, 
players* contracts shall have a minimum duration of one year and a maximum duration of five 
years.938 Furthermore, it is specified that contracts for a different period are only permitted if this 
is consistent with national laws.939
In the first place, it must be observed that this additional reference to national legislation 
is to be applauded, for it clearly indicates that FIFA readily acknowledges that in this particular 
matter, its regulations are subordinate to the different national labour laws. The lawfulness of a 
clause within a player’s contract providing for a duration of the employment relationship between 
the club and the player between one and five years is thus primarily dependent on the specific 
content of the national labour law provisions applicable to the given situation, which may, as the 
case may be, accept divergences in both directions and allow contracts with a duration of less 
than one year or more than five years. If this is indeed the case, in these circumstances absolute 
priority has to  be given to the relevant national legislation.
From the point of view of the compatibility with the Community provisions on freedom of 
movement for workers, the clause permitting a contractual duration of maximum five years 
seems to be relatively innocuous.940 In combination with a prohibition of a unilateral breach of 
contract, as previously used to be the case, a term of five years would probably have raised 
questions under Article 39 EC, but things look entirely different now that unilateral termination 
of a contract has been made possible in the new FIFA Regulations, as will be demonstrated 
below. Admittedly, the precise maximum of five years appears to be rather arbitrarily established, 
but essentially, there is nothing wrong about it. It can be considered as an equitable attempt to
938 Article 4.2 FIFA Regulations 2001.
939 Article 4.2. FIFA Regulations 2001.
940 See also van Staveren & Boetekees, “Voetbaltransfers onder vuur van de Europese Commissie en de FIFA?’, 50 
Ars Aequi 4 (2001) 224, at 231-232.
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reconcile the various interests at stake in this matter. Both players and clubs often prefer to 
engage themselves for a somewhat longer period, the former to be guaranteed of a job for at least 
the duration 6f the contract, and the latter to be ensured of the continued services of these players 
or alternatively of receiving a transfer fee in the event of a premature termination of the contract. 
But by the same token, one wanted to avoid that players would commit themselves contractually 
for (almost) the entire duration of their sporting career to one club. Not only, this would be liable 
to hinder or preclude their rights to freedom of movement of workers; moreover it would 
basically exclude that they would ever arrive at the end of their contract, which would practically 
allow their clubs to easily circumvent the principles ensuing from the Bosnian decision of the 
Court of Justice, as they would always be entitled to receive a transfer sum in the relatively likely 
event the player would nevertheless move to another club before the expiry of his contract.941 The 
demands of both parties involved have duly been taken into consideration. The outcome of a 
maximum duration of five years for a contract seems to be an acceptable compromise in the light 
of the limited duration o f a footballer’s career, which generally does not extend beyond 10-15 
years. Furthermore, in this connection it should not be forgotten that both the clubs as the players 
always still have the opportunity to prolong their employment relationship after these five years, 
if they wish to do so. However, again it needs to be reiterated that this rule of a maximum of five 
years only holds true as long as national legislation does not stipulate it differently.
Secondly, at first scrutiny, there seems to be nothing really objectionable either about the 
measure providing for a minimum contractual duration of one year. Strictly legally speaking, 
even this minimum duration could of course be conceived as a restriction to the right o f freedom 
of movement for workers protected under Article 39 EC. However that may be, principally, it 
seems to correspond perfectly to the aim o f preserving the regularity o f sporting competitions942 
to impose on players the obligation to sign contracts of at least one year, so as to prevent them 
from club-hopping at any moment. Besides, this provision seems to comply with the 
requirements of proportionality, as the minimum duration remains limited in time to one year or a 
sporting season, which in sporting circles is always a closed entity. In this context, some 
additional observations deserve to be made, however. Firstly, the same proviso must be made as
941 To give but an example, Ronaldo had signed a contract with a duration o f 9 years with FC Barcelona, but already 
after one year, he moved to Intemazionale.
942 This aim has been recognised as a legitimate one in the case of Lehtonen, which will be discussed below.
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with the clause on the maximum duration o f contracts: the FIFA rule is only valid insofar as it 
doesn’t go against the relevant national legislation.943 Secondly, if we associate this rule with the 
one on limited transfer windows, which will be discussed in detail below,'the question arises as to 
whether the minimum contractual duration of one year should also apply to contracts signed 
during the mid-season transfer period? If  this were indeed to be the case, then contracts 
concluded for one year would terminate during the mid-season transfer window of the next 
season. It is submitted that the rationale underlying the principle o f the one year minimum, 
namely ensuring the club more or less o f the services of the player for the entire duration of the 
sporting season, doesn’t seem to apply in this particular circumstance, for it would entail that a 
player would be linked to a club for the second part of one championship and the first part of the 
next. And in the world of sport, these are completely separate events, which as such have nothing 
to do with each other, since at the beginning of each new sporting season, all competitors start 
again from scratch.944 It is therefore respectfully advocated that, at least in the specific situation 
of transfers halfway through the championship, it could be envisaged to allow the conclusion o f 
contracts for the remaining duration of the season, in other words for more or less six months. 
The alternative of imposing a duration of at least one year and a half in the event of a mid-season 
transfer, thus until the end of the next regular sporting season, seems to be more questionable 
from the Community free movement angle. More specifically, the criterion of necessity under the 
test of proportionality would appear not to be complied with in similar circumstances.
To a large extent, this is a rather theoretical discussion o f course, against the background 
of the widespread tendency to agree upon long-term contracts in an attempt to avoid players 
walking out of a club for free at the end o f their contract, but nevertheless, it might be worth 
examining the issue, for there will always be circumstances in which clubs may consider it more 
appropriate to call upon the services of a player only for a short term. For example, if a team 
finds itself at the bottom of the ranking at Christmas, it might contemplate to do an extra financial 
effort to avoid relegation and look for reinforcement o f the squad, engaging players with that sole 
particular objective in mind. Often, these players* salary demands weigh heavily on the budget-of
943 See also van Staveren & Boetekees, “Voetbaltransfers onder vuur van de Europese Commissie en de FIFA?’, 50 
Ars Aequi 4  (2001) 224, at 231-232.
944 Exception made of course for the teams which have been promoted or relegated at the a id  of a sporting season. 
They will start in a new league, at a higher, respectively lower level than in the previous season.
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the club, and can only be sustained -  if at all -  for a short duration. If such a club were 
constrained to  offer these players a contract of at least one year, it might have to call the affair
( r
off, as it often cannot run the risk of remaining saddled with these contracts in the case of a 
negative outcome on the pitch. The situation would be entirely different if it were entitled to 
conclude contracts for only half a season, as it would be able to release itself from these 
contractual burdens after the ‘emergency operation’ at the end of the season, regardless of 
whether it has been successful or not. Arguably, therefore, in these and similar circumstances, it 
could be considered to permit contracts with a duration o f only half a season.
Presumably, by the same token, the option of limiting contractual stability to the next 
transfer window rather than covering at least one year could also be extended to contracts agreed 
upon during the main transfer period in summer. Undoubtedly, valid arguments can be advanced 
supporting these short-term contracts also at the beginning o f the season. Just consider the 
following example: after the departure of striker Jan Koller to Borussia Dortmund in the summer 
of 2001, Anderlecht had secured themselves of the services of Yugoslavia’s Nenad Jestrovic to 
replace the giant Czech in attack. However, already during the first training sessions o f the new 
season, it became clear that the newcomer was severely injured, and that he would be out for the 
first part of the Belgian championship as well as for the initial stages of UEFA’s Champion’s 
League. It could possibly be advocated that the management o f the Brussels* club, when they 
returned to explore the transfer market for a suitable replacement, should have been allowed to 
offer that player in question only half a year contract, to get through the difficult period until 
Jestrovic returned to fitness. However plausible that argument may sound, I admit being 
somewhat more reticent about this. My personal opinion is that when a club signs a player during 
the transfer period at the beginning of the season, the starting point should be that the co­
operation between the club and the player will last at least for the entire duration of the sporting 
competition. Admittedly, along the way, things may evolve in one or the other direction, even 
drastically, and precisely for that reason, one has instituted a second mid-season transfer window, 
to facilitate changes to be effectuated, and during which certain principles may be applied in a 
more flexible way, but I am inclined to say that one should leave intact the initial intention to 
honour a contract o f one year. Consequently, it is submitted that derogations from the rule of a
2 9 9
3.2. Unilateral breach o f contract
The former rule denying players to unilaterally denounce their running contracts with 
their club o f affiliation has been replaced in the amended H FA  Regulations by a whole new set 
of provisions. In the first place, it is stipulated that in case a contract which has been signed up to  
the player’s 28th birthday is unilaterally terminated without ‘just cause’ or ‘sporting just cause’ 
during the first 3 years, sports sanctions shall be imposed and compensation shall be payable.945 
For contracts concluded after the 28th birthday of the player in question, the same principles are 
applicable, but only during the first 2 years.946 Unilateral breach without these excusable grounds 
of just cause or sporting just cause after the protected periods o f 3 years or 2 years respectively 
will no longer result in sanctions, but compensation will remain due.947 In any event, unilateral 
breach o f contract without just cause is prohibited during the season.948
Even though it must be recognised that the newly drafted rules are undoubtedly 
substantially more flexible and permissible than its strict predecessor and thus clearly constitute a  
step forward in the right direction, it nevertheless cannot be denied that these rules -  or at least 
parts of it - still run the risk of being considered contrary to Article 39 EC, for they remain liable 
to preclude or deter nationals of a  Member State from leaving their country in order to exercise 
their right to freedom of movement 949 Furthermore, it cannot be excluded that they also 
contravene national labour legislation and/or national contract laws.
3.2.1. Duration o f the ‘protected period’
In order to escape that conclusion, FIFA stresses that contractual relations between 
• players and clubs must be governed by a regulatory system which responds to the specific needs
945 Article 21.1(a) FIFA Regulations 2001.
** Article 21.1(b) FIFA Regulations 2001.
947 Article 21.2(a) FIFA Regulations 2001.
948 Article 21.1(c) and 21.2(b) FIFA Regulations 2001.
m inim um  duration o f  a  contract o f  one year should only be accepted under certain circum stances,
and only during the  m id-season transfer w indow.
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3.2. Unilateral breach o f contract
The former rule denying players to unilaterally denounce their running contracts with 
their club of affiliation has been replaced in the amended FIFA Regulations by a whole new set 
of provisions. In the first place, it is stipulated that in case a contract which has been signed up to 
the player’s 28th birthday is unilaterally terminated without ‘just cause’ or ‘sporting just cause’ 
during the first 3 years, sports sanctions shall be imposed and compensation shall be payable.945 
For contraas concluded after the 28th birthday of the player in question, the same principles are 
applicable, but only during the first 2 years.946 Unilateral breach without these excusable grounds 
of just cause or sporting just cause after the protected periods of 3 years or 2 years respectively 
will no longer result in sanctions, but compensation will remain due.947 In any event, unilateral 
breach of contract without just cause is prohibited during the season.948
Even though it must be recognised that the newly drafted rules are undoubtedly 
substantially more flexible and permissible than its strict predecessor and thus clearly constitute a 
step forward in the right direction, it nevertheless cannot be denied that these rules -  o r at least 
parts of it - still run the risk of being considered contrary to Article 39 EC, for they remain liable 
to preclude or deter nationals of a Member State from leaving their country in order to exercise 
their right to freedom of movement.949 Furthermore, it cannot be excluded that they also 
contravene national labour legislation and/or national contract laws.
3.2.1. Duration of the ‘protected period’
In order to escape that conclusion, FIFA stresses that contractual relations between 
players and clubs must be governed by a regulatory system which responds to the specific needs
945 Article 21,1(a) FIFA Regulations 2001.
946 Article 21.1(b) FIFA Regulations 2001.
947 Article 21.2(a) FIFA Regulations 2001.
948 Article 21.1(c) and 21.2(b) FIFA Regulations 2001.
rninimum duration o f  a  contract o f  one year should only be accepted under certain circum stances,
and only during the m id-season transfer w indow .
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of football and which strikes the right balance between the respective interests o f players and 
clubs and preserves the regularity and proper functioning of sporting competition. It thus attempts 
to justify the êxistence of these rules on the ground of sporting stability, which it regards as being 
of paramount importance in football, from the perspective of both clubs, players and the 
public.94 50 Firstly, management and board o f clubs claim contractual stability is absolutely vital in 
view of the team building efforts o f clubs. It is often argued it takes at least two or three years to  
form a homogeneous team out of a group o f players and to make them perform at the best of their 
capabilities, so it is considered essential to be sure to be able to work throughout that whole 
period with the same players. Secondly, contractual stability is also estimated to be to the benefit 
of players for it provides them with valuable employment security. Finally, also the public and 
the fans are expected to welcome contractual stability with enthusiasm. Supporters often like to  
identify themselves with their favourite club’s star players. They shouldn’t be deprived of this 
sentiment by players leaving at the whim o f  the moment.
In my opinion, however, serious doubts may be raised as to the appropriateness and the 
necessity o f this means of contractual stability to reach the perceived ends of team building, 
employment security for players or identification by the public, legitimate as they potentially 
might be. Arguably, all elements advanced to underscore the indispensability o f contractual 
stability in professional football can easily be counterbalanced by arguments of - a t  least- equal 
authoritative force. Firstly, it must be recognised that the arguments as to team building of clubs 
has a certain appeal. Some clubs do indeed plan ahead and invest time, effort and money in view 
of fiiture success, often at the expense o f immediate results. During the transfer negotiations, 
Arsène Wenger, Arsenal’s successful manager, set himself up as an eminent advocate of this 
working method, threatening to leave club management if contractual stability was drastically 
touched upon. However intelligent or admirable this approach may be, factors such as the 
enormous coverage o f the media and the press, the huge investments of sponsors and 
shareholders or the ever-growing patterns expectation o f the public -to  name but a few- produce 
the result that in present-day football, clubs which- adhere to a long-term vision are easily 
outnumbered by clubs opting for instantaneous success. Champion’s League, Uefa Cup,
949 Bosnian, par. 96.
950 See http://www.fifa.com: Principles fo r  the amendment o f FIFA rules regarding international transfers, at p. 2.
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Intercontinental Cup, Supercup, national championship, national cup, league cup, qualification in
Europe, avoidance o f relegation, promotion, etc.: during the course of angular season, clubs are
4 t"offered m aaf platforms on which to excel. The only thing that really counts is winning, if
possible preferably uninterruptedly from August until May. After watching his team obtain a
string of disappointing results, AC Milan’s president and Italy’s prime minister Silvio Berlusconi
engaged Turkish coach Fatih Terim, the former magician of Galatasaray Istanbul, in the summer
of 2001 to make his team return to greatness, offering him, however, only a one-year contract,
with an option for a second. The message being conveyed was clear as sunlight: “if you don’t win
today, you can go tomorrow”. And effectively, so it happened: a couple of months later, after a
series of somewhat ambivalent performances of the ‘rossoneri’, Terim was already sent packing,
and was replaced by Carlo Ancelotti. So far for team building thus. In this respect, it could of
course be argued that this particular example is not really an appropriate or accurate one, as it
concerns a coach, not a player, and it is well-known that contractual stability linked to the job of
a trainer almost sounds like a contradictio in terminis. However, to this it can be replied that this
example illustrates perfectly the limited value of the team building aim, which is clearly
subordinate to the economic need of immediate sporting success. Naturally, the players are the
constituent parts of a team, but in general, it is the coach who moulds it concretely. Licensing the
trainer, who is in charge of the building of the team, therefore inevitably means that the project
risks stumbling. And if team building is not really an objective which is properly pursued, this
already inevitably prompts the question why there should be such an extensive need for
contractual stability. Secondly, as to the identification o f the public with the player, also this
argument does not seem watertight. It is submitted that fans identify in the first place with a team,
and only in a subsidiary way with the players the team is composed of. Certain players may
indeed become the symbol of their club and the idol for the supporters, such as Johan Cruyff for
Ajax Amsterdam in the Netherlands in the seventies, Jan Ceulemans for Club Brugge in Belgium
in the eighties or David Beckham for Manchester United in the nineties, but in general, this
particular fame or glory is extremely superficial and volatile. Normally, it lasts only as long as
the players in question are at the club. When they retire or leave, their representative or leading
role is taken over by a new hero the fans will worship. For nine years Gabriel Batistuta was the
undisputed king of Florence. But when he decided to make the move to AS Roma in the Summer
of 2000 to finally realise his ambition to win a championship’s title in the closing stages of his
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playing career, Manuel Rui Costa immediately took his place in the hearts of the Fiorentina fans. 
‘The king is^dead, long live the king.” To the contrary, affection or k>ve for a particular club 
never dies. The bond o f allegiance between a real fan and his preferred club is just like a marriage 
“for better and for worse.” The real fan doesn’t care who saves the penalties or scores the goals, 
as long as the team performs well. Again, there are already some doubts as to the objective 
pursued as such, let alone about the issue whether contractual stability is the best way to achieve 
it. Finally, also the importance o f the aspect of players’ employment security needs to  be 
somewhat downplayed, or at least re-evaluated in my opinion. Job security for players appears as 
a laudable objective, worthy o f adequate protection. It is indeed true that the new FIFA regulation 
of unilateral termination of a contract works equally in both directions, so that also clubs cannot 
unilaterally breach a contract without ‘just cause’ or ‘just sporting cause’, at least if they want to  
avoid sporting sanctions being applied to  them. However that may be, it shouldn’t be forgotten 
that termination o f a contract under common consent remains possible at any moment, even 
within the so-called ‘protected period’. Admittedly, at first sight, these two situations seem to 
cover two completely distinct realities: unilateral breach of contract occurs when one party to it 
wishes to bring an end to the co-operation, whereas for termination of a contract under mutual 
agreement, both parties need to consent. It simply takes two to tango. In the most likely scenario 
concerning the latter situation, the player concerned ultimately always has to consent to a transfer 
before the expiry o f  his contract. For example, in the summer o f 2001, the transfers o f Italy’s 
national goalkeeper Francesco Toldo and Portugal’s Manuel Rui Costa from Fiorentina to Parma 
fell through at the last moment because both players refused to sign a contract for the club o f 
Emilia-Romagna even though both clubs had reached a transfer deal. However, it is cautiously 
submitted that care should be taken not to over-accentuate the theoretical differences between 
these two situations in current football practice. The preceding example may point in another 
direction, but these are top class players who put considerable weight in the balance during 
transfer negotiations. Conversely, in most cases, the player-club relation is still one o f David 
versus Goliath, and if a club is really intended to get rid of a player’s contract, it will often find 
ways to do so. And this is precisely where the shoe pinches. In principle, there’s nothing wrong 
in se with termination of a contract by mutual consent being possible at any given moment 
whereas unilateral breach of contract is prohibited during a certain period: if club and player both 
come to the conclusion that it is better for all parties to end the collaboration, they should
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definitely be able to do so. However, problems arise if the balance of powers between the actors 
involved is not equal: in that case, and unfortunately, this is the case of many football players, the 
termination o f  the contract, though mutually agreed upon at first scrutiny/may very well turn out 
to be not that consensual at all. Therefore, the very fact that this possibility exists renders the 
whole argument o f contractual stability for reasons of employment security probably not 
nugatory, but at least less forceful or convincing in the current football practice. As long as clubs 
can basically force a player to accept a transfer, this deplorable practice effectively defeats the 
purpose of employment security to a large extent.
It derives from the foregoing that aims such as team building, identification of the public 
and the fans with the players of a team and, to a lesser extent, employment security for players, 
cannot really be considered as objectives which are always unequivocally pursued under all 
circumstances in the football world. This is not to say that the element of contractual stability has 
no important role to play in the transfer rules. On the contrary, it is an essential means to achieve 
the end of preserving the regularity and proper functioning of the sporting competition. 
Consequently, it is simply suggested that the importance of the element of contractual stability 
should somewhat be moderated. The actual FIFA provisions stipulating that when players and 
clubs which decide to  unilaterally breach their contract during the first two or three years without 
adducing a ‘just cause* or a ‘sporting just cause* for this behaviour, compensation will be due and 
sporting sanctions will be imposed, do seem to go beyond what is really necessary to reach this 
preconceived objective from the point of view of the duration of this so-called ‘protected period* 
and appear therefore to fail the test of proportionality and run foul of Article 39 EC. Arguably, 
the balance between the interests of the players and the needs of the clubs and federations should 
be tilted more in the direction of the former. A proposition which could be acceptable would 
consist of limiting the contractual stability to one year or, alternatively, even to the period 
between two transfer windows during which no transfers can be effectuated. It is submitted that a 
similar solution would comply with the requirements of proportionality and would be compatible 
with the objectives-recognised by the Court in Bosman and Lehtonen as legitimate, for it could be 
seen as maintaining a balance between clubs by preserving a certain degree of equality and 
uncertainty as to results951, as well as ensuring the regularity of sporting competitions952.
951 Bosman, par. 106.
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Simultaneously, it would also constitute a recognition of the free movement rights o f the 
individual athletes.
t -
í  ^
In any event, also in this context it shouldn’t be forgotten that the matter concerning the 
possibility of unilaterally terminating employment contracts is a labour law issue, which belongs 
primarily to the realm of Member States’ competence. It is unquestionable that the FIFA rules in 
their current form are incompatible with certain imperative provisions of the labour laws of some 
Member States. In Belgium, for example, Article 4 of the Act o f 24 February 1978 stipulates that 
remunerated sportsmen who have concluded an employment contract with a specified duration 
can terminate it at any time on the condition of the payment o f a ‘buy-out indemnity* to their club 
of affiliation.952 53 The FIFA Regulations may thus very well stipulate that unilateral breach o f  
contract without excusable grounds is prohibited during the season, if a player in Belgium 
decides to invoke the provisions of the law of 1978, this latter one will always prevail.
3.2.2. The issue of compensation for breach of contract
According to the newly drafted FIFA rules, in the event of unilateral breach of contract 
without ‘just cause* or ‘just sporting cause*, regardless o f whether it is initiated by the player o r 
the club, and irrespective of whether it occurs during or after the protected period, compensation 
shall always be payable. Moreover, it is provided that the amount of such compensation -  if not 
provided for in the contract - shall be calculated with due respect to applicable national law, the 
specificity of sport and all objective criteria which may be relevant to the case, such as:
•  Remuneration and other benefits under the existing contract and/or the new contract;
•  Length o f time remaining on the existing contract (up to a maximum of 5 years);
•  Amount of any fee or expense paid by or incurred by the old club, amortised over the
length of the contract;
•  Whether the breach has occurred during the ‘protected period’ or afterwards.954
952 Lehtonen, par. 53.
953 Wet van 24 Februari 1978 betreffende de arbeidsovereenkomst voor betaalde sportbeoefenaars, Belgisch 
Staatsblad.
954 Article 22 FIFA Regulation 2001.
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This enumeration conveys the impression that these elements are cumulative, and all have to 
be duly taken into consideration when determining the amount of compensation due. However, 
this appearance is deceptive, for this is not necessarily the case. Irfprinciple, the issue of 
indemnification for breach of contract belongs to the domain o f national private law. Member 
States’ legislation may contain specific provisions regulating this. If this is effectively the case, 
one should abide by these rules to  calculate the amount of compensation and the other factors 
mentioned in the FIFA Regulation should not come into the equation. To take up the example of 
Belgium again, the Act of 24 February 1978 concerning employment contracts for remunerated 
sportsmen does deal with this issue in a detailed way. Originally, the Act stipulated that when a 
player prematurely terminated his contract, a compensation of maximum 6 months wages could 
possibly be due, in accordance with the terms of Article 40 of the Act on Employment 
contracts.955 Hence, initially, this Act offered players the opportunity to walk out of their existing 
contracts relatively cheaply. However, with the Royal Decree of 10 March 1997,956 the amount of 
compensation to be paid in case o f unilateral breach of contract was substantially increased. The 
figures o f compensation it introduced were the following:
• 12 months wages if the annual salary varies between 900.000 and 1.200.000 BF;
•  24 months wages if the annual salary lies between 1.200.000 and 3.600.000 BF;
•  36 months wages if the annual salary is higher than 3.600.000 BF.
This Royal Decree expired on 1 July 2000. It was replaced by another Royal Decree o f 26 June 
2000957 dealing with the same topic. It establishes that when a party to an agreement concluded 
for a precise duration prematurely ends this contract without an urgent reason or without 
complying with the provisions of Article 5.1 of the Act of 24 February 1978, it has to pay the 
other contracting party a sum of compensation amounting to:958
• if the annual salary does not exceed 551.951 BF (13.682,51 Euro):
4 Vi months wages if the contract is breached during the first two years after the 
beginning of the agreement;
955 Article 5.2 Act of 24 Febmary 1978.
956 Koninklijk Besluit van 10 maait 1997 tot vaststelling van het bedrag van de vergoeding bedoeld in Artikel 5, 
tweede lid, van de Wet van 24 februari 1978 betreffende de arbeidsovereenkomst voor betaalde sportbeoefenaars.
957 Koninklijk Besluit van 26 juni 2000 tot vaststelling van het bedrag van de vergoeding bedoeld in Artikel 5, 
tweede lid, van de Wet van 24 februari 1978 betreffende de arbeidsovereenkomst voor betaalde sportbeoefenaars, 
Belgisch Staatsblad, 5 juli 2000.
958 Article 1 Royal Decree of 26 June 2000.
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3 months wages if the contract is breached from the third year after the beginning 
of th^agreement;
• if the* annual salary varies between 551.951 BF (13.682,51 Euro) and 900.000 BF
(22.310,42 Euio):
6 months wages if the contract is breached during the first two years after the 
beginning o f the agreement;
3 months wages if the contract is breached from the third year after the beginning 
of the agreement;
•  6 months wages if the annual salary varies between 900.000 BF (22.310,42 Euro) and
1.200.000 BF (29.747,22 Euro);
•  12 months wages if the annual salary varies between 1.200.000 BF (29.747,22 Euro) and
3.600.000 BF (89.241,67 Euro);
•  18 months wages if the annual salary exceeds 3.600.000 BF (89.241,67 Euro).
This Royal Decree entered into force on 1 July 2000 and is to expire on 30 June 2002.959
In the Netherlands, the situation is somewhat different: an employment contract between a 
club and a football player can only be terminated prematurely by mutual consent or by rescission 
of a judge (in casu the Commission of Arbitration of the Royal Dutch Football Association, the 
‘KNVB’) on the grounds of a just cause960 upon request of one of the parties involved.961 A 
football player can file a request to rescind his contract if he can improve his financial and/or 
sporting situation with another club. It is the Commission of Arbitration which decides whether 
this change of circumstances constitutes a sufficient ground for the rescission of the player’s 
contract with the club to which he is still affiliated and which establishes the actual amount of 
compensation due to this club for the breach o f the contract.962 The national legislation does not 
contain any specific requirements with regard to the determination of the sum of compensation. It 
is not yet crystal clear how the Commission of Arbitration will precisely approach this particular
939 Article 2 Royal Decree of 26 June 2000.
960 See Article 7:685 of the Dutch Civil Code.
961 See van Staveren & Boetekees, “Voetbaltransfers onder vuur van de Europese Commissie en de HFAT", 50 Ars 
Aequi 4 (2001) 224, at 228-229.
962 The player must pay this compensation to his former club on the basis of Article 7:685.8 of the Dutch Civil Code.
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issue in the yost-Bosman era,963 as it refused the only request which has been made since then.964 
Because of the inherent risk of rejection o f the request to rescind the contract by the Commission 
of Arbitration, parties generally opt for the possibility to terminate the contract by mutual 
consent.
When the national legislation does not prescribe imperative requirements as to the 
quantification of the compensation, the parties involved in the agreement can presumably also 
take care of this matter amongst themselves in the employment contract. In Spain, the practice of 
the so-called ‘rescission clauses* in players* contracts is legally permissible since the adoption of 
the Royal Decree 1006/1985 of 26 June 1985 and really caught on in the aftermath of the Bosnian 
ruling. At the time, Real Madrid developed this trend, signing star players such as Brazilian 
Roberto Carlos and Dutch Clarence Seedorf on long-term contracts and systematically inserting a 
specific rescission clause in their agreements. In reality, these clauses boil down to a mutual 
agreement between the club and the player who conclude a contract upon the conditions under 
which the contract can be rescinded. As a general rule, the principle of contractual freedom 
leaves the parties to the contract at liberty to agree upon the height of the compensation. This has 
increasingly led to astronomic figures being put into players* contracts. In the lobby of Nou 
Camp for example, it was murmured at the time that whomever wanted to acquire Brazilian 
Rivaldo before the end of his ongoing contract, had to deposit 175 million Euro on Barcelona’s 
bank account.965
Even though this matter remains o f course primarily an issue of national legislative 
competence, confronted with these figures, one may nevertheless probably legitimately wonder 
whether similar sums of compensation do not practically deter o r preclude a player from 
breaching his contract and constitute a restriction of his Community free movement rights, even 
though strictly \egally speaking, the possibility of prematurely walking out of his contract
963 In the period before the Bosman decision, the Commission of Arbitration based itself on the transfer value of the 
player according to the old system to assess the sum of compensation provided for in Article 7:685.8 of the Civil 
Code. See in this respect, the decision of the Cantonal Court of Rotterdam in the case of Laseroms v Sparta of 5 
April 1967, A7 (1967) 418.
** Decision of the Commission of Arbitration of the KNVB of 30 July 1998, n° 702, JAR (1998), 171: it concerned 
the request of the de Boer twins to rescind their contract with Ajax at the end of the 1997/98 season to enable them to 
move to Barcelona.
965 Meulenaere, “Commissie op transfers”. Knack, 1 maart 2001,136.
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remains open to him. In this respect, it needs to be outlined that in its Statement of Objections to 
FIFA, the Commission had readily acknowledged the right of national legislation to impose
e Cobligations upon the players in the event of a premature breach of contract, even if these 
obligations constitute a restriction to the freedom of movement of players or to the competition 
between clubs, adding, however, the important proviso that this only holds true in so far as the 
obligations are in proportion to the objectives pursued. According to the Commission 
indemnification ensuing from breach of contract, regardless of whether it were fixed in the 
contract itself or agreed upon later between the contracting parties, could be considered as a kind 
of damages or as compensation due in case of non-compliance with a contractual obligation, and 
concerns only the two contracting parties involved.966
It derives from this that according to the Commission, compensation for breach o f  
contract is lawful as long as it does not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives 
pursued. As it appears hardly conceivable to establish a fix rule for this, it is submitted that this 
issue will have to estimated on a case-by-case basis, taking into consideration the circumstances 
of the particular situation. In this context, it may be useful to take up the two above-mentioned 
situations again. It will become immediately clear that this issue will not be as simple as it may 
look at first. In principle, in the event o f unilateral termination of a contract by a player, it is the 
player himself who has to pay the compensation to the club he has decided to leave. Viewed at in 
this regard, the obligation to pay for example 36 months wages imposed on players who earn 
more than 90.000 Euro annually by the Belgian legislation appears as particularly burdensome967 
and could effectively be regarded as an obstacle to his rights of free movement going beyond 
what is necessary to preserve contractual stability or the regularity of sporting competitions, were 
it not for the fact that in reality, this compensation is virtually always paid for by the new club 
acquiring the player (and for whom the player in question has breached his contract with his 
former club). And for this club, the amount of compensation reached at on the basis of this 
calculation will often only be peanuts, or at least only a fraction of the sum which would be paid
966 EC Commission DG IV Competition 14-12-1998, IV/36.583, Statement o f  objections o f the Commission o f 14-12- 
1998 against FIFA with regard to a procedure under Article 81 EC, 24-25.
967 In my opinion, the same holds true for the lower wage categories, since players belonging to them will still have 
to pay one or two years of income to terminate a contract See Blanpain, "Transfers van voetballers naar nationaal en 
Europees rech t Recente ontwikkelingen” (2000-2001) 20 Rechtskundig Weekblad, 766; see also Maesschalck, Je 
rechten als sportbeoefenaar (Brugge, die Keure, 2000), 36.
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in case o f termination of a contract by mutual consent.968 When Ipswich Town wanted to engage 
Belgium’s Gert Verheyen from Club Brugge in the beginning of 2001-. they initially offered 3 
million E uro 'an  almost ridiculously low bid on the contemporary international transfer market, 
but still considerably higher than the sum it would have to pay Brugge if Verheyen decided to 
have recourse to the Act of 1978 and unilaterally breach his contract. If the transfer fell through, 
it was only because the player ultimately wanted to avoid an open conflict with Brugge and 
decided not to play hardball.969 At first sight, in the light o f its after all - and especially in 
comparison with the regulations in other countries - relatively low threshold, it is thus nothing 
less than remarkable that even though this Act already entered into force in 1984, it has only been 
applied one single time in a concrete case since.970 Besides that, in a couple of occasions, players 
-successfully, by the way- threatened their club to invoke the Act to compel it to accept the offer 
from another club wanting to engage them971, but that’s it really. The explanation is 
straightforward: Belgian clubs have concluded a gentlemen’s agreement not to make use of the 
Act of 1978 for the purposes o f national transfers and not to engage players who did do so.972 
And according to Luc Misson, one o f the lawyers of Bosman, Michel D ’Hooghe, at the time 
chairman of the KB VB, would have obtained a promise from FIFA that it would refuse to issue a 
licence to players who invoked the Act of 1978 to play abroad.973 However, after the entering 
into force of the new FIFA Transfer Regulations in September 2001, it was feared that this 
gentlemen’s agreement would no longer be sustainable and that players would take maximum 
advantage of the opportunity offered to them by the Act of 1978 to change clubs at a relatively 
low prize (compared for example to the figures inserted in Spanish rescission clauses), to the 
detriment of the competitive position of the Belgian clubs which would inevitably have to let 
them go.974 Therefore, immediately after the Commission and FIFA had reached their agreement 
in March 2001 on the transfer system reform, the Belgian football association cautiously 
suggested to the national government that it would be advisable to modify the terms o f the Act of
968 Hauspie, “Aan de zijlijn: Wet van *78”, Sport Magazine -  Voetbal Magazine, 21 February 2001,19.
969 Subsequently, the Flemish club also refused Ipswich last-higher- offer and the player remained in Belgium.
970 In the case of Mrmic v Charleroi, in which the national judge ruled in favour of the club: see Van Laere, “Johnny 
Maesschalck (juridisch raadgever): ‘Merkwaardige vrees’“, De Standaard, 7 March 2001.
971 Kjetil Rekdal put pressure on lierse  to obtain a move to Rennes, Bart de Roover also wanted to leave Lierse for 
NAC and Pieter Collen from Gent wished to try his luck at NEC.
972 Hauspie, “Europa speelt op veilig”. Sport Magazine -  Voetbal Magazine, 28 February 2001, at 48.
973 Demets & Killemaes, “Doorlichting Eersteklassevoetbal: Luis Figo naar WesterloT’, Trends 32, (2000) 22-23.
974 Lambaerts, "Alain Courtois, secretaris-generaal voetbalbond, rekent op goodwill politieke wereld: “België dreigt 
slachtoffer te worden van wet van *78’”’, De Standaard, 7 March 2001.
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24 February 1978 -  read: make it harder for players to breach their contracts.975 Summarising, 
from the point o f view of compliance with the principle of proportionality that forms part o f the 
objective justification test for measures which are liable to restrict the freedom of movement o r 
workers protected in Article 39 EC, it might make a difference whether the compensation is 
actually paid by the player who breached his contract with his club of affiliation or rather by the 
team which induced the player to do so and for which he’ll start playing afterwards.
In Spain, as has already been illustrated above, the situation is somewhat different, as the 
national legislation allows the private parties to deal with the issue of termination of contractual 
relations in the contract itself, by means o f the so-called rescission clauses. Practice has show n 
that the amounts of compensation as laid down in these contractual clauses have rocketed to  
unprecedented heights. Apart from the morality issue, which is o f no real concern here,976 this 
inevitably also prompts the question whether these sums are lawful from the point of view o f  
Community free movement law. The issue of compatibility with Article 39 EC may be addressed 
as the Court has explicitly recognised that Article 39 EC is horizontally directly effective and is 
thus applicable in a dispute between private parties. Interestingly, in this specific context, a recent 
dispute involving some Spanish First Division clubs concerned a request for compensation fo r 
breach of contract as agreed upon in the rescission clause.977 978The circumstances of the case w ere 
the following: in the beginning of the nineties, Jorge O.B. played on a professional basis fo r
Celta de Vigo in the Spanish Primera Division. His contract with Celta was due to  expire on 30 
June 1994. In accordance with the provisions of Article 16 of Royal Decree 1006/1985, his 
employment contract contained a rescission clause stipulating that if he breached his contract, a 
sum of 200 million pesetas would have to be paid to Celta. In February 1993, Jorge O.B. entered 
into a private agreement with Deportivo La Coruña, another Spanish First Division team, in 
which he undertook to provide his football services to the club from Galicia for the period from  1 
July 1993 until 30 June 1997. In the agreement, it was explicitly recognised that for the 1993-94
975 Van Laere, “Onduidelijkheid troef na akkoord FIFA, UEFA en Europese Commissie over nieuw internationaal 
transfersysteem. Natíonale wetgever heeft het laatste woord” [2001] De Standaard, 7 March 2001.
976 See Mercy and Wauters, “Interview: Voonnalig Europees Commissaris Van Miert overtuigd dat beslissing in 
transferdossier niet lang meer uitblijft”, De Standaard, 27 February 2001: “The simple fact that a player ‘costs* 2 
Billion BF as such does not constitute a breach o f European rules.*’
977 See Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Galicia Social Federación, sentencia de 3 Junio 1999, Tribunales Superiores 
de Justicia (1999) at 359.
978 Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Galicia Social Federación, sentencia de 3 Junio 1999, o.c., 359-361.
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season, the player was still under contract with Celta, and therefore, that the contract with 
Deportivo would only become effective as from the moment Celta had officially released the 
player, either because the two teams had reached an agreement as to tins effect or because the 
player had made use of the rescission clause in his contract with Celta to terminate his 
employment with the club. The player also engaged himself not to sign any contract with another 
club during his agreement with Deportivo. Furthermore, the amount of compensation to be paid 
to Deportivo in case of rescission of the contract was set at 500 million pesetas. Two months 
later, in April 1993, Jorge O.B. extended his contract with Celta de Vigo until 30 June 1996. The 
sum of compensation mentioned in the rescission clause was reduced to 200 million pesetas. 
During these months, neither the player nor Deportivo acted in such a way so as to render their 
agreement effective. Consequently, during the 1993-94 season, the player simply continued to 
regularly defend the colours of Celta. In May 1994, Celta and Valencia, a third Spanish First 
Division team, agreed upon the transfer o f Jorge O.B. On 1 July 1994, he signed a contract with 
Valencia for 6 years. Hereupon, Deportivo officially urged for the situation to be regulated and 
asked 500 million pesetas as compensation for the rescission of the contract it had concluded with 
Jorge O.B.. In the light of the factual circumstances, it was somehow to be expected that the 
Superior Tribunal of Galicia, which was seized of the matter, would condemn the player to pay a 
sum of indemnification, it mainly remained to be seen how much the Tribunal would effectively 
award Deportivo. For the purposes of its decision, the Tribunal made a distinction between a real 
employment contract on the one hand, and a pre-contractual agreement or a contract the 
fulfilment of which is dependent upon the realisation o f a certain condition on the other hand.979 
It stipulated that recourse to the rescission clause could only be had in the former situation, when 
there was a real labour contract which had entered into force. As this had not been the case, it 
considered that the Royal Decree of 1006/1985 could not be applied in the present situation. 
Subsequently, it proceeded estimating the compensation due by the player on the basis of civil 
law grounds, taking into consideration factors such as the age o f the player, the duration of the 
agreement, the salary agreed upon, the specific situation on this professional market, the amount 
o f compensation -foreseen in the rescission clause, the kind o f responsibility imputed on the 
player for the non-execution of the agreement, possible ‘dannum emergens* or iucrum  cessans*
979 Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Galicia Social Federación, sentencia de 3 Junio 1999, o.c., 362-365.
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for the club, etc.980 Ultimately, the Tribunal awarded Deportivo 90 million pesetas.981 This 
undeniably constitutes a considerable amount of compensation, but equally, by the same token, it 
is abundantly clear that it is substantially less than the 500 million pesetas which Deportivo 
hoped for.
The question now is which concrete lessons can be drawn from this judgement. In the first 
place, it is essential to put the case in the correct framework and to see everything in the right 
proportions. Hence, these 90 million may appear little, certainly in comparison with the 500 
million provided for in the rescission clause, but it shouldn’t be forgotten that the contract has 
never become effective. Jorge O.B. didn’t play one single match for Deportivo. This made it 
much harder, if not impossible, for the Tribunal to evaluate which was the actual damage 
inflicted upon the club or which potential profits it lost due to the non-execution of the 
agreement. Arguably, these are factors which would have substantially increased the total amount 
of compensation, probably bringing it closer to the requested 500 million. In any event, the 
Tribunal came to this amount of money taking into consideration certain prescribed factors o f 
calculation, these 90 million pesetas do not simply represent a wild estimation on behalf of the 
Tribunal. Furthermore, it has to be considered that this affair dates from the pre-Bosman era, 
when one still used to work with completely different parameters in terms of money, which 
explains the -  relatively speaking - lower amounts of money involved. Apart from this, the 
factual circumstances o f the case give us a better insight in the concrete functioning of the 
mechanism o f the rescission clauses. In principle, the underlying objective is undoubtedly 
primarily to ensure that contracts are honoured, or alternatively, that the parties to the agreement 
are compensated adequately in case one o f them decides to terminate it prematurely. However, 
recently the amounts of compensation contained in the rescission clauses have sometimes 
reached such withering heights that in reality, it has become often practically impossible for a 
simple player to unilaterally breach his contract. In most circumstances, the players will simply 
not be able to cough up the contractually stipulated sums of money. Essentially, this means that 
the clubs again exert a great influence on a player’s career. If a club is really -interested in the 
services o f one or the other player who is still contractually linked to another club, it will either
980 Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Galicia Social Federación, sentencia de 3 Junio 1999, o.c., 365-366.
981 Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Galicia Social Federación, sentencia de 3 Junio 1999, o.c., 366.
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have to pay the sum o f compensation for the contractual breach itself, or try to enter into transfer 
negotiations with the other club to engage the player. And here we arrive at the crux of the 
matter often\he soup isn’t eaten as hot as it is served and the transfer tafics successfully result in 
an agreement on a transfer sum which is lower than the contractually specified compensation. But 
this depends exclusively on the goodwill of the selling club. It is not obliged to release the player 
for a lower bid than the figure that is contained in the rescission clause. For example, in the 
summer o f 2000, there was no other option for Real Madrid to engage Luis Figo but to pay the 
entire sum contractually foreseen to rescind his contract with the arch rivals o f Barcelona. 
Similarly, in July 2002 Barcelona publicly announced its willingness to co-operate to a transfer of 
its Brazilian star player Rivaldo, on the condition that he doesn’t move to another Spanish side.982 
These examples illustrate plainly that basically, by means of the system of the rescission clauses, 
clubs have a considerable power over the players. To a certain extent, they definitely have an 
important word to say on the issues of whether the player stays at the club or not and furthermore, 
if the player leaves the club, where he actually moves. Therefore, rather than compensate the 
former club for the unilateral termination of the contract, these contractually stipulated sums of 
money often constitute transfer sums pur sang. Viewed from this perspective, one could thus 
probably reasonably argue that a factual situation in which a player can practically only leave his 
club of affiliation before the actual expiry o f his contract at the discretion of this club because the 
amount of compensation provided for in the rescission clause is simply too high, is questionable 
from the point of view of its compatibility with Article 39 EC.983
982 In the end, Barcelona even agreed upon letting Rivaldo move to AC Milan at cost zero, after rescinding the 
contract by mutual consent
983 hi this respect, it is necessary to make one small caveat though: these rescission clauses are genuinely non- 
discriminatory. Up until today, the Court has recognised the full horizontal direct effect of Article 39 EC only with 
regard to discriminatory measures. In chapter 2 of this thesis, it has been submitted that the Court will presumably 
extend this stance also to non-discriminatory measures. However, for the time being, this cannot be taken for granted 
yet In any event, it is submitted that one might reach the same conclusion on the basis of a wide interpretation of 
certain specific terms of Regulation 1612/68 on the free movement of workers within the Community. Article 7(4) of 
Regulation 1612/68 stipulates that “any clause of a collective or individual agreement or of any other collective 
regulation concerning eligibility for employment, employment, remuneration and other conditions of work or 
dismissal shall be null and void in so far as it lays down or authorises discriminatory conditions in respect of workers 
who are nationals of the other Member States.” Admittedly, this provision is aimed at discriminatory measures, 
whereas the rescission clauses in the individual player’s contracts are genuinely non-discriminatory, but this used to 
be the original interpretation of the Community free movement provisions as well, before their scope of application 
was extended by the Court so as to cover also non-discriminatory restrictive measures. If this specific interpretation 
of Article 39 EC were to be transposed now to the domain of its implementing Regulation, then Article 7(4), which 
merely clarifies the terms of Article 39 EC and gives effect to the rights already conferred by Article 39 EC (Case C- 
419/92 Scholz v Opera Universitaria di Cagliari [1994] ECR 1-505, par. 6; Case C-15/96 Schöning- 
Kougebetopoulou v Freie Und Hansestadt Hamburg [1998] ECR 1-47, par. 12.) could maybe be held to prohibit also
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Be that as it may, however, on the other hand, one shouldn’t fotget the fact that, legally 
speaking, the* - financial - conditions under which a contract can be prematurely terminated by  
one of the parties, have been freely discussed and negotiated and consequently, are the result o f  
an agreement of the concluding parties. If the players have consented to a high sum o f  
compensation, making it more difficult for them to buy-out their contract, this is their choice and  
in principle, nobody has any business with this. Besides, there are often also financial advantages 
attached to these clauses for the players, inducing them to accept the insertion of these clauses in  
the employment contract. As a result, it could equally be argued that even if high sums o f  
compensation may theoretically amount to an obstacle to the free movement rights o f the players, 
they should nevertheless not be considered as a restriction prohibited by Article 39 EC, as these 
barriers have been construed with the collaboration or at least the permission of the players 
themselves.984
Summarising, in principle, this system of providing which amount o f compensation is due  
in case o f breach of contract in a specific rescission clause of the contract does not appear to be a t 
odds with the Community free movement provisions. This would only be the case if the am ounts 
of compensation laid down in these rescission clauses proved to be transfer sums in disguise, 
going beyond reasonable compensation for premature breach of contract. And even then, one  
would be confronted with a clash of two fundamental rights, the right of freedom o f movement 
for workers and the principle of pacta sunt servanda, the outcome of which is uncertain in th is  
particular situation. Therefore, it is submitted that it would be highly preferable, in any event, to  
elaborate a transparent and uniform mechanism which would allow the calculation of sums o f  
compensation to be inserted in rescission clauses a priori and on an objective basis, as this w ould 
remove a lot of misunderstandings and uncertainties.
clauses in individual agreements which are simply restrictive of free movement, such as rescission clauses which 
provide for unduly high amounts of compensation payable in the event of a unilateral termination of a contract which 
resemble more like true transfer sums. Intrinsically, this argument clearly has some force. For a concurring opinion, 
see Thill, o.c., at 110.
984 Naturally, the entire situation would be different if it could be conclusively demonstrated that the balance o f 
power at the discussion table was so distorted that rescission clauses were imposed on players against their will or 
that in some way or the other these clauses were fraudulently inserted in the employment contract without the 
consent or the knowledge of the player concerned. This will prove to be a daunting task though.
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3.2.3, Imposition of sports sanctions
Finally, besides the payment of compensation, the new FIFA regulations on international 
transfers also provide for the imposition o f sports sanctions in the event of unilateral termination 
of a contract within the ‘protected period* -  as seen above, amounting to two or three years |
depending upon the age at which the player signed the contract -  if the breach wasn’t prompted 
by a ‘just cause* or a ‘sporting just cause*. Firstly, when the contractual breach is caused by the 
player, if the breach occurs at the end o f the first or the second year of the contract, the sanction j
shall consist of a restriction on his eligibility to participate in any official football matches for an 
effective period of four months as from the beginning of the national championship o f the new 
club.985 In the event of a unilateral breach at the end of the third year of contract (or at the end of 
the second year if the contract was signed after the age of 28), there will be no sanction, unless
j
there was failure to give notice in due time after the last match o f the season, in which case the I%
sanction must be proportionate.986 In the case of aggravating circumstances, such as failure to j
give notice or recurrent breach, sports sanctions may go up to, but not exceed, an effective period !
j
of six months.987 Secondly, in the case of the club breaching a contract or inducing988 such j
*
breach, if the breach occurs at the end of the first or second year of the contract, the sanction shall j
be a prohibition on registering any new player, either domestically or internationally, until the 
expiry of the second transfer window following the date on which the breach became effective. In 
all cases, no restriction for unilateral breach of contract shall exceed a period of twelve months 
following the breach or inducement of the breach.989 Again, as was the case in the case of the >
player, if the unilateral breach occurs at the end of the third year of contract (or at the end of the 
second year if  the contract was signed after the age of 28), no sanctions shall be imposed, except 
where there was failure to give appropriate notice after the last match of the season, in which case 
a proportionate sanction shall be applied.990 Furthermore, it is also stipulated that, without
i
prejudice to the foregoing, other sanctions of a sporting nature may be imposed on clubs by the •
985 Article 23.1(a) FIFA Regulation 2001.
984 Article 23.1(b) FIFA Regulation 2001.
987 Article 23.1(c) FIFA Regulation 2001.
948 According to Article 23.2(c) FIFA Regulation 2001, a club seeking to register a player who has unilaterally 
breached a contract during the protected period will be presumed to have induced a breach of contract.
989 Article 23.2(a) FIFA Regulation 2001.
990 Article 23.2(b) FIFA Regulation 2001.
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FIFA Disciplinary Committee where it considers these to be appropriate. These sanctions may 
include, in particular, fines, deduction of points or even exclusion from the competition.991
c r*
It may be useful to reiterate once again that the payment of a sum o f compensation due for 
the breach o f a contract -  as we have described in the preceding paragraph - is regarded in se as 
an obstacle to the freedom of movement o f players, which can however be objectively justified 
under certain circumstances. According to the applicable FIFA Regulations now, sports sanctions 
are to be imposed on a player on top o f this obligation to compensate for his unilateral 
termination of the contract, if there’s no valid reason available in support of this action. 
Furthermore, effectively inflicting upon a player a prohibition to play for a new club during a 
period of four up to  six months appears to be a serious sanction, taking into account the relative 
brevity o f a sporting career. A fortiori, such sanctions seem therefore at first sight to be liable to  
impede or deter a player from exercising his free movement rights and seem to be contrary to  
Article 39 EC, unless there exists a proper justification for it.
It is clear that in this respect, one of the key issues will turn out to be the exact 
interpretation of the concepts ‘just cause* and ‘sporting just cause’, for there will be no sanctions 
if a player makes an end to his contract for a valid reason. In the Agreement struck between FIFA 
and the European Commission it was already stipulated that the presence o f a sporting just cause 
shall be assessed on a case by case basis by the Dispute Resolution, Disciplinary and Arbitration 
System to be established. The examination will take place at the end of the football season and 
before expiry o f the relevant registration period in the former club’s national association. Each 
particular situation will be evaluated on its individual merits. For this purpose, all relevant 
circumstances will be taken into consideration, such as, for example, injury, suspension, the 
player’s age, the field position of a player, the position in the team (e.g. reserve goal keeper), 
reasonable expectations on the basis of past career, etc.992 In some ways it is to be regretted that 
apart from simply enumerating, by way o f example, certain elements which may be regarded as 
relevant, the FIFA Regulation does not offer more precise guidance in this respect. As a result, it 
currently remains a largely unanswered question what constitutes precisely a ‘sporting just
991 Article 23.2(d) FIFA Regulation 2001. Besides, it is provided that appeals against such sanctions may be lodged 
to the Arbitration Tribunal for Football.
992 Article 24 FIFA Regulation 2001.
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cause’. The only concrete mainstay one has to go by for the moment is a provision in the FIFA 
Regulations concerning the application o f the basic FIFA Transfer Regulation, in which it is 
unequivocally stated that a player is entitled to  terminate his contract witlrhis club unilaterally for 
sporting just cause where he can show at the end of a season that he was fielded in less than 10% 
of the official matches played by his club.993 Furthermore, and importantly, it also remains to be 
seen whether these concepts of ‘just cause’ and especially ‘just sporting cause* will be interpreted 
in a broad or rather restrictive way. Here, however, it can already be anticipated that, in all 
likelihood, the football authorities will have a relatively strong inclination towards the latter 
option, especially in the light o f football’s plea for stability of contracts and its clear aversion to 
unilateral termination of contracts. Also the only practical situation which has been outlined in 
detail is conceived rather restrictively and this points in that direction.
Let us pause here for a moment, and try to illustrate the issue on the basis of some 
examples, be they hypothetical or fictitious or not. For the purposes of this research, only 
situations in which the players may be led to breach their contract will be dealt with. Would 
Vincenzo Montella, one of Italy’s most prolific strikers, be entitled to unilaterally breach his 
contract, in other words, does he have a valid sporting reason, if AS Roma coach Fabio Capello 
almost consistently keeps him sidelined during most of the games, preferring the duo Batistuta -  
Delvecchio in attack and inserting him only when things seem to go wrong, even though he 
regularly decides games in favour o f his team with highly influential goals and/or assists? 
Rivaldo, Barcelona’s Brazilian star, got enmeshed in an open conflict with Dutch coach Louis 
Van Gaal because of a disagreement about the field position of the player. Could this be 
construed as a just sporting cause allowing the player to terminate his contract with the Catalan 
club? Does relegation of a club to a lower division as such constitute a just sporting cause for its 
players, or does it make a difference whether it involves Belgium’s KV Mechelen, only a decade 
ago national champion and winner of the former European Cup Winners Cup, or only Harelbeke, 
a small club with no significant results? If  France’s Marseille gets penalised for corruption or 
sporting fraud, is that sufficient ground to  leave for players who do not wish to be identified with 
the club any longer? What if a team such as Italy’s Lazio Roma suddenly faces financial hardship 
and must readjust its ambitions for the near future, no longer aspiring to win the scudetto but
m  Article 12 FIFA Regulations governing the Application of the Regulations for the Status and Transfer o f Players.
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merely gain a place to participate in the UEFA Cup or even to simply extend its permanence in 
the Serie A? Could failure to attain a certain objective, such as the .championship’s title or 
qualification to participate to the European Cups, under certain circumstances be a valid reason to 
terminate a contract? Can it be considered as a ‘just cause’ if a player can simply financially 
improve himself, or is it also required that the player moves to a better club or league? And one 
could go on for a while. The point which I am trying to make here is that in my opinion, the 
matter o f the imposition of sports sanctions and inevitably thus also the entire matter of the 
unilateral termination of contracts depends for a great deal on the content and the interpretation o f  
the concepts ‘just cause’ and ‘just sporting cause’. If these notions are interpreted restrictively, as 
is to be expected for the reasons outlined above, the financial compensation which is always due 
in case o f breach o f contract will frequently be accompanied by a sports sanction. In the light o f 
the nature and the gravity of these sanctions, this particular circumstance will almost certainly 
have a strong deterrent effect on possible intentions o f the players to buy out their previous 
contractual engagements. This prompts the question whether sports sanctions in the event o f  
contractual breach are überhaupt tenable from a Community free movement point of view?
In principle, there is nothing to object to sporting associations pronouncing sanctions o f  a  
disciplinary nature upon players who do not comply with the sporting rules or fail to live up to a 
sporting obligation. Indeed, federations do have the right and the duty to elaborate a set of rules 
in order to regulate sporting events organised by them. This necessarily involves also the 
disciplinary authority to sanction sportsmen who act in contravention of these rules. For example, 
if Roma’s Francesco Totti receives a red card during a Serie A game for, let’s say, foul play o r 
abusive conduct on the pitch, or if Lazio’s Fernando Couto or Juventus’ Edgar Davids test 
positive on nandrolone, a prohibited drug, and therefore fail to pass a doping test, the Italian 
Football Federation can legitimately suspend these players, thereby effectively preventing them  
temporarily from participating in official matches played by their respective clubs. However, it is 
an entirely different matter whether sport federations have the necessary competence to create 
sports sanctions in the event o f a simple unilateral termination of*contract. After all, this remains 
a labour law issue, and thus belongs primarily to the preserve of Member States’ competence. In 
theory, national legislation could therefore provide in the imposition of an additional sanction, 
amounting effectively to a temporary prohibition for the player to exercise his profession, on top
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of the more usual contractual sanction to which a breach of contract generally already gives rise, 
namely the payment of compensation. Be that as it may, it appears at least questionable whether 
such a supplementary sanction is really necessary to maintain contractual'stability and ensure the 
regularity o f sporting competitions, which are the most important objectives pursued by this 
measure. It seems that when a player who has unilaterally breached his contract has duly paid the 
amount of compensation due, he has adequately indemnified his old club for the incomplete 
execution o f the employment contract. In principle, therefore there appears to be no reason to 
inflict any further sanctions upon him. Both club and player should be able to continue 
undisturbed their separate ways. That is to say, at least this appears to be so as long as there are 
no other shortcomings which can be imputed on the player. Some theoretical situations in which 
the imposition of additional sanctions on top of financial compensation could possibly be 
envisaged immediately spring to mind. Firstly, there is the circumstance of the player unilaterally 
terminating his contract during the course of the season. According to the FIFA Regulations, this 
is prohibited, but there is nothing to stop the player from doing so if the relevant national 
legislation doesn’t prevent this. It is incontestable that this particular behaviour of the player 
could cause his club some trouble, for it simply cannot look for a replacement immediately, since 
the contractual breach occurs between two transfer periods. At first glance, one could reasonably 
consider the imposition of a disciplinary sanction in this particular context. However, an 
important specification needs to be made in this respect: in reality, this is clearly a purely 
hypothetical situation, which will hardly ever occur in practice. A player will simply not buy-out 
his ongoing contract in the course of a season without just cause or sporting just cause. Acting in 
this way, the player puts himself completely off-side, he places himself temporarily outside the 
labour market for the remainder of the season or until the next transfer window, for he cannot go 
to another club between two transfer periods. Consequently, if this scenario were to unfold itself 
anyway, there seems to be no need for a sanction in the form of a suspension to play for another 
team, as the player has effectively inflicted it already on himself. For this reason, if the applicable 
national legislation provided for such a sanction anyway, arguably it should not exceed the 
duration o f the period until the next transfer window. Secondly, one could conceive the more 
likely situation of the player breaching his contract without notifying his club about this 
sufficiently in advance. Such behaviour is indeed liable to make it difficult for a club to find a 
fully-fledged substitute for the leaving player in time, that is to say before the expiry of the
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transfer period  Under these circumstances, a proportionate sanction could therefore probably be  
contemplated. This could of course also simply take the form of an increased amount o f  
compensatiorf. Regard should be had again in the first place to the relevant national legislation.
3.3. Evaluation
The lessons which must be drawn from this analysis are several: in the first place, th e  
Commission has arguably attributed too much weight to the argument of the sporting associations 
that contractual stability is necessary to ensure objectives such as team building, identification b y  
the public with the team and employment security. It is submitted that more importance should 
have been given to the free movement rights o f the footballers in this context. Furthermore, it has 
also become clear that these FIFA rules are only valid insofar as they do not contradict th e  
relevant provisions of the applicable national laws in the Member States. But even the event th a t 
the issue o f contractual stability is actually regulated by the provisions of national legislation o r  
even by provisions in the employment contracts of the players, these rules may still be checked 
upon their conformity Community law. As a result o f the attribution of horizontal direct effect to  
Article 39 EC, Community law may now interfere deeply into the private sphere!
4. Transfer windows
In order to protect the regularity and proper functioning of sporting competition, F IFA  
also consented to a limitation in time o f the opportunity for clubs to reinforce their squads b y  
means of transferring players. The revised FIFA Regulations stipulate that players can only be 
registered to play with a national association during one of two registration periods per year, as 
laid down by the national association for this purpose, with a limit of one transfer o f registration 
per player in the same sports season in a period o f 12 months.994 In the FIFA Regulations 
governing the Application of the Regulation for the Status and Transfer o f Players, it is 
established that each national association has to decide upon the institution of these tw o  
registration periods, according to  the following principles:
994 Article 5*2 FIFA Regulations 2001.
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a) The first registration period will start, at the earliest, when the national 
championship has ended and finish, at the latest, before .Jthe subsequent national 
championship begins. This period should, in principle, last^for no longer than six 
weeks.
b) The second registration period will occur approximately in the middle of the 
season. This period should, in principle, last for no longer than four weeks and should 
be limited to registrations for strictly sport related reasons, such as technical 
adjustments to a team or the replacement of injured players, or in exceptional 
circumstances.
This was the only point of the entire transfer reform soap upon which the football 
authorities and the European Commission reached almost immediately a consensus. This has a 
lot, if not everything, to do with the fact that the issue of restricted transfer periods had already 
been conclusively tackled by the Court o f Justice in the case o f Lehtonen.95 96 In this case, the 
Court demonstrated again its sensitivity towards the special features o f sport, correctly 
considering the need to ensure the regularity of sporting competitions as a legitimate objective to 
uphold measures which are liable to constitute a barrier to freedom of movement.
4 A . The case o f Lehtonen
4.1.1. Regulatory setting of the case
This case involved basketball, another vastly popular ball game. Basketball is organised at 
world level by the International Basketball Federation (hereinafter referred to as ‘FTBA’). The 
responsible Belgian federation is the Fédération Royale Beige des Sociétés de Basketball (the 
‘FRBSB’), which governs basketball both at professional and amateur level.997 The FEBA rules 
governing international transfers of players apply in their entirety to all the national
995 Article 2 FIFA Application Regulation 2001.
996 Case C-176/96 Jyri Lehtonen and Castors Canada Dry Namur-Braine v Fédération Royale Beige des Sociétés de 
Basketball ( ‘FRBSB’) [2000] E C R 1-2681. Perhaps this suggests that a bit more EU litigation on the transfer issue 
might not be such a bad thing after all.
997 Lehtonen, par. 3.
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federations.998 For domestic transfers, the national federations are recommended to take the 
international rules as guidance and to draw up their own regulations on transfers of players in the 
spirit of the H B  A rules.999 The FRBSB rules draw a distinction between affiliation, which binds 
the player to the national federation, registration, which is the link between the player and a 
particular club, and qualification, which is the necessary condition for a player to be able to take 
part on official competitions. A transfer is defined as the operation by which an affiliated player 
obtains a change o f registration.1000 In the version applicable at the material time, it was 
stipulated that “players of foreign nationality, including EU nationals, are qualified only if  they 
have completed the formalities relating to affiliation, registration and qualification. They must in 
addition comply with the HBA rules to obtain a licence.” 1001 Furthermore, with regard to 
transfers, the Belgian federation distinguishes between three geographical zones: the national 
zone, the European zone, and finally the zone of the other countries. Rule 140 et seq. of the 
FRBSB rules concern the transfers between Belgian clubs o f players affiliated to the FRBSB, 
which may take place during a defined period in each year, which in 1995 ran from 15 April to 
15 May and in 1996 from 1 to 31 May of the year preceding the championship in which the club 
in question takes part. No player may be registered with more than one Belgian club in one 
season.1002 For the European zone, comprising the 15 Member States of the European Union plus 
Switzerland, Iceland, Norway and Liechtenstein, the deadline for the registration of foreign 
players1003 is set at 28 February, After that date it is still possible for players from other zones to 
be transferred.1004 Specifically, for players coming from the third zone, the rules of the Belgian 
federation state that when they join after 31 March o f the current season, they will no longer be 
qualified to  play in competition, cup and play-off matches of the ongoing season.1005 According 
to the FIBA regulations, after the deadline established for the zone in question, clubs are not
998 Rule 1(b) FIBA.
999 Rule 1(c) FIBA.
1000 See also Lehtonen, par. 8.
1001 Rule 145(4) FRBSB.
1002 Lehtonen, par. 9.
1003 Rule 2(a) FIBA defines a foreign player as a player who does not possess the nationality of the State of the 
national federation which has issued his licence. A licence is the necessary authorisation given by a national 
federation to a player to allow him to play basketball for a club which is a member of that federation. Rule 4(a) FIBA 
prescribes that when a national federation receives an application for a licence for a player who has previously been 
licensed in a federation of another country, it must, before issuing him with a licence, obtain a letter of release from 
that federation.
1004 Rule 3(c) FIBA.
1005 Rule 144 FRBSB.
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allowed to include in their team players who have already played in another country in the same
zone during the same season.1006
4 C
4.1.2. Factual circumstances of the case
The concrete factual circumstances of the case were the following: Jyri Lehtonen, was a 
professional basketball player of Finnish nationality. In March 1996, after the ending of the 1995- 
96 Finnish championship, he was transferred from his Finnish club to Castors Braine, a Belgian 
team affiliated to the FRBSB playing in the first division, to participate in the final stages of the 
sports season in Belgium.1007 In Belgium the national men’s first division basketball 
championship is divided into two stages: a first stage in which all clubs take part, and a second 
stage which includes only the best-placed clubs (play-off matches to decide the national title) and 
the clubs at the bottom of the league table (play-off matches to decide which clubs will stay in the 
first division).1008 The Finnish federation issued a letter of release for Lehtonen on 29 March 
1996. One day later, his engagement by Castors was registered with the FRBSB. However, 
according to the rules o f FIBA governing the international transfers of players at the time of the 
proceedings, the deadline for the registration of players from the European zone was set at 28 
February. In other words, Castors Braine had engaged Lehtonen after the expiry of the relevant 
transfer period. Consequently, on 5 April 1996 the FRBSB officially informed Castors Braine 
that if FIBA did not issue the required licence for Lehtonen, the club might be penalised and that 
if  it fielded him it would do so at its own risk.1009 Notwithstanding this warning, Lehtonen 
effectively took part in the competition match of 6 April 1996 against Quaregnon. Five days later, 
following a complaint by Quaregnon, the competition department of FRBSB decided to award 
the match to Quaregnon by 20-0, penalising Castors for fielding Lehtonen in clear violation of 
the FIBA rules on transfers o f players within the European zone.1010 Castors still included 
Lehtonen on the team sheet for the subsequent game against Pepinster, but in the end, it didn’t 
field him. Nevertheless, the penalty was the same, the match being awarded to the opposing team. 
After that, the club decided to dispense with the services of Lehtonen for the remainder of the
1006 Rule 3(c) FIBA.
1007 Lehtonen, par. 12,
1008 Lehtonen, par. 4.
1009 Lehtonen, par. 12.
1010 Castors Braine had actually won the match on the field.
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competition, since it clearly ran the risk o f being penalised each rime it included Lehtonen on the 
team sheet, or even of being relegated to a lower division in the event o f a third default.1011 
However, bdth the club and the player involved instituted proceedings against the Belgian 
federation before the Tribunal o f First Instance of Brussels. Essentially, the sought for the 
FRBSB to be ordered to lift the penalty imposed on Castors for the match against Quaregnon, and 
to be prohibited from imposing any penalty whatsoever on the club preventing it from fielding 
Lehtonen in the 1995-96 Belgian championship, on pain of a monetary penalty.1012 The Tribunal 
decided to stay the proceedings and referred the following question to the Court of Justice for a 
preliminary ruling: “Are the rules of a sports federation which prohibit a club from playing a 
player in the competition for the first time if he has been engaged after a specified date contrary 
to the Treaty of Rome (in particular Articles 12, 39, 81 and 82) in the case of a professional 
player who is a national of a Member State of the European Union, notwithstanding the sporting 
reasons put forward by the federations to justify those rules, namely to prevent distortion o f the 
competitions?”1013
4.1.3. Judgement of the European Court of Justice of 13 April 2000
The Court o f Justice decided that the rules on transfer deadlines are “liable to restrict the 
freedom of movement of players who wish to pursue their activity in another Member State, by  
preventing Belgian clubs from fielding in championship matches basketball players from other 
Member States where they have been engaged after a certified date.”1014 Consequently, these 
rules constituted an obstacle to the freedom of movement of workers. It rejected as irrelevant the 
fact that the rules in question do not concern the employment of such players, on which there is 
no restriction, but only the extent to which their clubs may field them in official matches, 
considering that “in so far as participation in such matches is the essential purpose o f a 
professional player’s activity, a rule which restricts the participation obviously also restricts the 
chances o f  employment of the player concerned.”1015 When addressing the subsequent issue o f  
justification, the Court readily acknowledged that -“the setting of deadlines for transfers of players
10,1 Lehtonen, par. 13.
1012 Lehtonen, par. 14.
1013 Lehtonen, par. 18.
1014 Lehtonen, par. 49.
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may meet the objective of ensuring the regularity of sporting competitions.”105 016 It specified that 
“late transfers might be liable to change substantially the sporting strength of one or the other in 
the course o f  the championship, thus calling into question the comparability o f results between 
the teams taking part in that championship, and consequently the proper functioning of the 
championship as a whole.”1017 It acknowledged that the risk o f that happening was especially 
clear in a sporting competition such as the Belgian first division national basketball 
championship, as the teams participating in the play-offs for the title or for relegation could 
benefit from late transfers to strengthen their squads for the final stage of the competition, o r even 
for a single decisive match.1018 Be that as it may, however, in the particular case of Lehtonen, 
after the deadline for players from the European zone had expired, clubs could still engage 
players from federations from other zones, for example from Brazil or the United States, until 31 
March. Accordingly, the Court was of the final opinion that the rule under scrutiny must be 
regarded as going beyond what is necessary to achieve the aim pursued, since it didn’t seem to 
the Court that the transfer between 28 February and 31 March of a player from a federation in the 
European zone jeopardises the regularity of the championship more than a transfer in the same 
period of a player from a federation in another zone.1019 Ultimately, the European Court left it up 
to the national court to ascertain “the extent to which objective reasons, concerning only sport as 
such or relating to differences between the position of players from a federation in the European 
zone and that of players from a federation not in that zone, justify such a different treatment.”1020
4.2. Relevance o f the Lehtonen ruling fo r  the football transfer windows
In the light of the preceding case, it seems straightforward that the FIFA rules limiting the 
opportunity for clubs to effectuate transfers of football players to two transfer periods per year, 
are liable to restrict the freedom of movement of players who wish to pursue their activity in 
another Member State” and thus constitute an obstacle to the freedom of movement of workers, 
contrary to Article 39 EC. Arguably, by the same token, the Court’s explicit admission that the 
setting of deadlines for transfers of players may meet the legitimate objective of ensuring the
1015 Lehtonen. par. 50; see also Bosman, par. 120.
1016 Lehtonen. par. 53.
10.7 Lehtonen. par. 54.
10.8 Lehtonen. par. 55.
10.9 Lehtonen. par. 56-58.
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regularity of sporting competitions102 021 can be transposed without any difficulty to the present 
case. Most importantly in this respect, FIFA clearly drew its lessons from the Lehtonen decision 
and ensured itself o f  not falling on the same last hurdle o f the principle of proportionality - as the 
FIBA rules did - by introducing homogeneous transfer windows, restricting the possibility for 
any player, regardless o f his nationality, to be registered to a national association to these transfer 
periods. Besides, on the specific request of the top-11 of the European football nations, UEFA 
decided to introduce completely uniform transfer periods: the main transfer period runs from the 
end of the national championships until 31 August, and the mid-season transfer period from 1 
January until 31 January.1022 Hence, the principle of limited but homogeneous and uniform 
transfer periods appears to be acceptable from the point of view of Community free movement 
law.
Be that as it may, some additional observations deserve to be made with regard to the 
issue of limited transfer periods. Firstly, apart from simply instituting two unified transfer 
periods, FIFA has also stipulated that there is a limit of one transfer per player per season. 
Evidently speaking, also this rule is inspired by the need to protect the regularity and proper 
functioning of sporting competition. Consequently, at first scrutiny there seems to be no direct 
objection against this rule. Be that as it may, however, it is important to grapple the precise scope 
of this provision in practice. The fact that only one transfer o f  registration of a player in a period 
of 12 months is allowed unequivocally implies that a player, newly acquired by a club in 
summer, can under no circumstances leave his new club during the mid-season transfer window 
to play for another team, because that would inevitably entail a second, and thus impermissible, 
change o f registration within 12 months. It is submitted that this appears to be an infringement o f 
the fundamental free movement rights o f the players, just as the principled minimum duration o f 
contracts of one year, as described above. It seems that for example, France’s Zinedine ‘Zizou* 
Zidane, who has been transferred from Juventus to Real Madrid in the summer of 2001, and who 
initially didn’t thrive at all in the shirt of the ‘merengues’, legally speaking should have been able 
to leave the club already in winter, even though he just arrived there a couple of months ago. 
Players* careers are generally so short they can’t really afford losing an entire season. This is not
1020 Lehtonen, par. 59.
1021 Lehtonen, par. 53.
1022 ^  “Europees akkoord over uniforme transferperiodes”, De Standaard, 5 December 2001.
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at all meant to undermine the importance o r the legitimacy of the aim of protecting the regularity
and proper functioning of sporting competition. On the contrary, to underline the intrinsic value
c C
of these objectives, it is suggested that one considers the introduction of the following rule,
instead of the ‘one transfer per player per season1: in order to preserve the sporting ethics, and to
avoid players from having their bags packed at any moment, players should not be allowed to
play for two different teams which are competing with each other in the same competition during
the course of one season. To take up the previous example, in my opinion, in principle there is
nothing to prevent Zidane from leaving Madrid and moving abroad to join Liverpool during the
mid-season transfer window and play for ‘the reds* in the English Premier League for the
remainder of the season, even if he joined the ranks of Real only in the previous summer.
However, if both teams participate in UEFA’s Champions’ League and Zidane has already
played for Real in this European competition, he shouldn’t be allowed to wear the Liverpool shirt
any more in that competition during the same season. This alternative rule seems to me to be
more easily acceptable from the point of free movement, while still adequately reflecting the need
to preserve the regularity of sporting competition.
In this particular context, it might be interesting to explore also shortly a recent 
phenomenon which can be noticed on the football transfer markets. In the summer of 2001, 
Atalanta Bergamo’s midfielder Cristian Zenoni was transferred to AC Milan, only to be inserted 
almost immediately in the deal between Milan and Juventus concerning the move from striker 
Filippo Inzaghi from Turin. During one and the same transfer period, the player was thus 
transferred twice. Only a couple of days later, AC Milan almost pulled the same trick again, 
acquiring Andrea Pirlo from the neighbours of Intemazionale before offering him, together with 
60 billion ITL, to Fiorentina in return for Florentine’s captain Manuel Rui Costa. Had it not been 
for the desperate need for cash on behalf of the Italian cup winners 2001 in order to avoid 
bankruptcy, the affair would have gone through on these terms... Clearly, this novel way of 
negotiating is not an isolated fact and might quickly find acceptance in the football establishment 
if it is not prohibited instantly. Admittedly, both examples concern only national transfers, 
involving only Italian clubs, whereas the transfer deal struck between FIFA and the European 
Commission deals with international transfers. However that may be, it is advocated that this 
method, theoretically at least, can be transposed without too many problems to the international
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level. And sooner than later probably, FIFA will be confronted with it. In July 2002, Italian 
newspapers reported about AC Milan’s interest in Parma’s defender Fabio Cannavaro. 
Supposedly, Yarma were offered a certain amount o f money plus ¿anish  striker Jon Dahl 
Tomasson in return for the services of their captain.1023 The Dane had just arrived at Milanello 
after his transfer from Holland’s Feyenoord Rotterdam. These are all still mainly rumours o f  
course, and besides, if the whole affair were to be concluded in this way, it would still only 
involve one international transfer, but from this to making a player change country twice in one 
and the same transfer period would definitely only be a  small step, and no longer a giant leap. 
Therefore, this matter needs to be addressed. In all likelihood, FIFA will not readily consent to 
this method of football transfers. Its current regulations on international transfers of players 
unequivocally prescribe a limit o f one transfer of registration per player in the same sports season 
in a period of 12 months. At the moment, this particular practice is therefore simply not possible 
under the applicable regulations. Besides, not only this rule, but also the principle o f contractual 
stability would risk being -  at least partially - undermined by this way of moving around players 
between clubs, almost as simple pieces on a chessboard. For once, Blanpain’s vigorous 
condemnation o f the football transfer system as ordinary human trade and its characterisation o f  
modem slavery would definitely also find some echo in this specific context.1024 However, it is 
important to look at this issue from the right perspective. First of all, it has previously already 
been submitted that the rule of only one transfer of registration per player per season appears to  
be incompatible with the requirements o f Community free movement law. The alternative 
proposal, preventing players to play for two different teams who participate in the same 
competition during the same season, seems to be respected by this manner of concluding 
transfers, as players do not effectively represent the ‘intermediate team’ in official games. 
Moreover, the argument of contractual stability may be a valid one, but it especially holds true in 
the context of unilateral breach of contracts, and does not preclude the termination of contracts 
under common consent. Since all these transfer agreements are reached in a purely consensual 
sphere, also this objection against this way o f trading seems to be removed. Consequently, in 
theory, there seems to be nothing inherently wrong about this practice. The fact that this practice 
is tolerated at national level (or at least in some places) could figure as an incentive to allow it
1023 See http://www.kwsport.kataweb.it of 26 July 2002: “Milan non vuole solo Rivaldo”.
1024 See Blanpain, Les gladiateurs du sport. La maffia du sport (die Keure, 1992).
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also at international level, really consecrating the rights to freedom of movement of football 
players. It could even be argued that, even though strictly formally speaking there have been two 
transfers of régistration, conceptually there has been only one transfer m the real sense of the 
term, as the player in question will not really wear the shirt of the intermediate team. Besides, one 
shouldn’t make too much out of it either, as such a situation will probably not occur all that 
frequently, due to the supplementary formalities or practical difficulties linked to international 
transfers in comparison with domestic transfers. It is submitted that, for the official régularisation 
of this transfer practice, it is fundamental that the player involved has really consented to these 
subsequent moves. This could appear strange at first sight - why would one accept two different 
transfers in one transfer period - but one shouldn’t forget that the circumstances at a club may 
change quickly -  for example the sudden arrival of a new coach -  which may induce the player to 
agree with a new transfer deal. It is also conceivable that, at the moment of the conclusion of the 
first transfer, one had already reached an agreement upon a subsequent move. Essentially, when 
the player in question does not pose objections to it, for whatever reason, this practice therefore 
seems to be acceptable. However, one final remark needs to be made in this respect: one should 
be aware of the fact that this practice may constitute a sham exercise of the rights to freedom of 
movement, with the purpose of profiting from the status of a worker who has made use of his 
Community rights.1025 This could possibly be the case if, for example, a Spanish team acquires a 
player from a German team and subsequently immediately inserts him in a transfer deal with 
another German team. Both transfers may be homologated, but one could argue that under these 
circumstances, the player in question has not really effectuated his free movement rights.1026
Another interesting observation can be made specifically with regard to the conception of 
the second transfer window, situated more or less in the middle of the season. From the terms of 
the Regulation governing the Application of the Regulation for the Status and the Transfer of 
Players, it can clearly be deduced that FIFA at least has the intention to consider the second, mid­
season registration period as of secondary importance in comparison with the first summer
1025 See Weatherill, “Case C-415/93 Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Association ASBL v Jean-Marc 
Bosnian. Article 177 reference by the Cour d'Appel, Liège, on the interpretation of Articles 48, 85 and 86 EC. 
Judgment of the European Court of Justice of 15 December 1995“, Common Market Law Re\iew 33 (1996). at 1019- 
1020.
1026 In the case law of the Court of Justice, one can find indications that the Court «ill actually look behind such a 
‘sham’: see, inter alia, cases such as Surinder Singh.
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registration period: not only w ill it last no longer than four weeks, and thus two weeks less than 
the first period, but transfers o f registration will also only be allowed under certain prescribed 
circumstanced1027 However, it is advocated that the terminology usecf is so wide so that in 
practice, virtually every transfer effectuated will be interpreted as a ‘technical adjustment to the 
team* and explained as for a ‘strictly sport related reason1. And the remaining category o f 
transfers will probably be accepted under the heading o f exceptional circumstances. As a result, 
the only substantial difference between the two registration periods seems to be their respective 
duration.
Conclusion
As is commonly known by now, feelings had run high in the aftermath o f the Bosnian 
judgement of the European Court of Justice. The football authorities only complied reluctantly 
with the decision o f the Court and tried to limit its impact as much as possible. However, it 
quickly became clear that the Bosman ruling had set a trend and that further judicial inroads in 
the self-proclaimed and strenuously safeguarded regulatory autonomy of the sporting 
organisations were to be expected. Even though it had overcome this first crisis, the world o f 
football was still living on the edge of a grumbling volcano, as some important matters were still 
left unresolved by the Court of Justice. It therefore didn’t come as a surprise that when FIFA and 
UEFA had another passage of arms with ‘Europe’, in casu the European Commission, in the 
sequel of the transfer saga a couple o f years later, there was a tot of tension in the air again. 
However, contrary to all expectations and in sharp contrast with the outcome o f Bosman, both 
parties involved in the proceedings gently and complaisantly complimented each other when they 
finally reached an agreement on the reform of the traditional transfer system in the beginning o f 
March 2001 after months of grim discussions. Besides, both parties didn’t miss an opportunity to 
emphasise their particular satisfaction with the outcome of the dispute, which is truly remarkable 
given the fact that the differences Of opinion on several issues seemed to be almost irreconcilable. 
On closer scrutiny, these reactions are perfectly explicable. Arguably, behind the thin facade of 
contentment, both the European Commission and FIFA greeted the final transfer deal
1027 Article 2(b) FIFA Application Regulation 2001.
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predominantly with a huge sigh o f relief. Hence, there had been a lot at stake for both of them 
during the infringement procedure. In the first place, this was the case fox the football authorities. 
The ruling of the Court of Justice in Bosman had struck a serious Sow to their claims of 
autonomy and self-regulating power. And while they were still coming to terms with this 
decision, the remains of the transfer system, undeniably one of the fundamental pillars of the 
organisation of football and undoubtedly still one of the main sources of income for football 
clubs, were already put under fire again by the Community institutions. In the light of its previous 
bad experience in Luxembourg, FIFA clearly wanted to avoid the risk of another outright 
condemnation of its rules and preferred to enter into transfer reform talks with the Commission, if 
only to keep this affair out of the hands o f the Court. This way o f dealing with the matter out of 
court had the advantage that the parties to the proceedings could meet and discuss more openly 
and serenely. Furthermore, and importantly, FIFA could also ^temporarily - evade once again a 
pronouncement in principle of the Court of Justice on the applicability of the Community 
competition rules to sporting matters, which intrinsically would have an impact which could 
reach far beyond the confines of the specific transfer debate. Secondly, the same also held true, 
and maybe even more, for the European Commission, albeit for predominantly different reasons. 
In the media, the Commission action with regard to these infringement proceedings was followed 
Argus-eyed. In their extensive coverage, the Commission was largely one-dimensionally 
portrayed as the villain that wanted to inflict harm on the football world by abolishing the transfer 
system  Somewhat biased, often narrow-minded or even outright misleading as this press 
attention may have been to a certain extent, as the Commission didn't want to abolish the transfer 
system all together, but merely intended to bring it possibly in line with Community law,1028 it 
definitely did no good to the European cause at a truly delicate moment for the entire European 
Union construct. In the event of a failure to find an amicable solution out of court, it would 
definitely have been the Commission who would have taken the blame for it. This was something 
the Commission could do without in a period in which politically, it had already sustained 
considerable loss of face with the resignation o f the Commission-Santer after serious allegations 
of fraud. The new Commission under the presidency of Prodi was still very busy rebuilding a* 
positive image and could simply not afford to slip on this affair. Furthermore, several Heads of 
State and Government lobbied extensively to  work out a satisfactorily solution without the
1028 In practice, this meant ensuring respect for the player’s interests.
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intervention of the Court of Justice. The option of engaging in transfer reform discussions was 
also favoured^ internally by the Commission, as the different Commission services charged with 
the affair seefaied to differ in opinion on the final outcome o f a negative decision procedure. 
Consequently, the Commission faced a daunting task: on the one hand, it had to try by all means 
to elaborate a transfer reform proposal with FIFA for which also the football authorities would 
settle, while on the other hand, by the same token, the agreement which they would reach also 
needed to be acceptable from the point o f view o f Community law. If the Commission wanted to 
avoid a repetition o f the Bosman debacle, when the Court o f Justice openly reprimanded the 
Commission for having given its approval to the so called *3+2’ nationality clauses which 
engendered direct discrimination on grounds of nationality as prohibited by the Treaty, a cautious 
approach was necessary in this respect. In the institutional interplay, the Commission could not 
run the risk of being regarded as taking light-heartedly its role of guardian of the Treaties.
All this may very well explain for a great deal why the European Commission and the 
FIFA managed to finally reach an agreement on the reform of the transfer system in March 2001 
after months of laborious discussions, which necessarily implied that the procedure leading up to 
a negative decision against some aspects o f the traditional transfer system for infringement of 
Article 81 EC came to a halt before it arrived at the Court of Justice, it does not really say 
anything about the intrinsic value of this agreement though. Consequently, it is important to take 
this agreement for what it really is: it constitutes the formal recognition of the Commission that 
the revised transfer system is compatible with the requirements of Community law. However, it 
is no more than that: certainly, it does not preclude the Court from deciding otherwise, from 
ruling that the amended FIFA regulations nevertheless still contravene some provisions of 
Community law.
As has been demonstrated in the analysis effectuated above, if the Court o f Justice were 
effectively asked to pronounce a judgement on the conformity o f the new transfer system with 
Community law, in all likelihood it would come to the conclusion that some aspects of the new 
rules are - still -  excessively restrictive of free movement and do infringe Article 39 EC (and/or
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Articles 81-82 EC).1029 This is not to say that the agreement reached between the Commission
and FIFA necessarily is entirely useless. On the contrary, it definitely has some merits as some
£ . Cimportant changes have been introduced and progress has been achieved on previously
completely unacceptable issues: for example, the untenable prohibition of international transfers
for minors has been wisely transformed into a principled permission, albeit under strictly
prescribed circumstances. The possibility has been created to unilaterally terminate a contract.
And the football authorities have officially recognised that in case of a dispute, recourse to the
ordinary civil courts and tribunals is possible. Also with regard to the other crucial issues of
compensating clubs for the training and education of young football players, stability o f contracts
and transfer windows, some important steps have been made in the right direction. However, the
major criticism of the new rules is that the modifications made are still not sufficiently far-
reaching. The pursued liberalisation has probably not been carried through radically enough. The
rights to freedom of movement of football players are still unduly restricted. Also on this
occasion, the responsible Community institution has at times shown too much respect for the so-
called specific needs of sport. Firstly, with regard to the issue of compensation for the training
and education of young players is concerned, the Commission has simply accepted the decision
of the Court in Bosnian that the need to ensure the recruitment and training of youngsters
constitutes a legitimate aim to justify obstacles to the free movement of workers. Arguably, this
objective is not specific to sport and therefore may not deserve this preferential treatment under
Community law. In any event, even if the special status for this in se undoubtedly laudable
objective were confirmed at a later stage by the Court, one should have at least examined the
potential feasibility in practice o f some less restrictive alternatives to the FIFA rales, such as for
example a system based on a redistribution of resources out of a central fond, possibly coupled or
increased with a solidarity contribution consisting of a percentage of the fees paid in the event of
later transfers between clubs. Contrary to the currently applicable mechanism of compensation
due in the event o f a transfer, this system based on pooling o f resources does not have an
uncertain or contingent character and it is not liable to constitute a barrier to the free movement
-rights of the football players. Besides, it remains to be seen whether the Court will accept that the
element of uncertainty and contingency is still very much present in the current system. Also, the
1029 See also the analysis by Weatherill, “T air Play Please”: Recent Developments in the Application of EC Law to 
Sport”, 40 CMLRev. (2003) at 65-73.
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national federations will have be extremely cautious when they put concrete figures to the purely 
theoretical concepts such as the famous player factor and the flat-rate sums which constitute the 
basis for the tabulation of the compensation, so as to  avoid the sums o f compensation payable 
going beyond the costs actually incurred for the training of the young players. Secondly, also 
with regard to the issue of contractual stability, which belongs to the realm of Member State’s 
competence, the Commission has favoured too much the interest of the clubs and the associations 
over the interests o f the players. The argument that contractual stability is necessary to ensure 
team building, identification o f the public with the team and employment security cannot be 
construed in such a way as to justify the restrictions to free movement as laid down in the new 
FIFA rules, limiting the possibility for players to unilaterally terminate their contracts during the 
first two or three years, - depending on the vague concepts of just cause and sporting just cause - 
and providing for sports sanctions under certain circumstances to be inflicted upon the club or the  
player on top of the compensation due for the breach of contract. Contractual stability should 
presumably be limited to one year or one sports season. This seems to be in line with the need to  
guarantee the regularity of sporting competitions, which can legitimately be regarded as an 
overriding requirement in the general interest. From this point of view, it should also be possible 
to limit the duration of contracts concluded during the mid-season transfer window to half a  
season. Also the issues concerning the amount of compensation due for breach o f contract and 
the imposition o f sports sanctions belong in the first place to the preserve of Member State’s 
competence and are regulated in national legislation and/or in individual contracts between the 
club and the player. However, if they amount to barriers to free movement in practice, the 
Community institutions may intervene in the matter. As a result of the recognition of horizontal 
direct effect, not only public measures, but also private rules fall nowadays under free movement 
scrutiny. Thirdly, limiting the possibility to  effectuate transfers within certain prescribed periods 
-  ‘transfer windows’ -  seems to  be acceptable, but the additional rule prohibiting more than one 
move per player per season again seems to  be incompatible with Article 39 EC.
•Summarising, from the point o f view of Community free movement law, even though the 
new FIFA Regulations on international transfers of football players undoubtedly constitute an 
improvement in comparison with the previous rules, the compatibility of some aspects of it with 
Article 39 EC still appears to be problematic. In view of the particular climate in which the
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transfer reform meetings between the European Commission and the football authorities were 
held, this conclusion does not come as a big surprise. The final agreement which was reached in 
March 2001 \vas nothing more than a compromise, the best possible*'- or the least worst -  
solution one could arrive at under the given circumstances. Probably it does not entirely or 
precisely reflect the legal views of the Commission on the whole issue. Be that as it may, 
however, this time the Commission was very careful to  cover its back: it ensured it did not 
consent to anything which is in blatant contravention o f Community law, contrary to its previous 
approval of the ‘3+2’ nationality clauses. Therefore, if the Court o f Justice were to abolish some 
of the new transfer rules at a later stage for infringement of Article 39 EC, it will essentially be 
because it considers that these measures fail to comply with the requirements of the principle of 
proportionality. In view of the strong assertion of free movement rights in Bosman and other 
cases, it is possible the Court will indeed adopt a  stricter approach to the elements of 
‘appropriateness’ and ‘necessity’ than the Commission has done in this context. Admittedly, a 
condemnation on behalf of the Court of the new transfer system to which the Commission has 
given its approval would still boil down to a defeat for the Commission, but an ‘overruling’ of 
‘Big Brother’ the Court of a Commission’s action solely on the basis of the principle of 
proportionality is probably something one can live with at the Commission’s headquarters in 
Brussels. After all, a similar outcome would be explained to the outside world as a simple 
difference of opinion about the concrete application of the contested rules with the given context 
rather than as a profound disagreement about the law itself. This whole affair conveys the 
impression that the Commission carefully balanced all interests at stake in these proceedings and 
subsequently made a calculated choice: it watered down its originally strictly legally inspired 
exigencies sufficiently so that FIFA would be found willing to strike a  deal on the transfer issue, 
but not to such an extent that the new FIFA Regulations clearly would not stand a single chance 
before the Court of Justice. The compromise which ensued from the transfer talks is all together 
not too bad, but at the same time probably simply just not good enough.
Where does all that leave one now? The European Commission is probably relieved that it 
has been able to get rid of this hot potato without having incurred too much collateral damage, 
politically, legally or institutionally. And the football authorities are largely satisfied as well, as 
they managed to preserve important traits o f the transfer system they regard as absolutely sacred.
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Everybody happy? Not quite. In all likelihood, some aspects of the revised transfer system  are
going to be brought before the Court of Justice sooner or later. In the., current constellation, it
c ifwould be unréalistic to presuppose that another 20 years will go by without these revised transfer
rules being legally challenged. And then, these rules probably won't be withheld by the Court. In
the end, essentially, one has thus probably only been putting off the evil day. In some media, it
has been reported that the Commission overplayed its hand and that FIFA has called the
Commission's bluff. Arguably, however, the Commission had the necessary trump cards in its
hands to force the football authorities to enter into a constructive dialogue on the peaceful
existence of sport within the European Union construct. Regrettably however, for reasons w hich
had nothing to do with the law or sport as such, the Commission has let this excellent opportunity
slip sliding away. As a result, the football world is currently saddled with new transfer
regulations that are clearly less restrictive than the former transfer rules, but that nevertheless s till
contain provisions which unduly obstruct the right to freedom of movement of football p layers
within the EU/EEA and should therefore be abolished for infringement of Article 39 EC. At som e
point, the Court of Justice might rectify this, but in the meantime, precious time has been lost to
make the transfer rules comply with Community law. If  one wanted to grasp the whole affair in
one catch-phrase, it would therefore be fairly accurate to say that the elephant has given birth to  a
mouse... Besides, it must be not be forgotten that many aspects of the new FIFA rules actually
belong to the sphere of competence of the Member States. In the event o f a conflict between the
FIFA rules and national legislation, the latter must prevail.
Moreover, that is not the end of the story yet: when the European Commission in 
December 1998, after having received a series of complaints, finally decided to institute form al 
proceedings against FIFA for infringement of the Community competition rules, it did so w ith  a 
view to making an end to the unsatisfactory situations and the uncertainties still surrounding the 
remains of the transfer system in the post-Bosrrum era. Hence, the immediate impact o f the 
Bosman judgement remained limited to the particular circumstances of an EU/EEA professional 
football player who* had served the terms of his contract but was nevertheless hindered in the 
exercise of his free movement rights by the existence of transfer rules imposing on a club in 
another Member State wishing to engage him the obligation to pay a transfer sum to his former 
club. Strictly legally speaking, by means of an a contrario reasoning, domestic transfer systems
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were thus left untouched, as the Court had held on several previous occasions that the free 
movement rules didn’t apply to “wholly internal situations”. Situations of reverse discrimination 
and of sham'exercise of freedom of movement rights were an unfortunate consequence o f a 
rigorous application o f the Community rules. Moreover, most third-country national football 
players, namely those who couldn’t rely on directly effective provisions of Europe, Co-operation 
or Accession Agreements extending -  some of, as the case may be -  the free movement rights to 
them, were not concerned by the decision either, and thus transfer payments remained due when 
they were transferred after the expiry of their contract, as the Treaty provisions on free movement 
were only applicable to Member States* nationals. Furthermore, EU/EEA footballers who were 
still under contract with their club were also left in a legal limbo. All these aspects of the transfer 
system were specifically individuated by the Commission in the official statement of objections it 
had sent to FIFA. The agreement upon the transfer reform which was ultimately reached in 
March 2001 was supposed to be a cease-fire between ‘Europe and football’, and it may gloriously 
have been presented as a kind of ultimate New Deal, but this is clearly raising hopes too high. 
The Commission and FIFA have concluded no more but a temporary truce. Not only, as has 
already been outlined above, do the new FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players 
still contain several provisions which seem unjustifiably restrictive of free movement, even 
though it must be acknowledged that they undoubtedly constitute an improvement from the point 
of view of compliance with Community law in comparison with the previous rules. Also, 
specifically, if it were the purpose of the infringement procedure was to cover once and for all the 
loopholes left by Bosman, one has arguably failed to do so.
Firstly, it must be admitted that especially the situation o f in-contract players has been 
taken care of, albeit not entirely satisfactorily. Secondly, as regards the treatment reserved to 
third-country nationals, the story is somewhat more complicated. Already in Circular n° 611 of 
27 March 1997, FIFA had notified the national associations that, as from 1 April 1997, players 
who were not subjects of an EU or an EEA country would henceforth be classified as European 
citizens and that no compensation would be due for the transfer of these players between two 
countries on EU or EEA territory after the expiry of their contract. The Executive Committee of 
FIFA ratified this decision on 31 May 1997. However, at the request of several national 
associations and on the recommendation o f the Players’ Status Committee, it decided to postpone
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the enforcement of the new rule until 1 April 1999. This implies that clubs and players affected 
by the decision had been granted a transitional period of two years to prepare for implementing it 
smoothly. In \he  interim period, a club domiciled on EU/EEA territory which transfers an out-of- 
contract third-country national player to another club domiciled in another country in the 
EU/EEA continued to be entitled to a transfer sum, in accordance with Article 14 of the  
applicable FIFA Regulation at the time. This Circular, however, didn't regulate the situation in 
the event of a transfer involving a club from a non-EU/EEA country. The lawfulness of transfer 
payments in this particular situation was subsequently explicitly questioned in the Commission's 
statement of objections to FIFA. Interestingly, contemporaneously with the Commission’s 
proceedings, the Ba/og-case was pending before the Court o f  Justice, in which it was asked to  
deliver a preliminary ruling on the compatibility of the transfer system with the Treaty 
competition rules. Despite all this, however, neither in the agreement of March 2001, nor in the  
newly revised transfer regulations, is any specific mention made of the situation of third-country 
nationals with regard to the issue o f transfer payments. And the Balog case was ultimately settled 
amicably out o f court. It can therefore only be assumed that for transfers of out-of-contract third- 
country nationals involving a club o f a  non-EU/EEA country, transfer payments are no longer 
due, as the new FIFA Regulations contain no provisions to that effect. However, it seems that it 
can not be entirely excluded that national transfer systems still contain contrary provisions in th is  
respect, as the matter has never been explicitly settled. Evidently, some more clarity in the  
amended transfer rules would have been helpful in this respect. Furthermore, if third-country 
nationals doubt the viability o f the new FIFA transfer system, they of course still cannot rely on  
the free movement provision of the Treaty in principle, but need to have recourse to the 
competition law provisions.
Thirdly, and finally, in the preamble of the new FIFA Regulations it is provided explicitly 
that these regulations deal with the status and the eligibility o f players, as well as with the rules 
applicable whenever players move between clubs belonging to  different national associations.1030 
Moreover, it is stipulated that several of the principles outlined in the regulations are also-binding 
at national level.1031 Besides, each national association is obliged to elaborate a system for
1030 Preamble, point 1 FIFA Regulations 2001.
1031 Preamble, point 2 FIFA Regulations 2001.
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domestic transfers and to draw up appropriate regulations which are to be approved by FIFA. 
These regulations must observe the general principles o f the FIFA Regulations and contain 
provisions fof the resolution of disputes that may arise in connection w i£  a national transfer.1032 
This explicit preservation of domestic transfer systems comes as a surprise. First of all, it has 
been argued on several occasions that the maintenance o f a restrictive domestic transfer system in 
a more liberalised market seems anomalous: not only does it give rise to circumstances of 
‘reverse discrimination’ in which Member States nationals are liable to be worse off than 
nationals of Member states who have made use of their free movement rights, it also constitutes 
an incentive to circumvent or evade the national rules by artificial trans-frontier transactions.1033 
In the light of the Community internal market project, the hands-off approach of the Court does 
indeed seem outdated.1034 Furthermore, importantly, the conformity o f such national transfer 
systems in this particular context with the Community competition rules seems to be dubious.1035 
The Commission initially seemed determined to address the matter from this particular angle,1036 
but in the end obviously consented in a status quo. This may be indicative of the fact that even 
though the entire procedure was initiated for supposed infringements of the Community 
competition rules, the affair was primarily conceived as a free movement case. Instead of being 
abolished, the practice of domestic transfer payments has thus unfortunately once again been 
confirmed. One straightforward example will suffice to illustrate this conclusion. According to 
the revised transfer rules, the international transfer market has been closed at 31 August 2002, to 
reopen on 1 January 2003. In Italy however, the national football federation has decided to 
reopen the domestic market from 7 until 13 September 2002 to give Italian clubs the opportunity 
to effectuate additional internal transfers. Even though this measure may appear indistinctly 
applicable at first sight, as both Italian as foreign football players may move from one Italian club 
to another, it is submitted that it is indirectly discriminatory in practice, as more nationals of other 
Member States than Italians will be affected by it...
1032 Preamble, point 3 FIFA Regulations 2001.
1033 Weatherill, “Case C-415/93 Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Association ASLB v Jean-Mafc 
Bosman”, o.c., 1020-1021.
1034 See also Mortelmans, “Zaak C-415/95 KBVBt Royal Club Liégeois, UEFA tegen J-M. Bosman”, 4 SEW  (1996), 
141, at 144.
1035 Weatherill, “Case C-415/93 Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Association ASLB v Jean-Marc 
Bosman”, o.c., 1021-1026.
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By way of summary, the final outcome of the formal infringement procedure launched by 
the Commission against some contested transfer practices tastes bitter iwice: not only for what 
has actually been achieved, which is arguably insufficiently liberal from the point of view o f  
freedom of movement, but also for what arguably should have been done, and has not (fully) 
been realised. The last word on the transfer saga clearly hasn’t been said y e t ...
Epilogue
The new FIFA Regulations entered into force on 1 September 2001. In the final 
provisions of the Regulations, it is stipulated expressly that contracts concluded before this date 
remain in principle governed by the previous rules of the FIFA Regulations o f 1997, unless 
players and clubs explicitly agree to base agreements signed after 5 July 2001 on the new  
Regulations.1036 037 Barely one year has passed since the introduction of the new rules. It would 
therefore definitely be premature to pronounce already a judgement on their application or the ir 
workability in practice. Be that as it may, some tentative observations will nevertheless 
cautiously be made at this point. The football world currently faces a period of economic 
recession, after 10 years of seemingly unlimited growth, mainly due to a spectacular explosion o f  
the revenue generated from the sale of the television rights for football matches. To give but an 
example, in the last three years only, the total income o f the 20 richest European clubs increased 
by 70%. However, disappointing audience figures brought several private television channels on  
the edge of bankruptcy, and induced them to make lower bids for the football broadcasting rights. 
Almost immediately, the financial crisis in the media extended itself to the sector of football.1038 
All too many clubs had got enmeshed in the dangerous spiral o f money, offering royal salaries to 
the players they employed and paying astronomic transfer sums for the services of a player in the 
aftermath of Bosman. To be able to cover their actual expenses, many a club’s management even 
didn’t hesitate to anticipate on the income it would receive from future commercial transactions. 
As it seems extremely likely that these future‘deals will turn out to be much less lucrative than
1036 See also Van Miert, “L’arrêt Bosman: la suppression des frontières sportives sportives dans la Marche unique 
europeen”, a c ,  3.
1037 Article 46 FIFA Régulations 2001.
1038 Roox, “Na euforie komen magere járen voor profvoetbal”, De Standaard, 17 April 2002.
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initially expected, for many clubs it really is all hands on deck to survive now.1039 In this 
particular climate, it does not come as a surprise that there has been very little activity on the 
transfer market this summer in comparison with the previous years, even in a post-World Cup 
year. Most clubs simply do not have the necessary cash to effectuate transfers at the moment. 
Some exceptions do confirm the rule of course. The sting was clearly in the tail: on the last day of 
the transfer period in the summer of 2002, Real Madrid finally managed to concretise the transfer 
of Ronaldo from Intemazionale. The 2002 European club champions paid 35 million Euro for the 
Brazilian world champion to the Italians, who could also pick one out of three players of the 
Spanish squad with a market value of 10 million Euro.1040 In total, the deal thus cost Madrid 45 
million Euro, still a gigantic amount of money, but significantly less than the 70 million Euro it 
paid only one year ago to convince Juventus to release Zidane. At exactly the same day, 
Alessandro Nesta, captain and symbol o f Lazio Roma and arguably the best defender in the 
world, was transferred to AC Milan for 30 million Euro. Only one year ago, his value on the 
transfer market was still estimated almost twice as high. Both transfers were realised with the 
mutual consent of all parties involved. Presumably, this substantial fall of transfer amounts within 
a period of only one year is to be explained simply by the modified -  financial -  situation on the 
market of offer and demand rather than by the changes in the legal situation created by the new 
FIFA Regulations. This rebuts the criticism that everything would remain as it was before the 
introduction o f the new transfer rules because the possibility o f freely negotiating transfer sums 
by mutual consent had not been repealed. These two transfer soaps which lasted both more or less 
the entire summer reveal another element which is worth mentioning in this context: despite the 
fact that both players had clearly indicated from the outset that they wanted to leave their club of 
affiliation, they never hinted at possibly unilaterally breaking their contract and ultimately, would 
have stayed at their club, at least until the next transfer window, if the clubs involved in the 
transfer negotiations hadn’t reached an agreement by mutual consent. Arguably, the new FIFA 
Regulations on contractual stability were not yet applicable to the particular situations of Nesta - 
whose transfer is a domestic one besides - and Ronaldo, who had signed their contracts with 
respectively Lazio and Intemazionale before 1 September 2001, but still, the implementation of
1039 Muiten, “Interview. Sporteconoom Stefan Késenne over voetbal en economie: “Betaal een voetballer als 
hoogleraar, dat is toch niet slecht”, De Standaard, 9 August 2002; Colin, Financiële revolutie in Belgisch voetbal 
noodzakelijk”, De Standaard, 13 August 2002.
1040 According to press reports Munitis, Flavio Conceicao or Solan.
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these new rules could have induced them to rely on the applicable Italian labour law to terminate 
their respective contracts unilaterally in case a transfer by mutual „consent seemed to be 
impossible, eVen though the FIFA Regulations o f 1997 prohibited tras kind o f behaviour. 
Essentially, the fact that they didn’t even seem to take into consideration this course of action 
may mean two things: on the one hand, it is entirely plausible and even likely that, even though 
the possibility o f unilaterally terminating a contract constitutes a real option nowadays, players 
will still prefer to follow the traditional road o f a transfer by mutual consent of all parties 
involved in the transaction to avoid misunderstandings or displeasure in the after all small world 
of football, and will have recourse to unilateral action only as a kind of last resort. This illustrates 
that law and regulation only have a secondary role to play in the whole area of sport. On the one 
hand, it is often murmured that the new Regulations are too imprecise and complex and therefore 
didn’t come to the fore during the transfer discussions.1041 This criticism, which might become a 
real stumbling block for the existence o f the new rules if its persists, must be taken seriously. 
FIFA should therefore clarify the existing ambiguities and uncertainties as soon as possible.1042 
The ongoing dispute between Belgian rivals Anderlecht and Bruges on the transfer o f Alin Stoica 
may already constitute a golden opportunity to do so, even if  it concerns a domestic transfer the 
Brussels team claims a sum of 400.000 Euro of compensation for the training and education o f  
the player, while Bruges refuses to pay anything, claiming that the Romanian midfielder was 
acquired transfer free after the expiry o f his contract with Anderlecht. Undoubtedly to  be 
continued...
1041 Mercy, “Acht maanden oude transfexregeling Fifa ingewikkeld, onduidelijk en niet toegepast”, De Standaard, 17 
May 2002.
1042 Van Laere, “Onduidelijkheid troef na akkoord Fifa, Uefa and Europese Commissie over nieuw internationaal 
transfersysteem”, De Standaard, 7 March 2001.
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The Nationality Issue:
Alle Menschen werden Brüder?
- Friedrich von Schiller, Ode an die Freude -
Introduction
A second set of rules elaborated by the national and international sporting federations the  
viability o f which has been contested from the point o f view o f conformity with the Community 
provisions on freedom of movement turn around the issue of nationality.1043 The competent 
authorities within any given sports discipline have always imposed in their regulations a certain 
number of conditions which must be fulfilled by the athletes active in this discipline before they  
get the green light to take part in the official competitions staged by these associations. W ith 
these requirements which must strictly be complied with, the sporting federations generally 
pursue the objective of homogeneity and regularity o f its competitions, characterised by a certain 
equality of chances and uncertainty with regard to the outcome of the tournament or the 
championship. Broadly summarising, these prerequisites normally have regard to different 
matters, ranging from specifically acquired capacities or skills of a sportsman to participate in a 
certain sporting contest, over his social status as amateur or professional sportsman, to his 
physical aptitude (age, gender, weight, etc), etc. In this context, often also nationality 
requirements pop up amongst these criteria o f eligibility. Undeniably, just as was the case w ith 
the transfer rules discussed previously, in some way or the other, these provisions thus 
substantially limit the athlete’s opportunities to compete in the sporting events o f his choice. 
Specifically, in‘the case of conditions linked to nationality, these limitations basically take tw o 
different forms: firstly, some provisions absolutely and completely bar athletes from becoming
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member of a certain team or deny them the right to perform their sporting activities in a sporting 
competition simply on grounds of their -  foreign1043 044 - nationality; secondly, other rules are less 
far-reaching and contain only quantitative restrictions on the possibility &>r clubs to contractually 
engage and/or field players of a  foreign nationality in official contests or national federations to 
select individual athletes to participate in competitions. It has already been alleged on several 
occasions that these nationality requirements constitute also unlawful restrictions on the right to 
freedom o f movement of persons as guaranteed in the European Community Treaty. In this 
chapter, this particular assertion will be examined in detail. It shall also be evaluated whether the 
Court of Justice in its case law has managed to reconcile the interests of the sportsmen to see 
their free movement rights safeguarded with the claims of the sporting associations to respect 
their freedom of association and to take duly into account the specific needs of sport. Particular 
attention will be paid to the status under Community law of national sports teams.
This chapter will be composed o f two sections. The first section will consist o f a broad 
overview of the different sorts o f nationality clauses which are frequently found in the regulations 
of various sporting associations. Some attention will also already be paid to the reaction of the 
Court of Justice towards these nationality requirements in some of its case law. The second 
section will be entirely dedicated to an in-depth analysis o f the Court’s judgements on the 
compatibility of the nationality restrictions with Community law. Especially the Court’s ruling in 
the Bosman case will constitute the core of the examination. It will be unveiled on the basis of 
some concrete examples that the concept o f national teams is less than simply straightforward. In 
this context, the often somewhat peculiar situation of naturalised sportsmen and of athletes with a 
dual nationality will also be taken into consideration.
1043 For a more general analysis of to what extent the concept of nationality may constitute an obstacle to the full 
realisation of the internal market, see, inter alia, Hall, Nationality, Migration Rights and Citizenship o f the Union 
(Martinus Nijhoff, 1995).
1044 As will become clear below, the concept of ‘foreign nationality’ may mean different things in sporting circles: it 
may refer to a foreign legal nationality, but equally to a foreign sporting nationality, which essentially means that the 
athlete in question cannot be selected to play for the national representative team. For a more elaborate analysis, see 
Dubey, La libre circulation des sportifs en Europe (Bruylant, 2000), at 417-437.
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§1: The Nationality Clauses: An Overview
5 V
In general, nationality criteria take two different forms: either they Impose an absolute ban  
on participation of foreign sportsmen in certain sporting competitions, be it at international o r a t 
domestic level, or they are somehow more flexible, involving quota, implying that th ey  
quantitatively restrict the participation o f foreign athletes in sporting events, or even the actual 
engagement by sport clubs of foreign players. These two different types of nationality restrictions 
will be dealt with successively in this paragraph. On each occasion, specific reference will b e  
made to the relevant case law o f the Court o f Justice on this matter.
I. ABSOLUTE PROHIBITION OF PARTICIPATION  
1. At international level
At international level, international sporting federations have organised some sporting 
competitions, such as continental championships or world championships, to promote th e ir 
discipline and to improve the relations between the different national federations.1045 D uring 
these events, the national or representative teams of the national federations which are a m em ber 
of the international federation enter in the arena with each other in search for sporting glory. 
From the early beginning onwards, these competitions have been very peculiar events, 
surrounded by a lot of traditions and characterised by the presence of many typically national 
elements: the teams participating in these contests carry the name of the country they represent; 
they generally wear an outfit in the typical colours of the country; national anthems are played 
before or at the end of the games or the races, etc. Within this particular context, it is no surprise 
that the sporting federations have explicitly stipulated in their regulations that only athletes w ho 
possess the nationality of the country o f the federation can represent their country during these 
sporting manifestations. In football, for example, the applicable FIFA Regulations provide tha t 
each player who is a citizen of a country on grounds of the laws of that country iç qualified to  
play for the national or representative team  of that country.1046 Similarly, with regard to cycling,
1045 See for example A n  2.2 FIFA Statutes 2001.
1046 Article 18 FIFA Regulations governing the Application of Statutes 2001.
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I the relevant UCI Regulations hold that the national federation can only select cyclists of its
I nationality to participate in the world championships.1047
Î ir
1 At first sight, it appears nothing less than self-evident and belonging to common sense1048
I that the national team of a given country in a certain sports discipline is composed exclusively of
I athletes who have the nationality of the country which they officially represent. All the players of
* the ‘Divine Canaries* that beat Germany in the final of FIFA’s 2002 World Cup had the BrazilianJ nationality. However logical and socially acceptable the federations’ rules to this effect may seem
I to be, they are undeniably discriminatory on grounds of nationality, as other sportsmen who do
I not have the nationality o f a certain country are simply excluded from playing for the national
[ team of that country. The world’s number one and 2002 Wimbledon champion Lleyton Hewitt
I can only play Davis Cup tennis for Australia, he’s not entitled to compete for, for example,
 ^ France, whereas French nationals Sébastien Grosjean or Arnaud Clément can play for ‘les bleus’.
I Now, Article 12 of the European Community Treaty unequivocally states that “within the scope
j of the Treaty, any discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be prohibited.” From the point of
I view of the application of Community law, the lawfulness of this specific nationality conditionJ  therefore suddenly appeared to be problematic.
j In the seventies, this issue was indirectly raised for the first time in the case o f Walrave
I and Koch v International Cycling Union.1049 Bruno Walrave and Noppie Koch were two Dutch
\ nationals who used to act as pacemakers on motorcycles in medium distance cycle races with so-
j called stayers, who cycle in the lee of the motorcycle. They provided their services for
I remuneration under agreements with the stayers or the cycling associations or with private
; sponsors. Walrave and Koch were generally considered by the UCI itself to be amongst the best
( pacemakers in the world, and used to participate in these races as pacemakers for stayers of other
j nationalities, in particular Belgians and Germans, because of a paucity of top-class Dutch stayers
( at the material tim e.1050 In 1970, the UCI undertook to amend its rules about the conduct of the
■ World Championships for motor-paced races, so as to provide that, as from 1973, a pacer-should
i ---------------------------------------
, 1047 Article 9.2.002 par. 1 UCI Regulation 2000.
iM8 terminology was used by O’Keeffe & Osborne, “The European Court Scores a Goal”, The Industrial 
' Journal o f Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations (Summer 1996) at 127.
I 1049 Case 36/74 Walrave and Koch v Union Cycliste Internationale [1974] ECR 1405.
I,
I
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be of the same nationality as his stayer. The UCI declared that it had proceeded to this 
amendment because the World Championships were intended to be competitions between 
national teanSs. Walrave and Koch sought to repeal this rule, which they considered as a severe 
constriction of the market in which they could sell their skills, and instituted formal proceedings 
before the national courts, claiming that they were unlawfully discriminated against on grounds 
of nationality. The Dutch tribunal which was seized of the case (the ‘Arrondissementsrechtbank’ 
in Utrecht) decided to stay the proceedings and referred the matter to the Court of Justice, 
requesting for a preliminary ruling on the question whether Articles 12, 39 and 49 EC must b e  
interpreted in such a way that the provision in the rules of the UCI relating to medium-distance 
world cycling championships behind motorcycles, according to which the pacemaker must be o f  
the same nationality as the stayer, is incompatible with them.
Initially, the Court couched its preliminary ruling in terms of principle, holding that in  
view of the objectives of the Community, the practice of sport is subject to Community law o n ly  
to the extent that it constitutes an economic activity within the meaning of Article 2 of th e  
Treaty.105 051 It subsequently specified that when such activity has the character of gainful 
employment or remunerated service, it comes more particularly within the scope, according to th e  
case, of the freedom of movement o f workers or the freedom to provide services.1052 These 
provisions, which give effect to  the general rule of Article 12 of the Treaty, prohibit any  
discrimination based on nationality in the performance of the activity to which they refer.1053 A t 
this point, the Court introduced an important proviso, declaring that this prohibition o f  
discrimination does not affect the composition of sport teams, in particular national teams, th e  
formation of which is a question o f purely sporting interest and as such has nothing to do w ith  
economic activity.1054 It also added that this restriction on the scope of the provisions in question 
must remain limited to its proper objective.1055 Ultimately, the Court left for the national court to  
determine, on the basis of the information furnished, the nature of the activity submitted to its
1050 Warner AG in Case 36/74 Walrave and Koch v Union Cycliste Internationale [1974] ECR 1423.
1051 Walrave, par. 4.
1052 Walrave, par. 5.
1053 Walrave, par. 6.
1054 Walrave, par. 8.
1055 Walrave, par. 9.
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judgement and to decide in particular whether in the sport in question the pacemaker and the 
stayer do or dp not constitute a team.1056
K
2. At national level
At national level, sporting federations have only occasionally reserved participation in the 
domestic competitions exclusively to the nationals of their country.1057 In general, foreign 
sportsmen were allowed to freely take part in these championships as well.1058 The most famous 
exception which proverbially confirms the rule was probably the formal decision o f the Italian 
football federation to completely close the frontiers after the early exit of the national team at the 
1966 World Cup in England following an unexpected elimination by North Korea. The idea 
behind this drastic measure excluding non-Italian nationals from playing in the Italian 
championship was to create more space again in the line-up of the Italian clubs for Italian football 
players, especially youngsters, so that ultimately, the ‘squadra azzurra’ would return to greatness 
again. This complete ban on foreign football players would only be lifted from the 1980/81 
football season onwards, after the Italian federation had been forced to do so by the judicial 
authorities.1059
Indeed, on its turn, also this purely domestic condition of nationality had been subject to a 
legal challenge in the case of Dona v M antero.1060 The factual circumstances of this case were the 
following: Mario Mantero, former chairman of the Italian football club of Rovigo, had entrusted 
Gaetano Dona with the carrying out o f some enquiries in football circles abroad in order to 
discover players potentially willing to play for his team Rovigo. In this respect, Dona arranged 
for the publication of an advertisement in a Belgian sporting newspaper with this object in view. 
However, Mantero refused to consider the offers submitted as a result of the advertisement and to 
repay to Dona the expenses incurred in the publication of the advertisement. Hereupon, Donk
1056 Walrave, par. 10. Ultimately, Walrave and Koch declined to press for judgement at national level, after the UCI 
had allegedly threatened to remove the paced races from the programme of the world championships.
1057 For example, the presence of foreigners in professional football in Greece was completely prohibited until 1974.
1058 See European Commission, The impact o f European Union Activities on Sport (Brussels, 1994), n® 1012.
1059 When the federation didn’t immediately comply with the terms of the Dona ruling, a second request for a 
preliminary ruling had been filed with the Court of Justice. In this context, it may be interesting to point out that 
already in the next World Cup in 1970 in Mexico, Italy forced its way through to die finals, only to bow for mighty 
Brazil. And 12 years later, Italy did win the 1982 World Cup in Spain. Coincidence?
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commenced a legal action before the national judge, requesting that Mantero be ordered to pay 
the expenses in question. Mantero replied that Dona had acted prematurely, and in support of his 
statement he* referred to the combined provisions of Articles 16 and 2o(g) of the ‘Rules of the 
Italian Football Federation’, according to which only players who are affiliated to that federation 
may take part in matches as professional or semi-professional players, membership in that 
capacity being in principle only open to players of Italian nationality. In his opinion, it would be 
possible to consider the engagement of foreign players only when this ‘blocking of the frontiers’ 
has been abandoned. To this, Dona replied that the provisions quoted were invalid on the ground 
that they were contrary to Articles 12, 39 and 49 of the Treaty. By order of 7 February 1976, the 
national judge (the Giudice Conciliatore o f Rovigo) referred to the Court of Justice under Article 
177 of the Treaty various questions concerning the interpretation of Articles 12, 39 and 49 of the 
Treaty. Essentially, the Court was asked to rule whether these provisions confer upon all 
nationals o f the Member States the right to provide a service anywhere in the Community and, in 
particular, whether football players also enjoy the same right where their services are in the 
nature o f a gainful occupation.106 061 Moreover, the national judge asked the Court to rule whether 
this right may also be relied on to prevent the application of contrary rules drawn up by a sporting 
federation which is competent to control football on the territory of a Member State.1062
In its final judgement, the Court firstly stipulated that any national provision which limits 
an activity covered by the Treaty provisions on the freedom of movement for workers and the 
freedom to provide services to nationals of one Member State is “incompatible with the 
Community rule” .1063 Subsequently, it reiterated its principled decision from Walrave that 
“having regard to the objectives o f the Community, the practice o f sport is subject to Community 
law only in so far as it constitutes an economic activity within the meaning of Article 2 o f the 
Treaty”, only to proceed that this “applies to the activities o f professional or semi-professional 
football players, which are in the nature o f gainful employment or remunerated service.”1064 
Consequently, it logically ruled that where such players are nationals of a Member State they 
• benefit in all the other Member States from the provisions of Community law concerning
1060 Case 13/76 Dona v Mantero [1976] E C R 1333.
1061 Donay par. 2.
1062 Dondy par. 3.
1063 Dondy par. II.
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freedom of movement of persons and o f provision of services.1064 065 After having reached this 
partial conclusion, the Court repeated the exception it had previously made in Walrave to the
t'
application oY the Community rules to sporting rules, albeit in a slightly modified version, 
holding explicitly that “those provisions do not prevent the adoption of rules or of a practice 
excluding foreign players from participation in certain matches for reasons which are not of an 
economic nature, which relate to the particular nature and context of such matches and are thus of 
sporting interest only, such as for example, matches between national teams from different 
countries.”1066 Before referring the matter back to the national court for the final decision as to 
the determination o f the activity at stake in the proceedings,1067 the Court still declared once 
again that the restriction on the scope o f the provisions in question must remain limited to its 
proper objective.1068
H. RELATIVE LIMITATION OF PARTICIPATION
Apart from the longstanding general practice of strictly reserving participation to matches 
of the national team of a country in any given sports discipline to sportsmen who are nationals of 
that country, and the relatively exceptional situation of a complete prohibition of foreigners to 
take part in competitions at domestic level, sporting federations have usually allowed foreign 
athletes to perform their sporting activities together with national athletes in competitions both at 
national and international level. However, that is not to say that foreigners enjoyed an 
unrestrained freedom to deliver their performances. On the contrary, many, if not all associations 
have set limitations on the total number of foreigners who could be recruited and/or fielded in 
official matches or races. The actual quantitative restrictions imposed could vary from one 
national federation to another, from one sporting discipline to another, from one season to 
another, they differed according to the level of the competition, the age or the gender of the 
athletes, etc.1069 However, these relative limitations all have in common that they were the 
concrete answer of the responsible federations’ balancing exercise between on the one hand, the
1064 Donà, par. 12.
1065 Donà, par. 13.
1066 Donà, par. 14.
1067 Donà, par. 16.
1068 D onà  par. 15.
1069 See also Garrigues, Activités sportives et droit communautaire (thesis Strasbourg, 1982), at 273 et seq.
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clubs’ quest for the best sporting performance and the best spectacle, the attainment of which 
may be dependent on or facilitated by the presence and participation of foreign sportsmen, and on 
the other hand, the need to maintain a certain competitive balance between the different clubs, the 
concern to preserve the traditional link between a club and its country, and the need to create a 
sufficient pool of national players for the national team.
1. The example of football
At some point, just as was the case with the absolute prohibitions imposed on foreign 
athletes to participate in certain contest or championships, also the more liberal and only partially 
restrictive nationality requirements became the subject o f  legal scrutiny in the Bosman case. 
Again, as has become clear from the previous chapters, the circumstances giving rise to the 
concrete dispute were to be situated in the sphere of professional football. From the 1960s 
onwards, many national football associations introduced rules, the so-called ‘nationality clauses’, 
restricting the extent to which foreign players could be recruited and/or fielded in a match.
1.1. Rules limiting the recruitment o f fo reign  players
The applicable rules in Italy, for example, provide a nice illustration of the former 
situation. Until 1987, the Italian national football federation forbade clubs from the Serie A  to 
have more than two non-Italian football players under contract. In this respect, it didn’t make a 
distinction between EU and non-EU nationals. From  the 1988-89 season onwards, clubs were 
entitled to engage a third foreign player.1070 The federation also started to differentiate between 
EU and non-EU nationals: for example, in the 1995-96 season, clubs could conclude employment 
contracts with as many EU nationals as they wished; however, the recruitment of non-EU 
footballers was still limited to maximum three per club.1071 Also in France, clubs weren’t allowed 
to have more than two foreign players under contract either until 1979. Afterwards, the 
federations authorised clubs to freely engage players with a nationality o f a Member State o f the
1070 Transitory provision to Article 40 NOI -  Federazione Italiana Gioco Calcio (FIGC) 1995.
1071 Article 40.7 NOI -  FIGC 1995.
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European Union without reservation.1072 However, in the 1995-96 season, maximum two non-EU 
nationals could be contractually linked to a French club.1073
i:
1,2. Rules limiting the participation o f foreign players
Furthermore, instead of or on top o f limiting the number of foreigners to be contractually 
engaged, UEFA and several national federations had had recourse to the latter situation, 
quantitatively regulating the number o f foreigners who could effectively be played during an 
official match. Already in 1978, UEFA gave an undertaking to Mr. Davignon, a Member of the 
Commission of the European Communities, that it would remove the limitations on the number 
of contracts entered into by each club with players from other Member States and would set the 
number o f such players who may participate in any one match at two, that limit not being 
applicable to players established for over five years in the Member State in question.1074 In 1991, 
following further discussions with Mr. Bangemann, a Vice-President of the Commission, UEFA 
adopted the ‘3+2' rule permitting each national association to limit to three the number o f foreign 
players whom a club could field in any first division match in their national championships, plus 
two players who have played in the country of the relevant national association for an 
uninterrupted period of five years, including three years as a junior. The same *3+2' limitation 
also applied to matches in UEFA’s European Cup competitions for club teams.1075 Interestingly, 
for the purposes of those clauses, nationality was defined in relation to whether the player can be 
selected to play in a country’s national or representative team.1076 Importantly, the *3+2’ rule 
didn’t constitute a ceiling, but a threshold: the national federations were entitled to allow more 
foreigners on the pitch.1077 The examples from rules laid down by national federations which will 
be furnished in this context are all taken from rules applicable in the 1995-96 season, not by 
chance the year when the Court of Justice pronounced its ruling in the Bosman case.1078 At that 
time, in Spain, for example, clubs could only engage four players who could not be selected for 
the Spanish national team  Only three o f them could be fielded during one and the same official
1072 Article 114.2 par. 1 RA- Ligue Nationale Française (LNF) 1995/96.
1073 Article 114.2 par. 2 RA-LNF 1995/96.
1074 Bosman, par. 26.
1075 Bosman, par. 27.
1076 Bosman, par. 25.
1077 See Lenz AG in Bosman, par. 40.
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game.* 1079 In France, the official match sheet could contain maximum three names of foreign 
players, regardless of whether they were EU or non-EU nationals, plus two ‘assimilated* players. 
Maximum two of these players could be non-EU nationals. To be considered as an assimilated 
player, a foreigner had to have played in France during an uninterrupted period of five years, at 
least three of which in the junior youth categories.1080 The situation in Italy was relatively 
comparable: only five players, out of which two assimilated players, who were not eligible to  
play for the national team could participate in an official match.1081 Assimilated players w ere 
those foreigners, nationals of a country which was a  member of UEFA, who had been licensed to  
play by the Italian federation during five consecutive seasons, out of which at least three in the 
junior categories.1082
2. The Bosnian case
In the context of the dispute in Bosnian, the national court -  after all rather surprisingly1083 
- referred to the Court of Justice a specific question relating to the lawfulness of these nationality  
clauses in professional football, with which in substance it sought to ascertain whether A rticle 3 9  
EC precludes the application of rules laid down by sporting associations, under which, in m a tch es  
in competitions which they organise, football clubs may field only a limited num ber o f  
professional football players who are nationals o f other Member States.1084 In its prelim inary  
ruling on this nationality issue, the Court of Justice followed exactly the same scheme as it h ad  
used previously to decide the transfer issue: firstly, it considered whether the nationality c la u se s  
amounted to a restriction of the right to the free movement for workers, prohibited by A rticle  39  
EC, before secondly, analysing whether this obstacle could be justified by an imperative re a so n  
in the general interest.
!07S For more detailed information, see for example Dubey, o.c„ at 251-254.
1079 Article 289 RG -  Regulación Federación España de Futebol (RFEF).
1080 Article 114 RA -  LNF 1995/96.
1081 Article 40.7bis N OI-FIGC 1995.
1082 Article 40.8 NOI -  FIGC 1995.
1083 See analysis below, §2, L
1084 Bosnian, par. 115.
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2.1. Existence o f an obstacle to freedom  o f movement fo r  workers
. ç
In the first place, the Court of Justice recalled that Article 39(2)VEC expressly provides
that freedom of movement for workers entails the abolition o f any discrimination based on
nationality between workers of the Member States as regards employment, remuneration and
conditions of work and employment.1085 It declared that this provision has been implemented, in
particular, by Article 4 of Regulation 1612/681086, under which provisions laid down by law,
regulation or administrative action of the Member States which restrict by number or percentage
the employment of foreign nationals in any undertaking, branch, of activity or region, or at a
national level, are not to apply to nationals o f the other Member States.1087 Subsequently, it
decided that the same principle applies to clauses in the regulations of sporting federations which
restrict the right o f nationals o f other Member States to participate, as professional players, in
football matches.1088 In this respect, the Court considered irrelevant the fact that those clauses
concern not the employment of such players, on which there is no restriction, but the extent to
which the clubs may actually field them in official matches. It firmly ruled that “in so far as
participation in such matches is the essential purpose of a professional player’s activity, a rule
which restricts that participation obviously also restricts the chances of employment o f the player
concerned.” 1089
2.2. Existence o f justifications
After having established the existence of an obstacle to the freedom of movement, the 
Court went on to consider whether that obstacle may be justified in the light of Article 39 of the 
Treaty.1090 The KBVB, UEFA and the delegations of the intervening governments of Germany, 
France and Italy had forwarded a series o f arguments so as to justify the contested nationality 
clauses on non-economic grounds, “concerning only the sport as such”.1091 Firstly, they had
1085 Bosnian, par. 1 1 7 . .
1086 Regulation EEC No. 1612/68 of the Council of 15 October 1968 on freedom of movement for workers within the 
Community, OJ Special Edition 1968(11), at 475.
1087 Bosnian, par. 118.
1088 Bosnian, par. 119; DonA, par. 19.
1089 Bosnian, par. 120.
1090 Bosnian, par. 121.
1091 Bosnian, par. 122.
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asserted that those clauses served to maintain the traditional link between each club and its
country, a factor which they considered o f great importance in enabling the public to identify
£" ITwith its favdurite team and ensuring that clubs taking part in international competitions
effectively represent their countries.1092 Secondly, these clauses were arguably also necessary to
create a sufficient pool of national players to provide the national team with top players to field in
all positions.1093 Thirdly, they advocated that these clauses also helped to maintain a competitive
balance between clubs by preventing the richest clubs from appropriating the services of the best
players.1094 Finally, UEFA pointed out that the ‘3+2’ rule was drawn up in collaboration with the
Commission and was to be reviewed regularly to remain in line with the development of
Community policy.1095
In its reply to these submissions, the Court of Justice firstly reiterated its previous 
statement from the Dona decision to the effect that the provisions of Community law concerning 
freedom of movement of persons and o f provision of services do not prevent the adoption of rules 
or practices excluding foreign players from certain matches for reasons which are not of an 
economic nature, which relate to the particular nature and context of such matches and are thus o f  
sporting interest only, such as, for example, matches between national teams from different 
countries. Again, it also emphasised that such a restriction on the scope of the provisions in 
question must remain limited to its proper objective.1096 Earlier it its judgement, the Court had 
already declared that this restriction therefore cannot be relied upon to exclude the whole of a 
sporting activity from the scope of the Treaty.1097 In this particular context, the Court ruled that 
the contested nationality clauses did not concern specific matches between teams representing 
their countries but applied to all official matches between clubs and thus to the essence of the 
activity of professional players.1098 Hence, it concluded that in those specific circumstances, the 
nationality clauses could not be deemed to be in accordance with Article 39 EC, “otherwise that 
provision would be deprived o f its practical effect and the fundamental right to free access to
1092 Bosman, par. 123.
1093 Bosman, par. 124.
1094 Bosman, par. 125.
1095 Bosman, par. 126.
1096 Bosman, par. 127.
1097 Bosman, par. 76.
1098 Bosman, par. 12S.
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employment which the Treaty confers individually on each worker in the Community rendered
»»1099nugatory.
Subsequently, the Court o f Justice judged that “none of the arguments put forward by the 
sporting associations and by the governments which have submitted observations detracts from 
that conclusion.”109 100 In the first place, it unequivocally quashed the argument based on the role 
served by the nationality clauses to maintain the traditional link between a club and country. 
According to the Court, a football club’s links with the Member State in which it is established 
cannot be regarded as any more inherent in its sporting activity than its links with its locality, 
town, region or, in the case of the United Kingdom, the territory covered by each of the four 
associations. It subtly observed that even though national championships are played between 
clubs from different regions, towns or localities, there exists no such rule restricting the right of 
clubs to field players from other regions, towns or localities in such matches.1101 Moreover, it 
pointed out that in international competitions, participation is limited to clubs which have 
achieved certain results in competition in their respective countries, without any particular 
significance being attached to the nationalities of their players.1102 Secondly, the Court also failed 
to be convinced by the supposed indispensability of the nationality clauses for the good of the 
national team. It remarked that whilst national teams must be made up of players having the 
nationality of the relevant country, those players need not necessarily be registered to play for 
clubs in that country. In this respect, it referred to the rules of the sporting associations, according 
to which foreign players must be allowed by their clubs to play for their country’s national team 
in certain matches.1103 Furthermore, it countered the defendant’s arguments by holding that 
“although freedom of movement for workers, by opening up the employment market in one 
Member State to nationals of the other Member States, has the effect of reducing workers’ 
chances of finding employment within the ember State of which they are nationals, it also, by the 
same token, offers them new prospects of employment in other Member States. Such 
considerations obviously apply also to professional footballers.”1104 Thirdly, the Court rejected
1099 Bosman, par. 129. See on that last point Case 222/86 Unectefv Heylens and others [1986] ECR 4097, par. 14.
1100 Bosman, par. 130.
1101 Bosman, par. 131.
1102 Bosman, par. 132.
1103 Bosman, par. 133.
1104 Bosman, par. 134.
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the assertion that nationality clauses are an effective instrument to preserve a certain competitive 
equilibrium between clubs. It decided that although it has been argued that the nationality clauses 
prevent the richest clubs from engaging the best foreign players, those clauses are nonetheless not 
sufficient to achieve the aim of maintaining a competitive balance, since there are no rules 
limiting the possibility for such clubs to recruit the best national players, thus undermining that 
balance to the same extent.1105 Finally, as regards the argument that the 'three plus two’ rule was 
drawn up in collaboration with the Commission, the Court firmly held that, “except in 
circumstances where such powers are expressly conferred upon it, the Commission may not give 
guarantees concerning the compatibility o f  specific practices with the Treaty”1106, and that “the 
Commission in no circumstances has the power to authorise practices which are contrary to the 
Treaty.” 1107
Consequently, as the Court refused to accept the grounds of justification invoked to 
uphold the nationality clauses, which were deemed to constitute an obstacle to the right to  
freedom of movement for workers, it ruled that Article 39 EC “precludes the application of rules 
laid down by sporting associations under which, in matches in competitions which they organise, 
football clubs may field only a limited number of professional players who are nationals of o ther 
Member States.”1108
§2: Legal Analysis
The decisions of the Court of Justice in the cases o f Walrave and Dona in the seventies 
passed by relatively unnoticed. This had a lot to do with the fact that the Court remained after all 
relatively vague in the formulation o f its rulings and left it up to the national courts to decisively 
settle the concrete disputes. Consequently, rather unsurprisingly, these judgements did no t 
provoke a significant change in the mindset of the sporting associations, inducing them to m ake 
some modifications to their existing regulations and carry out some reforms in certain traditional
1105 Bosman, par. 135.
im  See also Joined Cases 142-143/80 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Staio v Essevi and Salengo [1981] ECR 
1413, par. 16.
1107 Bosman, par. 136.
1108 Bosman, par. 137.
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sports practices, the conformity of which with the principles of Community law had become
doubtful in the light of the Court’s pronouncements. Conversely, the Bosnian decision of the
( CCourt did produce a shock wave of dismay in sporting circles. It appears thus that the specificity
rather than the novelty of the Court’s stance in Bosnian led to the supposed ‘revolution’. The
particular approach of the Court and the express statements made in Luxembourg relating to the
issue of the nationality clauses in this case are therefore at the centre of the legal examination in
this paragraph. Firstly, the issue of the jurisdiction of the Court to tackle effectively the
compatibility of the rules on foreign players with the requirements of free movement law in
Bosman will be subject to further scrutiny. Secondly, it will be examined what constitutes the
exact legal basis for the privileged status granted by the Court in its sports-related case law to
certain nationality requirements, and subsequently what is the precise extent of this restriction on
the scope of the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality. In this context, the
legal position of naturalised athletes and sportsmen with dual nationality will be examined.
Thirdly, some observations will be made on the particular way the Court in Bosman construed the
infringement of Article 39 EC by the contested ‘3+2’ rules. Fourthly, it will be evaluated whether
the Court was right in rejecting as unmeritorious the various grounds of justification advanced by
the sporting association and the several intervening governments to uphold the restrictive
nationality clauses in Bosman.
I. JURISDICTION OF TH E COURT IN  BOSM AN
It must be admitted that the second question the Belgian court referred to Luxembourg for 
a preliminary ruling in the Bosman case, in which it asked the Court of Justice specifically to 
pronounce its judgement on the compatibility of provisions contained in the regulations of 
national and international football federations restricting access o f foreign players from the 
European Community to their competitions,1109 somewhat came as a surprise. The contested 
nationality clauses undoubtedly affected the recruitment of players with a foreign nationality, but 
this appeared to be entirely irrelevant in the case at hand.1110 After all, the French team of 
Dunkerque had effectively offered Bosman a contract of employment. At most, one could 
envisage the possibility of Bosman suffering a disadvantage in his future career because of the
1109 Bosman, par. 49.
1110 See also Weatherill, “Case Note on Bosnian", 33 CMLRev. (1996) at 1006-1008.
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application of the rules on foreign players.1111 The transfer rules which precluded a professional 
EU football flayer from freely moving to  a  club in another Member State, even after the expiry 
o f his previoiis contract, constituted the real problem in this case. It was to be expected therefore 
that during the proceedings before the Court o f Justice, the jurisdiction of the Court to give a  
preliminary ruling on the lawfulness o f  the nationality clauses has been challenged. More 
specifically, the KBVB, UEFA, the Danish, French and Italian governments and, in its written 
observations, the European Commission, have claimed that the question relating to nationality 
clauses has no connecting with the disputes, which concern only the application of the transfer 
rules. They asserted that the impediments to his career which Bosnian claims arise as a result o f  
the application of these clauses are purely hypothetical and therefore do not justify a preliminary 
ruling by the Court on the interpretation o f  the Treaty in that regard.1112
However, in its reply to those submissions, the Court stated that it had jurisdiction to ru le  
on all questions referred to it by the national court.1113 It generally ruled that the issues in the  
main proceedings, taken as a whole, w ere not hypothetical and that the national court had  
provided it with a clear statement o f the surrounding facts, the rules in question and the grounds 
on which it believed that a decision on the questions submitted was necessary to enable it to  
render a judgement.1114 Furthermore, w ith regard more particularly to the questions concerning 
nationality clauses, the Court indicated that the relevant heads o f claim have been held admissible 
in the main proceedings on the basis o f a national procedural provision permitting an action to be 
brought to prevent the infringement o f a right which is seriously threatened. The national co u rt 
considered that application of the nationality clauses could indeed impede Bosnian’s career b y  
reducing his chances of being employed or fielded in a match by a club from another M em ber 
State,1115 an assessment which the Court didn’t call into question. The Court simply concluded
1111 Id this context, consult also Lenz AG in Bosman, at par. 99: “A question is not hypothetical simply because the 
. feet on which it is based has not yet occurred. A preventive action for a declaration is an important means of securing
effective protection of legal rights.”
1112 Bosman, par. 57.
1113 Bosman, paras. 59-61. The Court made reference to, inter alia, Case C-125/94 Aprile v Amministrazione delle 
Finanze deUo Stato [1995] ECR1-2919, paras. 16-17; Case C-143/94 FurlanisvANAS [1995] EC R 1-3633, par. 12; 
Case C-83/91 Meilicke v ADV/ORGA [1992] ECR 1-4871, par. 32.
1114 Bosnian, par. 62.
1115 Bosman, par. 64.
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that these questions submitted by that court meet an objective need for the purpose of settling 
disputes properly brought before it.1116
ir
Some commentators have criticised the Court’s case law with regard to the admissibility 
of preliminary references as inconsistent, observing that “if the Court wants to answer a reference 
because it raises an interesting or important point of law, it will find a way to do so.”1117 
Arguably, the precise reason lying at the basis of the readiness - or even eagerness - of the Court 
to settle the issue of the nationality clauses is to be found in the opinion which Advocate General 
Lenz delivered on this case. After an elaborate analysis of the recent relevant case law of the 
Court,1118 the Advocate General conceded that that the Court of Justice “is at most entitled, but 
by no means obliged, to dismiss the question submitted in this case as inadmissible.”1119 
Moreover, even though he acknowledged that rejection of the question is quite conceivable, he 
regarded it as “neither necessary nor appropriate”.1120 He emphatically recommended the Court 
not to make use of that possibility because he couldn’t see how the question of the compatibility 
of the rules on foreign players with Article 39 EC could reach the Court in any other way than 
through individual challenge.1121 *In this respect, the Advocate General pointed out that the 
Commission, in spite of having frequently criticised those rules, has not brought an action under 
Article 226 EC for breach of Treaty obligations, as the prospects of success of such an action 
appeared it to be uncertain for procedural reasons. Furthermore, he also recalled that it has not 
been since Dona in the seventies that a request for a preliminary ruling concerning those rules has 
reached the Court. Presumably, players and clubs negatively affected by these nationality clauses 
are either unwilling or unable to have the matter clarified by the national courts. And even in the 
situation that a legal challenge is actually mounted, the Court o f Justice is not ensured of being 
consulted by the national court. In the light of these considerations, Advocate General opined that 
it is extremely unlikely that a reference will ever again reach the Court which raises the question 
of the compatibility with Community law of the rules on foreign players. In his opinion, the 
Court would be “assisting in the administration of justice in the Member States” in answering the
1116 Bosman, par. 65.
1117 Bamard & Sharpston, “The Changing Face of Article 177 References”, 34 CMLRev. (1997) at 1144.
1118 SeeLenz AG in Bosman, paras. 68-119.
1119 Lenz AG in Bosman, par. 111.
1120 Lenz AG in Bosman, par. 98.
1121 Lenz AG in Bosman, par. 112.
1,22 Lenz AG in Bosman, par. 117.
362
question; otherwise, regulation o f  this field would continue to be left to the whim of the sporting 
associations, something which he regarded as “scarcely tolerable” .1123
H . PRIVILEGED STATUS O F NATIONALITY REQ U IREM EN TS IN SPORT
In this section, some issues which are of crucial importance for the purposes of this 
research are to be addressed: firstly, it will be examined whether the restriction on the scope o f 
the principle of non-discrimination for certain matches o f purely sporting interest must be 
situated inside or outside the Community Treaty framework. Secondly, the precise scope of this 
‘restriction* must be determined.1124 In this context, the rights to freedom of movement of the 
athletes must be carefully weighed against the private interests o f the sporting authorities.
I .  Legal basis o f th e  restriction
In Walrave and Donà, the Court accepted a restriction on the scope of Articles 39 and 49 EC , 
ruling that the principle of non-discrimination did “not prevent the adoption o f rules or o f  a  
practice excluding foreign players from participation in certain matches for reasons which are not 
of an economic nature, which relate to the particular nature and context of such matches and are 
thus of sporting interest only, such as, for example, matches between national teams from  
different countries.” 1125 Substantially, there seemed to  be nothing new under the sun with regard 
to this issue in Bosnian, were it not for the fact that the Court this time seemingly introduced a 
conceptual difference, holding that the relevant Community provisions do not preclude “rules o r 
practices justified  on non-economic grounds which relate to the particular nature and context o f  
certain matches.”(emphasis added)1126 In its Deliège and Lehtonen decisions, the Court again 
conspicuously refrained from using the term ‘justified’, at least explicitly, and contented itself
1123 Lenz AG in Bosman, par. 117.
1124 See also McCutcheon, “National Eligibility Rules After Bosman", in Caiger & Gardiner (eds.), Professional 
Sport in the EU: Regulation and Re-regulation (The International Sports Law Centre, TMC Asser Press, 2000) 127.
1125 Dona, par. 14.
1126 Bosman, par. 76.
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with literally repeating its statement from the Dona judgement, referring however also to what it 
had ruled in Bosnian in this respect.1127
l  t
It appears to be a complex task trying to analyse this ‘restriction on the scope’ of the 
relevant Treaty provisions in strictly legal terms on the basis of these judgements. Admittedly, in 
his opinion to the Walrave case, Advocate General Warner had already argued that an exception 
should clearly be made from the provisions of the Treaty against discrimination based on 
nationality for “rules o f organisations concerned with sport that are designed to secure that a 
national team shall consist only of nationals of the country that that team is intended to 
represent”. To this end, he referred to the test of the ‘officious bystander’, that is adopted, in the 
laws of some countries, to ascertain whether a term should be implied in a contract, and which 
seemed to him to be equally appropriate in the interpretation of the Treaty: “suppose that an 
officious bystander, at the time of the signing of the EEC Treaty, or, for that matter, at the time of 
the signing of the Treaty of Accession, had asked those round the table whether they intended 
that Articles 39 and 49 should preclude a requirement that, in a particular sport, a national team 
should consist only of nationals of the country it represented. Common sense dictates that the 
signatories, with their pens poised, would all have answered impatiently “Of course not” -  and 
perhaps have added that, in their view, the point was so obvious that it did not need to be 
stated.”1128 This contribution of Advocate General Warner undoubtedly constitutes an interesting 
and valuable attempt to explain the existence of this restriction, but arguably, it is no more than 
that either, as he does not offer any further guidance on how to square this restriction within the 
specific framework o f the Treaty. Equally, also Advocate General Lenz in Bosman was of the 
opinion that the Court’s conclusion that rules prescribing that only nationals o f a State are entitled 
to play for that country’s national team are consistent with Community law appears “obvious and 
convincing” , but he added immediately that “it is not easy to state the reasons for it.”1129
In view of the relative obscurity surrounding the Court’s decisions in this respect, several 
efforts have been undertaken in the legal doctrine to find a sound legal basis for these nationality 
restrictions. The search for an acceptable solution has been carried out both inside and outside the
1127 Deliege, par. 43; Lehtonen, par. 34.
1128 Warner AG in Walrave, at 1422.
1129 Lenz AG in Bosman, par. 139.
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formal Treaty framework. In the first place, one has examined whether the privileged status 
granted to certain matches of purely sporting interest could possibly be framed within the 
derogations to the free movement provisions which have been expressly provided in the Treaty. 
Concretely, the Treaty distinguishes between the public policy, public security and public health 
exceptions of Article 39(3) EC on the one hand, and the public service exception laid down in 
Article 39(4) on the other hand. Two out o f the three grounds for exception laid down in Article 
39(3) EC, namely those relating to public security and public health, could immediately be  
discarded, as they have nothing to do in se with the subject-matter concerned; it thus only 
remained to be seen whether the situation of these specified matches could be caught under th e  
heading of public policy.1130 Also this possibility was quickly abandoned though, in the light o f  
the restrictive interpretation given to this derogation, both in the case law of the Court of Justice 
as in Council Directive 64/2211131 132. The Directive explicitly provides that measures taken o n  
grounds o f public policy must be based exclusively on the personal conduct o f the individual 
concerned. Hence, it is clear that the public policy exception cannot be relied upon to uphold  
rules containing nationality requirements, whose general objective and effect is to prevent a  
priori nationals from other Member States to participate to specific matches which are considered 
to being of purely sporting interest.1133 Furthermore, it has also been suggested to offer th e  
national teams shelter from the application of the Community free movement provisions b y  
means o f the public service exception o f Article 39(4) EC.1134 However, in its case law,1135 th e  
Court has restrictively interpreted Article 39(4) EC in such a way that it “removes from the am bit 
of Article 39(1) to (3) a series of posts which involve direct or indirect participation in th e  
exercise of powers conferred by public law and duties designed to safeguard the general in terest 
of the State or o f other public authorities”, clarifying that “such posts in fact presume on the p a rt 
of those occupying them the existence of a special relationship of allegiance to the State and  
reciprocity of rights and duties which form the foundation of the bond of nationality.”1136 T h is
1130 See Dubey, o.c., at 439-442.
1131 Council Directive 64/221 of 25 February 1964 on the Co-ordination of Special Measures concerning the  
Movement and Residence of Foreign Nationals which are justified on Grounds of Public Policy, Public Security o r 
Public Health (1963-1964) 0 3  L 117.
1132 Article 3(1) Directive 64/221.
1133 Weatherill, Discrimination on Grounds of Nationality in Spori**, 9 YBEL (1989) at 66.
1134 Van Nuffel, “Case Note on Bosman", C ol JEL Vol. 2 (1996), at 359; Mortelmans, “Note to Bosman", SE W  
(1996) at 147.
1135 See, for example, Case 149/79 Commission v Belgium [1980] ECR 3881.
1136 Commission v Belgium, par. 10.
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possibility has effectively been rejected by most authors as being o f no relevance to football.1137 
Arguably, even if one were still to accept generously that a national sports team in official
4 tcompetitions 'represents the nation and in some way or the other safeguards the general interests 
of the State, and that its constituent players are attached to their shirt and have a bond of 
allegiance with their country, it is indeed hard to sustain that representative national teams 
participate in the exercise of powers conferred by public law.1138 It would presumably require too 
wide a reading of the different concepts involved to enable matches between national sides to be 
qualified as employment in the public service covered under Article 39(4) EC. Consequently, 
therefore, also Article 39(4) EC should in all likelihood be eliminated as a possible legal basis for 
the special treatment conferred by the Court to certain matches of purely sporting interest.
Since it appeared to be inconceivable to indicate an appropriate legal foundation to the 
Court’s démarche with regard to specified matches of purely sporting interest within the 
Community Treaty, legal scholars have formulated some alternative propositions. According to 
Delanney, the nationality clauses had to be considered as a European custom which had been 
developed during the international competitions and which had continued to exist even after the 
entry into force of the Treaty of Rome, despite the fact that it has established principles which go 
against this custom. He argued that at that moment, the custom had simply acquired a contra 
legem  character.1139 In my opinion, it is not necessary to spend too much time on this thesis: 
firstly, written rules of sporting federations cannot be regarded as customs; and secondly, the 
adoption of a contrary law simply signifies that different rules have to be abolished or at least 
amended, it does not render them contra legem. Dubey advocated yet another explanation: 
according to him, the right to free movement of the individual athlete, guaranteed by the 
Community free movement provisions, collided with the right to freedom of association, 
protected by Article 11 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, and 
more specifically, the right of the associations to adopt rules and regulations.1140 Within the 
European construct, both are considered being fundamental rights. To resolve a conflict o f norms
1137 See, for example, Weatherill, Discrimination on Grounds of Nationality in Sport”, o.c., at 66; Lenz AG in 
Bosman, par. 133.
1138 See also Séché, “Quand les juges tirent au but”, CDE (1996) at 374.
1139 Delanney, “Observations à la suite de l’arrêt Walrave", CDE (1976) at 212.
1,40 Dubey, o.c., at 449-450; see also Hilf, “Die Freizügigkeit des Berufsfussballspielers innerhalb der Europäischen 
Gemeinschaft”, NJW  (1984) at 522.
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of equal rank in a particular situation, one proceeds to a careful balancing of all interests at stake, 
which is often referred to as the method o f ‘praktische Konkordanz’,1141 and which finally results 
in one fundamental right receiving priority over the other depending on the precise circumstances 
o f the case. Consequently, he regarded the restriction on the scope of the free movement 
provisions conferred by the Court to certain matches o f  purely sporting interest as the outcome of 
the balancing exercise of these rights with the fundamental right of the football federations to 
adopt their own regulations for the practical organisation of the sport. Advocate General Lenz 
observed that the fundamental importance of Article 39 EC for the internal market, which has 
been expressly stressed by the Court, would not be given sufficient account by such a simple 
balancing of rights. He was of the opinion that only an “interest of the association which is o f 
paramount importance” could justify a restriction on freedom of movement, and argued that such 
interests could be subsumed under the concept of imperative reasons in the general interest.1142 
This particular statement summarises a fundamental point of this thesis, which involves the clash 
of the supposedly private sphere of sport and the exigencies o f Community law.
Interesting though the preceding theories may have been, the Court’s special treatment o f  
specific matches of purely sporting interest has nonetheless predominantly been explained in 
legal writing, either as a limited exception to the scope o f the Community Treaty or as a  
restriction of the Treaty principles on freedom of movement which could nevertheless be justified 
by an overriding reasons in the public interest. After the Court’s judgements in Walrave and 
Dona, the former explanation clearly prevailed over the latter; the Court ‘s formulation in its 
Bosman decision threw the matter of the precise legal basis into turmoil again. O ’Keeffe and 
Osborne asserted that the Bosman ruling effectively represented an important shift in the 
relationship between sport and Community law.1143 They argued that, contrary to what the Court 
allegedly did in previous cases, namely examining whether a contested measure fell within the 
scope of the Treaty, the Court now found that all activities of professional football players have 
an economic character and therefore fall within the provisions relating to the free movement o f 
persons. Consequently, arguments concerning the particular nature and context o f certain matches 
of purely sporting interest may only serve as a possible justification to a measure which would
1141 Schroeder, Sport und Europäische Integration (thesis München, 1989) at 191 et seq.
1142 See Lenz AG in Bosman, par. 216.
1143 O’Keeffe and Osborne, “The European Court Scores a Goal”, o c., at 120.
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otherwise be qualified as unlawful. Summarising, the precise significance of this shift in 
perspective lies in the fact that once a sporting activity passes the-.threshold of ‘economic 
activity’, “sporting interest does not operate to take it outside the scope'-of the Treaty, but may 
constitute a justification for exceptions to the non-discrimination rule.”1144 Weatherill strongly 
objects to this point o f view. His starting point was that discrimination on grounds of nationality 
is in principle only unlawful where it occurs within the scope of application of the Treaty. In his 
opinion therefore, a rule prescribing that only sportsmen who are nationals of a given country are 
entitled to be selected to play for the national team is not incompatible with EC law, even though 
it is discriminatory on grounds o f nationality, “for the rationale for such choice lies in the 
function of the side as a representative of national pride, which is not a matter touched by EC 
law.” 1145 He acknowledges that competitions between national representative sides nowadays 
have a strong commercial character and that players financially benefit from their ‘international’ 
status,1146 but he maintains that national pride and identity are more important in this respect, and 
that the basis of team selection has no connection with economic objectives.1147 The core of his 
argument is thus that such nationality-based discrimination is acceptable because it escapes the 
scope of application of the Treaty, not because it is justified. Weatherill therefore rejected the 
Court’s terminology of justification in Bosnian as improper and inexact, for it gives the wrong 
impression that discrimination falls within the scope of the Treaty, but is nevertheless permissible 
according to the standards of the mandatory requirements doctrine.1148 Also Advocate General 
Lenz in Bosman adhered to this orthodox jurisdictional reading o f the Court’s judgements and 
referred to the limits of EC competence as the rationale for upholding such nationality clauses, in 
spite of their discriminatory nature.
There is something to be said for the latter point of view. When dealing with sport, the 
Community institutions have to be careful not to infringe the principle of attribution of 
competencies.1149 Viewing the situation o f these matches of purely sporting interest as an issue
1144 O’Keeffe and Osborne, “The European Court Scores a Goal”, o.c., at 121.
1145 Weatherill, “European Football Law”, Collected Courses o f die Academy o f European Law, Vol VII, Book I 
(Kluwer, 1999), at 354.
1,46 Players’ contracts often contain specific clauses awarding financial bonuses to players who are selected for the 
national team.
1147 Weatherill, “Case Note on Bosman", o.c., at 1008-1009.
1148 Weatherill, ‘European Football Law”, o.c. , at 354.
1149 See Article 5 EC.
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which is in principle susceptible to Community law but which is nevertheless worthy of 
protection under the imperative requirements doctrine could be regarded as an encroachment of 
national or private competencies. However, it can no longer be maintained that matches between 
national teams are o f purely sporting interest. Many championships in which national teams 
compete for sporting glory such as the football World Cup or the Olympic Games are huge 
commercial events generating enormous amounts of money. Equally, participation and/or success 
in these competitions has important financial repercussions for the athletes. From the perspective 
that there are obviously economic interests present alongside the traditional national pride and 
identity in these contemporary competitions, it seems thus more accurate and conceptually sound, 
even if practically interventionist, to adhere to the ‘justification’ theory. As has already been 
outlined above, the language of the Court in its judgements is not particularly revealing in th is  
respect. The term ‘justification’ popped up for the first time in Bosnian, only to disappear again 
in Deliege and Lehtonen. Be that as it may, however, the Court did explicitly refer to its  
statement to this effect in Bosman in these last two decisions. The fact that the Court in these 
rulings dealt with this issue in the context o f the applicability of the relevant free movement 
provisions then again might indicate that it considers the status of matches of sporting interest 
rather as an exception to the scope of the Treaty. This sole observation is however not sufficient 
to conclusively settle the matter. It is submitted that the Court should make an end to th is 
controversy, not only for the sake of clarity, but also to avoid further disputes in the future. U p  
until now, in practice, it never actually mattered whether the Court regarded the restriction on th e  
scope o f the prohibition of discrimination on grounds o f nationality as an exception to the scope 
of the Treaty or merely as an obstacle which was justifiable by imperative reasons in the general 
interest. The concrete outcome for the parties involved in the disputes was the same, as there w as 
no infraction of Community law. Arguably, however, this will not always be the case. I t  is 
submitted that one can effectively conceive of situations in which it does make a difference 
whether the famous restriction amounts to an exception to the Treaty, placing the contested 
measure outside the reach of Community law, or rather to a justifiable barrier, which inevitably 
means that the delicate balance between sporting and economic interests one day might tilt in the 
other direction. The latter option gives the Community institutions or Community legislation, if  
such were introduced, much more say in how these issues must ultimately be determined and  
decided.
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2. Precise scope of the restriction
4 Ç
After having analysed what could constitute the correct legal basis for the viability o f this 
particular nationality restriction, in spite o f its obviously discriminatory character, it still remains 
to be ascertained what the precise extent is of this restriction on the scope of the principle of non­
discrimination on grounds of nationality. There has been considerable uncertainty surrounding 
this issue as well.1150
In Walrave, the Court held that the prohibition of discrimination for reasons related to 
nationality did not affect “the composition of sport teams, in particular national teams, the 
formation of which is a question o f purely sporting interest and as such has nothing to do with 
economic activity.” 1151 Two years later, in Dona, the Court seemingly decided to narrow down 
this restriction for ‘composition o f teams’ to ‘certain matches’, stipulating that Articles 39 and 49 
EC did “not prevent the adoption of rules or of a practice excluding foreign players from 
participation in certain matches for reasons which are not of an economic nature, which relate to 
the particular nature and context of such matches and are thus o f sporting interest only, such as, 
for example, matches between national teams from different countries.”1152 On both occasions, 
the Court emphasised also that such a restriction on the scope o f the provisions in question must 
remain limited to its proper objective and could, therefore, not be relied upon to exclude the 
whole of a sporting activity from the scope of the Treaty.1153
The Court was criticised for not stating more precisely which matches it intended to be 
covered under the restriction o f the scope of the principle o f non-discrimination, and during 
which one could therefore lawfully discriminate on grounds o f nationality. Only the fact that 
matches between national sides from different countries formed part of this restriction could be 
affirmed with absolute certainty. It may have turned out to be hard to find a rational legal 
explanation for this privileged status for national teams, as has been demonstrated-in the previous
1150 See also Dubey, o.c., at 455-466.
1151 Walrave, par. 8.
1,52 Dona, par. 14.
1153 See Walrave, par. 9; Donà, par. 15.
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section, but substantially, the Court’s concession in this respect has nevertheless met with 
unanimous approval. Presumably, plain common sense induced the judges in Luxembourg to 
arrive at this conclusion. In modem society, there are probably very few -sacred houses’ left, but 
the national sports teams definitely still constitute one o f them.1154 Apart from this after all rather 
self-evident assessment, however, the rulings in Walrave and Dona didn’t really allow for more 
unequivocal assertions. At most, from the explicit use of the terminology “in particular” in 
Walrave or “such as, for example” in D ona , it could be inferred that the references to matches o f  
national teams were probably o f merely exemplary nature. Be that as it may, the Court didn’t 
offer any further guidance as to which other situations might benefit from the same privilege it 
had conferred to national teams. This uncertainty led some authors to adopt a wide interpretation 
of this exception, so as to include also matches between clubs both at domestic and international 
level. In his opinion in Dona, Advocate General Trabucchi claimed that in the case of the  
composition of sports teams which compete for the national championship, there is “nothing to  
prevent consideration of purely sporting interest from justifying the imposition of som e 
restriction on the signing o f foreign players or at least on their participation in official 
championship matches so as to ensure that the winning team will be representative of the State o f  
which it is the champion team. A condition of this kind seems all the more reasonable when it is 
borne in mind that the team which wins the national championship is often chosen to represent its 
own State in international competitions.” 1155 And the Advocate General didn’t even leave it there, 
holding that “the same naturally applies at the local level whenever there is a wish to make the  
local sports team really representative o f the area or locality. O f course, in this second situation, 
the restrictions must extend not only to foreigners but to nationals who belong to a different 
locality from that represented by the local team. While, within those limits, the principle o f  
engaging local players is, as one of the principles of freedom to manage one’s own business, 
normally accorded unreservedly to sporting clubs, if  the restriction means the exclusion only o f  
foreign nationals, its justification as an exception to the full application of the rules on freedom o f  
movement for workers or the freedom to provide services must be based on solid sporting o r  *153
1154 For a concurring opinion, see for example O ’Keeffe and Osborne, “The European Court Scores a Goal”, o.c., at 
127: “Although as Lord Mackenzie Stuart once memorably declared, as far as the Treaty is concerned, the Members 
of the Court could all be Russians, the same is not true, as far as the public is concerned, of the composition of 
national sporting teams.”
1153 Trabucchi AG in Dona., at 1344.
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athletic requirements.”1156 Conversely, other commentators favoured a more restrictive approach, 
arguing that discriminatory measures based on nationality could only be accepted for matches
C * I»*
between natidnal teams and matches between teams truly representative of other geographical 
entities.1157 They considered that a professional football club cannot be regarded as a 
representative side analogous to the national team. In some way, a club may be viewed as 
representing a city, a region or a country, but in the great majority of cases,1158 the players which 
constitute the team are not specifically engaged or selected on that basis or for that reason.1159 As 
Hilf pointed out eloquently, ‘the identity and the origin of the individual player remain in the 
background’.1160 Nowadays, teams composed of 11 home-grown players are really the rare 
exception. Understandably from this point of view, it was therefore submitted that Advocate 
General Trabucchi’s opinion that professional football teams could pursue discriminatory policies 
for reasons o f pure sporting interest must be rejected.
In this respect, it might be interesting to look at what the Court of Arbitration for Sport 
(hereinafter further referred to as the ‘CAS’) had to say on this subject. The CAS was seized of a 
dispute between a professional basketball player and the international basketball federation.1161 
The player in question possessed both the Belgian as the American nationality. During the 1990- 
91 season, he played for a club in Switzerland. The next season, he was employed by a French 
team. On both occasions, his request for a licence from the national federations, signed by the 
player himself, only mentioned his American nationality. For the FIB A, the nationality of the 
player for sporting purposes was also the American one. Subsequently, the player was transferred 
to Maes Pils Mechelen in Belgium. He filed a request to be authorised to participate as a 
professional basketball player o f Belgian nationality to the European competitions in which his 
club took part and to the international championships with the Belgian national basketball team. 
In first instance, FIB A and the Belgian basketball federation rejected his request, considering that 
the player was regarded as an American according to the applicable FIBA regulations. He was
1156 Trabucchi AG in Dona, at 1344.
1157 See, for example, Delanney, ox., at 214.
1158 Exceptions always confirm the rules of course: in Spain, Athletic de Bilbao still conscientiously adheres to its 
policy of contracting only players of Bask origin. Real Sociedad of San Sebastian surrendered the same policy at the 
beginning of the 1989-90 season.
U5® Weatherill, “Discrimination on Grounds of Nationality in Sport“, ox., at 61.
1160 Hilf, o x ., at 521: “Die Person und die Herkunft der einzelnen Spieler bleibt im HintergmndL”
1161 CAS, 25 March 1993, B. v FIBA, Reports CAS 1986-1998,287 et seq.
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Ttold that if he wanted to change his sporting nationality into Belgian, he had to comply with a |
waiting period of three years. Ultimately, the parties agreed to submit their dispute for resolution I* (r ito the CAS. In its argumentation, the CAS affirmed that the participation of the player in ordinary j
matches o f the national championship constitutes an economic activity, but emphasised that the  |
same didn’t hold true for performances in European club competitions.1162 For the CAS therefore, f
matches played between clubs within the framework of the European Cup competitions could  j
benefit from the exception for nationality clauses provided by the Court in Walrave and Don&. \
f
Revealing or helpful as this arbitration may be, as long as the Court of Justice itself hasn’t !
definitively settled the issue, some uncertainty will continue concerning the precise extent o f  th e  |
restriction of the scope of the prohibition of non-discrimination for the nationality clauses. In  j
Bo smart, the Court had another excellent opportunity to  put an end to this, but again, it refrained (
from doing so. It firstly noted that “the nationality clauses do not concern specific m atches ;
between teams representing their country but apply to all official matches between clubs and th u s  j
to the essence of the activity o f professional players.” 1163 Subsequently, it held that “in th o se  
circumstances”, the contested *3+2* nationality clauses could not be deemed compatible w ith  
Article 39 EC, because otherwise this provision would be deprived of its practical effect and th e  ,
fundamental right of free access to employment conferred on each worker would be rendered  I
nugatory.1164 At first reading, these statements seem to imply that all matches to which th e se  j
nationality clauses applied are excluded from the exception for matches of purely sporting  I
interest. Practically, as the *3+2’ clauses have been implemented both by the national federations 
and UEFA, this exclusion thus appears to concern the confrontations between clubs in th e  
domestic championship as well as the matches they play in the European cup competitions. T h is  
is indeed the way the decision has been explained by most commentators. However, it is 
advocated that the Court’s ruling in this respect also leaves room for an alternative interpretation.
In the first place, in paragraph 128, the Court has used the terminology of ‘teams representing 
their country’, instead of the more usual ‘nationals teams’, as it had done in paragraph 127 o r  in 
Dona. The former concept seems to be larger than the latter one: the national teams unmistakably 
represent their country, but arguably, the same could equally be said about the clubs w hich
1162 CAS, 25 March 1993, B. v FIBA, Reports CAS 1986-1998,287 et seq., points 9,18 and 19.
1163 Bosman, par. 128.
1164 Bosnian, par. 129.
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participate in the European club competitions. After all, the actual number of football clubs a
national federation is entitled to inscribe for UEFA’s Champion’s League or the UEFA Cup in a
t fcgiven season depends on the results which have been obtained by the clubs of that federation in
the previous editions of these competitions. Sporting achievements of a certain club thus also
come to the benefit o f the other teams of the same country, which confirms the impression that a
club not only competes for its own glory at international or European level, but also represents its
country. Consequently, if the Court had really wanted to limit the exception for matches o f purely
sporting interest to matches between national teams, it should have simply said so, instead of
using the wider and less straightforward concept of ‘teams representing their country’, with
which it definitely conveys the impression that the exception may also include other matches
which are not between national teams. Moreover, this partial conclusion is further reinforced by
the following construction of the Court’s decision: literally, the Court condemned the contested
nationality clauses precisely because they applied to all official matches between clubs and thus
to the essence of the activity of professional footballers. Upholding the contested ‘3+2*
nationality clauses ‘in those circumstances’ would have meant to deprive Article 39 EC of all
practical effect and to render the right of free access to employment redundant. Consequently, by
means of an a  contrario reasoning, it seems possible to assert that if nationality clauses were not
applicable to all official matches, but only to matches between clubs competing at international
level, they might be acceptable from the point of view of Article 39 EC, as these clubs are
deemed to represent also their country during these competitions.1165 This specific interpretation
of the Bosnian decision thus boils down to a recognition of the decision of the CAS in the
previously described basketball case.
In the end, even after Bosman it was thus not unequivocally clear exactly which matches the 
Court considered being of purely sporting interest, and during which measures which 
discriminated on grounds of nationality could therefore be legitimately applied. Presumably 
however, some progress has nevertheless been made in this respect: on the basis of the ruling in 
Bosman, it seems possible to conclude that it is extremely improbable that matches between clubs 
in the domestic leagues will benefit from the sporting exception, as clubs cannot be regarded as 
representing their country when simply competing for the national title against the other teams of
1165 Fot a concurring opinion, see Dubey, o.c., at 461-462.
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the same country. From this perspective, it seems thus relatively safe to assume that Advocate 
General’s Trabucchi’s suggestion in Donò is effectively to be rejected.
r k.
Subsequently, the Court’s ruling D éliége permitted another step forward. Purely textually, 
again nothing changed, as the Court initially simply referred to its earlier judgements in Dona 
and Bosnian and maintained the exemplary nature o f the exception for matches between national 
teams.1166 However, some interesting observations can be made on the basis of the concrete 
application of the general principle to the particular circumstances of the case. Indeed, the Court 
decided that international sporting competitions o f a high level -  such as the Category A  
international judo tournaments in question -  to which only athletes who have been selected for 
this purpose by the national federation to which they are affiliated can participate, regardless o f  
their nationality, cannot be considered as events between national teams which might fall outside 
the scope of Community law.1167 Arguably, it can be deduced from this statement that encounters 
between clubs in the context of international o r European cup competitions, which are 
undoubtedly events of a high level, by analogy cannot benefit either from the exception fo r 
national teams, as the players which defend the colours of these clubs only have to be affiliated to  
the federation of which their employing club is a member, regardless of the specific nationality 
they possess.1168 Besides, the Court did effectively drop the reference to ‘teams representing their 
country’ it used in Bosnian and took up the language o f ‘national teams’ again.
To sum up, the locus standi o f the case law o f  the Court seems to be that both matches 
between clubs at domestic level as the international or European cup competitions in which clubs 
take part cannot benefit from the judicially created exception for sporting purposes which keeps 
Community law at bay. Currently, only matches between national teams fall beyond doubt under 
the scope of this exception. It is difficult to conceive o f any other context in which certain 
matches may be considered of purely sporting interest. However, the Court rigorously holds on to  
the exemplary nature of the exception for national teams, so at least theoretically, this possibility 
still continues to exist. From the point o f view of the application of Community law, this practical 
situation is probably rather satisfactory. It is submitted this issue could have been straightened o u t
1166 Deliège, par. 43.
1,67 Deliège, par. 44.
1168 Similarly, Dubey, o.c., 462-464.
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much more quickly if the Court had been more explicit in the language of its decisions. However* 
it must be aclaiowledged though that the task of the Court in sports cases is not always all that 
easy: in the Tirst place, it must necessarily render a judgement on tne questions which are 
specifically put to it. Furthermore, it attempts to give enough guidance so that the national courts 
and the sporting associations can resolve the issues concerned, while it simultaneously tries to 
avoid providing too detailed information as to place itself in the role of the sporting authorities as 
rule maker. This fine line is not always easy to walk.
3. Naturalised athletes & sportsmen with dual nationality
3.1. Elaboration o f the problem
In all likelihood, the "restriction on the scope’ of Articles 39 and 49 EC is this limited to 
matches between national teams. In this respect, it is worth looking into a separate category of 
athletes who are confronted with instances of nationality discrimination, in spite of the fact that 
they do possess the legal nationality o f the Member State in which they undergo this 
discrimination. This is the particular case of sportsmen who went through a naturalisation 
procedure and sportsmen with a dual nationality. In theory, the obstacles they encounter may be 
of an absolute and exclusionary or rather o f a relative character, and may be situated both at club 
level as at the level o f the national teams. In practice, most problems are related to the specific 
issue of the national teams.
Some practical examples, taken from the sporting associations* regulations governing the 
situation in different sports disciplines, may serve to illustrate this matter. In football, the relevant 
FIFA provisions stipulate that any footballer who is a citizen of a country in virtue of that 
country’s laws shall in principle be eligible to play for the national or representative team of that 
country.1169 However, if a player has been included in the national or representative team of a 
country, he shall not be permitted to take part in an international match for another country.1170 
This rule covers the situation of a naturalised athlete: once a football player has worn the national 
shirt of a country during an international match in an official competition, regardless of the level
1169 Article 18.1 FIFA 2001 Regulations governing the Application of the Statutes.
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at which the competition takes place, he cannot play for another national team any more, even if
he adopts the legal nationality o f  that country through official channels. For sporting purposes, he 
c"
is considered to have the nationality o f this first country. Equally, players who possess dual 
nationality and are therefore in principle qualified to play for more than one national association, 
will be deemed to  have committed themselves to one association when they play their first 
international match in an official competition at any level for that association.170 171 *According to  
the FIFA rules, the only players exempt from this rigid principle are those whose nationality has 
been changed not voluntarily, but as the result o f an international decree either granting 
independence to a region, or ceding part o f one country to another. At club level, there are in 
general no problems in this context: a player who obtains the legal nationality of a country 
through naturalisation is simply entitled to participate to both domestic and international club 
competitions under his newly acquired nationality, in the same way as the other native players.
In basketball, the situation of this particular group o f athletes is similar. In the first place, 
according to the International FIBA Regulations, only a player who holds the legal nationality o f  
a country and has fulfilled the terms of eligibility according to  the appropriate internal regulations 
is eligible to play for the national team of that country.1173 Subsequently, the FIBA rules stipulate 
that any basketball player with two legal nationalities or more, by birth or by naturalisation, m ay 
choose at any age the national team for which he wishes to play. Be that as it may, however, if  a  
player is selected for the national team by a national federation after reaching the age of 18, he is 
under an obligation to make his choice. If  the player turns down the summons, he may only still 
choose the nationality/nationalities of the other country/countries, unless he declares in writing, 
within 15 days o f receiving the summons, that he has nevertheless opted for the national team  o f  
the country that summoned him first.1174 Furthermore, just as in the FIFA regulations, it is also 
here provided that any basketball player having played in a main official competition for a 
national team for which he is eligible, is considered as having chosen the national team o f that 
country. These choices are in principle irrevocable.1175 However, there does exist a sm all
1170 Article 18.2 FIFA 2001 Regulations governing the Application of the Statutes.
1171 Article 18.2 FIFA 2001 Regulations governing the Application of the Statutes.
1,72 Article 18.3 FIFA 2001 Regulations governing the Application of the Statutes
1173 Article 3.3.1. FIBA 2002 Regulations governing the National Status of Players.
1174 Article 3.3.2. FIBA 2002 Regulations governing the National Status of Players.
1175 Article 3.3.2. FIBA 2002 Regulations governing the National Status of Players.
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TI exception to this general rule: with the express agreement of the two national federations
j concerned, FIBA may authorise a player having played on a national cadet team of a country in a
f main official competition of FIBA, to play for a national team of a new country of which he hasJ acquired legal nationality. A player thus authorised to change national teams may do this only
i once in his lifetime though and may not, after his change, play again for the team of his first
country.1176 It is effectively stated that after having played in the junior, young people’s or senior 
age category for a national team of a country in a main official competition of FIBA, a player 
may no longer, under any circumstances, play for any national team of another country.1177 178
Moreover, the FIBA rules provide that a national team participating in an international 
competition may have only one player on its team who has acquired the legal nationality o f that 
country by naturalisation or by any other means after having reached the age of 16. Finally, 
with regard to the international club competitions, it is stipulated that the composition of the 
teams is not subject to any limitation concerning the legal nationality of the players. The 
possibility is left open, however, for national federations to establish more restrictive 
regulations.1179
I
In athletics, the relevant rules are much more flexible. The statutes o f the International 
Association of Athletics Federations (hereinafter referred to as the TAAF’) firstly stipulate as a 
general rule that during the Olympic Games, the World Championships, the World Cups, the 
Continental Championships and some other important international meetings,1180 the national 
federations which are members of IAAF shall be represented only by citizens of the country 
which the affiliated member represents.1181 Subsequently, the statutes provide that once a 
contestant has represented any member federation in one of the aforementioned competitions or 
meetings, he may thereafter in principle no longer represent any other member in such
1176 Article 3.3.5. FEB A 2002 Regulations governing the National Status of Players.
1177 Article 3.3.4. FIBA 2002 Regulations governing the National Status of Players.
1178 Article 3.3.3. FIBA 2002 Regulations governing the National Status of Players. This provision does not apply to 
those athletes whose eligibility was defined prior to the new regulations come into force.
1179 Article 3.4. FIBA 2002 Regulations governing the National Status of Players.
1180 Fore more details, consult Rule 12.1 a), b) and d) IAAF Statutes:
a) Olympic Games, World championships and World Cups;
b) Continental, Regional, or Area Championships open to all IAAF Members in the Area or Region (i.e. 
Championships over which IAAF has exclusive control, comprising only athletics events);
d) Continental, Regional, or Area Cups and Age Group Events.
1181 Rule 12.10.1 IAAF Statutes.
378
championships or meetings. Nevertheless, the IAAF has agreed upon some exceptions to this
principle in the following circumstances:
[ j-
a) the incorporation of one country into another;
b) the creation o f a new country created by Treaty;
c) acquisition o f a new citizenship. In this case, the athlete in question cannot compete for the 
new country for a period o f at least three years after the date when the athlete last represented 
another member federation in a competition or meeting mentioned in one of the categories 
under Rule 12.1 a), b), d). This period may be reduced to one year, if the two member 
associations concerned agree.
d) Where an athlete holds, or is legally entitled to hold, citizenship of two or more countries, 
provided that it is at least three years since the athlete last represented the first member in any 
competition under Rule 12.1. a), b), d). This period may be reduced to one year, if the two 
members concerned agree.
It emerges clearly from these almost randomly chosen examples of regulations from different 
sports disciplines that the international sporting associations have adopted a rather divergent 
attitude towards the phenomenon of athletes changing nationality or sportsmen with a dual o r  
even multiple nationality, or at least in part. In the first place, there appears to be an almost 
general consensus amongst federations about the fact that athletes who possess a certain legal 
nationality, regardless of whether they obtained it through naturalisation or whether they also 
have yet another legal nationality, can take part in national and international competitions for 
their club of affiliation or on an individual basis without reservation or any further due, in exactly 
the same way as the ‘ordinary’ national sportsmen o f that country. Secondly, however, opinions 
seem to differ somehow on the question o f whether these two particular categories of sportsmen 
should be allowed to participate in international matches o f  the national team of the country o f  
which they possess the legal nationality. As long as these sportsmen have not yet represented the 
national team of the country o f their previous or other nationality in an official international 
game, the federations of the country o f the new or the other nationality do not seem -to object 
against the presence of these athletes in their representative national side. However, it becomes 
an entirely different story when these sportsmen have already defended the colours of another 
national team in official international matches. To cover this situation, the international
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associations have introduced varying provisions in their respective regulations, ranging from a 
strict and unequivocal interdiction to wear the shirt of a second national team, such as in football, 
over an alm6st equally restrictive prohibition in basketball, with one small exception for 
members of the national representative side in the youth category of the cadets, to a principled 
permission in track and field athletics, provided that the athletes concerned comply with the 
waiting periods foreseen in the regulations. From a more legal point of view, the situation can be 
broadly summarised as follows: in order for an athlete to be able to represent the national team of 
a country in a certain sports discipline, it is absolutely necessary that he possesses the legal 
nationality o f that country. However, this is not a sufficient condition: in principle, the athlete 
must also have the sporting nationality o f that country. For some federations, a sportsman has 
irrevocably acquired the sporting nationality o f a country once he has played for the national 
team of that country in an official contest during an international competition. Thereafter, he can 
no longer represent another national team. Other federations adopt a more lenient attitude and 
stipulate that a sportsmen may change his sporting nationality provided he fulfils certain 
conditions.
It must be admitted that the lack of consensus amongst the international sporting 
associations appears somewhat as a surprise. To a certain extent at least, one would have 
expected that the federations, in the respective exercise of their tenaciously safeguarded 
regulatory autonomy, would have achieved more harmony on this particular point. After all, it 
concerns the composition of the representative national sides, which constitute the sign-board of 
a national federation and whose matches and specific performances at international level are 
supposed to be the ultimate crowning o f their federation’s efforts and investments at domestic 
level. However, the simple determination that the different international federations have failed to 
reach unanimity on this issue probably reflects the fact that the situation of sportsmen who have 
previously already taken part in international matches for any given national team and who are 
now desirous of playing for another national team is not all that straightforward. It is o f course 
precisely this crucial role which a national team occupies in its federation’s activities which has 
provoked this dilemma. Virtually every sporting association regards a selection for the national 
team as the highest honour which can be awarded to an athlete during his career, namely the right 
to represent his country during international matches. In the opinion of some associations, to earn
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this honour, it does not suffice for a player to simply possess the nationality of the country in 
question and to figure amongst the best sportsmen of his generation. In addition, the player in 
question also'has to give evidence of a special bond of allegiance with nis country. In general, 
this specific bond o f allegiance is presumed in the situation of athletes who have obtained the 
legal nationality o f their country by birth. This is however not always the case for players who 
have acquired this nationality through naturalisation or for players who have more than one 
nationality. For some federations, the circumstance that these players on another occasion have 
already played for the national team of another country is sufficient to decisively exclude that 
they might have the required allegiance with their new country. Conversely, other federations 
proceed from the assumption that the mere possession of the legal nationality inherently 
comprises the necessary link with or the attachment to a particular country. At most, sportsmen 
who are naturalised or have a dual nationality might have to fulfil a waiting period before they 
are entitled to perform for the national side o f the country of their new or other nationality if they 
have already represented another national team. In any event, whatever the precise underlying 
reason for any given sporting association's positioning on this particular issue may be, the 
disharmony between the various sporting disciplines is to be deplored.1182
3.2. Legal assessment
Obviously unsatisfactory as it may appear to be that athletes performing in one discipline 
are entitled to compete for different national teams during their sporting career, whereas their 
colleagues from other disciplines are outright prevented from doing so, the question arises as to 
whether this is a matter for regulation by Community law. Hence, in this context, it should not be 
forgotten that this is an issue o f  considerable importance. In the current sporting constellation,
1182 When ice skating ace Bart Veldkamp won the gold medal on the 10.000 meter during the Olympic Games of 
Albertville in 1992, the Dutch national anthem echoed through the stadium, but eight years later, during the 2000 
Olympic Games of Nagano, he won the bronze medal on the same distance for Belgium. Equally, 800 meter athletics 
world record holder Wilson Kipketer currently engrosses medals for Denmark at various World and European 
Championships, although he was fa-evented from taking the start at the 2000 Atlanta Olympics because the Kenyan 
federation refused to release him, which meant that he had to sit out a waiting period of three years after his 
naturalisation before he could run under the Danish flag. To the contrary, however, Bayern Munich talent Owen 
Hargreaves’ acceptance of England coach Eriksson’s call to play for England at the 2002 FIFA World Cup 
effectively meant that the youngster will never be able to defend the colours of the German Mannschaft, even though 
he possesses both nationalities. Indeed, former Belgium striker Luis ‘Lulu’ Oliveira was only allowed to score goals 
for the Red Devils because he had never played for the Brazilian sele^ao before he acquired the Belgian nationality 
through his marriage with a Belgian woman.
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participation in these international events is not only extremely rewarding from a purely sporting 
point of view, but also has important and appealing financial repercussions for the sportsmen 
involved. Ap^art from the prize money to be won at these events anb the financial bonuses 
awarded by the national federations to the athletes that compose the national team, sportsmen are 
generally also able to convert their international status during other competitions, in the form of 
start premiums or improved contractual terms. It is therefore quite comprehensible that most 
athletes are normally keen to acquire such an international status.
In this respect, the sporting associations have consistently claimed that the composition of 
the representative national sides is an issue which belongs to the preserve o f the association’s 
autonomous regulatory competence. In the case of Walrave, the Court of Justice did indeed 
acknowledge that the formation o f national teams is a question of purely sporting interest and 
therefore amounts to a restriction on the scope of Community law.1183 However, already in the 
subsequent case of Dona, the Court of Justice subtly modified the terms o f this restriction, 
explicitly holding that the Community provisions “do not prevent the adoption of rules or of a 
practice excluding foreign players from participation in certain matches for reasons which are not 
of an economic nature, which relate to the particular nature and context of such matches and are 
thus of sporting interest only” (emphasis added).1184 Arguably, this specific wording represents a 
limitation o f the proposition adopted by the Court in Walrave. Advocate General Lenz opined in 
Bosnian that the Court was right in doing so, suggesting that the Court was presumably not 
unaware that the question of the composition of teams could very well by dominated by non­
sporting motives.1185 Two examples may illustrate this point: it is often murmured that former 
Brazilian team coach Zagallo was put under heavy pressure by shirt sponsor Nike to include 
superstar Ronaldo in the line-up for the 1998 World Cup final in Paris, in spite of the fact that the 
attacker was in an apparent state of illness and nowhere near able to play an international game of 
that calibre. Also, shortly after Italian football club AS Roma was quoted on the international 
stock exchange, its management board approved of the incoming transfer of Japanese midfielder 
Nakata. This decision provoked a substantial increase o f the value of the shares, given the interest 
in the Far East in European football In both situations, the composition o f the team was thus
1183 Walrave, par. 8.
1184 Donh, par. 14.
1185 Lenz AG in Bosman, par. 138.
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prompted by other factors than purely sporting considerations. Since its judgement in Dona, the 
Court has always rigorously referred to this latter statement in its later .case law relating to this 
matter. It can thus relatively safely be assumed to be an acquired fact that the restriction on the 
scope of the Community provisions, granted by the Court to the sporting federations, does not 
comprise the whole issue of the composition o f the national teams, but is more limited, 
presumably, taken literally, to rules or practices excluding foreign players from taking part in 
certain matches for reasons of purely sporting interest.
As has been discussed above, according to Weatherill, and concurred with in this respect 
by Advocate General Lenz, this restriction on the scope of the principle of non-discrimination on 
the grounds of nationality must be conceived as a kind o f limited exception to the scope of 
application of the Treaty. Consequently, this exception must probably be interpreted strictly. By 
means of an a contrario reasoning, it might therefore be argued that rules or practices excluding 
national players from participation in certain matches, such as matches between national teams, 
even if it were for reasons which are not o f an economic nature, which relate to the particular 
nature and context of such matches and are thus of sporting interest only, do not benefit from the 
limited exception on the scope o f the Community Treaty provisions and thus have to be evaluated 
upon their compatibility with Community law. The regulations of the sporting federations 
preventing athletes who obtained a new legal nationality through a process of naturalisation or 
who possess a dual nationality from taking part in international matches with the national team of 
the country of their new or other nationality if they have previously already played for the 
national team of the country o f their former or other nationality, seem to fall squarely within this 
category. Hence, essentially, stripped o f all formalities, these rules boil down to effectively 
preventing sportsmen from representing the national team of the country of which they are 
nationals. Besides, it is submitted that exactly the same intermediary solution, namely that the 
rules o f sporting associations prohibiting a naturalised sportsman or a sportsman with dual 
nationality under certain precise circumstances to play for their national side have to be examined 
upon their conformity with Community law, would be attained as well if one were to adhere to 
the proposition advanced by O'Keeffe and Osborne, according to whom the privileged status 
accorded by the Court to matches between national teams is not so much an exception to the 
scope o f the Treaty, as a restriction which is justifiable for pressing reasons in the general
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interest. As has already been outlined above, in their opinion sport is firmly subject to 
Community law insofar as it amounts to an economic activity. As soon as this threshold of an 
economic activity is passed, reasons o f sporting interest must operate-under the justification 
umbrella. Arguably, this is clearly the case in this situation.
At this particular stage, it remains of course to be verified whether the rules of the 
sporting associations under examination actually constitute an infringement of the principle of 
free movement of persons which is laid down in Article 39 EC. Provisions strictly reserving 
selection to the national team of a country to nationals of that country are as such clearly 
instances of direct discrimination on grounds of nationality, as non-nationals are simply denied 
the right to represent the national team o f a country. However, in this context, one is confronted 
with rules prohibiting nationals o f a country to play for the national team of their country, on the 
condition that they have already represented the national team of another country previously. In 
these precise circumstances, there are deemed to have the sporting nationality of that other 
country. The basis for the distinction is thus the sporting nationality rather than the legal 
nationality o f the sportsmen in question. Legally speaking, these rules appear to be indistinctly 
applicable, as they are foreigners who might escape their application just as well as there are 
nationals who might be caught under these rules.1186 Presumably, however, in practice, they turn 
out to be indirectly discriminatory, as these rules are principally aimed at foreigners, who are 
more likely to have already played for the national team of another country than the one of the 
country they wish to represent at a later stage, rather than at the nationals of that second country. 
Besides, in any event, evidently, these specific regulations of the sporting associations are liable 
to preclude or deter the access of naturalised sportsmen or sportsmen with a dual nationality to 
international matches with their national team in other Member States of the European Union and 
therefore constitute a restriction which is in principle prohibited by Article 39 EC.
Furthermore, whatever the precise grounds o f justification may have been that were 
traditionally successfully invoked to preserve the discriminatory rules on the composition of the 
national team, strictly reserving places in the national team o f a country to nationals of the 
Member State in question, they definitely cannot be used in this particular context: naturalised
1186 See also Dubey, ox., at 422-424.
384
athletes and athletes with a dual nationality are excluded from taking part in international 
matches with(the national team o f their country, in spite o f the fact that they do possess the legal 
nationality o f  that country, on the negative condition that they have already represented another 
national team in the past. It is submitted that this proviso is too restrictive and should 
consequently be rejected. Sportsmen who have acquired a new nationality through a 
naturalisation process should be entitled to represent the national team of the country of their new 
nationality, even if they previously have already taken part in international matches for the 
national team of the country o f their former nationality. The same should also hold true — 
possibly with even more force - for athletes with a dual nationality. To underpin this assertion, 
one could refer, by analogy, to the use o f the public service exception in Article 39(4) EC. In  
the case of Sotgiu, the Court of Justice made clear that the use o f Article 39(4) EC was limited to  
restricting the admission of foreigners into the public service. Once they were considered being 
sufficiently trustworthy or loyal to  the state to be admitted to such employment, there was no 
reason any longer for treating them  differently on account o f their nationality. Similarly, one 
could convincingly argue that if foreigners are sufficiently integrated and loyal to a State for the 
nationality o f that State to be conferred upon them, there are no grounds anymore for treating 
them differently from other nationals o f that State and they should therefore be entitled to  
represent the national team of that country in the sporting discipline in which they are active. T o  
further substantiate this submission with an extra-legal argument, it suffices to refer to the 
Olympic Charter, elaborated by the International Olympic Committee, the highest official 
sporting organ. In the bye laws to  Rule 46 on the nationality o f the athletes, it is stipulated that a 
competitor who has represented one country in the Olympic Games, in continental or regional 
games o r in world or regional championships recognised by the relevant international federation, 
and who has changed his nationality or has acquired a new nationality, is nevertheless entitled to  
participate in the Olympic Games to represent his new country. The athlete in question only has 
to sit out a waiting period of at least three years since he last represented his former country. This 
period may be reduced or even cancelled, with the agreement of the National Olympic 
Committee’s and* international federation concerned, by the IOC Executive Board, which takes 187
1187 For more general information, see Craig & de Burca, EU Law. Text, Cases and Materials (OUP, 2003) at 722- 
728.
1188 Case 152/73 Sotgiu v Deutsche Bundespost [1974] ECR, par. 4.
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into account the circumstances of each case.1189 The same also holds true, mutatis mutandis, for 
competitors who are a national o f two or more countries.1190
After having postulated the general principle, it is necessary to add some further subtle 
refinements. In the first place, athletes who have adopted a new legal nationality through 
naturalisation normally lose their previous nationality. It speaks for itself that they are in these 
circumstances no longer entitled to participate in international matches with the national team of 
the country of their former nationality. Obviously, the situation of sportsmen with a dual 
nationality is somewhat different, as they contemporaneously possess two different legal 
nationalities. As such, it does not seem possible to exclude a priori that they have a strong bond 
of allegiance with both countries of their nationality at the same time. As a result, in principle, 
they should also be able to play for both national teams more or less concurrently. At this point, it 
is nevertheless felt some necessary limitations should be imposed. For reasons of clarity and, 
even more so, to preserve the homogeneity o f international competitions, these players should be 
enjoined to make a choice of national team at the start of each international competition and 
subsequently stick to this choice, at least until the next championship starts. Take the hypothetical 
example of a skilful football player with a Belgian and French passport, bom out of a Belgian- 
French couple. In August 2002, at the beginning of the pre-qualification stage for the UEFA 
European Championships to be held in Portugal in 2004, the player has to decide whether he will 
be available for selection for either the ‘red devils* or ‘les bleus*. Once he has made his choice, 
he can only represent the national eleven of his preference during the entire pre-qualification 
stage and the final stage o f the tournament. This entails that if he were to choose for France and 
they do not manage to obtain a ticket for the finals, whereas Belgium does, he still cannot join the 
Belgian squad on their way to Portugal. However, in theory there is nothing to preclude the 
player from changing his choice at the start of the introductory phase in August 2004 leading up 
to the 2006 FIFA World Cup in Germany. Strictly legally speaking, it seems thus perfectly 
feasible that the player participates in the European Championships with France and in the World 
Cup with Belgium. Finally, several sporting associations make the admission to*the national team 
of a country conditional upon the fulfilment of a waiting period since the athlete in question has
1189 Rule 46, Bye Laws 2,2001 IOC Olympic Charter.
1190 Rule 46, Bye Laws 1,2001 IOC Olympic Charter.
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last represented the national side o f the country o f his former or other nationality. Arguably, such 
a  waiting period is acceptable provided it is proportionate in relation to the relatively short
4 r
duration of a 'sporting career. In any event, the relatively frequently used waiting period of three 
years appears to be excessive. A period of one year seems to be more appropriately adapted to the 
particular circumstances.
4 . The difficult definition of what constitutes a national team
From the analysis effectuated above, it has emerged clearly that, from the point of view of 
the application of Community law, it makes a  crucial difference whether any given sports match 
o r competition is to be considered as an encounter between national teams or a contest between 
individual athletes representing their country or alternatively, merely as a championship to which 
clubs and sportsmen participate in the first place for their own account. From this perspective, it 
is thus essential to determine with absolute precision what specifically constitutes the national 
team  of a country in a  sporting discipline and when an athlete competing in an individual meeting 
must be considered as representing his country. At first sight, this assessment may appear to be 
almost ridiculously easy. However, it is submitted that in practice, this question is not always as 
straightforward as it may seem. The following two examples, taken from two previous Court 
case, may serve to illustrate this point. In the case of Walrave, there was no discussion about the 
fact that the sporting activity in question was carried out in the framework of a competition 
opposing athletes representing their countries. The dispute turned around the question of whether 
the paced races constituted an individual sporting discipline or rather a team sport. Subsequently, 
in Deliege, it was unequivocally questioned whether the performances of the judoka during 
international category A tournaments were delivered while she was defending the colours of her 
country or not.
4.1. Walrave: team sport v individual activity?
m »
4.1.1. Dilemma
In W alrave, the Court o f Justice ultimately left it for the national court to determine the 
nature of the activity in question and thus also to decide whether one had to conceive a paced
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race as one between teams each consisting of a man on a motorcycle, known as a pacemaker,
followed by one on a bicycle, known as the stayer, or rather as one between men on bicycles each
4 C
of which is preceded by a man on a motorcycle. The actual dispute was never really resolved, as
Walrave and Koch declined to press for a judgement from the national court after successful
‘lobbying’ from the UCI. Apparently, the UCI had threatened to remove the medium-distance
races from the programme of the World Championships if the two plaintiffs had actually pursued
their action. In the academic doctrine, the whole issue was presented as if the pacemakers were
denied probable success or victory. It was suggested that they probably would not have been
considered to be part of the representative national team, which would thus be composed solely
of the stayer. Hence, a similar assessment would have enabled them to benefit from the
application of the Community free movement provisions.
4.1.2. Analysis
Admittedly, the issue is deprived of direct practical relevance, but it might nevertheless be 
interesting to add some critical comments in this respect, if only to have also a look at the other 
side of the issue. After all, as Advocate General Warner correctly stressed, “it makes all the 
difference” whether the pacer and the stayer are to be regarded as a team or whether the stayer is 
to be considered the only participant in the competition.1191 In its observations for the hearing of 
the case, the European Commission proposed some matters for consideration: the technical 
characteristics of the activity in question (qualities of the pacemaker as a sportsman), the 
frequency of participation in the activities of the team, the scope of the organisers in applying the 
rules of the events and the conditions of the award of prizes for winning. It also held that the 
mere fact that the pacer actually participated in the event was not such as to decisively conclude 
that pacer and stayer formed a team.1192 To this conclusion, also the president of the 
Arrondissementsrechtbank had come before the Court of Justice was seized of the matter, arguing 
that in a motor-paced race, the pacer, despite the skill he was called upon to exert, was no more 
than an auxiliary, comparable to a manager or masseur.1193 Now, if the task of the pacemaker 
consisted only of standing on the accelerator pedal during the races, one could indeed have
1191 Warner AG in Walrave, at 1427.
1192 See Report for the hearing in Walrave, at 1409-1410.
1193 Report for the hearing in Walrave, at 1412.
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plausibly argued that he didn’t really form part of a team with the stayer. However, it is submitted 
that his involvement goes much further than that. A good pacemaker must know his stayer inside 
out, and they^must rely on each other. The pacer must ‘read’ the race as well, feel or know when 
to slow down or accelerate, look for the perfect line on the track, ‘protect’ his cyclist. After all, 
by reason of his position behind the pacemaker, the stayer has only a very limited view of the 
race, which inevitably entails that he has to rely, at least partially, on his pacer for the tactics o f  
the race.1194 Arguably, it could therefore be asserted with equal force that his participation to the  
race exceeds beyond what is generally regarded as merely a helping hand to the actual 
competitor. Presumably, it should also be taken into account that prizes are presented to both the  
cyclist and the pacemaker.1195 Against this, however, it can be remarked that in the official results 
of the medium-distance races behind motorcycles at the world championships, only the cyclists 
are classified. Besides, stayer competitions are organised by the cycling federations, not th e  
federations responsible for motorcycling. During the proceedings, the plaintiffs maintained tha t 
the fact that in spite o f the very clear distinction in sporting competitions between amateurs and  
professionals, professional pacemakers may take part in competitions for amateur cyclists, is a  
decisive factor in holding that pacer and stayer do not form a team .1196
Summarising, valuable arguments exist both in favour o f and against considering pacers 
and stayers as forming part o f a team, rendering it difficult to satisfactorily settle the m atter. 
Advocate General Warner declined to express his opinion on the issue, leaving it for the national 
court to decide, but intuitively felt correctly that “it looks very much like a borderline case”.1197 
In any event, at the least, one cannot a priori exclude the possibility that the national team in 
cycling races behind a motorcycle is effectively composed of the pacemaker and the stayer, w ho 
therefore have to share the same nationality. This circumstance would enable the UCI to validly 
uphold the rule that in the World Championships, pacer and cyclist must be o f the same 
nationality. To support this conclusion, it may be useful to add just this last observation: if  the 
pacer really doesn’t influence the result o f the races and the cyclist does everything on his own
1194 Report for the hearing in Walrave, at 1412.
1195 Report for the hearing in Walrave, at 1414.
1196 Report for the hearing in Walrave, at 1416.
1197 Warner AG in Walrave, at 1426.
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anyway, why did everyone consider Walrave and Koch as the best pacers of the lot then and did 
everyone want to work with them?1198
4.2. Deliege: national team?
If the facts of the Walrave case have clearly demonstrated that it is not always self-evident to 
state with absolute certainty what precisely constitutes a sports team, the circumstances lying at 
the basis of the dispute in the case o f Deliege reveal that is sometimes also far ifom clear whether 
the particular sporting performances o f an individual athlete are delivered in the context of the 
national team or not. In the light of the preferential treatment reserved by the Court of Justice to 
national teams, it is obvious that the importance of this particular issue is not to be 
underestimated.
4.2.1. Organisation of judo
In this respect, it might therefore be interesting to have a somewhat closer look at the decision of 
the Court in Deliege. The facts o f the case are to be situated in the sphere of martial arts. Judo, a 
martial art, is organised at world level by the International Judo Federation (hereinafter referred 
to as the TJF’). At European level, the various national federations are grouped into the European 
Judo Union (the ‘EJU’). The Belgian federation (the Ligue Beige de Judo, the ‘LBJ’) deals 
essentially with international competitions and is responsible for the selection of athletes with a 
view to participation in international tournaments. It comprises two regional leagues, the Flemish 
Judo Federation (the ‘Vlaamse Judofederatie’, ‘VJF’) and the French speaking Judo League (the 
‘Ligue Francophone de Judo, LFJ). Individual judo athletes are member of a club which, in turn, 
is also a member o f the regional league. The regional league issues the licences which enable the
1198 It might be interesting to compare these races to some extent with jumping in equestrian sports: also here, there is 
participation to the contest of the horse. Clearly, without a good horse, even a brilliant jockey can’t do miracles and 
win races. In jumping, the ‘nationality* of the horse does not seem to matter. Arguably, however, die co-operation 
between a stayer and his pacemaker goes further, is to be situated than the feeling between a jockey and his horse. 
And of course, there is the convincing argument that a pacer is a person, and a horse is an animal. Ultimately, after 
carefully balancing all arguments, I believe that the pacer and his stayer do form a team and thus that the nationality 
of the pacer does matter in certain races.
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athletes to take part in courses or competitions. Licence holders are required to accept the
obligations imposed upon them by the statutes and regulations o f the regional leagues.1199
% n
4.2.2. Judo Regulations
Traditionally, judo athletes are classified into 14 different categories according to sex an d  
weight. In 1994, the EJU adopted a set o f rules relating to the participation of the sportsmen in  
European Category A Tournaments. On the basis of the results o f these tournaments, a European 
ranking would me made up which could serve as a possible basis for qualification for the 1996 
Olympic Games of Atlanta. Only the national federations could enrol athletes to take part in these  
tournaments. For each European federation, there was a limit of 7 athletes o f each sex. T h is  
implied that a federation could, in principle, list one judoka for each category. However, a  
federation could opt to inscribe two athletes for a particular category, as long as it didn’t exceed 
the maximum of 7 men and 7 women. Federations could only enter athletes who were a m em ber 
of that particular federation, their specific nationality was irrelevant for that purpose.1200
The selection criteria for the 1996 Olympic Games adopted by the IJF in 1993 stipulated 
that would be qualified for the Games, in each category, firstly, the first 8 in the most recent 
world championships, and furthermore, a number of athletes o f each continent,1201 to be selected 
on the basis of the results obtained by each judoka in a specified number of tournaments in th e  
period leading up to the Olympics. In this context, the EJU rules stated that account would be  
taken of the best three results obtained at these Category A tournaments and the senior European 
Championships in the period extending from the 1995 World Championships to the 1996 
European Championships. Importantly, the EJU rules also indicated that the places would be 
allocated to the national federations, and not to the athletes individually.1202
1199 Delikge, par. 3.
1200 Delikge, par. 4.
1201 Specifically for Europe, 9 men and 5 women in each weight category.
1202 Deltige, par. 5.
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4.2.3. Factual circumstances of the case
Since 1987, Christelle Deliège, a Belgian national, had achieved excellent results in the 
under -5 2  kg category in both national and international judo tournaments. Deliège claimed that 
the national and regional federations had improperly frustrated her career development since 
1992 by preventing her from participating in several important international competitions.1203 In 
particular, she complained about not being selected for the 1992 Barcelona Olympics, the 1993 
World Championships or the 1994 and the 1995 European Championships. In December 1995, 
she was also prevented from taking part in the Category A international tournament of Basel. The 
events directly giving rise to the main proceedings concerned participation in the Paris Category 
A International Tournament of 10 and 11 February 1996. When the Belgian federation selected 
two other athletes to take part in the under -52  kg category, Deliège took the matter to the 
national court, making an application for interim measures to the Tribunal of First Instance in 
Namur.1204 She maintained that her activities as a judoka were to be considered as a genuine 
economic activity and that she deserved protection under Community Law, thereby questioning 
the lawfulness of the rules laid down by the EJU regarding the limited number of athletes from 
each national federation and the authorisations issued by the federations for participation in 
individual Category A tournaments. The national court decided to stay the proceedings and 
referred the matter to the Court of Justice, requesting a preliminary ruling essentially as to 
whether or not these rules are contrary to the Treaty of Rome, in particular Articles 49 to 55, 81 
and 82 EC .1205
4.2.4. Difference of opinion between Advocate General & Court of Justice
Interestingly, Advocate General Cosmas and the Court of Justice somewhat differed in 
their opinion on the issue of whether the judokas fighting at Category A international 
tournaments were to be considered as representing the national team of their federation during 
their performances on the tatami, and consequently reached an opposite conclusion as to the
1203 Deliège, par. 7.
1204 Deliège, par, 9.
1205 See Deliège, paras. 16 and 22.
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applicability of Community law to the circumstances of the case. Advocate-General Cosmas 
considered that in these international Category A tournaments, the competition is not only 
between sporfsmen, but also between national teams, the main trophy consisting of the right to  
send athletes to the next Olympic Games. He acknowledged that it might not directly be the  
nationals teams that meet in these judo tournaments, but insisted that this assessment does n o t 
detract from the fact that these tournaments are o f crucial importance for each of the national 
teams of the European countries.1206 According to the Advocate-General, the principal objective 
of the contested rules of the EJU is the selection o f national teams for Atlanta. These ru les 
logically stipulate that one has to send the best European national teams to the Olympic Games. 
These teams are composed of the athletes who have delivered the best performances in th e ir 
discipline. In the opinion of the Advocate-General, therefore, the European selection is rightfully 
effectuated on the basis of the success athletes had at certain international tournaments and th e  
European championships.1207 He argues that within this particular framework, in which th e  
selection of national teams for the Olympics depends for a great deal on the results obtained a t 
these international category A tournaments, it is perfectly logical that the national federations, 
which bear the sole responsibility to promote the interests of the national team, are a lso  
exclusively competent to designate the athletes whom it considers fit to defend the colours of th e  
national team.1208 Besides, also within this context, he accepted that the EJU has deemed it 
appropriate to limit the number of participants of each federation to one or two per weight 
category, in order to guarantee the national federation a system of equality of opportunities to  
gain a final selection for the Olympics.1209 In the light of the foregoing, he concluded that the  
contested rules o f the EJU were justified for “reasons which are not of an economic nature, which 
relate to the particular nature and context of such matches” and thus regarded the Community 
provisions on the freedom to  provide services as inapplicable to the circumstances of this 
case.1210 The Court dealt with this issue only in a very concise way. Contrary to its Advocate 
General, however, it answered the question on the applicability of Article 49 EC in the 
affirmative. The Court immediately postulated that it considered that the selection rules at issue 
in the main proceedings did not relate to events between teams or selected competitors from
1206 Cosmas AG in Delitge, par. 70.
1207 Cosmas AG in Deliige, par. 71.
1208 Cosmas AG in Delikge, par. 72.
1209 Cosmas AG in Deliige, par, 73.
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different countries.* 1211 It emphasised heavily the fact that the athletes selected by the national
federations to take part in these competitions do not necessarily have, to be nationals of the
4 r
Member Stati of the federation they represent, for it simply suffices that they are affiliated to the
federation which selected them. Furthermore, also the mere circumstance that the results
achieved by the judokas in these tournaments are taken into consideration when determining
which countries qualify to send athletes to participate in the Olympic Games was not such as to
persuade the Court to treat these competitions as events between national teams which might fall
outside the scope of Community law.1212
4.2.5. Analysis
Undeniably, this divergence o f opinion does appear surprising at first sight. One wouldn’t 
have expected there to be any controversy possible around the question o f whether a certain 
athlete or sports team represents or constitutes the national team  of a country in a given sports 
discipline. However, the concrete situation in the case of Deliege perfectly highlights that even 
this issue is not always that straightforward. Arguably, in ca su , the ambiguity is the consequence 
o f the complexity of the contested mles of the ETLJ, which do not point clearly in one or the other 
direction. On the one hand, the Advocate General was undoubtedly right in holding that a system 
attributing the points won at these category A tournaments to the different national federations, 
rather than awarding them to the individual athletes of these federations who actually fought for 
them, seems to suggest that the athletes in question have represented the countries of the 
federations to which they are affiliated during these competitions. The individual performance of 
the athlete is then subordinate to the greater goal of qualification of the national team for the 
Olympics. On the other hand, the Court o f Justice equally correctly stipulated that it is hardly 
sustainable that a judoka is representing the national team of his or her federation if it is not even 
required that the athlete possesses the nationality of that country. In the contemporary sporting 
constellation, this would arguably undermine the whole essence of competitions between national 
teams. Clearly, one can thus adduce both arguments in favour o f and against the submission that 
the judokas deliver their performances during these Category A tournaments as representatives of
12,0 Cosmas AG in Deliege, par. 74.
1211 Deliege, par. 44.
1212 Delitge, par. 44.
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the national team of their federations. Presumably, the entire issue was complicated by the f a c t
that one was confronted with an intrinsically individual sport in this case. Once a selection f o r  a
i ITcertain sporting competition is made, the chosen sportsmen perform in the first place for th e i r
own account. This is a characteristic feature of individual sports, distinguishing them from t e a m
sports. The idea of representation is less present in individual sports than in team sports. A t th e
end of the day, even if an individual athlete is representing his country in a p a rtic u la r
competition, the result obtained always reflects more on the individual than is the case in t e a m
sports. Brazil, and not only Ronaldo, won the last football World Cup. The Chicago Bulls h a v e
dominated the NBA championship in the nineties, and claiming they were simply composed o f
Michael ‘Air’ Jordan plus four other players would somehow be doing injustice to players l i k e
Scott Pippen & Co. The performances o f  the individual players in team sports are being h e a v i ly
scrutinised and commented in the media, applauded by the public and highly valued a n d
remunerated by sponsors and there will be awards for individual players, but ultimately it is, o r  a t
least should be, the team that matters. Individual competitions are different: Michael J o h n s o n
may have won the golden medal for the USA in the 200 meter athletics at the 1996 A t la n ta
Olympics, but it is his individual world record breaking performance that stands o u t .
Consequently, it is submitted that in individual sports, it is harder to speak of n a t io n a l
representative teams. Be that as it may, it might nevertheless be interesting to make s o m e
additional observations relating to this particular case. Firstly, as has been argued in a p re v io u s
section, nowadays one can no longer reasonably deny that in the current sporting context, m a n y
competitions between national teams have a substantial economic impact. If  one n o netheless
wants to uphold the special status awarded to national teams, one has to find a better, u p d a te d
justification for it.1213 The Court was not directly concerned with this in this case, but it d e fin ite ly
could have been an additional factor which finally helped tilting the balance in favour o f  th e
applicability o f Article 49 EC. Furthermore, it must also be taken into consideration that th e re
does already exist a specific judo championship for national teams. During this com petition,
national teams compete with each other in the following way: for each o f the 7 weight categories,
there is one fight between -the two athletes which have been selected by their respective
federations to represent their country. The winner of each fight scores one point for his o r  h e r
country, to be added to the partial results of the other direct meetings. The national team  th e
1213 See also O’Keeffe & Osborne, “The European Court Scores a Goal”, o.c., at 126-127.
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athletes of which win at least 4 out o f the 7 separate fights wins the entire contest. The existence 
of this separate championship for national teams could be taken to suggest that in the Category A 
tournaments,5 the athletes fight predominantly for themselves, and omy subsidiary for their 
country. After all, the Court has always expressly stated that the privileged position of the 
national teams must remain limited to its objective. Besides, in Bosnian, it further specified that 
this special treatment cannot go so far as to exclude the whole of a sporting activity from the 
scope of the Treaty.1214 Qualifying these international Category A judo tournaments as events 
between national teams may practically have precisely this unwarranted effect. After all, 
objectively speaking, what is left in the judo landscape if these Category A tournaments, plus the 
European and World Championships and the Olympic Games are reserved to national teams? 
Finally, it is submitted that in the end, the fact that the points gained by the individual athletes at 
these tournaments are in fact gained for the national federation, does not necessarily imply that 
these tournaments concern matches between national teams. An analogy with the situation in the 
European Cups in football serves to exemplify this assertion: the results of the club teams in these 
competitions are taken into account to calculate the national coefficient on the basis o f which one 
decides how many clubs of a particular country will be authorised to participate in the European 
Cups during the next season, but these clubs take part for their own account and their matches 
cannot be considered as being matches between national teams. Consequently, all in all, the Court 
probably reached the better conclusion in declaring the Community provisions applicable to the 
contested rules in question.
m ,  TH E SPECIFIC VIOLATION O F ARTICLE 39 EC IN BOSM AN
Clearly, the way in which the Court of Justice dealt with the issue of its own jurisdiction 
in Bosnian to seize the matter of the nationality restrictions is open to some criticism. 
Presumably, the Court decided to declare this particular part of the request for a preliminary 
ruling admissible for predominantly opportunity reasons. It accepted the invitation o f the national 
court to clarify the state of Community law in this respect with open hands, even though it was 
well aware of the fact that the case before it was strictly speaking a purely hypothetical one. 
Arguments of strict legal orthodoxy nonetheless succumbed for the judicial consciousness that
1214 Bosman, par. 76.
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such an exquisite occasion to denounce discriminatory practices based on nationality in sp o rt 
might not easily present itself again. However, furthermore, as if this ascertainment did n o t in  
itself suffice, 'also the concrete way in which the Court actually examined the conformity o f  th e  
contested nationality clauses with the Community provisions on free movement of workers le d  to  
some controversy.
Both in reports1215 and official documents1216 on behalf o f the European institutions a s  in  
doctrinal writings from legal scholars1217, rules o f sporting associations limiting the num ber o f  
foreign players to be engaged by clubs or fielded in official matches have invariably b e e n  
earmarked as paradigm examples o f  discrimination on grounds of nationality, prohibited b y  
Article 39 EC. This determination is undoubtedly correct with regard to the ‘3+2* rules w h ic h  
were under scrutiny in Bosmcmy entailing that a maximum of five foreign players can p artic ip a te  
in official football matches between club teams. Basically, it only needed to be verified w h e th e r  
the contested nationality clauses were o f a directly or merely indirectly discriminatory nature. A t 
first sight, this may have appeared to be a rather straightforward and trivial evaluation ex erc ise , 
but on closer scrutiny, in practice this issue turned out to be somewhat more complicated.1218 
Hence, the UEFA and the national federations had not all implemented these nationality c la u se s  
in exactly the same way. Some associations had simply taken the legal nationality of the fo o tb a ll 
players as the distinctive criterion for the nationality clauses: were considered as foreigners in  a  
certain country the players who did not possess the nationality of this country. This was the case  
in France1219 and Germany1220, for example.1221 On the contrary, however, UEFA and ce rta in
1215 See for example, European Parliament, Report Janssen van Raay on the freedom of movement of professional 
footballers in the Community, PE DOC A2-415/88, 1 March 1989: “Considers the restriction on the num ber o f 
foreign players entitled to play for a professional football team to be a proscribed discrimination on grounds o f 
nationality, a contravention of freedom of movement pursuant to Article 39 EC.** Also European Parliament, L arive 
Report on the European Union and Sport, PE DOC A3-0326/94,27 April 1994.
12li European Parliament, Resolution on the freedom of movement of professional footballers in the Community, 11 
April 1989, (1989) OJ C 120/33, at pts. 4 ,5  and 15; European Parliament, Resolution on the freedom of movement 
of professional footballers, 21 November 1991, (1989) OJ C 326/208, pts. 2 and 5; European Parliament, Resolution 
on the European Community and Sport, 6 May 1994, (1994) OJ C 205/486, pts. 6 and 9.
1217 See inter alia, Delanney, o.c., at 213; Forlati Picchio, “Discriminazioni nel settore sportivo e Comunità europee”, 
Rivista di diritto intemazionale (1976) at 754; Hilf, o.c., at 521; Palme, Hepp-Schwab and Wilske, “Freizügigkeit im 
Profisport -  EG-rechtliche Gewährleistungen und Prozessuale Durchsetzbarkeit”, Juristen Zeitung (1994) at 344; 
Weatherill, “Discrimination on Grounds of Nationality in Sports”, o.c., at 66.
1218 See also Dubey, o.c., at 417-436.
12,9 Article 114 RA-LNF 95/96.
1220 §22.2a SpO-Deutsche Fussball Bund (DFB) 95/96.
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other national federations, such as the Spanish12 222 and the Italian1223 one, relied on the concept of
sporting nationality as point of departure for the rules on foreign players; they distinguished
Cbetween players who could and those who couldn’t play for the national team of a certain 
country. In the former category of rules, foreigners were directly discriminated on grounds of 
nationality; also the latter set o f rules were based on nationality discrimination, but this time of an 
indirect nature through reliance on the notion of sporting nationality.1224 Arguably, at the time of 
the proceedings in Bosnian, this specific assessment was of crucial importance in the process of 
deciding whether the prima facie  discriminatory nationality clauses amounted to an infringement 
of the free movement provisions, as it was traditionally accepted that directly discriminatory 
measures could only benefit from the expressly provided Treaty justifications of Articles 39(3) 
and (4) EC, whereas indirectly discriminatory rules could in addition also be objectively justified. 
In this respect, it was therefore somewhat problematic, in view of the largely hypothetical 
character of the issue, that it was not really clear which nationality clauses precisely fell to be 
scrutinised by the Court.
Be that as it may, the Court of Justice steered the same pragmatic course as it had 
previously already done with regard to the transfer issue and stripped the contested nationality 
clauses o f all ballast, reducing them to their essence, namely a quantitative limit on the number of 
professional players who are nationals o f other Member States who can be fielded in official 
matches in competitions organised by the sporting associations. However, this kind of back-to- 
basics approach may very well have turned out to be successful in the context of the contested 
transfer rules, as it allowed for the Court’s decision on this point to take on a more general 
dimension overstepping the confines of the specific circumstances of the case, it is not entirely 
clear whether the decision to reiterate the same experiment once again in the context of the 
nationality restrictions, proved to be as fortunate in the end. Arguably, this has a lot, if not 
everything, to do with the fact the Court couched its final decision on the contested nationality 
clauses in terms of a restriction on the freedom of movement for workers, in spite of the fact that 
these rules on foreign players were obviously discriminatory. Admittedly, the Court made an
1221 Arguably, this is also the case in England, where Scottish, Welsh and Northem-Irish footballers were considered 
to be national players on the basis of their UK passport. See Weatherill, “Case Note on Bosman", o.c., at 995.
1222 Article 289 RG-RFEF.
1223 Article 40.8 NOI-FIGC 95.
1224 See also Dubey, o.c., at 420-423; Weatherill, “European Football Law”, o.c., at 354.
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explicit reference to Article 39(2) EC, which provides that the freedom of movement entails th e  
abolition o f any discrimination based on nationality between workers of the Member States a s  
regards employment, remuneration and conditions of work and employment,1225 and it a lso  
invoked Article 4 o f Regulation 1612/68 implementing this Treaty provision.1226 However, it le f t  
it at this principled exposition o f these provisions and did not examine the matter any further w ith  
regard to principle o f non-discrimination. Instead, the Court proceeded with a more g en e ra l 
reasoning. It rejected as irrelevant the fact that the nationality clauses do not concern th e  
employment of professional football players, but only the extent to which their clubs m a y  
actually make use of them in official matches. Subsequently, it simply concluded that insofar a s  
participation in such matches constitutes the essential purpose of a footballer’s activity, a r u le  
restricting that participation evidently also restricts the chances of employment of the p la y e r  
concerned and therefore amounts to an obstacle to the principle of freedom of movement f o r  
workers, prohibited by Article 39 EC .1227 Hereinafter, the Court moved on to the justification 
issue. As such, there is presumably nothing inherently objectionable about the Court’s approach  
of the nationality clauses. But then, it cannot possibly be denied that these rules on fo re ig n  
players o f the sporting associations have a directly or at times at least an indirectly -  as th e  
specific way of implementation of the ‘3+2’ rule may have been -  discriminatory character. 
Viewed from this perspective, the Court’s refusal to deal with these different types of nationality 
clauses separately and its preference for grouping them together under the more general um brella  
of ‘restrictions’ inevitably entails some consequences. In the first place, it appears to confirm th a t 
the concept of ‘restriction’ has become the common denominator for infringements o f th e  
Community free movement provisions, comprising both directly and indirectly discriminatory 
measures as well as genuinely indistinctly applicable rules. Secondly, and more importantly, th e  
fact that the Court has implicitly put directly and indirectly discriminatory measures on the sam e 
par seems to have repercussions on the issue of justification. Whereas previously, it w as 
generally accepted that measures which were considered to be directly discriminatory could only 
be safeguarded by means of justifications expressly provided in the Treaty, this judgement o f the 
Court seems to imply that they can now also be upheld on the basis of the judicially created 
doctrine of imperative requirements in the general interest, just like indirectly discriminatory and
1225 Bosman, par. 117.
1226 Bosman, par. 118.
1227 Bosman, par. 120.
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genuinely non-discriminatory measures. Intrinsically, the decision to open to directly 
discriminatory measures the escape route of the objective justification method can undoubtedly 
be concurred'with for several reasons. Firstly, it is not always easy to distinguish whether a 
contested measure directly or only indirectly discriminates on grounds of nationality. The 
difference is often very subtle, as the various types of nationality clauses demonstrate. In these 
circumstances, the traditional strict dichotomy between directly and indirectly discriminatory 
measures may sometimes have been too rigid. Furthermore, it is not because in theory now the 
possibilities of justification of directly discriminatory measures appear to have increased that this 
will also effectively occur in practice. Essentially, it remains undeniably and invariably the case 
that direct discrimination constitutes the most pervasive and reprehensible type of obstacle to the 
right of freedom of movement. It therefore has to be treated accordingly. Within the uniform 
mandatory requirements doctrine, there is still enough discretion to make use of the principle of 
proportionality in a sufficiently flexible way, so as to ensure that directly discriminatory 
measures will not pass the threshold o f objective justification too lightly. Besides, invoking 
overriding requirements to justify directly discriminatory measures injects additional flexibility in 
this subject-matter, allowing to take into account some arguments and objectives which may have 
not necessarily been foreseen or foreseeable at the moment of the drafting of the Treaty and 
which are nevertheless worthy o f protection. Consequently, taking all factors into consideration, 
the Court’s decision in this respect appears to be comprehensible and acceptable in principle. 
However, this detracts nothing from the fact that it remains nonetheless somewhat regrettable that 
the Court refrained from stipulating explicitly that nowadays even directly discriminatory 
measures may potentially be justified under the imperative requirements doctrine. It may very 
well be true that the Court’s statements unmistakably seem to yield this particular conclusion, but 
as long as the Court has not explicitly confirmed it, there inevitably remains room for 
speculation.
IV . THE ISSUE OF JUSTIFICATION IN BOSMAN
Once the Court of Justice had established that the contested nationality clauses constituted 
an obstacle to the freedom of movement for workers, it moved on to the next issue of whether 
that obstacle could be justified in the light of Article 39 EC. Contrary to its previous approach of
400
1the transfer issue, the Court adopted an uncompromising stance on this point, keeping th e  d o o r  
firmly shut for any possible techniques o f somehow granting preferential treatment to d o m e s tice
players. As far as mter-club competitions are concerned, foreign players of EU nationality h a v e  
to be treated in exactly the same way as national players.1228 Firstly, as has already b e e n  
demonstrated in an earlier section o f this chapter, the Court rejected that the ‘3+2’ rules c o u ld  
escape Community scrutiny in a similar way as the matches between national teams, for w h ic h  
discrimination based on nationality is deemed lawful. Secondly, it also refused to recognise a n y  
of the arguments advanced for justification purposes by the football associations and s o m e  
intervening governments -  the maintenance o f the traditional link between each club a n d  i t s  
country, the creation o f a sufficient pool of players for the national team and the preservation o f  a  
competitive balance between clubs * as overriding requirements in the general interest. In  th i s  
section, it will be examined somewhat more in detail whether the Court’s unequivocally n e g a tiv e  
assessment of these three arguments was correct.
By way of preliminary, it is worth observing briefly that according to some scholars, th e  
Court could have easily dispensed with each one o f these arguments in the first place. It has b e e n  
asserted that all the reasons invoked to justify the existence of these nationality re s tric tio n s  
essentially are o f an economic nature. As a result, there was supposedly no need for the C ourt a n y  
longer to verify the viability o f these arguments.1229 It must be acknowledged that the e lem en ts  
brought forward do indeed undeniably have a certain economic connotation. Nevertheless, it is  
submitted that the objectives aimed at are predominantly o f sporting interest. Consequently, a s  
the sporting factor outweighs the economic one, the Court presumably did the right thing b y  
exploring further whether the arguments invoked could effectively serve to justify the nationality  
restrictions.
1. M aintenance of the traditional link between each club an d  its country
According to the KBVB, UEFA and the German, Italian and French governments, the  
nationality clauses serve to maintain the traditional link between each club and its country. T heir
1228 See also Weatherill, “European Football Law*’, o.c., at 355-359.
1229 See, inter alia, Hilf, o.c., at 521; Martin, “’’Discriminations”, “entraves” et “raisons impérieuses” dans le Traité 
CE: trois concepts en quête d’identité”, CDE (1998) at 607.
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importance is supposed to be twofold: firstly, they enable that the public will identify with its 
favourite team, and secondly, they ensure that clubs taking part in international competitionst
effectively represent the country of the federation o f which they are a member.1230 
1.1 Identification o f the spectator with its team
The Court adopted a rather pragmatic approach in its rejection of this first suggestion. It 
considered that a football club’s links with the country in which it is established cannot be 
regarded as more inherent in its sporting activity than its links with its locality, town, or region. 
Subsequently, it contented itself with pointing out that in spite o f the fact that the national league 
is made up of clubs from different regions, towns or localities, there is no rule restricting the right 
of clubs to field players from other regions, towns or localities in such championship matches.1231 123
The idea behind this simple affirmation seems to be that if the presence of players from other 
regions, towns or localities does not prevent a spectator to identify with its favourite team, also 
the presence on the field of players with a different nationality should not be a disturbing factor. 
Arguably, this implicit conclusion is correct. It can be illustrated with an example: Francesco 
Totti, bom and bred in the popular quarter of Testaccio in the eternal city, will always take a 
special place in the hearts of the ‘tifosi* o f AS Roma, but for the rest, the fans do not really care 
all that much whether it is Montella from Tuscany, Cassano from Puglia or Batistuta from 
Argentina who partners their captain in attack. Each one of them enjoys the affection and the 
admiration of the crowd.
As also Advocate General Lenz expressed in his opinion, the intrinsic weakness of this 
argument is apparent. The great majority of supporters of a particular club are predominantly 
interested in the performances and the success of their team; their interest in the individual 
players the team is composed of only comes in second place.1233 In principle, therefore, the 
participation in official games of foreign players does not prevent spectators from identifying 
with their team. On the contrary, on many occasions, the popularity of foreign players with the 
local fans reaches high peaks. This has a lot, if not everything to do with the fact that most
1230 Bosnian, par. 124.
1231 Bosnian, par. 131.
1232 Lenz AG in Bosnian, at par. 143.
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players of foreign nationality who are engaged by a club occupy an important position on the 
field or within the team  and therefore play a decisive role in the team’s performances. The 
legendary side of AC Milan that conquered first Italy and subsequently Europe and the rest of the 
world in the eighties with several victories in the European Cup and the Intercontinental Cup was 
a collection of extremely skilful Italians, but the undisputed stars o f the team, who constituted the 
cherry on the pie, were the three Dutchmen Gullit, Rijkaard and Van Basten.
Besides, the counter-argument that the presence or participation of foreign football players 
does not obstruct the spectators in their identification with their favourite team is further 
corroborated by the concrete facts and figures on the football scene: nowadays, almost every 
team counts one or more foreigners within its ranks. It even occurs regularly that teams are 
composed of a majority of foreign players.123 234 Teams that are entirely made up of players who 
possess the nationality o f the country in which the club is located have almost become a curiosity. 
In this respect, it may be necessary to introduce a caveat though: fans often have a higher level o f 
tolerance towards local players. In general, they are less inclined to accept mediocre 
performances and disappointing results from foreign players. They are supposed to bring an 
added value to the team, and they are judged on their performances. Putting in hard efforts does 
not suffice to the fans. In this context, a large continent of foreign players in the line-up of a team 
combined with a string of bad displays and/or few successes may have as a result that the 
supporters -  temporarily - turn their back to the team. And in times of sporting misadventure, the 
normally richly rewarded foreigners are always at the centre of criticism. The recent malaise in 
FC Barcelona illustrates this point:1235 at some stage in the late nineties, the ‘blaugrana’ had a 
Dutch coach, a Dutch training staff and no less than seven Dutch players under contract.1236 
When the team failed to attain its preconceived goals, the fans started reacting against the 
‘bollandisation’ of the squad and urged for a  larger Catalan representation in the club. Ultimately, 
Barcelona’s management had no other option but to listen to the voice of the people and sack 
coach Van Gaal and sell several o f the under-performing Dutch players. It is important to look at 
this issue from the right perspective: this is not a plea for the introduction or maintenance of
1233 See also Forlati Picchio, o.c., at 759.
1234 In this respect, see also Explanatory Statement to the Report Janssen van Raay, p. 12, pt. 15.
1235 Traini, “Barcelone vire á l ’orange”, L ’Equipe, 30 January 1999, at 8.
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former clauses restricting the number of foreign players. Spectators and fans are and remain in 
the first place concerned about the spectacle offered by their team and the concrete results 
obtained and tu p s  and honours won. The specific composition of the teams’ eleven is a factor of 
secondary importance. It only comes to the forefront when the team fails to live up to the 
supporters* expectations. Nobody likes to be associated or identified with a losing team. Under 
these circumstances, the fans* possible perception that the contingent of foreigners is too large 
might thus become an issue. However, it is submitted that even then, clauses laying down 
quantitative restrictions on the number of foreigners to be engaged or fielded during official 
matches are not really a viable option, for one because one cannot predict with absolute certainty 
whether the fans will actually turn against the foreign players, and also because one cannot state 
with sufficient precision where the critical threshold or saturation point for foreigners is to be 
situated. Some spectators may be against too much involvement of foreigners, whereas others 
don’t really care or simply do not care at all about how many players of different nationality 
actually defend the colours of their favourite team. Ideally speaking therefore, the club’s should 
draw the line for foreign participation themselves.1236 237 Such an individual club policy is by far to 
be preferred over the nationality clauses under scrutiny in Bosman.
Summarising, the Court’s decision in this respect appears to be concct: supporters are 
more interested in the team’s success than in its individual players. And besides, the nationality 
clauses do not appear to be an appropriate or necessary means to achieve the objective of 
identification of the spectators with their favourite team. In this context, the market conects itself.
L 2 . Representation by the club o f its country in international competitions
The Court also failed to be convinced by the second aim pursued by the nationality 
clauses in this respect, namely guaranteeing that clubs taking part in international competitions 
effectively represent their countries. It limited itself to stating briefly that participation in 
international competitions is restricted to clubs which have achieved certain results in the
1236 At some point, Ronald and Frank de Boer, Philippe Cocu, Boudewijn Zenden, Winston Bogarde, Patrick 
Kluivert and Michael Reiziger contemporaneously played for Barcelona.
1237 See also Explanatory Statement to the Report Janssen van Raay, p. 12, pL 15.
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competition of their respective country, without there being any particular importance being 
attached to the nationalities of their constituent players.1238
( t'
In deciding in this particular way, the Court followed the advice of Advocate General Lenz, 
who had rejected in his opinion the submission that clubs representing their Member State in the 
European Cup competitions must consist o f at least a majority o f nationals of that State. He finely 
observed that the title o f ‘national champion* o f a Member State could be interpreted without any 
difficulty in an alternative way, noting that there is no reason why it cannot be taken as simply 
designating the club which has won the competition organised within the territory of that 
Member State.1239 This alternative interpretation has also been embraced by several 
commentators. Basically, this argument boils down to the following: it is the club that wins the 
national championship, and not the individual players that compose the team; therefore it is the 
club that represents the country during the European cup competitions, rather than its players; 
consequently, it is the nationality of the team which counts, not that of the players.1240 124
Manchester United will always represent England at the European scene, even if all its eleven 
players were foreigners. That this theoretically may lead to a rather strange situation in which in a  
European competition a German team composed of 11 French players meets a French team w ith
i a j i
11 Germans, in principle does not detract anything from that conclusion. As the Court subtly 
noted, the idea that the nationality of the team  prevails over the nationalities o f its players is 
further reinforced by the fact that the regulations of football associations do not always have rules 
limiting the number o f foreign players in the competitions they organise on the national 
territory.1242 The Advocate General had illustrated this by pointing out that in Germany it is 
perfectly possible that an amateur team consisting of 11 foreigners, as no rules on foreign players 
apply for amateur teams, wins the national cup and hence qualifies to play in the European Cups. 
And the same could be said about the national league in Scotland for example. Now, if this is an 
accepted practice at domestic level that a club established within a country can win the national
1238 Bosman, par. 132.
1239 Lenz AG in Bosman, par. 144. He had based himself on Zäch, “Wettbewerbsrecht und Freizügigkeit für 
Arbeitnehmer im bereich des Sports nach dem Recht der EG”, in Schluep and others (eds.), Festschrift fü r Arnold 
Koller (Bern, Stuttgart and Vienna, 1993) at 847 et seq.
1240 See for example also Hilf, o.c., at 522; Forfati Picchio, o.c.y at 759.
1241 See Kahlenberg, “Anmerkung zum Urteil des LandesGerichts Frankfurt am Main -  2/14 O 392/93 -  vom 
18.1.1994”, SpuRt (1994), 129 et seq.
1242 The British football associations have special rules for their mutual relations.
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championship or cup with the -  sometimes unlimited - active involvement of foreign players, it is 
indeed difficult to conceive why this should be any different at European level. However, when 
taking part in these European Cups, these teams would be forced somehow to limit the number o f 
players from other Member States during these matches, as a result of the application o f the 
contested nationality clauses. According to Advocate General Lenz, the argument of the national 
representative function o f the clubs cannot be used to justify “professional football players from 
the European Community being forbidden to take part in the European cup competitions.”1243 
Besides, the fact that the nationality clauses in any event allow clubs to field a certain number of 
foreign players in the European cup competitions also clearly demonstrates that the representative 
role fulfilled these clubs during these competitions is of an entirely different order and can 
therefore not be compared with the one carried out by the national teams.1244 These European 
competitions are events between clubs, which compete in the first place for their own sporting 
glory, and only in second place for their country.
Furthermore, it must be remarked that it is indeed possible to detect a certain territorial 
attachment in the organisation of sporting events: London—based football club Wimbledon, 
playing in the English Premier League, had asked UEFA for authorisation to transfer its 
establishment to Dublin, in view of its large share of Irish fans, but expressed the wish to 
continue playing in the English competition. UEFA declined to give his fiat to this operation. By 
the same token, UEFA also denied Belgian border club Excelsior Moeskroen authorisation to 
play its home-leg o f his contest against French club Metz in the first round of the UEFA Cup in 
the neighbouring city of Lille on French territory. In both circumstances, the Commission 
recognised the autonomy of the sporting federations in these matters and thus refused to apply 
Community law.1245 In all likelihood therefore, if the football associations were to be confronted 
with the hypothetical question o f  whether Holland’s Ajax Amsterdam could play in the more 
attractive leagues o f  Italy, England or Spain, the answer would be negative.
1243 Lenz AG in Bosman, par. 144.
1244 See also Dubey, o.c., al 479.
1245 IP/99/965, 9 December 1999; IP 99/956, 9 June 1999. See also Weatherill, “”Fair Play Please”: Recent 
Developments in the Application of EC Law to Sport”, 40 Common Market Law Review (2003) at 61.
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Summarising, in view of the foregoing considerations, the Court arguably correctly concluded 
that the nationality clauses were not a necessary means to ensure that clubs performing at 
international'level effectively represent their country during these event's. Clubs established in a 
certain Member State earn the right to participate in European competitions for their country as a  
result of a series of sporting performances on the territory of that State. It is the nationality o f the 
team that is o f prime importance, not that o f  the players that form the team  And besides, contrary 
to the national team, these clubs defend in the first place their own private interests during these 
European club competitions. Their role o f  representing the country in which they are established 
is only of secondary importance.
2. Creation o f a pool of players for the national team
A second group o f considerations advanced as justification for the restrictive rules on foreign 
players concern the situation of the national team, albeit partially indirectly. The KBVB, UEFA 
and the Italian, German and French governments argued that without the nationality clauses, the 
development of young football players would be affected and also that these clauses w ere 
necessary to ensure that enough national players were available to provide the national team w ith 
top players to field in all team positions.1246
2.1 . Development o f young players
Advocate General Lenz was not convinced by this line of argumentation. In his opinion, there 
was nothing to suggest that the development o f young football players would be adversely 
affected if the rules on foreign players were dropped. He pointed out that there are only few top 
teams that pursue the promotion o f young players as an active club policy. In general, talented 
youngsters start their career in smaller teams or teams playing in lower divisions, to which these 
rules often do not apply, and only subsequently make their way to the top by means of their 
performances on the pitch.1247 He admitted that the number o f jobs available to native players 
decreases, the more foreigners play for the clubs, but considered that as an inevitable
1246 Bosman, par. 124.
1247 Lenz AG in Bosman, at par. 145.
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consequence of the right to freedom o f movement. Furthermore, the Advocate General also 
indicated that the abolition o f the nationality clauses would not oblige chibs to engage more 
foreigners, it*simply creates the possibility for them to do so if they deerrtit useful.1248
The Court followed its Advocate General and turned down this particular argument, albeit in 
a very concise way. It acknowledged that the principle o f  freedom o f movement for workers, by 
opening up the labour markets o f  the different Member States to nationals o f the other Member 
States, did have the effect of reducing the opportunities o f  workers to find an employment within 
the Member State o f which they possess the nationality, but it observed that the same principle, 
by the same token, also offered these workers new prospects o f employment in other Member 
States.1249
Evidently, the issue relating to the development of young players is a delicate one. On the one 
hand, the liberalisation of the employment markets in the European Union entails that many 
young players nowadays get the opportunity to acquire valuable international experience by 
playing in another Member State at a relatively early stage of their career. Conversely, on the 
other hand, it also inevitable leads to an increased presence of foreign players at domestic level, 
which somehow renders it often more difficult for young players to force a breakthrough in the 
highest divisions of the league of their own country. It is submitted that the concrete situation in 
the different Member States will vary considerably and therefore, ideally speaking, should be 
evaluated for each country separately.1250 In France for example, many clubs have famous youth 
development centres where young players receive an excellent training and formation. 
Consequently, many young French footballers successfully go on to play abroad. 
Contemporaneously, they also get ample opportunities to play in the national league, as the 
French competition is not yet as pervaded by the exigencies of big business as other competitions 
in Europe. Youngsters often still get the chance to mature into experienced players at home, in 
teams such as Auxerre or Nantes. Whereas France can be considered as an ‘exporter* of football
1248 Lenz AG in Bosman, at par. 145.
1249 Bosman, par. 134.
1250 In the Motion for resolution (doc B2-1547/86) tabled by Ephremidis, Adamou en Alavanos, in Annex 4, Report 
Janssen van Raay, p. 16, it was argued that an “unlimited number of footballers moving freely will doom talent to 
wither away unused , particularly in the small countires, since it virtually nips in the bud the development of such 
talent”
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talent, a country such as Italy is more an ‘importer* o f foreign players. The last decade or so, the 
Italian championship has built up such a formidable reputation, mainly due to an impressive 
string of successes in the European Cups, that many sponsors and advfertisers want to identify 
their products with the Serie A and invested enormous amounts of money in Italian football. 
Equally, the Italian football federation and the leading clubs have been able to conclude lucrative 
television deals w ith national and international broadcasters for the transmission of the 
championship matches. The money stream currently circulating in the peninsula has reached 
unprecedented heights. All this sounds very appealing, but there is another side to this medal as 
well: in return for their investments, sponsors and broadcasters want to see attractive games and 
require Italian teams to win as much silverware as possible. For commercial purposes, teams such 
as Milan, Intemazionale or Juventus simply cannot afford to lose anywhere at any time. To m eet 
the exigencies of the industry, and because they have the necessary financial means to do so , 
most Italian teams have adopted the policy of engaging the best players from the o ther 
competitions abroad, who can deliver more or less instantaneously performances of a high level 
and are a guarantee for sporting success. As a result, it is extremely difficult for young football 
players to gain a place in the teams o f the big Italian clubs which are generally composed o f  
experienced and skilful Italians and foreigners. Youngsters are often constrained to try their luck 
abroad or forced to play in the lower divisions of the national league.
Diverse as the practical training and/or playing opportunities may be for young football 
players in the various countries o f the European Union, it appears nevertheless feasible to make 
some general observations. Admittedly, the participation of foreign players reduces the number 
o f places available to  national players in the domestic leagues, but as the Advocate General and 
the Court already correctly pointed out, this reduction is compensated for by the increased job  
opportunities abroad. Furthermore, there is much to say for the assertion that the participation o f  
good foreign players promotes the development of football1251 In principle, they are recruited to  
give an additional value to the team, to improve the attractiveness of the team’s performances and 
to increase the chances o f sporting success.1252 Essentially, therefore, early and intense contact 
with foreign players, be it at national level or abroad, “can only be of advantage to a young
1251 Giardini, “Diritto camunitario e libera circolazione dei calcialori”, Diritto comunitario e degli scambi 
intemazxonali (1988) at 454.
1252 Hilf, o.c., at 521.
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player.” In the short term, these foreigners may effectively bar the younger players from 
playing for the team, but in the long run, the youngsters will be able to benefit from the training 
with these mbre experienced players. Also playing in the lower division^ of a national league for 
a certain spell does not necessarily obstruct the career o f a young player and often turns out to be 
a truly positive experience, in view o f  the fact that these young players will often occupy an 
important place within those teams and have to bear part of the responsibilities. This is definitely 
another important element in the learning process of young players.
1
Ensuring the development o f young players definitely constitutes one of the principal 
objectives o f the sporting federations. However, they failed to demonstrate that the rules limiting 
the number of foreign players to  be recruited by a club or fielded during official matches 
constitute an appropriate and necessary instrument to reach this aim. Arguably, the presence of 
foreign players does not per se have to be to the detriment o f the development o f young 
footballers. Conversely, in principle young players can learn a lot from frequent and intense 
contacts with their older foreign colleagues, both mentally, tactically, technically as physically. 
Therefore, both Advocate General Lenz and the Court were probably right in holding that this 
particular argument does not serve to safeguard the nationality clauses at stake in Bosnian}25* 
This is of course not to say that this objective of formation o f young football players is not worth 
f pursuing. It is only submitted that there are better ways to achieve this, which are acceptable 
under Community law. To ensure the continued investment o f time, effort and money into the 
> training and development of young players at all levels, it could possibly be conceived to impose
f on all clubs the obligation to have a certain minimum amount o f young football players who are
. EU/EEA nationals under contract. The age until which footballers can be considered as young
' players for these purposes could be set at 23, which corresponds with the age until which
compensation fees for training and education are due in the event o f an international transfer.* 1254255 
j It does not appear to be strictly necessary to add the further requirement that these youngsters
i
(. 1253 Palme, Hepp-Schwab and Wilske, o.c.f at 345.
1254 See also Explanatory statement to Report Janssen van Raay, at point 16: “Finally, occasional warnings are heard 
about hampering the development of young players and producing a fall in standards, particularly in the case of the 
national teams. However, there are no grounds for believing this, given the large number of clubs, particularly in the 
amateur sector, and the mobility and exchange factors. On the contrary, there is every reason to expect that the game 
will receive a shot in the arm through the demonstration of a high level and possibly, a different kind of footballing 
skill.”
1255 See supra, chapter 5, §2, n , 2.
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possess the nationality o f the Member State in which the club is established, as such a 
requirement risks to be rejected as indirectly discriminatory.1256 It could also be envisaged to 
require that à certain amount of young players -  three seems to be a fair number -have to be 
inscribed on the referee sheet for each official match. Ultimately, it would remain to the 
discretion of the coach o f the team though to decide whether they will actually be fielded during 
these games or not. These propositions do not seem to raise problems with regard to the 
compatibility with Community law. Theoretically, clubs remain entitled to recruit and field as 
many footballers o f foreign EU/EEA nationality as they deem fit or necessary to pursue their 
sporting goals. By the same token, contemporaneously, these minimum criteria as to the 
engagement and selection o f youngsters somehow ensure that the framework is created for 
rigorously preserving the objective o f developing young players.
2.2. Creation o f a sufficient pool o f players fo r  the national team
Also the argument that the rules on foreign players are needed to create a sufficiently 
large and strong pool o f players eligible for selection for the national team,1257 which is closely 
linked to the previous one, was rejected by Advocate General Lenz as unconvincing. He 
considered it unlikely that the abolition o f the nationality clauses would result in such a great 
influx of foreign players that native players would no longer get a chance to play.1258 
Furthermore, the Advocate General pointed out that it is in the club’s own interest to develop 
good players who are available to play for the national team. The prestige which these players 
acquire by representing the national colours also reflects on the clubs for which they play during 
the regular season. And the success or failure o f the national side undoubtedly also has a positive 
or negative effect on the interest in the national championship o f that country.1259 He also 
indicated that the fact that the national teams o f the Member States of the Community nowadays 
very often include players who play for a club abroad does not cause particular disadvantages, as
1256 See also Weatherill, “European Football Law*’, o.c., at 358.
1257 See for example the Motion for resolution (doc 2-1167/84) tabled by Ford and Stewart, Annex 1, Report Janssen 
van Raay, p. 13: “Concerned that the quality of international teams from Community countries will inevitably decline 
in consequence of a free m arket”
1258 Lenz AG in Bosman, par. 146.
1259 Lenz AG in Bosmany par, 146.
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the regulations of the football federations provide that these players have to be released for the 
matches of the national team.1260
r l:
The Court was again less elaborate than its Advocate General in its rejection o f the 
argument. It limited itself to stressing that whilst “national teams must be made up o f players 
having the nationality o f the relevant country, those players need not necessarily be registered to 
play for clubs in that country.” In addition, it only still mentioned that under the rales of the 
sporting associations, “foreign players must be allowed by their clubs to play for their country’s 
national team in certain matches.”1261
It is unmistakably true that clubs all over the world have to release their players who are 
selected by their national federations to participate in matches o f their national team. The relevant 
FIFA and UEFA Regulations explicitly provide that selected players must be enabled to join the 
training centre of the national squad a certain period of time before the matches in question. This 
amount of time varies according to whether the scheduled encounter is simply a  friendly 
international game, or whether it is a qualification match in the preliminary phase of the UEFA 
European Championship or the FIFA World Cup. The regulatory framework being unequivocally 
clear, one would not expect there to arise any particular problems from the fact that many 
national players nowadays earn their living abroad. On the contrary, it is often perceived to be a 
positive factor that several national footballers play for a foreign team, as they can gain some 
international experience and improve by playing in foreign leagues, which can ultimately only be 
o f benefit to the national team. However, foreign clubs are sometimes reluctant to let their players 
go to play for their national team, especially if  the club more or less contemporaneously has to 
play a championship’s game for which it then cannot count on the services o f their player. In 
these circumstances, clubs sometimes force the player in question to decline a national selection 
with the argument that he is an employee under contract with the club, his regular employer. 
Nevertheless, recently, the situation has much improved in this respect, as serious efforts have 
been undertaken to come to a more or less uniform international calendar. Currently, all 
European teams play their international games more or less at the same time.
1260 Lenz AG in Bosman, par. 146.
1261 Bosman, par. 133.
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Also the second factor invoked by the Advocate General to rebut the argumentation o f the 
defendants in the proceedings, relating to the interest o f the clubs in the success o f the national 
team, has to be viewed somewhat in perspective. In principle, the national team is supposed to be 
the flagship of any given sport federation. Also for an athlete, a selection to represent one’s 
country is considered to be the highest possible honour. Titles won by the national team on the 
international scene indeed often send a wave o f enthusiasm through the country, attracting 
spectators to attend the matches o f  the national championship, inducing sponsors, advertisers and 
television broadcasters to invest in the sport, and appealing federations and clubs to continue and 
even intensify their efforts on the road to success. Clubs therefore undeniably do have a certain 
interest in ensuring that the national team remains or becomes competitive in international 
competitions. However, it should be taken into consideration that clubs are in the first p lace 
concerned about their own private interests. And these are not always concurrent with the  
interests of the national team. It is a general and recurring complaint of clubs that the matches o f  
the national teams, especially the friendly matches and the qualification games which a re  
normally played during the regular football season, overburden an already full playing calendar 
and demand too much of the international players, both mentally and physically. In the opinion o f  
the clubs, players returning tired or even injured from international obligations and subsequently 
underachieving in the next competition games are more the rule than the exception.1262 T o  
reconcile the interests of both the clubs and the national teams, plans have been tabled to revise 
the international calendar, entailing that international matches would only be played during the 
winter- and summer breaks of the national championships in January and June-July.
According to the Advocate General, the removal o f the nationality clauses would not lead to  a  
massive intake of foreign players, so that native players would no longer find the necessary space 
to play. It must be acknowledged though that in the aftermath of Bosnian, the number of foreign 
players in the national leagues has increased considerably. And it is a widespread criticism that 
the strong presence o f foreign players on certain key positions in the team has on occasions led 
to a shortage of national players who are able to occupy these positions in the national team, as 
they are barred at club level from playing in these roles. These assertions must be evaluated on 
their merits. It can indeed not be denied that there are more foreigners participating in the
1262 An extreme example was the injury incurred by G ub Brugge’s and Belgium’s goalkeeper Philippe Vandewalle 
during the friendly international Holland -  Belgium in ‘De Kuip’ in Rotterdam in the autumn of 1998, effectively 
ending his playing career.
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national championships than previously, but it would go too far to claim that they take up so
much place that native players do not find a team any more. Besides, m in e ra l ,  the coach o f the
rnational team makes his selection of 16-22 players for international matches out of a group of 
some 40-50 names. These are supposed to be the best players o f their country, and normally they 
do not encounter any particular problem finding a team that wants to engage them, either 
domestically or abroad. If there are only few native footballers playing in the national league, it 
must be either because they are simply not good enough in comparison with the players from 
other countries, or because they all go on to play abroad, where they may find more attractive 
playing circumstances. The suggestion that the increased participation of foreigners has resulted 
in an impoverishment of the qualities o f the native players holds no ground: if players are good 
enough, they will make it anyway in the professional football world, be it in their own country or 
abroad. So if the coach of the Belgian Red Devils or the German Mannschaft were to complain 
that they have difficulties finding a fast striker or a skilful playmaker, this is not because there are 
too many foreign strikers or playmakers playing in the Belgian Eerste Klasse or the German 
Bundesliga, but mainly because there are currently simply no good Belgian or German strikers or 
playmakers. Some generations o f players are simply better than others. Brazil had to wait for 24 
years between its third and fourth world title. That is just the law of nature. It is not every day 
that a new Maradona sees the light. This whole argument concerning the creation of a pool of 
players eligible to play for the national team  is of course closely related to the previous issue on 
the development o f young players. If clubs were to neglect their youth training programmes, this 
would inevitable have a negative impact also on the strength o f the national team sooner or later. 
Arguably, the measures proposed in that particular context are sufficient to ensure that clubs will 
continue to devote time and money and effort to the development of young footballers. The 
national team will be an indirect but important beneficiary of these efforts at club level.
This argument is probably the one that has been invoked most frequently by the proponents of 
the rules on foreign players. It must be admitted that it does have a certain appeal, as the health of 
the national team is an issue which is o f  interest to almost the entire nation. However, again, the 
Advocate General and the Court were probably right in concluding that the nationality clauses 
were not a necessary tool to guarantee that the national coach will have sufficient players out of 
whom to distil a strong representative eleven.
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3. Maintaining a competitive balance between clubs
t-
, t;
Finally, the KBVB, UEFA and the intervening governments claimed that the nationality 
clauses help to preserve a competitive balance between clubs by preventing the richest clubs from 
appropriating the services of the best players.1263 The Advocate General deemed the interest 
expressed to be a legitimate one, but he was nevertheless o f the opinion that there were 
alternative means o f reaching that objective without adversely affecting the right of freedom o f 
movement.1264 Moreover, he stressed that those rules were in any event only to a limited extent 
appropriate to ensure an equilibrium between clubs.1265 The Court essentially confirmed the 
advice of its Advocate General, ruling that even though it had been argued that the rules on 
foreign players prevent the richest clubs from  engaging the best players, those nationality clauses 
are not sufficient to achieve the aim of maintaining a competitive balance between clubs, “since 
there are no rules limiting the possibility for such clubs to recruit the best national players, thus 
undermining that balance to just the same extent.”1266
In the first place, it appears already questionable whether the nationality clauses constitute an 
appropriate means to effectively attain the objective of preserving a certain competitive 
equilibrium, which the Court recognised to be a legitimate one, earlier on in its decision in the 
context o f the contested transfer rules.1267 With or without these rules, the richest clubs always 
have the opportunity to assure themselves o f the services of the best and most expensive foreign 
players. In addition, they are also in a position to recruit the best domestic players, without being 
restricted in doing so by one or the other rule. Moreover, as Késenne pointed out, the removal o f 
the nationality clauses definitely entails a substantial advantage for the smaller clubs, as it has as 
its effect that the total amount of players available on the market increases. Previously, the rules 
o f the federations limiting the number o f foreigners to be engaged or fielded kept the offer of 
players at an artificially low level. The abolition of these clauses promotes competition between
1263 Bosman, par. 125.
1264 See for a more elaborate explanation, supra, chapter 4, §2, V, 5.
1263 Lenz AG in Bosman, at par. 147.
1266 Bosman, par. 135.
1267 Bosman, par. 106.
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players and should therefore lead to a reduction of the costs for recruiting them.1268 1269However,
conversely, it has also been advocated that the nationality clauses, by imposing a quantitative
h
limit on the dumber of foreign players which can be fielded during air official match, in some 
way prevent the big teams from unlimitedly pushing through their financial market bargaining 
power by buying all the best players and thus serve to preserve the competitive balance to a
1269certain extent at least.
It must be admitted that since the condemnation o f the contested nationality clauses in the 
Bosman decision, the gap between the big and the smaller clubs has substantially widened. This 
determination forces the question whether it is a mere fortuitous conjunction of circumstances or 
rather whether it is -  at least partially -  due to the abolition of the rules on foreign players. In the 
nineties, and especially in their second half, one can also witness an exponential growth of 
financial injections in football on behalf o f the industrial and commercial world. This had a lot to 
do with the more or less simultaneous definitive consecration of football as a television 
phenomenon, capable o f attracting high audience rates. As a result, the figures paid by television 
channels for the exclusive rights for the broadcasting o f football matches reached unprecedented 
heights. The explosion of revenue from advertising, sponsoring and the sale of television rights 
was especially to the benefit o f the big clubs playing in the highest divisions of the national 
leagues. Small clubs had to content themselves with some crumbs that fell off the table. These are 
the principal factors that explain the increasing gap between the big clubs and the smaller ones. 
However, it is also true that the removal o f the nationality clauses has led to an intensification of 
the international transfer activities. Money that was previously destined to circulate within the 
national leagues and constituted an important and often even indispensable means of income for 
many smaller clubs nowadays often disappears to clubs in other Member States, as clubs 
increasingly call upon the services of foreign players. Moreover, the exigencies o f attractive play 
and sporting success induce the clubs to recruit predominantly foreign players who have already 
acquired a certain status and experience and who therefore normally already play in the higher 
divisions of their national championship. In this way, the abolition o f the nationality clauses has
1268 Kdsenne, “L*affaire Bosman et l ’iconomie du sp o t professionnel par equipe”, 1 RMUE (1996) at 85.
1269 See Dubey, o.c., at 467-472.
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arguably probably contributed to a certain extent to the growing differences in wealth and thus
also in sporting competitiveness between the bigger and the smaller clubs.
1 1:
However that may be, even if it were accepted that rules on foreign players could be helpful 
to preserve a certain competitive balance between clubs, it remains very much to be ascertained 
whether these rules are also necessary to  attain this preconceived aim. Basically, if it were 
feasible to elaborate a set of measures with which this objective can effectively be reached, and 
which are moreover less restrictive from the point o f view o f Community free movement law 
than the nationality clauses, then preference has to be given to these alternative rules. Advocate 
General Lenz proposed in his opinion a system of collective wage agreements and especially a 
mechanism o f redistribution o f a certain amount o f income between the clubs as viable 
alternatives which do not raise problems relating to freedom of movement.1270 Both measures 
have been discussed in detail in the previous part.1271 In this context, may it therefore suffice to 
make the following short observations: presumably, a system o f so-called ‘salary caps’, fixing a 
maximum amount of money which can be dedicate to players’ salaries, could be envisaged if it 
were agreed upon by all parties in the football industry. However, it is still not crystal clear 
whether it would be compatible with the Community competition rules. Consequently, most 
attention has been devoted to the other solution, based on the idea o f  solidarity between the clubs, 
and simply consisting of a redistribution o f  resources, originating mainly from gate receipts, 
sponsoring and advertising contracts, and the sales of broadcasting rights. In theory, this appears 
as the ideal solution, which creates no problems with regard to compliance with Community law. 
The bottleneck is whether this proposal o f pooling and redistribution o f income is sufficiently far- 
reaching to guarantee that a certain competitive balance between clubs is safeguarded. In 
practice, even though there is undoubtedly a mutual interdependence between clubs, the 
solidarity between them is not all-encompassing, but strictly limited to a certain level: on the one 
hand, clubs are very well aware of the fact that they need competitors to be successful 
themselves, and therefore the bigger clubs are found willing to contribute to preserve a certain 
uncertainty of results, which is essential for the appeal o f the entire game, but on the other hand, 
they are not prepared to go as far in their solidarity with smaller clubs so as to risk their hard-
1270 Lenz AG in Bosman, at paras. 226-234.
1271 See supra, chapters 4 and 5 on transfers, in particular chapter 4, §2, V, 5 and chapter 5, §2,2,2.3.2.
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fought position in the football hierarchy. Manchester United, Arsenal and Liverpool will not 
object to financially supporting the likes o f  Sunderland and Southampton, and they will probably 
greet the occasional upsets created by these clubs against their main rivals for the English 
Premiership title or the FA Cup with enthusiasm, as long as these clubs do not become another 
real contender to be seriously taken into consideration. Therefore, the solidarity to which clubs 
are willing to proceed seems to run the risk o f being less substantial than what is needed to  ensure 
a given competitive balance between them.
If this were effectively to be the case in practice, and moreover if it turned out to be 
impossible to attain the objective o f a competitive equilibrium in an alternative way which is 
compatible with the requirements of Community law, one might, but only in last instance, 
potentially consider to combine such a system of redistribution o f  resources with adapted rules on 
foreign players to protect the pursued objective.1272 Basically, however, in order to be possibly 
considered for legitimisation under Community law, these rules would have to be stripped of 
their restrictive character as much as possible. Concretely, this would entail that any limitations 
imposed could only possibly concern the practical use o f  the foreign players during official club 
matches, and not their recruitment. Furthermore, as they boil down to a restriction of the 
fundamental freedom of movement of workers, these limitations would have to be construed 
narrowly. Practically, that is to say that it should be possible to have at least five or six foreign 
EU/EEA nationals participating to a game. One might even try to go further and accept that it 
should be possible to have always at least five or six o f these foreigners on the pitch, allowing 
thus for one foreigner to be substituted by another. Against this, it could probably be argued that 
such diluted nationality clauses are denatured o f any practical sense, as only rich teams can 
financially afford to engage more foreign players than they can contemporaneously field during a 
game, so that it adds nothing really to  the search for a competitive balance. This counter­
argument definitely has a certain appeal. However, in the current period o f recession which 
strikes the football constellation, and in which all clubs, the rare exception apart, are constrained
1272 See also Dubey, o.c., at 466-492. However, he effectively seems to consider re-introducing nationality clauses as 
a viable possibility to reach the objectives pursued, whereas I merely mention the theoretical possibility of very 
much watered down nationality limitations as an ‘ultimum remedium*. In fact, I believe that rules based on 
nationality discrimination are doomed. See also Gardiner & Welch, “’Show Me the Money*: Regulation of the 
Migration of Professional Sportsmen in Post-Bosman Europe”, in Caiger & Gardiner (eds.), Professional Sport in the 
EU: Regulation and Re-regulation (The International Sports Law Centre, TMC Asser Press, 2000) 107.
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to cut their coat according to their cloth, very few clubs can permit not to make maximal use o f 
their available player potential, so it is submitted that similar nationality clauses, in their 
proposed dilated form, might nevertheless provoke the desired effecf. Besides, under these 
circumstances there is an additional psychological element which comes into the equation and 
which must not be underestimated, namely the fact that most, if not all, football players do not 
like the concept o f ‘turn-over’ and simply detest spending time on the substitute’s bench. 
Therefore, the nationality clauses may very well have as a practical consequence that foreign 
players prefer one club over another for the simple reason that they consider the contingent o f  
foreigners in the latter one as too large, which potentially diminishes their playing opportunities.
Conclusion
Rules relating to the nationality o f  athletes normally take two different forms. Firstly, 
some nationality clauses completely deny athletes the right to be part of a certain team or to  
participate in a certain competition simply on the basis o f their nationality. In practice, this kind 
o f provisions is nowadays predominantly used in the context of national sports teams. On several 
occasions, the Court o f Justice has accepted the practice of excluding players with a foreign 
nationality from matches which are o f purely sporting interest, such as matches between national 
teams, as a restriction to the scope of the principle o f non-discrimination on grounds o f  
nationality. This particular stance o f the Court is clearly inspired by common sense. However, the 
Court should clarify the precise legal basis for this privileged treatment to this kind o f nationality 
restrictions and cut the knot as to whether it constitutes a limited exception as to the scope o f  
Community law or rather an overriding requirement in the general interest capable o f justifying 
rules which constitute an obstacle to Articles 39 or 49 EC. Furthermore, the Court’s readiness to 
accept the specificity o f  sport in this context is limited. Presumably, this restriction on the scope 
o f Community law should remain exclusively reserved to match between national teams. 
Moreover, it is submitted that athletes with a  dual nationality and naturalised sportsmen should 
not be prevented from representing the national team of the country of which they possess legal 
nationality, even if they have previously already defended the colours of the national team of 
another country.
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Secondly, other nationality clauses take the form of quantitative restrictions on the 
possibility for players to be recruited and/or fielded by clubs during an'official contest or to \x  
selected by sporting federations to take part in competitions. In Bosnian, the Court of Justice 
ruled that Article 39 EC precludes the application of the contested rules on foreign players, 
because they constitute an obstacle to the freedom of movement for workers. As such, this 
judgement is no doubt correct. Conceptually, it is somewhat regrettable though that the Court 
opted to couch its decision in terms of ‘restrictions’, whereas arguably it would have been legally 
more accurate to refer to the notions of direct and indirect discrimination. In addition, this w ould 
have allowed to affirm with more certainty perhaps that nowadays also directly discriminatory' 
measures may be justified under the doctrine of the imperative requirements in the public interest. 
Just as was the case in the context of the contested transfer rules, the Court failed to be impressed 
by the various arguments invoked to justify the nationality clauses. Arguably, the Court was 
again right in holding that the submissions with regard to the maintenance of the traditional link 
between each club and its country, the creation of a sufficient pool of players for the national 
team and the preservation of a competitive balance between clubs were not such as to safeguard 
the nationality clauses under the objective justification doctrine. This time, the Court’s 
condemnation of the rules on foreign players as a violation of Article 39 EC appears to be 
however more outspoken, leaving no longer room for the sporting associations to treat domestic 
athletes more favourable than foreign sportsmen with EU nationality. In all likelihood, this strict 
approach is preferable, in the light of the discriminatory nature of the nationality restrictions.
Finally, it is also interesting to observe that in the Court’s decision in Bosman to declare 
the request for a preliminary ruling admissible with regard to the lawfulness of the rules on 
foreign players, clearly factors other than simply legal factors played an important role as welL 
Also opportunistic considerations pushed the Court to accept jurisdiction in this respect. Precisely 
because the sporting authorities so strongly hold on to their regulatory autonomy, the Court does 
not frequently get the chance to express a judgement on sporting issues. Therefore, it does not 
have to surprise that when an opportunity presents itself, the Court grabs it with both hands.
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Conclusion
sr
-<<If  the m ountain does not come to M oham m ed, 
M ohamm ed m ust go to the  m ountain” -
In the early days, the task of the authorities o f a given sporting discipline consisted almost 
exclusively of ‘governance’: they had to create the regulatory setting within which the sporting 
performances were to be delivered and were responsible for the organisation of sporting events 
and competitions. Gradually however, as television broadcasters, sponsors and advertisers 
discovered the commercial potential o f  sport, a lot of sporting associations extended their 
activities to the commercial plane. The influx of money in the world of sport also resulted in the 
fact that many sportsmen could engage in sport on a professional basis. Inevitably, some o f the 
activities o f the federations started attracting the attention o f the law enforcement authorities, 
both at national and at supranational level. The sporting bodies firmly clung to their self- 
proclaimed autonomy, ‘for the good o f the game’, claiming that they were perfectly capable o f  
taking care of their own affairs. In spite o f their vigorous opposition against legal interference 
from outside into their business, soon it became evident that they were fighting a lost cause. In 
the case o f Walrave, the European Court of Justice set the standard, ruling that sport is part o f  
Community law, at least insofar as it constitutes an economic activity within the meaning o f  
Article 2 EC. The Court would not depart from this principled statement any more. It constituted 
the new reality the sporting world had to cope with for the years to come. The assumption that 
they were completely immune from intervention or control from the ‘ordinary* courts and 
tribunals had proved to be deceptive.
At first sight, it may somewhat appear surprising that the Court has subjected sport to 
Community law, given the conspicuous lack of direct legislative power of the Community in the 
domain o f sport. However, this démarche of the Court becomes understandable in the light of the 
broad impact of general Treaty objectives such as those concerning the internal market. 
Evidently, the tentacles o f the Community law reach further than one might deduce from a simple 
formal reading o f the Treaty. Precisely because the sports federations vigorously seek to assert
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their freedom of association, it is considered of the utmost importance to demarcate clearly the 
limits of Community intrusion in the sphere of sport. This proves to be all but a straightforward 
exercise. Theoretically, it seems possible to distinguish between two or three sets of rules or 
practices. Be that as it may, in practice it is not always easy to discern whether a given rule 
belongs to one or the other category. Firstly, there are the sports rules sensu strictu, which 
intrinsically have a non-economic character. They belong to the discretionary power of the public 
authorities o f the Member States and the sporting associations and remain outside the scope of 
Community law. The ‘rules of the game’ constitute the most obvious example within this 
category. To mention but some examples, it is the sole responsibility of the International Tennis 
Federation to stipulate that there is to be no tie-break in the fifth set of Grand Slam tournaments. 
Only the rugby federations can provide that a match lasts 80 minutes. And if 100.000 people in 
Aztec stadium in Mexico and billions o f people all over the world see Argentina's Maradona, *el 
Pibe de O ro \ score with ‘the Hand of God' against England during FIFA's 1986 World Cup and 
the referee is the only person who fails to notice and awards the goal, there is nothing ‘the law' 
can do about this afterwards; the arbiter has full authority in these matters. Secondly, there are the 
sports rules sensu laio, which have a certain economic dimension and therefore come in principle 
within the ambit o f Community law. Within this category, one can further differentiate between 
regulations that actually violate the Treaty provisions and must thus be abolished and measures 
that can be justified. An illustration of the former rules is the Commission's condemnation of 
agreements involving the exclusive distribution of tennis balls which in practice made parallel 
import impossible and led to a foreclosure o f the market.1274 The latter set of rules are the most 
intriguing from the perspective of the relation between sport and EC law. In this context, the 
imperatives of the Treaty principles must be weighed against the claim for autonomy of the 
governing sporting bodies under the cloak of the freedom o f association and the arguments 
concerning the special status of sport. It has been one of the principal objectives of this thesis to 
evaluate whether the Community institutions manage somehow to find an appropriate 
equilibrium in this respect. The issue has been approached from the free movement angle, as the 1273
1273 See, inter alia, European Commission, "The Helsinki report on sport” ; or European Commission, "The 
application of EC competition rules to sport”, 5 June 2002. Consult http://euroDe.eu.int/comm/soort. For specific 
comments, see, in particular, Weatherill, “The Helsinki Report on Sport”, 25 ELRev. (2000) 282; Dubey, La litre 
circulation des sportifs en Europe (Bruylant, 2000), at 82-87.
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regulation o f the mobility of sportsmen within the European Union has constituted the core of 
this research.
; l:
It has been demonstrated that the sporting performances of athletes can perfectly be 
considered as ‘genuine and effective, and not merely marginal or ancillary activities’ which are 
carried out in return for remuneration. A  priori, there is thus nothing to preclude the 
categorisation o f sportsmen as workers or service providers for the purposes of the application of 
Articles 39 and 49 EC. Furthermore, the Court of Justice has generally interpreted these free 
movement provisions in a broad way. ‘Citius, altius, fortius’! This large conception of the 
principle o f freedom of movement can easily be deduced from several aspects o f the C ourt’s 
relevant case law. Firstly, the Court of Justice has given a generous reading to the concept o f 
‘economic activity*, which has allowed many EU athletes to pass the crucial threshold for being 
entitled to exercise free movement rights under Articles 39 and 49 EC. These athletes possess the 
full gamut of free movement rights. In addition, the free movement protection has to a certain 
extent been extended to other athletes. Amateur sportsmen, who exercise sport in a non-economic 
way, and who may therefore not directly invoke Articles 39 and 49 EC, may nonetheless rely 
upon Community concepts such as ‘corollary free movement rights’, and, especially, ‘citizenship 
o f the European Union’, and upon some provisions o f Regulation 1612/68 to claim a lim ited 
version o f free movement protection under Community law. Moreover, also certain categories o f 
third-country nationals nowadays benefit from a certain degree of free movement rights. 
International agreements concluded by the Community with non Member State countries, 
generally constitute the largest source o f free movement rights to third-country nationals. Third- 
country national spouses or dependent family members of Community workers may derive some 
rights from Regulation 1612/68. And it is even entirely conceivable that third-country nationals 
could successfully invoke the Community competition rules to object against the application o f 
rules which somehow function as a barrier when they wish to migrate. Consequently, a large 
number o f sportsmen have actually been conferred some form of free movement protection by 
the Community institutions. Secondly, as a result o f the Court’s decision to attribute horizontal 
direct effect to Article 39 EC, Community free movement law nowadays appears to be able to 1274
1274 Commission Decision 92/261 Newitt/Dunlop Slazenger International e.a. OJ 1992 LI 31/32. See also Case T- 
43/92 Dunlop Slazenger v Commission ECR [1994] 0-441. For more information, consult Temmink, “Sport en 
Europees recht’\  45 ArsAequi (1996) 235.
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intervene deeply within the realm o f private relations. It follows from the Court’s judgement in 
Angonese that the principle of free movement of workers may be rejied upon, not only in a 
dispute involving a sporting association regarding measures which regulate gainful employment 
or the provision o f services in a collective way, but also in a conflict involving only purely 
private parties, for example a player and his club of affiliation, concerning contractual terms. 
Admittedly, some issues must still be decisively tackled in this respect. For the time being, it is 
still undecided whether this principle o f full horizontal direct effect o f Article 39 EC is limited to 
discriminatory measures or can also be extended to genuinely non-discriminatory measures. 
Moreover, it is not certain that the Court will go equally far with regard to Articles 43 and 49 EC. 
Somehow, it seems to be in the line o f expectations that the Court will adopt a broad stance in 
both respects. Thirdly, it has been indicated that the traditional requirement of a cross-frontier 
element has come under serious doctrinal strain and that the Court recently might been showing 
signs of a possible more flexible or lenient approach to the matter, which could result in the 
application o f Community law to situations which previously would have been earmarked as 
belonging to the exclusive preserve of Member States’ competence. Without wanting to engage 
in the substantive debate on the issue, this possible development definitely seems to fit squarely 
within a wide conception of the internal market. Lastly, but certainly not least, the evolution in 
the case law o f the Court from a pure discrimination-based analysis to a broader approach centred 
around the concept of restriction, which has also brought genuinely non-discriminatory measures 
under free movement scrutiny, has considerably widened the material scope o f application o f the 
free movement provisions. This development has been completed in principle, but the contours of 
the concept o f restriction must still be fine tuned in future case law. In particular, the Court is 
requested to furnish some more guidance on the delimiting factor o f market access.
Summarising, the personal scope of application of the Community free movement 
provisions has been widely conceived by the Court. Moreover, also with regard to the material 
scope of application, it can safely be stated that, mainly under influence of the Court of Justice, 
many discriminatory as well as indistinctly applicable measures, not only from public authorities 
but also from private actors, nowadays are susceptible to be tested upon their compatibility with 
free movement law. Concretely, this state-of-affairs boils down to a strong recognition o f the free 
movement rights o f Community workers and service providers. The sports sector does not escape
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from this general conclusion. In practice, this signifies that through the relevant case law of the 
Court, the Community has gradually but certainly, deepened and extended its grip on the world ofc
sport. * **:
In sporting circles, the harsh criticism is regularly voiced that the Court has actually over- 
accentuated the importance of the migration rights of the individual athletes and has effectuated 
or allowed on this ground too many and too intrusive judicial inroads on the self-proclaimed 
spheres of autonomous competence of the sporting bodies, thereby infringing their freedom of 
association and failing to take sufficient account of the specific needs of sport. This submission 
has been evaluated upon its merits on the basis o f some concrete examples. After close 
investigation, it must be rejected as unfounded. On the contrary, it is advocated that the 
Community institutions have at times shown probably too much respect for the autonomy of the 
sporting authorities and have overrated the special status of sport, both from a factual as from a 
legal point of view. This has led to  the unsatisfactory situation that the free movement rights o f 
the Community sportsmen are sometimes still unduly restricted. Sport may very well possess 
certain special features, but arguably, the special treatment legitimately accorded to sport under 
Community law should not go to the detriment o f the rights o f  the sportsmen, or at least have 
only a minimal and proportionate impact. Presumably, currently the balance is still being tilted 
too much into the direction of the association’s interests. As Advocate General Lenz correctly 
observed in his opinion in the Bosman case, only interests o f  the federations which are o f 
“paramount importance” could justify a restriction on the rights to freedom of movement of the 
athletes.
These conclusions are drawn from the different encounters o f the Community institutions 
with the sporting authorities studied in previous parts o f the thesis. Firstly, from the earliest cases, 
the Court has accepted the practice of excluding players with a  foreign nationality from matches 
which are of purely sporting interest, such as matches between national teams, as a restriction to 
the scope of the principle of non-discrimination on grounds o f nationality. So far, this first 
recognition of the special status o f sport has not met with real substantive criticism.1275 Simple
1275 Alternatively, however, it could be suggested that players who have been legally resident in a country for a 
number of years, should be entitled to represent the national team of their country of residence in the sporting
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common sense seems to have dictated the Court’s position in this respect. The Court has only 
been urged to clarify the precise legal basis for this restriction on the scope of Community law 
and cut the teiot as to whether it constitutes a limited exception as to thfe scope of the Treaty or 
rather an overriding requirement in the general interest capable of justifying rules which as such 
constitute an obstacle to Articles 39 or 49 EC. For the reasons outlined above, the latter option is 
to be preferred. However, the Court’s readiness to accept the specificity of sport in this context 
should be limited. The privileged treatment should remain exclusively reserved to match between 
national teams. Moreover, athletes with a dual nationality and naturalised sportsmen should not 
be prevented from representing the national team of the country of which they possess the legal 
nationality, even if they have previously already defended the colours of the national team of 
another country. Possible waiting periods should not be of an excessive duration.
Secondly, in Bosman, the Court acknowledged that both the need to maintain a certain 
competitive and financial balance between clubs and the need to preserve the search for talent 
and the training and education o f young football players could be considered as imperative 
requirements in the public interest to justify the contested transfer system, clearly offering sport 
clubs and federations to a certain extent shelter from purely market-based solutions within the 
framework o f the Treaty. The former aim is indeed sports-specific and must be accepted. 
Contrary to other ‘normal’ or ‘ordinary’ commercial undertakings, which strive to compete their 
direct rivals out of the market, sports teams are mutually interdependent, they need each other to 
be successful. Presumably this is the most distinctive feature of sport. The outcome of a particular 
sporting event must be surrounded with a certain degree of uncertainty. If the final result were to 
be a foregone conclusion, spectators, television broadcasters, sponsors and advertisers would lose 
interest in the sports product, the competition, which would inevitably email negative financial 
repercussions. Sports clubs must therefore cautiously maintain a certain competitive and financial 
equilibrium. Some form of ‘internal solidarity* is therefore acceptable. Whereas this objective is 
unobjectionable, the same however cannot unequivocally be said about the latter objective. 
Supposedly, the need to ensure the recruitment and training of young players is not sufficiently 
distinctive to sport so as to objectively justify regulatory barriers to freedom of movement.
discipline in which they are active, even if they do not possess the legal nationality of this country. This may seem a 
far-reaching proposal, but originally, the FIFA regulations were drafted in this way.
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Arguably, this aim is pursued in all sectors of the industry and it is not readily evident why sport 
should be accorded special treatment in this respect. In any event, the sporting federations have 
failed to adduce any useful evidence which might prove the contrary. wIt is submitted that the 
Court in this respect may thus have overestimated the specific needs of sport. In practice, this 
exaggerated openness to the sporting cause yielded no immediate consequences, as the Court 
subsequently correctly regarded the contested transfer rules as an inadequate and not 
indispensable instrument to achieve both aims pursued and ruled that they infringed the principle 
o f proportionality. However, this objective has been significantly relied upon during the transfer 
reform discussions between the Commission and FIFA. The comprehension and respect of the 
Court for the autonomy of the sporting federations clearly appears also from several other aspects 
o f the judgement in Bosnian. Ultimately, the Court wisely left it up to the sports authorities to 
elaborate possible alternatives for the condemned transfer system. It also conspicuously refrained 
from tackling the issue of the viability o f the contested transfer system under the Treaty 
competition rules. A  decision in terms o f Article 39 EC left several concrete issues unresolved. 
This way o f settling the dispute had the tactical advantage o f giving the sports authorities the 
opportunity to autonomously make some changes or modifications to a number o f questionable 
rules or practices. The Court even carefully considered various arguments invoked by the 
associations to safeguard the contested nationality clauses, such as the maintenance of the 
traditional link between each club and its country or the creation o f a sufficient pool of players 
for the national team, albeit that it finally rightly rejected the possibility that they could serve to  
justify these nationality clauses anyhow.
Thirdly, during the transfer reform negotiations which ensued from the statement o f 
objections sent by the European Commission to FIFA, the same pattern as had been witnessed 
already in Bosman repeated itself once again: the Community institution involved, in casu the 
Commission, was clearly willing to make an exception to the straightforward application o f the 
predominantly economically inspired Community free movement rules in view of the particular 
characteristics of sport, albeit strictly within the confines of the Treaty framework, and consented 
to practices, in spite o f their intrinsically restrictive character, for the sake of sport. Just as the 
Court did in Bosman, the Commission also arguably showed too much deference to the sporting 
authorities and gave the green light to a number of rules which probably would not withstand the
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test of proportionality if the matter were to be brought before the Court of Justice.1276 As a result, 
the rights to freedom of movement of the sportsmen concerned are unduly hindered by these 
collectively enforced regulations. In the first place, the Commission Accepted a complex and 
moreover restrictive system of compensation for training in the event of an international move 
between clubs of a young player, on the basis of the allegedly wrong assumption that the need to 
ensure the training o f young players constitutes a imperative requirement in the general interest. 
Instead, it is submitted that the Commission should have favoured less restrictive or non- 
restrictive alternatives to the FIFA rules, such as for example a system based on a redistribution 
of resources out of a central fund, possibly coupled or increased with a solidarity contribution 
consisting of a percentage of the fees paid in the event o f later transfers between clubs. Secondly, 
also with regard to the issue of contractual stability, the Commission has given too much weight 
to the interests o f the clubs and the associations. The argument that contractual stability is 
necessary to ensure team building, identification of the public with the team and employment 
security cannot be construed in such a way as to justify the restrictions to free movement as laid 
down in the new FIFA rules, limiting the possibility for players to unilaterally terminate their 
contracts during the first two or three years, - depending on the vague concepts o f just cause and 
sporting just cause - and providing for sports sanctions under certain circumstances to be inflicted 
on top of the compensation due for the breach o f contract. Contractual stability should 
presumably be limited to one year or one sports season. This seems to be in accordance with the 
need to guarantee the regularity of sporting competitions, which has been earmarked by the Court 
in Lehtonen as a legitimate objective in the general interest. Thirdly, with the same objective in 
mind, the possibility to effectuate transfers only within certain prescribed periods -  ‘transfer 
windows’ -  seems to be acceptable, but the additional rule prohibiting more than one move per 
player per season again seems to be too restrictive. A more flexible rule preventing players to 
play for different teams in the same competition during the same season seems sufficient to meet 
the objectives pursued.
1276 As already indicated above in chapter 5 ,1 reach this conclusion on the basis of the Court’s decision in Bosman, 
which clearly constitutes a strong assertion of the free movement rights of the sportsmen. Moreover, I would 
completely concur with such an outcome, in the sense that I do believe the Court should strike down those revised 
transfer rules which still unduly restrict the players’ mobility rights. The effect of the privileges accorded to sport 
under Community law on the basis of its special features on the individual rights of the athletes should be as minimal 
as possible.
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Which supplementary lessons can be drawn from these cases? When dealing with sports 
matters concerning the migration o f sportsmen within the EU, the European Court of Justice has 
consistently adopted the same rigorous approach: in the first place, the judges evaluate whether 
the sporting activity in question has an economic character so as to bring it under the scope o f 
application of Community law. Subsequently, it examines whether the contested sports rules or 
practices constitute a violation o f  the relevant Treaty free movement provisions. Finally, the 
Court considers whether in se restrictive measures can nevertheless be justified. In practice, the 
justification exercise involves a delicate balancing o f the interests of the athletes concerned, who 
wish to see their free movement rights protected, with the interests of the sports federations and 
clubs, which strive for the recognition o f  the specificity o f  the sporting practice. The Court’s 
search for a solution within the Community framework which takes into account the claims of the 
sporting authorities and at the same tim e complies with the exigencies of Community law is 
effectuated on a case-by-case basis, and is thus highly influenced by the specific circumstances o f  
each case. In its own dealings with sporting affairs, the European Commission has proceeded 
largely along the same track under the heading of the Community competition rules.1277 Almost 
inevitably, the outcome of these legal interventions into the sphere o f sport has not always turned 
out to be entirely satisfying. Basically, the Community institutions have at times been too  
generous towards the governing bodies o f sport. In the light o f  the concrete circumstances, this is 
not really surprising. In the current formal Treaty context, no official mention is made of sport. 
This entails that the Community institutions do not have specific competence in sporting matters. 
To intervene in those affairs, they have to fall back on their general competence with regard to  
freedom of movement or competition. This may explain why the Court and the Commission are 
occasionally somewhat reluctant to adopt a hard line with regard to the sporting associations. 
Also, the fierceness with which the associations continue to  resist legal interventions into w hat 
they consider to be their prerogatives is a  factor which should arguably not be underestimated. 
The sporting authorities are powerful entities which are able to generate a lot of - political - 
pressure in order to obtain what they want. The Commission in particular may be susceptible to 
this power play. It is therefore not unlikely that considerations other than purely legal issues have 
been influential in certain decisions. Besides, the simple perspective of facing long and expensive
1277 For a recent overview, see Weatherill, “Fair play please: Recent developments in the application of EC law to 
sport”, 40 CMLRev. (2003)51.
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proceedings against a powerful opponent such as the sporting organisations often suffices to 
discourage athletes from lodging a complaint before the ordinary tribunals. In many aspects sport
c
remains a world apart, in which the governing bodies try to rule with ¿1 iron hand. Relatively 
speaking, the Community institutions do not get many opportunities to set things straight from a 
Community law perspective. It is therefore maybe understandable that when the opportunity 
finally presents itself, the Community institutions -  again, especially the Commission - 
endeavour to avoid an open conflict, and try sometimes too hard to elaborate an outcome which 
satisfies everybody, which means that the interests o f the stronger party may slightly get the 
upper hand. Prudence is after all, still the mother of the china-cabinet.
All in all however, it must be acknowledged that the record of the Community institutions 
in dealing with the regulations on the free movement o f sportsmen within the European Union is 
acceptable. It could be better, but it could certainly also have been worse. Therefore, the final 
issue to be shortly addressed is how the current situation could possibly be improved?1278 In the 
first place, the prospect of effectively granting the sporting associations the outright exemption 
from the application o f the Community rules they have constantly been looking for could be 
considered.1279 1280This way, they would be able to settle all their affairs internally. And the 
Community institutions would no longer be saddled with difficult, long and costly disputes and 
proceedings relating to sport. However, it is highly questionable whether such a solution would 
actually turn out to be an improvement for all parties concerned, Le. the clubs, the athletes and 
the associations. Moreover, for such an exemption to be formalised in a Treaty amendment or a 
Protocol attached to the Treaty, the Treaty would need to be revised, and for such a procedure the 
unanimous approval o f all Member States is required. It is extremely improbable that such a 
consensus will ever be found.1281 Besides, the sporting world has failed to come up with 
convincing arguments which would justify such a drastic step being taken.1282 In all likelihood
1278 See also the recent observations of Weather ill on the wider terrain of of a policy on sport: Weatherill, ‘“’Fair Play 
Please": Recent Developments in the Application of EC Law to Sport”, o.c., at 86-93.
1279 Foster, “Can Sport Be Regulated by Europe?: An Analysis of Alternative Models”, in Caiger & Gardiner (eds.), 
Professional S p a t in the EU: Regulation and Re-regulation (The International Spots Law Centre, TMC Asser Press, 
2000)43.
1280 Fernández Salas, “De la possibilité de renverser l ’arrêt ‘Bosman’ par une modification du Traité. Perspectives 
juridiques”, 1 RMUE (1996) 155.
1281 See also Van Nuffel, “Case law. Bosman”, C ol JEL (1996), 345.
1282 Weatherill, “Do sporting associations make law or are they merely subject to it?”, Journal o f the Society fo r  
Advanced Legel Studies 13 (January 1999) 24.
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therefore, this hypothetical opportunity will remain a purely theoretical dream scenario for the 
sporting federations. In view o f  the observation that the current approach of the Community 
institutions With regard to sporting issues already produces relatively^acceptable results, it is 
submitted that a small modification within the formal Treaty structure should suffice to arrive at a 
more relaxed relationship between Community law and the world o f sport. Firstly and 
importantly, however, there must be a  change in the mindset of the Community institutions 
concerning sport. A t the European Union Conference on Sport in Olympia in 1999, for example, 
it was concluded that “sport must be able to assimilate the new commercial framework in which 
it must develop, without at the same time losing its identity and autonomy, which underpin the 
functions it performs in the social, cultural, health and educational areas,”1283 Similarly, the 
Helsinki report on sport of the Commission still gives pointers “to reconcile the economic 
dimension of sport with its popular, educational, social and cultural dimensions.”1284 More 
recently, in the Nice Declaration on sport, the European Council generally stipulated that “the 
Community must [...] take account o f the social, educational and cultural functions inherent in 
sport and making it special, in order that the code o f ethics and the solidarity essential to the 
preservation of its social role may be respected and nurtured.”1285 Clearly, the Community 
institutions still treat sport in a generic way. However, sport is a societal phenomenon which 
covers different realities.1286 It is submitted that currently it is no longer possible to deal w ith 
sport under all circumstances in a one-dimensional or uniform way. In many respects, 
professional and amateur sport belong to completely different worlds. Nowadays many sports 
teams operate as commercial undertakings and should be treated accordingly. The traditional 
values which do indeed undoubtedly characterise non-economic sporting practices are no longer 
always present in professional sport and are in any event subordinate to commercial motives. 
This means that these sports teams should be subject to EC trade law just like any other 
commercial undertaking. To the extent that the practice of sport possesses special features, such 
as in particular the mutual interdependence o f sports teams, they may still be offered shelter from
1283 European Commission, First European Union Conference on Sport, ‘Assises’, Olympia, May 1999 (For the 
conclusions, consult http://eurooe.eu.int/comm/sport>
1284 European Commission, “The Helsinki Report on sport”, consult http://europe.eu.int/comin/spoTt
1285 European Council, Declaration on the specific characteristics of sport and its social function in Europe, of which 
account should be taken in implementing Community place, attached to the Treaty of Nice, consult 
http://europe.eu.mt/comm/sport
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pure market-based solutions, but their privileged treatment should not go further than is strictly 
necessary. Arguably, the Community free movement rules, with the express Treaty exceptions 
and the judicially created objective justification doctrine, and especially the competition rules, 
with the possibility o f individual and block exemptions under Article 81(3) EC, are construed or 
interpreted sufficiently flexibly so as to ensure respect for the special status of sport. These 
Treaty provisions should continue constituting the regulatory framework against which the 
lawfulness of sporting rules and practices is tested. In addition, in order to guarantee for the 
future a truly adequate consideration o f the respective interests at stake in a dispute between a 
sportsman and a club or association, a formal, albeit moderate inclusion of sport within the EC 
Treaty is favoured.
Concretely, this inclusion would take the form of inserting the term ‘sport* in the 
provisions of Article 151 EC relating to culture. Article 151 EC would then be entitled ‘Culture 
and Sport*. It is suggested to put sport on the same footing as culture with regard to the first four 
paragraphs o f the Article; only with regard to the last paragraph a small alteration may be 
considered.1286 287 This subtle modification o f the Treaty is suggested for the following reasons: in 
the first place, it would have the considerable advantage of creating clarity on the so-called ‘legal 
environment o f sport*. Presumably, the lack of an explicit reference to sport in the Treaty and the 
ensuing uncertainty concerning the precise role to play for the Community with regard to sport 
are factors which have significantly contributed to the fact that the Community institutions have 
sometimes shown too much respect for the self-proclaimed autonomy of the sporting authorities 
and have overrated the specificity o f sport, to the detriment o f the free movement rights of the 
individual sportsman. The express introduction of sport within the Treaty should allow for this 
imbalance to be rectified. Arguably, this inclusion has thus partially a symbolic character, in the 
sense that it would officially ‘legitimate’ the Community interventions in sporting affairs insofar
1286 Parrish, “Reconciling Conflicting Approaches to Sport in the European Union”, in Caiger & Gardiner (eds.), 
Professional Sport in the EU: Regulation and Re-regulation (The International S p ats  Law Centre, TMC Asser Press, 
2000), 21
1287 Article 151(5) EC provides that “in order to contribute to the achievement of the objectives referred to in this 
Article, the Council shall [...] adopt incentive measures, excluding any harmonisation o f the laws and regulations o f 
the Member States." (emphasis added) It is advocated that this last limitation should not apply to sport. Arguably, if 
the representatives of clubs and players so desire, they should be able to conclude collective labour agreements at 
Community level which in effect constitute a harmonisation of national laws. This possibility could f a  example be 
envisaged in the context of a unilateral breach of contract (so as to avoid discrepancies between the different national 
labour and contract laws).
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as they have an economic dimension. Substantially, it does not go much further than that, the 
sporting associations do not have to fear that their regulatory competencies in the field of sport 
have been enfcroached upon. Admittedly, the putting o f sport on a par with culture in Article 151 
EC would inevitably mean that the Community is attributed for the first time expressly within the 
Treaty some competence with regard to sport. However, it is advocated that the sporting world 
will not object to this particular proposal. In any case, it would only boil down to a mere 
recognition o f the role the Community had already assumed in practice on the basis of the links 
of sport with other Community policies. Furthermore, importantly, the terms of Article 151 EC 
clearly indicate that the competence in this context rests primarily with the Member States and 
the sporting federations and that the Community only has a role o f secondary importance to play. 
Consequently, the mentioning o f sport in this precise context of Article 151 EC would have the 
additional advantage o f demarcating the role of the Community in the domain of sport. For these 
combined reasons, the insertion of ‘sport’ in an existing Treaty Article is to be preferred over 
political declarations on sport, which may be attached to the Treaty but do not have any concrete 
legal value.1288 In recent discussions within the framework of the European Convention, this 
possibility of including sport within the context of the other Community policies has effectively 
been considered.1289
Summarising, if sport were expressly referred to among the Community policies within 
the Treaty, this small Treaty revision might very well constitute the decisive impetus for the 
Community institutions to firmly subject sport in its economic dimensions to the EC trade law 
rules and to reduce the privileged treatment linked with the special status of sport accorded to 
these sporting activities to more appropriate proportions. By the same token, it would clearly 
indicate the hierarchy of power within the world of sport: in principle, the competence lies with 
the Member States and the sporting associations, the Community can only support and
1288 The creation of a separate Treaty Article on sport could equally be envisaged already at this stage, but such a step 
does not seem necessary few the purposes of this research. If however, one were to agree to attribute the Community 
more competence within the field of sport, it could effectively be appropriate to deal with sport under a separate 
Treaty heading.
1289 European Convention, “Contribution aux travaux de la Convention européenne sur la place du sport dans le futur 
Traité”, 10 January 2003, CONV 478/03, consult http://europe.eu.int/comm/sport. In this vein, see also European 
Commission, “Conclusions of the working group on taking account of sport in Community policies and measures”, 
XI European Sports Forum, 7-8 November 2002, consult http://europe.eu.int/comin/sports
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supplement their actions. Be that as it may, to the extent that sport acquires an economic 
character, the Community free movement and competition rules come into play, but the 
Community & required to take the special needs of sport into account in its actions under these 
Treaty provisions. Arguably, under such circumstances, it should be perfectly feasible to respect 
as much as possible the regulatory autonomy of the sporting associations and the special status of 
sport while simultaneously sufficiently protect the rights to freedom of movement o f athletes 
within the European Union. This way, an “All’s well that ends well” could come into sight...
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